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Abstract „
This thesis studies the establishment and. development of 
administration in the Anglo-Egypt!an Sudan, from the signing of the 
Condominium Agreement in January 1899? until the end of Wingate's 
governor-generalship in December;1916*
The role of the governor-general and of his principal assistants 
is examined in the introduction and in the first three chapters* 
Kitchener, who was governor-general in 1.899? formulated some of the 
policies of the new administration but had neither the time nor the 
patience to implement them.- During the next seventeen years Wingate 
served as governor-general of.the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* With the 
collaboration of Slatin, and a handful of British officials, Winga,te 
determined and implemented administrative policies with little 
interference by the British or'Egyptian governments* The only 
effective control over the Sudan administration was that of the 
British consuls-general in Egypt* After Cromer's resignation in 
1907? even this supervision tended to diminish and reached its lowest 
ebb u.nder Kitchener and McMahon in 1911-1916*
1
The predominant role of the British administrators is clearly 
demonstrated in chapters four and five, which analyse the structure 
of the new administration and of its personnel*
The remaining five chapters examine and evaluate the most 
important aspects of administrative policy in the Sudan- The 
government's religious policy developed upon separate lines in the 
northern and southern regions of the Sudan* In the Muslim north
the dominant position of Islam was preserved, whereas in the pagan 
south an anti-Islamic policy was pursued from 1910, and government 
support was extended to missionary societies*
The administration of justice and tribal policy aimed at 
pacifying the country and at establishing a religious and tribal 
leadership associated with the government* While achieving a large, 
measure of success with regard .to religious leadership, the govern­
ment's tribal policy undermined the authority of tribal leaders, 
which had already been weakened during the Mahdia, and in consequen­
ce had to be revised*
The last two chapters examine spheres of policy which were 
largely connected with the economic stability of the Sudan* The 
system of land settlement and the insistence on a low rate of tax­
ation, enabled the small landowners to cultivate their lands while 
avoiding the hazards of land alienation* The toleration of domestic 
and agricultural slavery, combined with the organization of labour, 
enabled the government to undertake the development of the country's 
economy and communications without disrupting its socio-economic 
structure*
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Introduction/
a* The reconquest of the Sudan and the Condominium Agreement*
*.. *0n 41b September11898ithe British and Egyptian flags
were hoisted with due ceremony on the walls of the ruined palaoe
' 1at Khartoum##.1 and the Mahdist state came to an end .
The overthrow of Mahdism had been propagated for many years
by some of the senior British officers of the Egyptian army* Most
2notable among them was Major Wingate , head of the. intelligence 
department, whose book Mahdilsm and the Egyptian Sudan, was the 
beginning of a concerted effprt to revive British interest in the 
reconquest of the Sudan . When;on.13 March 1898*. the British 
government ordered Kitchener to advance into the Sudan, public
•‘SIR - 60, 25 May-31 Deo. I8.98, p.8. . .
2Wingate, General Sir Francis Reginald (l86l-1953), joined the 
Egyptian army in 1883 and was appointed as A.L.O. on the staff of 
Sir Evelyn Wood, the first sirdar of the post *Urabi Egyptian army# 
Following a brief period as assistant military secretary to Sir 
Francis Grenfell, in 1886-7? he became assistant adjutant general 
for intelligance. in I889 Wingate was appointed director of milita­
ry intelligence and held hhis post until he became governor-general. 
of the Sudan in Deo. 1899* For details &bout Wingate’s earlier 
career, see R#Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, (London 1955)?PP*29-127? 
for Wingate’s governor-generalship, see pp.27-69#
3Wingate’s subsequent participation in writing Ohrwalder’s memoirs,
Ten years’ captivity in the Mahdi’s camp..* and Slatin’s, Fire- and 
Sword in the Sudan, was first commented upon by W*$i#Blunt, My Diaries, 
(London 1932), p.242. Holt subsequently proved Wingate’s role in 
writing these books which he described as ’...the public relations 
literature of the Egyptian Military Intelligence, the voice of the 
British officer-class in Egypt...*, P.M.Holt, ’The source materials 
of the Sudanese Mehdia*, St. Antony’s Parers, Middle Eastern Affairs 
Ho.l. (London 195$)?P*112? see also W.Daniel, Islam Europe and Empire, . 
(Edinburgh .1966) ? pp.*424-441*
■ “  13 ”  '
• 1 
opinion in Britain was well prepared for the forthcoming campaign .
Britain was furnished with a pretext for the expedition by the
defeat of the Italian forces at Adowa on 1 March 1896. However,
subsequent evidence has proved that the British decision of 11-12
March was prompted by European reasons conneoted with the Triple
Alliance. Egyptian interests in the Upper Nile played no role in
the governments considerations,, nor did the struggle for the control
of the Nile, which became a dominating factor only in the: later
• 2 '  ^
stages of the reconquest
The military campaign which brought about the collapse of the
Mahdist state started on 18 March 1896 and came to its successful
3conclusion on 24 November 1899 • it was planned and executed by 
Kitchener, the sirdar of the Egyptain army, assisted by the infor­
mation supplied by Wingate, Slatin, and the intelligence department^-.
W.S.Blunt’s letter to the The- Times, 10 Sep.1898, condemning the 
Bongola campaign, was a lone voice in the midst of the general appro­
val with which the reconquest was greeted in the British press.
2 . ' - 
For a detailed account of the diplomatic background of the reconquest
see G.N.Sanderson/England, Europe and the Upper Nile 1882-1899 *
(Edinburgh 1965) especially pp.381-403; see also M.Shibeika, The
independent Sudan< (New York 1959)1 pp.368-386*
3 ' • ; -
Wingate, who commanded the final battle against the Khalifa at
Umm BiwaykarSt, sent a telegram to Cromer ’...Mahdism has received
its coup de grace on 24th and I hope; a new era will now open for the
unfortunate Sudanese people..Wingate to Cromer, 25 Nov. 1899*
sAD/269/ii.
Slatin Pasha, Sir Rudolf Karl von, Baron (.1857-1932). Austrian offi-
cer who started his service in.the Sudan under Gordon in I878; 1879- 
81 governor of Bara in southern Barfur; 1.881-4 general-governor of 
Barfur; in 1884 he surrendered to the Mahdist.army at Bara and remain­
ed in Omdurman for eleven years, first as prisoner and later as one 
of the Khalifa’s private attendants (mula^im) • Following his escape 
from Omdurman in 1895 he became Wingate’s assistant in the intelligence 
department. For .Slatin’s earlier career see Hill, Slat in,pp.1-67; 
see also pp.70-102•
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However, the crushing defeat of the Khalifa*s army in the battles
of the Athara, Karari, and Umm.Diwaykarat, was first and foremost
the result of the technologioal superiority of the advancing con- 
1querors •
, The overthrow.of the Mahdist state forced the British govern­
ment to determine the status of the reconquered Sudan as well.as 
its future administration* Until June I898 there was everyjindioa- 
tion that the British government intended to restore Egyptian rule 
in the Sudan. In June 1898 Cromer pointed out to Salisbury that 
after the conquest of Omdurman the French might be encountered in 
the Upper Nile. In that case the Anglo-Egyptian commander would 
have to lay claim to the territory in the name either of the Egyp­
tian government of of the British government or of b&th. Thus, in 
July 1898 the 'two flags* policy was adopted which marked the 
beginning of Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan • The Condominium 
Agreement which came into being as a result of this policy excluded 
Egyptian and international authority from the Sudan and vested the
1There are numerous descriptions of the Anglo-Egyptian invasion*
Eor a detailed account see A.B.Theobald, The Mahdiya,, a History of . 
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899. (London 195l)» PP»189-238; see 
also Holt, Mahdist State, pp.210-224; who supplies information based 
on Sudanese sources.* There is a striking similarity between Kitche­
ner's campaign and that of Ismafrl Pasha whose conquest of the 
Sudan in 1821 marked the beginning of the Turco-Egyptian period.
An American officer in the Egyptian army, G.B.English, who took part 
in Ismafil's expedition wrote that the disparity in arms between the 
conquering Egyptiansjand the Sudanese was so vast that their defeat 
was unavoidable; see A narrative of the expedition to Dohgola and - 
Sennaar, by *an American in the service of the Viceroy', (London :
1822), p.85.. .
2 ■ Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile? p*332»
supreme civil and military command in the British-riiominated governor- 
general^* On the 19 January 1899 Lord Cromer and Butrus Ghall Pasha 
signed the 'Agreement for the Administration of the Sudan*, and on 
the same day Lord Kitchener of. Khartoum was appointed as the first
' - • • 2
sirdar and governor-general of the.Anglo-Egyptian Sudan •
b* Kitchener's governor-generalshio^.
The relationship between the governor-general of the Sudan and
the British consul-general^" in Egypt was largely determined during
the short period of Kitchener's governor—generalship* Following the
battle of Karari, the relations between Cromer and Kitchener came to 
5a. crisis * Cromer had just completed the first draft of the Sudan 
agreement• Included in it were two articles relating to the control 
of the consul-general over Sudanese affairs^. Kitchener strongly
For a detailed account of the political and diplomatic background 
of the Condominium Agreement, see Ibid, pp*. 332-380; M.Shibeilca,
The Independent Sudan, pp*441-59•
The Condominium Agreement included only those provinces which had 
been reconquered from the Mahdist state. On the 10 July 1899 it was 
extended to Sualcin by a separate agreement. For the Condominium 
Agreement, see Inclosure 1 in No.64, Cromer to Salisbury, 28 Jan.1898 
I sic. 18991, FO 407/150; see also.Shibeika - The Independent Sudan, 
PP-493-6, where both the Condominium Agreement and its subsequent 
extension to Sudkin are reprinted. Kitchener was appointed by a 
Khedivialjdecree published in the Egyptian Journal Offciel, 21 Jan.1899*
3 '
For Kitchener's earlier career, see Magnus, pp.15-149*
"^His full, title was British agent , and consul-general in Egypt. In 
the thesis he is referred to as consul-general.
^As early as 1897 Kitchener.had threatened to resign his sirdarship 
unless Cromer would relax his controlj see Wingate to Rundle, 19 Oct. 
l897» Rundle to Wingate, 25 Oct.1897» SAD/266/l/l.
6 ■ ■ ' ■
M.Shibeika, The Independent Sudani PP*447—57*
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objected and during his visit to England persuaded Salisbury to
alter the proposed constitution* In a letter to Cromer, Salisbury
summed up Kitchener1s arguments:
••*the Governor General of the Soudan is to govern and is to 
spend the money he has. In both cases he is, of course, to 
obey orders received from you*..but he shall not by a 
formal document be forbidden to pass an Ordinance or to. 
spend 100 £. without preliminary approval...B
As a result of this■letter the original draft of the proposed
Condominium Agreement was amended*. This draft contained, under
article IV, a passage stating that the governor-general of the
Sudan could notT promulgate laws or regulations without the prior
consent, of the Khedive and the British consul-general in Cairo.
Article VI stated that in all financial matters the Sudan would
2be controlled by the Egyptian ministry of finance • Both these 
articles were deleted from the final text of the agreement •
The financial regulation of the Sudan government thus became a 
separate document^. This gave a much greater latitude to the 
governor-general of.the Sudan who was empowered to make appoin­
tments of personnel and changes in the budget, with the only 
proviso that, should su6h changes entail any increase in the 
liability of Egypt, they must be approved by the ministry of 
finance and the Egyptian councillof ministers *
"^Salisbury to Cromer, 9 Bee. 1898, FO 633/7*
2fo 78/5026.
^FO 407/150* See. also Cromer to Salisbury, 14 Jan.1899i^ O. 78/5026.
4fo 407/150.
For further details see pp.43-4* 50-1.
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The signed agreement, as amended, contained no mention of the 
control exercised "by the "British consul-general in Cairo over the 
governor-general • Salisburytherefore, suggested that *...it will 
be necessary to take an acknowledgemeni|from each new Governor-General 
on his appointment , of his subordination t<b the British Agency. .
In the absence of any clearly defined regulations, it was left to 
Cromer and Kitchener to find a workable modus vivendi for the future 
relationship* On 19 January 1899 Cromer wrote tcjKitchener stating 
the principles of his relations with the Sudan:.Generally what1 
I want is to control the big questions, but to. leave all the detail 
and^execution to be managed locally...1 However, it was soon.appa­
rent that these general regulations were open to misinterpretation.
Kitchener1s aims were clear when he became governor-general.
He had avenged the murder of Gordon and proved that the Egyptian 
army could fight*. How, his first priority was to re-establish the 
seat of government in Khartoum, in the palace where Gordon had ruled, 
and to transfer the remna-nt.s, of the population of Omdurman back to 
the former capital. The rebuilding of Khartoum was ordered by
Kitchener in Hovember 1898, while enjoying a hero’s welcome in 
3England • Inadequate sums had been set aside for this project in the
Salisbury to Cromer, 14 Jan. 1899) FO 4Q7/15Q* ^ have not been
able to find any evidence that such a.declaration was ever made 
either by Kitchener of Wingate.
p
Cromer to Kitchener, 19; Jan. 1899) F.Q 633/8*
3
Magnus, p.149*
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Sudan budget, and Kitchener set out to find the necessary funds
through less conventional methods* ' On 26 January 1899, he directed
Wingate to ’...loot like biases. I want any,quantity of.marble
stairs., marble pavings, iron railings, looking glasses and fittings;
1
doors, windows, furniture of all sorts...’ Again he ordered
Wingate not to send any of the Sudan accounts to Gorst, the financial
2 3
adviser, of the Egyptian government • Even Maxwell , the new governor 
of Khartoum province, was left in the dark and complained to Wingate, 
’...everything will be sacrificed to Khartoum...the Budget too is 
merely a blind and {Kitchener} is juggling with it ...he is. a past- 
master in this art but/ it is very, difficult to follow...*^
Cromer attempted to; interfere, but to no avail. On two. occasions 
Kitchener’s obstinacy had far-reaching consequences. First, he' 
decided to stop the field allowance granted, to the Egyptian army 
serving in. the•Sudan; Cromer’s order to nenew this;allowance went 
unheeded . Secondly, Kitchener adamantly refused to cancel some of 
the trainloads of building materials destined for Khartoum which •
^Magnus, p. 149i quoting Kitchener to Wingate, 26 Jan. 1899*
O ’
Kitchener to Wingate, 1 Feb* 1899* SAD/269/2/l; according to the 
financial regulations,'the transfer of funds from one budgetary item 
to another had to be reported and approved by the.financial adviser. 
See also pp. \ ,
"^Maxwell Pasha, General Sir John Grenfell (l859“19^9) first 
governor of Khartoum 1898-1899? in 19C0 he.;.left fhB South Africa, 
and returned to Egypt in 1908 as commander of the British troops. 
BHBS, 1922-30, p.570-1.
^Maxwell to Wingate, 17 Jan. 1899, SAD/269/l.
Cromer to Sanderson, 29 Mar. 1899, ^0 78/5026;. Magnus, pp. 151-2.
1were needed to supply goain for the famine stricken, provinces •
The Times correspondent who wrote in April 1900 that the
“building of Khartomm was executed 1 . • .by the autocratic will of a
single man...1 was, therefore, not. far from the mark. But he made
the following criticisms. Firstly, owing to hasty legislation, most
of the townfs lands had passed into the hands of a few capitalists.
Secondly, Kitchener's assumption that the population.of Omdurman
would.move to Khartoum proved fallacious. Khartoum remained an empty
2city, while the inhabitants of Omdurman were completely neglected .
The Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Sudan started before 
Kitchener bacame governor-general* The reconquest had taken more
than two years, during which period the new administration was slowly
- 3extended, first to Haifa and then to Dongola and Berber . By April
1899? "the reconquered territories of the country had been divided
into five provinces and three districts, each under the governorship
v 4of a British officer, with Egyptian officers acting as ma murs .
A number of ordinances were promulgated, dealing mainly with tenure 
of property, taxation, the, licensing of fire arms, and the sale of 
alcoholic liquors . Kitchener also sent a set. of instructions to
Kitchener to Cromer, 15 Apr*,, 1899? FO 78/5023* For details see pp.22-3*
2 : "
The Times« 11 Apr.. 1900; see also Magnus* pp. 149“150.
3-
For details see pp.133-5*
^Inclosure *in Cromer to Salisbury, 4 May 1899? 5*0’ 78/5023; Ma’mur was 
the title used by the Egyptian government, for the official in charge 
a ma?murlyat a sub-division of a province.
■ SG - No.1-7, 1899; Cromer to Salisbury, 7 Mar. 1899, FO 407/15O;
for details see pp.
all governors, inspectors, and maVurs laying down his principles 
1
of government • The main premise of these instructions was that 
'•••The absolute uprootal by the Dervishes of the old system of 
government has afforded an opportunity for initiating a new 
administration more in harmony with the requirements of the Soudah.1..'
The new administration was to be built by '••.individual action
of British officers, working independently, but with a common purpose,
on the individual natives whose confidence they have gained...1
Kitchener warned his governors that this could be achieved only
through the '...better class of native, through whom we may hope
gradually to influence the whole population.*.' Furthermore, the
governors were warned against trusting the people of the Soudan who
make things appear as pleasant to their superiors as possible.
The treatment of the inhabitants was to be just but severe:
'...The Government should do nothing which could be interpreted as
a sign of weakness, and all insubordination must be promptly and
severely suppressed...' The memorandum included also detailed
instructions to the Egyptian ma?mfes who were warned against
accepting bribes, and were ordered '...to make the government
of your district as great a contrast as possible tfcothat of
the Dervishes...' Lastly, the memorandum mentioned the three
main principles to be observed by the Sudan government in the
coming years. These were : the toleration of domestic slavery, 
i
Memorandum to Mudirs, Incldisure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar.1899? 
PO 78/5022; Mudir was the Egyptian title for a provincial governor. 
The following details are all from Kitchener's memorandum.
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low taxation and the encouragement of Orthodox Islam as opposed to 
1sufii tariqas * ,
Having laid down these general principles, Kitchener left his new 
governors to use their own initiative. He was not concerned with
central administrative measures, and even refused to consider the
2 ' ' ’
Sudan Annual Report • In general, this system of decentralisation 
might have heen acceptable in a country like the Sudan, devoid of 
effective communications and hampered hy immense.distances, provided 
that the governor—general enjoyed, the respect and trust of. his pro­
vincial governors*. Unfortunately, Kitchener1 s relations with the 
British officers were predominantly based on fear. Hence the
criticisms they offered never reached his ear, but were received by
3Wingate,: who could only offer his sympathy •
Cromer, who knew Kitchener well, attempted to change the 
latter1s attitude to.his subordinates. In a private letter sent on 
the day of his appointment as governor—general, Cromer tfarned .
Kitchener,'...In the first place, pray encourage, your subordinates 
to speak up and tell you when they do not agree with you. They
are all far too much inclined to be frightened of you...'^ It was
not only fear that disturbed the relationship between Kitchener and
1 "Sufi tariqa (pi. turuq) - Islamic mystic order.
2 .In a telegram sent to Wingate, Kitchener wrote '...Re Lord C's
j_Cromer3 report.. I have no particular views.am sure you will do
it well...' Kitchener to Wingate., 26 Jan. 1899? SAD/269/l.
^See for instance Count Gleichen to;Wingate, 24 Oct. 1898, SAD/266/lO; 
Talbot to‘Wingate ln-d.l Nov. 1898, SAD/266/II.
^Cromer to Kitchener19 Jan. 1899? FO 633/8*
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his subordinates* They also lost faith in his ability to construct a 
civil administration and were concerned over his absolute absorption 
in the rebuilding of Khartoum, to the exclusion of everything else.
Mahon, then inspector in al-Qadarif, wrote to -Wingate despairingly,
'...I am.getting very tired of my life here...I do.not really know 
what I am supposed to be doing but I-am doing nothing...1,^ Similarly, 
Hamilton wrote f roin Omdurman, '.. .the, place is much as you left it 
and now I fancy Khartoum will be the centre of attracting...'
These remarks were written, towards the end of 1898, but when in 1899 
famine broke out in the Sudan, conditions were still unchanged..
Kitchener received ample warning as to the coming famine-. Towards 
the end of I898., over seventy Sudan notables presented him with a
-petition in which they complained that the people of the Sudan had
■ • • • •. -■ 3 ■ - ' . " ■ .
been robbed of all they possessed •' Moreover,, they claimed that owing
to the compulsory recruitment of slaves into the army,'cultivation
was at a standstill, and hence famine was imminent. As early as
April 1898, Talbot‘S wrote to Wingate:'...1 fancy we've skimmed the
Mahon to Wingate, $0 ,;Jan. 1899, SAD/269/l; Mahon Pasha, . Sir Bryan 
Thomas (1862-1930), joined the Egyptian army in 1893 and served in 
the Dongola and Wile campaigns; left the Sudan for the Boer War 1900;
. governor:of Kordofan 1901-4; reverted to the British army in 1904*
■.Hill,. BB, p.227.
^Hamilton to Wingate, 19 Jan. 1899, SAB/269/l.
■^Petition to the sirdar I Arabic text n.d. I898I , SAB/430/6. /
^Talbot Pasha, Milo George (1854-1931), joined the Egyptian army in 
1897* Following Wingate's appointment as head of the Sudan office 
in Cairo: in 1899, Talbot became assistant DMI, and in 1900-5 was 
Director of Surveys. He was one of Wingate*s closest friends throu­
ghout his career, and came to help him during the First World War;
Hill, BD, p.355*
“ 23 - • '
people pretty well* I hope they.„have enough left for seed...1
Commenting on. Kitchener * s proclamation to the shaykhs of Kordofan 
2
and Darfur a few months later, Talbot’added1...many of the men who 
are to receive it I the proclamation I are in here > ©1 aiming that they 
have been robbed of all they have...1 By April, Talbot reported 
that on the White Wile * •••people liv^upor^water andnuts and are 
dying in large numbers...1^  Yet, despite these warnings and Cromer's 
repeated demands, Kitchener refused to take, any measures to alleviate 
the people's plight. He maintained that the famine aided his policy 
of depriving the.Khalifa of local support, and left for a two months*
<5
vacation in England .
This same attitude prevailed in Kitchener*s treatment of ,the 
Egyptian army. The army;was.employed in constructing the Sudan
railways and in the works* department, without.receiving additional
6 ' ■ • . 
remuneration • But it was not only in the financial .sphere that
Kitchener's attitude manifested1 itself. * He also regarded the
Egyptian officers with profound distrust, as expressed in his
Memorandum to Mudirs. Before leaving the Sudan, he reiterated.this
distrust, to Maxwell, who duly reported it to Wingate:
^Talbot to Wingate, 19 Apr. 1898, SAD/266/4.
2 ■ ' ' :' ' '
Proclamation, of sirdar to Sheikhs of Kordofan and Darfur, 11 Wov.
1S98, Sm -  60, Appendix 98. :
3 '
Talbot to Wingate, (private), 11 Dec.- 1898, SAD/266/12.
^Talbot to Wingate, 1 Apr. 1899, SAD/2.69/4*.
R
Magnus, p.1^2.
^Maxwell insisted that this was one of the reasons for the Omdurman 
mutiny in January 1900. Maxwell' to Wingate, 19 Jan.1900, SAD/270/1/2.
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...the last thing he s&id to me,was to keep this in mind.
The fact is they Ithe Egyptian officers! are not to "be 
trusted and he always said even a British officer with no 
experience whatever would he better than a discontented 
intriguing Egyptian.
. Kitchener*s treatment of his officer^, and .his administrative 
measures, had won him the fear and mistrust of most of his subor­
dinates. The destruction.of the Mahdi*s tomb, and the treatment of
his remains, turned certain sections.of public opinion in Britain 
2
against him • Throughout the crises, Cromer and the British offic­
ers in the Sudan fully backed Kitchener's order to destroy the 
3Mahdi*s tomb • Kitchener argued that the destruction was dictated 
by political considerations, and that it was fully backed by the 
orthodox Muslim leaders^".
This attitude prevailed when a few months later a Mahdist 
insurrection was reported from the Blue Nile, On 27 August,Muhiammad 
Sharif (one of the Mahdi*s Khalifas)'and two of the Mahdi*s sons
R
were killed, and fifty-five prisoners taken . The insurrection 
seems to have been a minor affair, only three men of the Egyptian
1Ibid.
^Magnus, pp.135-9*
^Cromer to. Salisbury, 19 Feb. 1899, FO 78/5026; Wingate to Slatin,
2 Mar. I899, SAD/43I/H.
^Kitchener to Cromer, 1 Feb. 1899, FO 407/150; according: to a state­
ment made by Father Ohrwalder in I89I, shortly after his escape 
from Omdurman, the pilgrimage, to the Mahdi*s tomb had nearly stopped 
and only ol'd women-visited it. Hence, the reasons for its destruc­
tion could hardly be substantiated.- General Military Report on the. 
Egyptian Sudan I89I.••Compiled from statements.made, by Father
Ohrwalder, War Office London 1&92, p.16.
5Rodd "to Salisbury, 29 Aug. 1.899, FO 78/5026.
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force 'being slightly wounded. Yet Kitchener, fearing that any
leniency might be interpreted as weakness, decided to execute all ‘
the prisoners and to arrest all those implicated in the revolt •
Rodd, who was acting consul-general in Cromer's absence., refused to
comply with Kitchener’s demand, because of the effect on public
2opinion xn England of a wholesale execution.*.1
Kitchener*s term of office as governor-general should probably 
be regarded as an extension of his work as sirdar, rather than as a 
new venture of a civil administrator. His desire to leave the 
Sudan was first expressed in September 1898 ,^ and persisted 
throughout his governor-generalship^* Hence, it oould hardly be ex­
pected that he would devote his time and his talents to the tedious 
details oflong term government. The glory of rebuilding Khartoum 
and the palace, and the foundation of Gordon,College, were bound 
to appeal more to Kitchener who regarded his sojourn in the Sudan 
as purely temporary.
Cromer, who originally proposed Kitchener's appointment as 
governor-general, soon changed his mind. He realized that the
1Rodd to Salisbury, 31 Aug. 1899* Ibid, quoting a letter from Kitchener*
2
Ibid, and minutes by Salisbury who commented *...three or four 
executions at the very outside...'
3Kitchener told Wingate that he hoped to replace Cromer as consul- 
general, should Cromer retire after his wife's death; see Wingate 
to Lady Wingate, 28 Sep. 1898, SAl/233/5*
^'Kitchener tried to use his connections in political circles in 
Britain in order to . obtain an appointment in India; see Rowley to 
Wingate’, 9 Wov. 1898, SAL/266/ll; Magnus, p. 151*
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details of oiyilian government were beyond Kitchener's comprehension 
and hence did not insist that he should remain in the Sudan^.
On 18 December 1899 Kitchener was appointed as Lord Robert s's 
Chief of Staff in the Boer War, and a week later he sailed for 
South Africa. To his.successor he left a skeleton staff, a famine- 
stricken country and an army rife with discontent. It is no wonder, 
therefore, that when he expressed his wish to return to the Sudan 
after the Boer War, Cromer objected strongly and wrote:’...He 
would not be able to hold the Soudan without a large British force.
^Ibid; see also Cromer to Salisbury, 19 May 1899* FO 633/6.
2 .■Cromer to Salisbury, 27 Apr. 1900, Ibid.
- 2 7 -
Chapter I.
' ' 1 Wingate* s governor-generalship 1899-1916 .
a. Wingate1a appointment.
Wingate was appointed governor-general of the Sudan and sirdar
2of the Egyptian army on 23 December 1899 • Up to the battle of
Karari, Wingate had “been in charge of military intelligence and so
3had played an important role in preparing the reconquest • He had; 
established Close relations with many of the Sudanese shaykhs and 
with the help of Slatin and Wa*um Shuqayr^ had succeeded in provi­
ding valuable information for the advancing Anglo-Egyptian forces..
With the battle hearing its end, Wingate knew that the import­
ance of military intelligance was bound to decline. He, therefore, 
decided to seek a post which would secure his future in case.
Wingate’s policies as governor-general, and their implications will 
be discussed in.later chapters. This chapter deals only with his 
routine of office and some of his main principles of government.
2 •
Egyptian Journal Official. 24 Dec. 1899? for the structure of the
Sudan government, see p.104.
■3 ■ '
See pp.1-2^3. ' ,;
^Ha*um Shuqayr (Shoucair)(1863-1922), a Lebanese Christian served in 
the Egyptian army from I884 and joined the intelligence department 
under Wingate in I89O. After the reconquest he remained in Cairo, 
where he was responsible for the historical section of intelligence. 
During his service he published Ta^rlkh al-Sudan al-qadim wal-hadith 
wajughrafiy atuhu (Cairo 119031) » a major contribution to the history 
of the Sudan during the Mahdia. He also translated.into English 
Ismacil Abd al-Qadir1s biography of the Mahdi, Kitab sa*adat al- 
mustahdi bi-sirat al-imam al mahdl. The only known surviving copy 
of this work, as well as its translation are in the Sudan archive 
at Durham university. See SAD/99/6t SAD/260/2.
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Kitchener decided to leave# In a-letter to Kitchener, Wingate ex­
plained his views about the reorganization of the intelligence depar­
tment and its division into quite distinct military and civil branches* 
He suggested that he should head the civil branch in Cairo, and 
coordinate policies with.the British agency*^. Wingate was at this 
stage next to Kitchener on the Egyptian army seniority list* His 
presence in Cairo, in close proximity to Lord Cromer, and at the 
head of the Sudan office, chuld, therefore, place him in a better 
position when the next governor-general was appointed. In a letter 
to Rodd, Cromer1s first secretary at the agency, Wingate stated his 
views as to his future prospects:
••.The departure of Hunter has placed me in the position of 
second in command of the Egyptian Army; I do not say for a 
moment that in the event of the departure of the present 
Sirdar, I should be selected to succeed him; at the same 
time I should not submit to any other officer now in the 
Egyptian Army being given the preference over me to 
sucoeed the present Sirdar* It seems to me quite possible 
that some senior general from outside the E.A* I Egyptian 
Armyl may succeed, but under any circumstances I should, 
as head of the Sudan Office/be in a better.position to 
have my clamms considered*..if I were an Anglo-Egyptian 
than if I were a purely British' official...2
Cromer had mentioned the possibility of Wingate*s appointment to
3the governor-generalship as . early as May 1899 •: He had known
Wingate for fifteen years and held his achievements in.the intel­
ligence department in high esteem. Moreover, Cromer knew that
^Wingate to Kitchener, 7 Eeb. 1899? SAD/2 69/2/1. 
^Wingate to Rodd, 10 Mam. 1899? SAI)/269/3* 
^Cromer to Salisbury, 19 May.1899? EO 633/6.
-  29 -
,Wingate would be "easier to control than a general nominated' by the
‘ . • 1 
war bffice, whose appointments Cromer regarded with complete mistrust .
The appointment of a civilian governor-general was not considered at
2
that time, as the whole country was ruled by military officers *
For these reasons, when Kitchener was ordered to leave for the Boer 
War, Wingate’s appointment seems to have been unopposed^.
Wingate's appointment was greeted with satisfaction by the 
majority of,the Egyptian army officers, who had suffered from 
Kitchener’s autocratic methods^". : The Times correspondent in Khartoum 
described the atmosphere which was created by the appointment as 
’...a general expectation as of something springlike and mild.
1 - ' ■
The war office appointments were regarded with mistrust by many
civil servants. Cromer reiterated his fears of war office appoint­
ments both during the reconquest and afterwards. In reply to. one of 
his letters on the,subject Salisbury wrote:'...The War Office never, 
in the first instance^thinks. of the necessities of the public ser- 
vioe. It pursues blindly its own regulations.••* Salisbury.to Cromer,
2 Mar., 1900, FO 633/11. Similar doubts were expressed by Gorst in 
1909, when he feared that Wingate wotild have to be replaced due to 
his i l l n e s s . . T  may have to appeal to you to prevent the War 
Office trying to foist some military officer of high rank and low 
intelligence upon us...1 Gorst to Salmer, 6 Nov. 1909, FO 633/14*
^See pp.67-9•
3I have not found any correspondence between Cromer and Salisbury 
prior to Wingate’s appointment. The only reference in Wingate’s 
correspondence is a telegram he received from Kitchener on the 
22 Dec. I899,,SAD/270/1/1.
tsaid Shoucair to Wingate, 27 Jan. 1900, enclosed in Cromer to 
Salisbury, ,7 Feb. 1900, FO 78/5086. . . . .
The Times. 18 Apr. 1900.
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Even al-Ahram accepted Wingate, as the best possible choice, though
commenting that it would have been better to appoint ah Egyptian •
For Wingate himself, the initiation into the long-cherished
post of governor-general could hardly have been more difficult.
Many of the veteran officers who'had been administering the provinces
had left to take part in the Boer War, and before.Wingate could wind
up his affairs in Cairo, a mutiny of a Sudanese battalion broke out 
2 •
in Omdurman • Furthermore, the country was impoverished by conti- 
nuous wars culminating in the.famine of 1899 6 Cultivation and 
trade were practically at a standstill owing to the decline in
A - R
population , the tribal policy Of the Khalifa Abdallahi , and the
■ 6
trade and agricultural policy adopted by Kitchener • These were 
some of the difficulties faced by Wingate when, with a handful of 
British offleers, ■ inexperienced in administration, and with little 
knowledge of local languages, aided by Egyptian officers and
1al-Ahram, 26 Dec. 1899? al-Liwa* on the other hand commented that 
the appointment of an Egyptian governor-general was imperative, 
al-Liwa’, 4 Feb. 1900.
2
For details of the mutiny see R.Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan. 
pp*131“3*
^See pp.22-3•
^According, to an estimate made by Wingate in 1903, the population 
of the Sudan decreased from 8,525,000 before the Mahdia to 1,870,500 
after the reconquest, SAR - 1903, p*79*
^Holt, Mahdist State. pp.l41-6j 173-6.
6 '
Magnus,■p.152.
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officials whom he did. not trust, he. set about to build up the Sudan
civil administration.
Wingate’s powers as governor-general and sirdar were the same as
1those of his predecessor • The following definition which appeared
in The Times is a fairly accurate summary:
...Everything derives from the will of the Governor General...
He unites in himself, and delegates from himself, all legisla­
tive, executive and judicial powers...He "notifies” his ordinan­
ces to the joint Sovereigns, but he is under no obligation to 
attend to their advice...'2
The governor-general was, to a certain extent, controlled by the
British consul-general in Egypt, but apart from that his .authority
was not limited either by representative bodies or by public opinion.
The consultations which did take place on an executive level, were
undertaken by Wingate voluntarily, at least until-1910. when the gov-
3
ernor-general1s council was.instituted • *
During the seventeen years of Wingate’s governor-generalship, the 
underlying principle emerging was one of reconstruction. Development 
was slow, and consistent, but lacking in outstanding episodes. The 
Sudan emerged from a state of near famine and of financial dependence 
■on Egypt, to a fairly stable economy. whiGh could, support its growing
1
For details see pp.15-7*
The Times, 18 Apr. 1900; when Colonel Phipps was selected by Wingate 
to become acting governor-genera,!, Wingate defined the necessary 
characteristics of -a governor-genera,! as follows firmness, impar­
tiality and a thorough knowledge of your own mind are the three 
great essentials... .make up your mind independently and do not let 
it be said that you are in the hands of this or that individual...’ 
Wingate to Phipps, 6 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/l*
^See pp.58-65.
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population. An administrative, structure was built up in the provin­
ces and the centre, and though military rule prevailed, an;Xever-
increasing number of civilians were recruited into the servioe and
1slowly affected its character • The extension of communications by 
rail and river, and the building of Port Sudan were some of the 
important achievements of this period, contributing greatly to econo­
mic development. Economic expansion culminated, in the Gezira develop­
ment project, sanctioned in 1913, which enabled the Sudan to become 
a major cotton-producing country. Thus the Country, which was 
reconquered for strategical and political reasons only and was regar­
ded as a financial-liability, emerged as a potential economic asset 
for Britain before the Wingate era was over..
b. The routine of a governor-general.
A survey of Wingate1s routine of office is essential in order
2to understand how his government functioned ■ The 1 Sudan year1 
started in Cairo. The governor^-general, accompanied by Slatin and 
by his private secretaries, used to arrive in Cairo from their annual 
leave towards the end of October. During the following two weeks 
the biggest annual meeting of Sudan officials took place. The 
directors of all the departments and most of the provincial governors
1See pp. 146-161.
2The following remarks, unless otherwise stated, are based on the 
Sudan correspondence and Wingate*s private letters in the Sudan 
Archive at Durham•
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were gathered in Cairo to discuss1 the Sudan budget for the following
yeary. The budget had already been hammered out during the summer
months in England in endlsss meetings, in many of which Wingate had
participated. The purpose of the meeting in Cairo, was to enable the
governors and directors of departments to voice their objections,
1with the hope that some minor changes could still be effected •
The Cairo gathering was. Wingate*s only opportunity of meeting 
all his provincial governors personally. Therefore, there was as 
much activity hehing; the scenes of the budget discussions, as in the 
meetings themselves. Matters ranging from personnel and promotions 
to tribal policy and military expeditions were discussed, and in 
many cases deoided upon. There are numerous letters from Wingate to 
his governors insisting on their attending the Cairo gathering,.so 
as to conclude arrangements regarding their provinces. Buring the 
month he stayed in Gario, Wingate was a regular guest at the British 
agency where discussion with the consul-general took place - regarding 
matters on which the latter1s approval was necessary.
In his capacity as sirdar,. Wingate had also certain functions 
to perform in Cairo. A courtesy visit to the Khedive and the 
minister of war, followed by a review of the troops and barracks, 
formed the official part of the sirdar*s visit* More important, 
however, were.fhe discussions with the financial adviser to the 
war office and with the British staff officers in Cairo. These were
1Wingate*s correspondence during this period of the year was very 
blender, as most of his correspondents were in Cairo.
usually attended by the adjutant-general, and all matters concerning 
finance, recruiting and army personnel were decided upon.,
Wingate arrived in Khartoum towards the middle of November and 
took up his residence at the. governor-general* s palace. The follow­
ing extract from the diary of Butler, of the intelligence department, 
affords a glimpse of the palace routine.
...Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor General and Sirdar, was a 
most kind, pleasant little man...He loved pomp and state and 
his early morning rides round Khartoum weBB rather a joke 
, with British Bimbashis, as the cavalcade was so glittering 
and mmmense, black vavalry men with lances, ADCs, B.S.s. and 
, a herd of all grades of officials.*.1
The rest of the morning was spent in dealing with correspondence. 
Wingate kept up with nearly all his provincial governors a regular 
correspondence, in which matters concerning their respective provin­
ces were discussed. Most of their requests were then sent by 
Wingate to the heads of departments enclosing his own recommendations. 
Wingate*s letters.to the British consul-general and the Sudan agent 
in Cairo formed the most voluminous part of his correspondence.
A lot of time was also devoted to dealing with petitions from 
inhabitants of the Sudan. The direct.appeal to the governor-general 
had been ah accepted procedure of government during the Turco-Egyptian
1 '.Butler*s memoirs, SAD/422/12; Butler, S.S., was seconded to the .. 
Egyptian army in I909 and served in Wad Madani. In 1910 he was - 
transferred to the Camel Corps in Kordofan and participated in 
several expeditions against the Nubas. Since April 1911 he served 
in the intelligence department in Khartoum. His diaries are in 
SAD/400/lO, and. his memoirs in sAD/422/12.
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regime, and had been carried on by the Mahdi and the Khalifa. The 
number of petitions presented during the year was regarded by Wingate
. - i
as indicating the extent of public contentment • Many of the petit­
ions were forwarded by Wingate to Slatin and to the intelligence
department. Others found their way to the provincial governor or the
2departmental director concerned • ShahTn, Wingate*s Arabic secreta^-
ry, sorted out the petitions, translated them, and presented them
3 'to Wingate . The number of petitions presented to Wingate in 1900
was 4 10741 an& he soon realized that: many petitioners were repeating
requests which had already been decided upon. Hence in 1902 Wingate
published an order to the effect that his decisions were final^, and
by 1905 ihe number of petitions had decreased to 1,108. Most of
thhse dealt with problems of land ownership and taxation, while the
number dealing with slavery cases decreased rapidly over the years *
During the winter Wingate entertained a host of distinguished
guests, and compiled his annual report on the administration of the 
6
Sudan • This consisted of detailed reports by provincial governors 
1See for instance SAR - 1905? where Cromer reported that the
decline in the number of petitions is the best indication of the 
general improvement•
2
See for instance petition of Mustafia bint Mansi, 7 Web. 1915? and 
Wingate*s correspondence thereon with the chief judge and the 
financial secretary, SAD/236/2.
hsu - 1906, p. 6. ■
4OAO - 38, 16 Feb. 1902.
^GGR - 1906, p.6.
£
Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan - 
Confidential; see p. ^
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1and heads of departments, as well as, a memorandum by Wingate himself .
It was from these reports that the British consuld-general compiled
their annual reports on the Sudan, which were published as command
papers. As for Wingate* s guests, there were' oonstant complaints in
his correspondence with the consul-general, about the time and money
2
he had to spend on entertainment , • Yet judging by the many invita­
tions he sent, he was by no means^ager to put an end to these visits., 
It was Cromer who tried to limit his enthusiasm for |ruests when he 
wrote in 1905, *...1 am all for entertaining the officials and local
people. But I do not think you.are at all called upon to do much for
- 3
tourists. I do mighty little for them...*
Until 1912, the governor-general1s palace was the only place for :
Anglican services in.Khartoum, and Wingate never failed to attend.
Wingate*s deep religious feelings were described by Gwynne, the
first Anglican Bishop of the Sudani*...The holiness of life is most
marked by all who come in contact with him...He never moves in the
morning without- prayer and Bible reading...*^ But apart from his ■?
duties as a Christian, Wingate was also a keen Freemason, and soon
1These bulky memoranda were a constant cause for complaint by Cromer 
who asked Wingate to limit himself to original remarks. Cromer to 
Wingate, 15 N0V...1906, SAD/234/5*
See for instance Wingate to Cromer, 27 Apr. 1905? SAD/276/4.
^.Cromer , to Wingate, 19 May 1905? SAD/234/3•
^Gwynne to Adengy,23 Jan. 1902, CMSA/e/03/1902; for d&tails about 
Bishop Gwynne, see H.C.Jackson, Pastor on the Nile, (London i960); 
see also pp.220-9. .
after his appointment to the governor-generalship, ;he was approached
. • . ’ . ■ •. ■’ i
to establish a. district lihdge in the Sudan . In 1903 he founded the 
Reginald Wingate Lodge, which held its regular meetings at the palace.
Wingate played an active part in all its activities which were often
' I '' ‘ 2 ■
mentioned in the Sudan correspondence •
Wingate.undertook at least one big tour of inspection each year*
The official reports on these tours, give little information^.
'Fortunately, detailed accounts of some. of. them were written by the
inspectors who accompanied Wingate or by Slatin who kept a regular
diary of events. In 1902. Wingate himself kept a diary of his tour
of. the .Whit e Nile up to Gondolcoro. On these tours the governor-
general itfas usually accompanied by over twenty officers and officials
of the Sudan government in addition to his military escort^. Before
arriving at any government post or village the governor-general was
met by all government officials and army officers as well as by the :
shaykhs. of the various tribes • Following a parade of the army and
an. inspection of its magazines, Wingate met the assembled shaykhs
and.religious notables to whom he distributed presents of beads or
'‘S.Bailey to Wingate, 13 Aug. 1900, SAD/270/8.
2A short history.of the Sir Reginald Wingate .Lodge, SAD/292/2.
^For reports on these expeditions see for instance, SIR - 200, Mar. 
1911,p.2; SIR - 221, Dec. 1912,p.2; SIR - 232, Nov. 1913, p.2.
^Savile's diary, 21 Feb. 1905, SAD/427/6; Diary of Governor Generalfs 
Inspection :of White Nile and ICordofan provinces, Nov. 1906, SAD/279/6. 
Both give full, list of participants..
^Slatinfs diary, 21 Mar. 1901, SAD/441*
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money, and gave robes of honour or' religious robes^* During his 
stay at each station, Wingate received and settled petitions, appoin­
ted new shaykhs wherever necessary and attended various races and
2
sporting events prepared in his honour . .
Wingate1 s intentiop. in these inspections was to keep in direct
touch with his officers and officials as well as with the people of
the Sudan* During the first World War Wingate*s tours covered the
length and breadth of the country. As a strong advocate of the
value of direct contact, he believed that the loyalty of the Sudanese
people to British rule was in fact a personal loyalty to the BritisH\
3governor-general who had ruled them for fifteen years • Wingate 
elaborated on this when he wrote:1...I feel that were I to leave the 
Sudan, even for a day...I shaould seriously risk an upset of the 
present tranquil state of affairs here...-^- Commenting on his tours 
of Kordofan and the Gezira he noted:1...I have spent, several hours 
daily talking to important natives...and I am confident, that the
5sympathetic touch which these conversations produce is very helpfulU,..1 - 
During the hot summer months of April-June the governor^general 
and his staff moved to Erkowit, a v/hill station not far from Suakin,
1
Slatin*s diary, 23 Mar. 1901, Ibid; for details see pp*315«
2Savile's diary,'22-23 Feb. 1905, SAD/427/6.
See for instance Wingate to Savile, 24 Sep. 1914* SAD/l9l/3«
^Wingate to Sir Frederick Milner, 21 Jan. 1915? -SAD/l94/l*
^Wingate to Clayton, 21 Aug. 1915? SAD/469/lO; for, further details 
see pp. 213-219.
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1which.was established.in 1902 . During' his ■ stay there Wingate had
more time to deal with correspondence and to prepare the condidential
reports on the British officers for the war office* While at Erkowit,
Wingate usually undertook a tour of inspection of the Red Sea province*
In June Wingate:left the Sudan for his annual leave in England,
Where he stayed until October* During the summer the Sudan was
practically deserted by its British officials* A skeleton staff was
kept in variovis government departments, but very little work was
done and practically no decisions were,taken • The acting sirdar and
governor-general had to be an officer of. the rank of colonel, and
consequently was not too well acquainted with the problems of admin- 
3istration . ■ During Wingate's long absence^ in England at least two
acting governor-generals filled his position every year and apart
from the adjutant-general, Colonel Asser^, most of them never did it
for more than one year. As a result, the acting governor-general
had very little authority and had to .consult Wingate on any matter 
<5
of importance •
During these four summer months, the Sudan government continued
1GCrR - 1902, p*339,*
^See Clayton1s diary, June 1907* SAD/473/7*
^It was on this condition that the British war office agreed that
the British detachment in Khartoum would be commanded by the sirdar*
See also -pp*67-9 * ' :
^Asser, Pasha, Sir Joseph John (1867-1944)» joined the Egyptian army . 
in I892 and participated in the reconquest; 1905-14 adjutant-general 
of Egyptian army; 1910-14 member of governor-general1s council.
Hill, BD, p.62.
^See for instance.Wingate to Ferguson, 7 June 1902, SAD/272/4/l*
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to function in England. Wingate spent most of his time in his 
country house in Dunbar from where all the Sudan correspondence 
was conducted by his private secretary. Many senior government 
officials visited Dunbar to discuss their departments or provinces 
between rounds of golf, and Slatin was a constant visitor. The 
stay in England usually culminated in a visit to Balmoral, where 
both Wingate and Slatin were regular summer guests, and in October 
the whole retinue started on its way back to Egypt,.
c. Wingate's relations with the British consuls'-general in Egypt.
As sirdar and governor-general Wingate owed his nomination to 
the British government and his appointment to the khedive. However, 
neither the British nor the Egyptian governments exercised substan­
tial control over Sudan affairs. Egypt and lost its sovereignty
as a result of British occupation and was thus in no position to ,
1
assert its rights . The British government was quite happy to 
entrust the supervision of the Sudan to its cohsuls-general in 
Cairo from whom it received regular reports. Consequently, during 
the whole period of Wingat e1s governor-generalship,. the Sudan'was 
discussed by the British cabinet only on four occasions and only
1See pp.49-57•
Xonce was Wingate1s decision overruled • The extent of control
over-the administration of the Sudan can therefore only he^assessed
by analysing Wingate1s relations with the four consuls-general
under whom he served.
Throughout Cromer1s tenure of office his relations with
Wingate were strict hut cordial® Cromer regarded Wingate as an
able administrator but without any real grasp of the principles 
2
of government • Hence, his policy was '...to put Wingate to the 
front as much as possible before the public, but behind the scenes
3
...to exercise a thorough control over the whole administrations' 
Wingate trusted Cromer and relied on his greater experience.
Moreover, he had-been witness to, the uneasy relations between Cromer 
and Kitchener and knew that although constitutionally he was under 
no obligation to obey the consul-general, he had in fact little 
alternative but to follow his directives* Wingate expressed these
^Inqukry of Omdurman mutiny, 22-6 Feb., Cab.37/52; Rebellion in the 
Blue Wile province, 15 June 1908, Cab.37/93; The Situation in the 
Soudan and the Egyptian Press, 16,23 Oct.1908, Cab.37/95J The 
Soudan Loan,.14 May 1912, Cab.37/llO; 3 July 1912, Cab.37/111; 3 Jan. 
1913,.Cab.37/114® The only occasion upon which Wingate's decision 
was overruled was in 1^08 when the Cabinet decided to commute the 
death sentences passed on the participants of the Wad Habuba rebeLi 
lion; see pp.203-7*
^Cromer to Grey,-19 Apr. 1907* FO 633/13.
^Cromer to Revelstoke, 13 Oct. 1910, FO .633/19*
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views many years; later when he wrote to Clayton^ about .the tense
relations "between Kitchener and Cromer:
...Of course Cromer*s personality and his strong character 
' . resulted in his "being considered "by our Government as the
supreme authority "both civil and military in Egypt and the
Sudan, although if one hunted up chapter and verse for his
constitutional rights of; this, one would not f i n d . i t ^
Under these circumstances it was no wonder that, despite minor 
incidents"}, relations between Wingate and Gromer remained cordia,l.
It was Cromer who formulated government policy and advised on all 
administrative measures, while details of. execution were left in 
Wingate’s hands»
The* principles of policy to be followed by the Sudan government 
were enunciated by Gromer in January 1899 when he addressed the 
notables of the Sudan at Omdurman* Cromer, promised that the new 
government would not interfere with the people’s religion* Further­
more he- insisted on low taxation and. regarded the toleration of domestic
slavery as a necessary evil during the first few years of the new
3 -1 • .
governm&nt * Wingate never, questioned the wisdom of these principles*
He did, howetfer, object to Cromer’s view that, the Sudan was-an Egyp­
tian province* This was expressed by Gromer when he w r o t e : . T h e  - 
only reason why the British flag is flying, and why the Soudan has
1•Clayton, Sir Gilbert Falkingham (1875~1929)t joined the Egyptian ar­
my in 1900; and was transferred to the Sudan, civil service in 1910; 
Wingate1s. private secretary 1908-14; Sudan agent and director of in­
telligence 1914-8; During World War I plgcyed an -important role in the 
Arab bureau and in the subsequent Arab revolt; adviser to the Egyptian 
ministry of interior 1919; chief secretary in Palestine 1922-5*
DNBS, 1922-30, pp*l86~7*
^Wingate to Clayton, (private) 13 Se$* 1918, SAD/470/3*
'3 • - , . " ' .
Cromer’s speech to the Sheikhs, and Notables of the Soudan,Omdurman,
4 Jan.1899^0 633/255 for details see pp. .357-388, 380-387*
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a Governor-General and special laws, is to avoid the capitulations
1and the rest of international paraphernalia** Cromer’s attitude
was demonstrated in 1905 when he contemplated withdrawing from the
Bahr al-Gazal province. He wrote to Wingate:1...! daresay that the
real point is how far is its possession necessary in order to secure
' 2the Egyptian water supply...1
Wingate objected, even more to Cromer’s financial policy. Cromer 
regarded low taxation as a cornerstone of his policy both in Egypt 
and the Sudan. Yet, the development of the Sudan required large 
sums of money which, barring increased taxation, could only be acq­
uired, from outside sources. Cromer opposed Wingate’s plea for 
additional aid from Egypt^. Moreover, when Wingat^suggested approa­
ching the British government to extend financial support for the 
Sudan’s development, it was Cromer who interfered and urged Lansdowne 
to reject. Wingate’s plea^. There remained the possibility ,of devel- \ 
oping the country by granting concessions. Yet once again Cromer
^Cromer to Wingate, 25 Jan. 1904» FO 633/8.
^Cromer to Wingate, 9 Sep.1905, SAD/234/4* X
3
Cromer's speech to the Sheikhs and Notables of the Soudan, Khartoum,
24 Dec. 1900, EO 633/25; for a detailed account of the BudanEs 
development and its financial relations, with Egypt, see J.Stone - The 
finance of Government economic development in. the Sudan 1899-1913.
Sudan Economic Institute, (Khartoum 1954)
^Cromer to Landdowne,1 4 Mar. 1903, EO 800/124.
disapproved of the scheme for what seemed valid reasons. I...I do
not much believe in private enterprise in the Soudan except;on terms
which throw all the risk, on the Gov., and give all the profits to
private individuals...’^  Consequently Wingate had to reconcile
himself to a slow, rate of development and it was only towards the.
end of his governor-generalship that the prospects of large-scale
cotton production convinced the British authorities to change their :
2financial policy •
Cromer was able to exercise his. control over. Sudan affairs 
without being hampered by the lack of definite directives* He 
developed various means to achieve his objective. His voluminous 
correspondence with Wingate and with many of his British subordin­
ates enabled him to keep a constant watch over the smallest 
administrative details • A further opportunity to control Sxidan 
affairs was afforded by the annual reports of the Sudan government. 
Cromer used his red penoil freely and struck out whatever, in his 
opinion was inessential or possibly embarrassing to the British
■^Cromer to Wingate, 18 Sep. 1901, SAD/27l/9«
^Wingate to Staek^ 6 May 1913, SAD/l08/l'6; Wingate observed that the 
reason,for the sudden change of heart was that, the British Cotton 
Growing Association used its pressure in order to change the govern­
ment.* s attitude as it knew that the Gezira project would be very pro­
fit ah Hie*,,
3 'During Feb. 1900 Wingate exchanged with Cromer over 113 letters 
and telegrams. Although correspondence decreased in the following 
months it nevertheless remained extensive. Matters covered by 
Cromer ranged from education and land ownership to the excessive use 
of stationery in government offices. See Cromer to Wingate, 3 Feb. 
.1904, SAD/275/2; Cromer -fco Wingate, 17 Jan. 1901, FO 141/364; SAR - 
I9OI, p.61. .
government • Sudan government ordinances had to have Cromer’s 
approval prior to their publication in the Sudan Gazette • Many
ordinances were in fa,ct amended by Cromer and were then submitted
'■ ' . 3
for approval to. the Egyptian council of ministers • .
Cromer succeeded in controling and supervising the admihistratinn
of the Sudan by means of his strong personality and the great esteem
in which he was held by Wingate. However,’ when he left Egypt/n.inn in
1907, he warned the foreign office that with a weaker consul-general
. . . .  ' • A  A  ■ ' '
in Cairo, control of the Sudan should be strengthened!*
Gorst arrived in Egypt in October 1907 and served as British 
consul-general until his death in 1911* His relations with.fhe
Sudan were affected by his more flexible and conciliatory policy
5 - • • •in Egypt • As regards administrative policy in the Sudan,.Gorst
intended to leave things as they were and to limit himself to the
See for instance Cromer to Wingate, 8 Apr. 1900, SAD/270/4, where
he wrote that he had struck out Wingate1s references to slavery as
’...they frighten the F.O..;.* In the following year Cromer 
omitted a report on Egyptian convicts who were working.in the 
Sudan as their employment was 1 .. .'wholly illegal...’ Cromer to 
Wingate, 18 Feb. 1901, SAD/271/I.
Cromer to Wingate, 21 Feb. 1901, Fo 141/364.
See for instance Cromer to Wingate, 13 May 1905, E0. 141/393, contain­
ing Cromer*s amendments to^the ’Mining Licences* and the ’Officials* 
Salaries Ordinances’; see also p*52.
^Cromer, to Gr^y (private), 19 Apr. 1907, FO 633/13.
 ^ -
^For Gorst *s Egyptian policy see. P.M.Holt, Egypt, and th^oFertile 
Crescent 15l6-1922« (London 1966), pp.225™7; R.L.Tignor, Modernization 
and Britislf Colonial Rule in Egypt 1882^-1914. (Princeton 1966), 
pp.291-314; see also pp.52-3.
necessary supervision .
Relations 'between Wingate and Gorst were, however,■ uneas^y
Rumours about Wingate’s dismissal were current as soon as Gorstfs
' ' ' . : ■ 2 • 
appointment was announced, and persisted until 1909 '• Furthermore.,
Wingate had no confidence in GorstVs .Egyptian policy and resented
3 •
its application to the Sudan. * Hence, it was only to be expected
that Go'rst's attempt to base his supervision of the. Sudan on a
personal basis was bound to. fail^. The result , was that in 1910
the governor-general* s .'oouneil was instituted and the relations
between the Sudan and, the British cohsul-gsneral were put on a
formal basis • In a letter to Wingate, Gorst set, down in detail
the subjects on which he expected to be consulted by the governor-
general. These included major policy decisions,, laws, ordinances,
military or punitive expeditions, new services, concessions, loans
*] . ■ '• 1 
Herbert to Wingate (private), 6 Nov. 1907, SAD/281/5, reporting
on a meeting wiih Gorst; see also Gorst to-Grey .(private) , 12 Jan.
1908, fo 800/47. /
^Slatin to Wingate, 26 Aug. 1907, SAD/28l/2; Phipps to. Wingate, 8 . 
Sep. 1907, Ibid.; The rumours were originally started by. the Egyptian 
newspapers al-Liwa* and The Standard. They gained new lease of life 
following the Wad Habuba revolt in 1908. Only after Wingate placed 
his resignation in Gorstfs hands did the latter succeed to convince 
him that he wanted hiij to stay. See Wingate1 to Gorst, 26 Jan. 1909? 
SAD/234/8; Gorst to Wingate (private), 31 Jan. 1909, Ibid.
^Wingate to Slatin (private), 23-Mar. 1910, . SAD/431/1H  ■>
^The decrease in the volume of correspondence between Egypt and the 
Sudan following Cromer’s departurej is remarkable. See for instance
po 141/423.
For details see pp.58-62.
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or grants-'.from public funds, appointments of, new members to. the coun- 
oil, and the appointment of an acting governor-general . A close 
look at, this list will prove that on all these matters Wingate had 
in fact consulted Cromer. Thus the new regulations only formalized,' 
the control which, had existed prior to Gorst’s appointment. Wingate 
was relieved of sending detailed reports to the consul-gBneral* In­
stead Gorst received the minutes of the governor-general*s council 
and it was up to him to decide if his intervention was required.
The last five years of Wingate’s governor-g’eneralship canllargely 
be described as years of declining auntrol from Cairo. Kitchener, 
who .was British .consul— general in Cairo from 1911-14. hardly interven­
ed in the affairs of the Sudan. His only concern’was in the Gezira
■ . 2 - ' ■ ■ ' 3
development, project and in military and punitive expeditions .
Moreover, by reversing Gorst*s conciliatory policy in Egypt, Kitche­
ner enabled: Wingate to proceed with the removal of Egyptian gfficials 
from the Sudan which had been slightly hampered by Gorst^. It was 
not Tong before Wingate started complaining about Kitchener’s, lack
Gorst to Wingate, 13 Jan. 1910» FO 407/175. ■ ,
See correspondence between Kitchener and Grey, 19 Oct. 1911, 10 May
1912, 14 May 1912, FO 407/178; see also Clayton to Wingate, 3 Nov.
1913, SAD/l08/l6; - Clayton reported that the terms of the agreement 
between the .Sudan, government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate,
were dictated to him,by Kitchener; see also Gaitskell-y Gezira,pp.59-73*
3See. pp. 321-24,
V3ee pp.. 52-3
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1of interest in QucLan affairs . He wrote to Stack, then Sudan agent 
2
in Cairo , that Kitchener’s claim that the Sudan was autonomous
was /based on a misconception:
...There can be no mannei|of doubt that the intention.of Lord 
Cromer and the British Government...was that the British 
Agent in Egypt should be the deciding authority, and I have 
always loyally played up to that understanding...3
The appointment of McMahon as High commissioner in January 1§!15, 
increased Wingate’s independence even further^. McMahon had no pre­
vious experience either in Egypt or the Sudan. His appointment was
temporary, made in order to enable Kitchener tt return to Egypt after. 
5the War . Hence, he was in no position to offer Wingate advice as 
regards Sudanese affairs and whenever consultation was required, 
Wingate applied.to Kitchener at the war office in London • In fact 
the roles were reversed for it was Wingate who offered his advice
^Wingate to Stack, 31 Mar. 1912, SAD/180/3; Wingate to Phipps, 29 
Apr. 1912, SAI)/l8l/l/3* .
2
Stack, Sir Lee Oliver Fitzmaurise (1868-I924), joined the Egyptian 
army 1899 5 Wingate's private secretary 1904~8j Sudan agent in Cairo 
1908-14i resigned from the British army and joined the Sudan 
government in 1910; civil secretary 1914“l6; acting sirdar and. 
govdrnor-general 1917™19? sirdar and governor-general 1919”24? 
assassinated in Cairo, 20 Nov. 1924? LHBS 1922-30, pp.802-3*
^Wingate to Stack, 6 May 1913* SAD/IO8/16.
^Following the declaration of a British Protectorate over Egypt on 
18 Deo. 1914} Ihe consul-general became high-commisioner and the 
agency was called the residency. .
^Grey to Wingate (private), 12 Oct. 1916, SAD/104/2.
^Wingate to Kitchener (private), 2 June 1915* SAD/195/lO; see also 
FO 371/2351* where all correspondence regarding affairs in Egypt 
and the Sudan is minuted by Kitchener who in many cases proposed 
what action was to be taken.
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and help to McMahon in formulating his Arab policy and in preparing 
the Arab revolt'*-• ,Thus towards- the end of Wingate’s governor-gene­
ral ship control form Cairo had deereased to a minimum* It was only 
after Wingate’ s appointment as high commissioner in 1916, that the
process was reversed and the Sudan was brought once again under,
' 2 ' - • - closer supervision from Cairo •
d. Wingate*s~relations with Egypt.
The: Condominium agreement provided :for a joint,administration
of the Sudan by the British and Egyptian governments* Yet it was
clear from the outset.that Egypt’s.part of this administration was
to-be purely noniinal* The.supreme civil and military command of the
Sudan was vested in the'governor-generM who was nominated by‘the
British government* Moreover, all the senior officials of the Sudan .
were British officers of civilians, and a deliberate policy of
reducing the number of Egyptians serving in the Sudan wa,s initiated
'' - 3
by Cromer and Wingate:in 1900' after the Omdurman mutiny. *
1 • : . • • •'
The bullc of the correspondence between Wingate and McMahon was about
British policy in. the Middle East* See for instance.Wingate to McMahon 
15 May 1915* SAD/195/6; for an.account of Wingate’s part in'formula­
ting this policy see E.Kedourie, ’Cairo and Khartoum on the Arab- 
question, 1915-181 » The Historical JournalVil,2 .(1964)? pp*280-97*
Wingate to Clayton, 7 Wpv* 19l6,.EO 141/669? ironically, it was 
Cromer, with whom Wingate had often clashed about the extent of 
control from. Cairo, who advised him *«.*be careful and -try not to 
govern the Soudan too much in detail from Cairo*.Cromer to Wingate,
1 Dec. 19X6, SAD/202/5.
Gromer to Salisbury, 8 June 1900, PO 633/6; for details see pp.165-8.
~ 50 -
Wingate's attitude towards Egyptian rule in the Sudan crystalized
during the Mahdia. He regarded Egyptian maladministration as the
1major reason for the Mah&i's success . Hence his primary aim on 
assuming office was to make the new Sudan as free from Egyptian 
interference as he could* Tp pursue this policy he had to overcome 
not only Egyptian opposition hut also the reductance of the British 
consuls-general who had to face its consequences in Cairo*
The main difficulty lay in finance, as the Sudan budget was
2balanced by an annual subvention granted by the Egyptian government 
Moreover, the regulations for the financial administration of the 
Sudan were set down by the Egyptian councillof ministers, without
formal British participation, as. Britain did not intend to assume any
3 ■ ■ '
financial responsibility for the Sudan « The supervision of the
Sudan budget was vested in the Egyptian ministry of finance and was
executed by its British financial adviser^-« Wingate constantly
dsked for additional aid and at the same time rejected Egyptian
5 ■demands for increased control . Cromer, while generally accepting 
Wingate's attitude towards Egyptian’intervention9 insisted at the
1E«RoWingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, (2nd edition London 
1968), pp.7-147W: ~ “  ' :
2S-fcone, pp.2-6, 19-21, 59-89.
3Ibid; for the financial regulations see Inclosure 2 in Wo*65,
EO 407/150.
^Financial Regulations to be observed by the Soudan Government (signed) 
Gorst and. Wingate, 6 May 1901, EO 407/l57«
^See for instance Wingate to Stack, 31 Mar. 1908, SAL/284/13.
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same time that it was only natural that 1 «those who pay the piper
1 ' have a right to call the tune**.* Gorst went even further in his,
desire to conciliate the IChedive and his council of ministers*
Harvey, the financial adviser, was. instructed to decrease the
Egyptian subvention" to the Sudan, which resulted in endless , clashes
2
between him and Wingate * It was Kitchener who brought these problems 
to an end in 1913 by stopping the Egyptian annual subvention* Conse­
quently, the Sudan government was compelled to raise its ratio of
taxation but was enabled at the same time to‘ decrease Egytian super-
3vision even further *
The Khedive and the Egyptian council of ministers were ostensibly : 
the co-rulers of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In reality, their spheres 
of control were limited. The Khedive controlled the bestowal of 
Egyptian decorations yet the recipients had to be recommended by the 
Sirdar and governor-general^* Moreover, Wingate never recommended 
Sudanese for Egyptian decorations, as he feared it 1 .. .would transfer
5the patronage from the British Governing authorities to the Khedive...1 
In 1913, the Khedive1s control over decorations was restricted by
Cromer to Wingate, 25 Jan. 1904, EO 633/8.
O -
See for instance‘Harvey to Wingate, 30 Oct* 1907/ SAD/281/5 Wingate 
to Harvey,.! Dec. 1908., EO 141/416.
^Wingate to Stack, 29 Eeb. 19.13, SAD/180/2/2; Wingate to Kitchener, 
(private) 7 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3; see also pp. 166-68.
^Abbas Hilmi to Wingate, 31 Bee# 1905? SAD/277/6*
^Wingate to Kitchener, (private) 26 Oct. 1911, SAI)/30l/4.
Kitchener to Wingate's d e l i g h t A p a r t  from decorations the khedive
and his ministers had little chance of interfering in the Sudan.
Wingate reported to the khedive whenever the Egyptian army embarked
oh, a major compaign, but these reports, did not contain confidential
2details which were only included in the Sudan intelligence reports » 
The Egyptian council' of ministers had to approve the Sudan ordinances 
and its yearly budget but could not amend them in any way^. Even 
the minister; of war, whose office ostensibly controlled the Egyptian 
army, sometimes reveived his information regarding military engage­
ments in the Sudan, from the Egyptian press^. Wingate expressed his 
attitude to the Egyptian war minister, when he wrote '...it suits our 
policy to. have a purely nominal War ..Minister...*
Wingate's policy of. reducing Egyptian influence in the Sudan 
suffered arjsetback during Gorst*s consujh-generalship. As part of 
his efforts to restore good relations with the khedive and the 
legislative assembly, Gorst suggested an increase of Egyptian 
participation in the administration of the Sudan. When in 1909 the 
opening ceremony of Port Sudan was about to take place Gorst wrote
to Wingate: •
.1 - - 1 • ’ ' *
Wingate to: Kitchener9 May 1914j SAB/190/2/2; Wingate wrote:*...I
am much amused at. the subteefuges to which.our "ruler" is reduced
owing to stoppage of funds from graves and decorations.;.*
^Wingate to Stack, (private) 12 May 1908, SAD/284/l3«
3 ‘Memorandum by Clayton on the procedure regarding'ordinances, 1912, 
SAD/183/3; see also p.45*
^Stack to Wingate, 5 Eeb. 1912, SAD/180/2/2.
^Wingate to Cecil (Secret please destroy!) 13 Jan. 1913» SAD/185/l/l«
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•••I am anxious that the show should he made, as Egyptian as 
possible.o.we must try and;reconcile the Egyptians to 
spending some of their money,-on the Soudan, and the way. to 
do this is to make them feel that, the Soudan is part of 
Egypt•. o1
Consequently, the Khedive ?Abbas accompanied by several ministers
and members of the legislative1 assembly, attended the ceremony and
toured the Sudan* Wingate1s view about his guests of honour,was
concisely expressed when he wrote:1 ••.God help the country that is 
' ' - 2governed by such r u b b i s h * A  year later, Sirri Pasha, the 
Egyptian minister; of war;and public works, visited the.Sudan.and 
compiled a report about its administrative policy* Wingate wrote.
indignantly:1 ...I am at a. loss to know in what capacity Sirri
‘  3Pasha is reporting on the Government of the Sudan...’ Gorstfs
reply was curt:1...we cannot object to Egyptian Ministers taking
an interest in Souda,n affairs, if we are constantly./ asking the
Council of Ministers to provide, money for the development of the
c o u n t r y ^
Gorst!s conciliatory ,efforts.were shortlived, and under his 
successor Wingate was able to pursue his'policy of diminishing
Gorst to Wingate, (private) 18 Feb* 1909? SAd /286/i . Originally 
Cromer had suggested that the new port be called ’Port Wingate’, 
whereupon.Wingate suggested to name it ’Port Cromer’. Wingate wrote, 
however, that he would strongly objget to its being called 
"Port Gorst” ««*’, Wingate to Cecil, 8 Nov. 1904, SAd /275/8*
^Wingate to Phipps, 13'Apr. 1909, SAD/287/l*.
^Wingate to Gorst, 14 Mar. 1910, SAb/469/2/l.
^Gorst to Wihgate, 16 Mar. 1910, Ibid.
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Egyptian influence* When Kitchener stopped the Egyptian ministers
from interfering in the Sudan, Wingate expressed, his delight:
1.•.Within the last year our Ministers have learnt some sad truths,;
hut it is. just about time they realised the "hands, off" policy as
1far as the Sudan is concerned...’
Ther&were two additional spheres in which Egyptian penetration 
into the Sudan was regarded as dangerous, namely .Islam and nation­
alism. Of the two, Islam was the easier.to control, as apart from
the Egyptian qaftis employed in the Sudan, there was no direct link
2 ‘ 
between the Sudan and Egypt • The penetration of Egyptian nation­
alist ideas presented a far more, difficult' problem. Nationalism 
and anti-British propaganda were olosely linked in the Egyptian 
press. Moreover, numerous anti-British attacks were directed 
against the British rulers of the Sudan. They criticized.the 
Condominium Agreement which was regarded as an insult to Egyptian 
sovereignty^. Heavy attacks were also launched against Wingate 
himseldt whose, rule was .compared to that of the tsar^. He was also
accused of degrading’ the honour of the Egyptian offioers by compel-
5 ‘ ■
ling them to kiss his hand • A most frequent demand was that
1Wingate to Stack,.. 18 Nov. 1912, SAD/183/2.
S^ee pp.176-7•
3al-Liwa? 4 Feb.- 1900; 3 May 190O, '
4al-Watan, l?l Feb; 1904, SAD/275/2.
^al-Liwa’ , 15 Nov. - 1908. .
Egyptians should occupy the senior posts of the Sudan administration 
including that of governor-general^» The financial regulations by
which Egypt had to foot the Sudan bill x^ithout having a say in its
: 2 . 
administration, were also heavily criticised * The religious policy
of the Sudan government and the extension of missionary education to
the Muslim provinces, were resented by the Egyptian press more than 
3
anything else . Wingate would have preferred to see all these, pap­
ers suspended^. However, Cromer advocated a free press and did not
believe that the Egyptian newspapers were influential enough to
5cause any real damage <> Gorst, to begin with, followed Cromer’s
policy regarding the press^, but,in 1909 he decided to; revive the
Egyptian press, law of 1881 in order to silence,nationalist opposi- 
7tion . This gave Wingate the chance he had been waiting for and
8he decided.to promulgate a press'law for the Sudan .
"a^Liwa1, .4 Eeb# 1900#
2al-Liwa’, 21 Oct. 1907.
al-Iawa’, 7 Feb.. 1900; 3 May 1900; 30 May 1900; al-Mu’ayyaA, 17 Dec. 
1906. I have failed to find any substantial criticism about the 
governm?eht1 s religious policy in the southern provinces.
‘^Wingate to Cromer, 7 Mar. 1900, F0 141/356.
■^Cromer to Sanderson, 26 Apr. 1899 j EO 78/5026; Cromer to Wingate,
4 Jan. 1907, SAD/103/1.
6
Gorst to Grey, 20 Apr. 1907> EO 800/46.
7‘R.L.Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt ,1882-
122Ai pp- 299-300. ~ “ ~  " .* “  —  ~ ~ ~
o .
Wingate to Bonham Carter, 29 Mar. 1910, SAD/296/3/l; see also Wingate 
to Clayton (private), 29 Mar. 1910; the new law Was finally passed
in 1912. See Wingate to Stack, 18 Wov. 1912, SAD/l83/l/3.»
Throughout these years Wingate devised his own methods of dealihg 
with the press. Egyptian newspapers whioh criticised the Sudan 
government were stopped from entering the Sudani The effectiveness
of this measure was proved when Shaykh' * All Yusuf, editor of al-
^  ' ' * !
Mu ayyad, agreed not to publish.any news or articles about the Sudan
• 2
without the prior consent of the Sudan agent in Cairo .. Wingate also 
used the pro-government newspaper al-Muqattam in which sponsored ar­
ticles were published in order to counteract nationalist propaganda^. 
Wingate1s worries regarding the Egyptian press were greatly reduced 
under Kitchener who suspended their publication at the slightest 
provocation^*
Wingate1s aim in reducing Egyptian impact in the Sudan was two­
fold. He genuinely believed that the majority of Sudanese hated 
the Egyptians and that undue.Egyptian interfernece might instigate 
yet another revolt. Moreover, he wanted his rule in the Sudan to be 
as British as possible'short only,of outright annexation. To sup­
port his view, Wingate quoted the following from an interview he had 
with Sayyid ?Ali al-Mirghani, head of the KhatmTya o r d e r . " W h y  
should you English people be surprised at the thoroughly disloyal
^Owen to Wingate, 16 May 1906, SAD/278/5; al-Liwa’, al-Mu *ayyad7 al 
Minbar,: al&Qutr al-Misri, al-Watan, and W5df al-WTl , Were only a few 
of the newspapers which were Estopped by order of the Sudan agent.
^Wingate to Stack, 13 Apr. 1909? S-AD/287/l*
3 rThis task was entrusted to Ha urn Shuqayr of the intelligence dep­
artment, see Shoucair to Stack, 24 Jan. 1909» SAD/286/l; see also 
al-Muqattam, 22 Jan. 19,09°
^Kitchener to Wingate, 7 Apr. 1912, SAI)/l8l/l/3.
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attitude of the Egyptians? - They are a race of slaves and never')will he 
anything better; their character is, contemptible11....!' Whereupon 
Wingate commented:..This opinion is really, representative of the'
hulk of the better class Sudanese, who are in .every.respect superior
' • - ' ] 
to the Egyptians and look down upon, them with contempt.. .'
With the outbreak of the first World War and the declaration of
a British protectorate over Egypt‘Wingate saw his chanceo In a long
letter to McMahon, a copy of which was sent to .Kitchener, Wingate
stated his views on what he hoped might, he .a new venture in Anglo-
Sudanese relations: -
...Prior to the declaration of &bBrotect orate over E g y p t • : 
the policy of H.B.M.1s Government had been to make the status 
. of the Sudan.as Brit ish as possible, without making an official 
declaration...The declaration of a British Protectorate over 
Egypt had left them I the Sudanese! cold - had Egypt heen ' 
annexed by England. then it is possible that, in time, . ;
they might have realized that control from Cairo meant’ . :
British’ Control - as it stands...the Sudanese now cling 
more than ever, to the British as distingt from the 
.Egyptian., Government.. .2
Although the status of the Sudan remained unchanged, Wingate inten-s
sified his policy of removing Egyptians from the Sudan administra- -
tion until he left for Cairo in December l'9l6 .
Wingate to Cromer (private),.24 Feb. 1915? SAD/194/2? following 
these harsh words about the Egyptians it was interesting to read - 
in an obituary published in al-Ahram, ,22 Eeb. 1968 , t hat al-Mirghanx 
played a leading role in the national struggle to liberate the 
Sudan from British rule, ever since the turn of the century. For 
details about fAli al-MIrghani, see pp.196-8.
Q
Wingate to McMahon (private), 2 June 1915s SAD/195/10; Wingate to 
Kitchener,. 2 June 1915? PRO/30/57 *,no.47« This-letter was. ostensibly 
written in order to explain’ why Egyptian decorations should not be 
granted to Sudanese. . ‘ ■
ll ;
For details see pp»l6l~8.
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e. The governor-generalTa council.
During the first decade of his governor-generalship, Wingate 
set up. numerous consultative bodies to advise him on administra™ 
tive and economic problems. Among the more important commit-feess
were the Sudan government selection board\ the central economic
2 3board , and the central government board • The duties of each of
these bodies were defined by Wingate who also appointed the members^. *
Moreover, it was left to Wingate1s discretion to decide what to
R
place on the committees* agenda . In these circumstances it could 
hardly be expected that they would play' a significant role in poli- 
cy making. Government decisions were generally reached in direct 
consultation by Wingate with certain members of his staff. Slatin 
and the Sudan agents were privately consulted about most problems, 
while the *three secretaries*^ formed an inner circle of the central
7
administration and aided Wingate in formulating iifiis policy .
"^ The selection board was set up in 1905 when andincreased number of 
civilians joined the Sudan civil service; Wingate to Cromer, 30 Nov. 
1905, SAD/277/5-
2CA0 - 42?, 7 June 1906; GGR - 1906, pp.141-2.
^Wingate to Stack, I?I Nov. 1908, SAD/284/l3*
^See for instance Bonham Carter to Phipps, 13 August 1909? SAD/288/2.
^Wingate to Phipps (private), l6 Apr. 1911, SAD/300/4/l.
^The financial, legal, and civil secretaries were generally referred 
to as the 'three secretaries'.
7This conclusion was reached by assessing Wingate's correspondence 
during this period. Sir Harold MacMichael, whom I interviewed on 
6 June 1987, confirmed my impression and pointed out that Wingate's 
confidants namely: Slat in, Stack, Clajrton, and Symes were all inte­
lligence people like Wingate himself; for details see pp.lOO-2t113-7•
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The governor-general1s council came into being in January 1910, 
but already in 1908, if was first .suggested to-■■Wingate dby his civil 
secretary. Wingate had complained:' that many major a,dmi 11 istrative 
decisions were reached as a result of a brief dismission at the 
Cairo budget meeting between himself, the financial /secretary and s . 
the head of the department of 'the provincial governor concerned* ! He;. 
therefore suggested giving the permanent selection board power to 
deal also with general administrative; problems . Phipps.., the 
civil secretary, made a more;far-reaching suggestion and proposed 
the; creation of a governor-general (s.'.council, which would deal with 
f**. every off, unusual, or unlegislat.ed ' question. 1 Over a year 
passed before the subject was taken any further.. Wingate had, in' . ■ 
the meantime., been sent on a special mission to Somaliland, and r: ■ : 
upon his return in June 1909, proceeded direct to England^* It  ^
was from.his home in-Dunbar that he asked both Stack and, Clayton 
for.their views on constituting a governor-general1s council in the 
Sudan '• Only-in October I909 was the first recorded move made by. 
Gorst* In a private letter to Sir Edward Grey, he put forward the 
suggestion of 1 iy*instituting in the Soudan an executive legislative !
Wingate to Phipps (Strictly confidential)., 2 June I9O8, SAD/282/6,
2 . ' " ■ 1 _
Phipps Pasha, Powno.ll. Ramsay (1864—1932) , was seconded-to the yvr\rrvi'e
Egyptian army in 1899 ? joined, the; Sudan /government 1903.J Wingate's 
private secretary 1903-4? civil secretary 1905-14? retired in 1914- 
Hill - BD, p. 306. , : . !//■ ' ' ’
■^Phipps to Wingate, 7 June.1908, sid)/282/6* - . •
4Hill, Slat in-,.' pp. 97-101. •; : i
^Wingate, to Clayton, 11 Sep* l‘909f SAD/469/l.
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council on the. lines of the Viceroy's Council in India*..’ and added
that Wingate had already agreed to the suggestion^. The 1Draft . 
Ordinance for creating a council to assist the Governor General’ was
- .. • . 2
sent privately by Gorst to the foreign secretary on 7 October 1909 • 
The only, substantial suggestion made by the foreign office was to 
include a native member in it he c o u n c i l . W i n g a t  e will, perhaps be
startled at the notion of a native member* ' I would not be, if I
- ‘ 3  . ■ . ■ \ ■ 4/
were m  his shoes.. Yet, in spite of,Grey’s recommendation ,
the suggestion of a native member was. turned down,
...for the simple reason that there'are no such people in 
the Soudan suitable to occupy a seat oh the Council; nor 
are there likely to be. for, a long time to come. The 
Soudanese themselves are mere children, and the only 
Egyptians, in. the country are minor officials. Moreover,.
^Gorst to Grey (private) , 7 Oct. 1909, EO 8OO/47.
Ibid; the draft ordinance was later printed in F0 407/174*
G «M.A.Balchit in his thesis British Administration and Sudanese 
Nationalism, p.3* suggested that the governor-general1s council was 
forced by Gorst on Wingate in order to bring thw Sudan government 
to heel. Bakhit based his argument oh Gorst’s letter to Grey of 
20 Nov. 1909, FO 407/174, which was written over a month after the 
draft ordinance for instituting the governor-general's council had 
been sent to, England. Sir Geoffrey Archer, governor-general of the 
Sudan 1925“6, wrote that the council was founded V.v.-.at the instiga­
tion of the British Government.after General. Sir R.Wingate had 
embarlced-on his own initiative and at va,st expense- on the creation, 
.of Port Sudan...’• I have not been able to find any evidence to 
corraborate this claim. See G.Archer, Personal Historical Memoirs 
of an East Africa Administrator, (London 1963)? p .189• ’
^Sir RoR.itchie to.Grey, 19 Oct. 1909> EO 800/47* The inclusion of 
natives was proposed again by the Egyptian,council;of ministers, but 
Stack reportedthat ’...there is no intention of acceding to it... 
Stack to-Wingate, 30 Dec.- 1909, SAD/289/3*
4Grey to Gorst, 19 Oct., 1909, FO 800/47.
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the inhabitants dislike the Egyptians, and much prefer the 
Englisho..1
When Gorst, therefore, approached Grey officially a month 
2later the only comment offered in the foreign office minmtes was
to the effect that the council would only give formal status to a
. 3
position ithich already existed in practice . This remark was
;certainl3r true with regard to the text of the ordinance itself^* *
The council was to he constituted of four ex-officio members, namely
5the inspector-general , the financial, legal, and civil secretaries,
6and between two and four members appointed' by the governor-general *
It was authorised to promulgate laws, regulations and.ordinances, 
and to decide the yearly budget« The governor-general could overrule 
the council’-s decisions or suspend their operation, in which case he 
had to state his reasons for doing so. It was in a letter addressed 
to Wingate that Gorst laid down the nature of the relations between 
the. governor-general and his council, on the one hand and the
^Gorst to Grey, 30 Oct. 1909» Ibid*
Gorst to Grey',.•■14 Nov. 1909, FO -371/664. . .
3Refers to the central government board, which was- instituted in 1908®
^For full text of ordinance see S(> N0.I67, 24 Jan* 1910. The text
is identical with the draft ordinance*
5
After Slatin's resignation in 1914* there were only 3 ex-officio 
members*
6
Wingate hefused to be bound by precedent as to the members he appoin­
ted and when Currie left, in 1914? he. refused to appoint" his successor 
in the education department* See Glayton to Wingate, 16 Apr® 1914, 
SAD/469/6/2®
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1British consul-general on the other .
One of the first tasks undertaken-by the new council was to set 
down its own rules of procedure • These rules enabled the governor- 
general to refer to the council whatever he thought fit . Council 
could act, though only in an advisory capacity, on all matters, 
concerning promotions, appointments, and defence, and was allowed to 
discuss these matters only if they were referred to it-.by the gover­
nor-general » Heads of departments and provincial governors could 
bring to council only business relating to their own departments or 
provinces, and the governors had first to obtain, the sanction of 
the governor-general^. The convening of council was left to the 
discretion of the governor-general who could also adjourn it whenever 
he thought fit..
The first meeting of the cotincil was held at the governor-gene­
ral^ palace in Khartoum on 27 January 1910^ '. According to the 
regulations, the discussions of the council were not recorded in the 
minutes. Only if a member dissented from the majority decision, was 
he required to: give .his reasons, which then became part pf the min&h.es
R
utes . During the first seven years the council held the following
G^.orst to Wingate, 13 Jan. 1910, PO 867/1,pp*9“ll * For details 
see pp.46-7.
^Inclosure in No. 78, Gorst to Grey, 28 May 1910, PO 4Q7/l?5*
g
The suggestion of allowing governors to bring business to council 
wa„s made by- Currie. Phipps, the civil secretary, who felt that he 
represented the .provincial governors, strongly objected and wrote 
to WingAte:T...I do not think.our Governors are fit for it...’,
Phipps to' Wingate, 17, Apr. 1910, SAD/296/1/3*
4 F0 867/1, p.7.
Gorst to Wingate, 12 Jan. 1910, FO 867/l»
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number of meetings: 1910 (25), 1911 (20), 1912 (14), 1913 (ll), 1914 
(12), 1915 (lO)? 1916 (4)^ ** Wingate presided over less than fifty 
percent of the meetings and even then very rarely cast his vote.. It 
was Slatin who used his extra casting vote as acting-president of
. • 2
the council at its second meeting, in February 1910 At its 9^^
meeting, the council decided that its members should take precedence
3over all other officials of the Stidan government •
The majority of the meetings dealt with problems of land owner­
ship, personnel, agriculture, and trade, and a special series of 
meetings were devoted to the yearly budget^. During its first year, 
the only serious.disagreement occurred when the council had to deal 
with the salaries of its own members v Consequently Wingate and
Gorst became the sole arbiters with regard to council members1 pro™
6 '■ 
motions and pay 0 When, however, Gorst tried to interfere with the
generaX terms of employment in the Sudan civil service, his suggest
7
tion was rejected by the council and Gorst ha,d to withdraw «
~F0 867/1-7.
2FO 867/1,' p.22. The vote was taken about the leasehold system in 
Omdurman market,. See also pp. 356-57«
^Ibid, p.55*
^See.for instance Wingate to Stack (private), 29 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/
1/3, where Wingate wrote tthat council had devoted five meetings of 
five to. six hoiirs each to budget discussions.
867/1, pp.137-80
Wingate to Gorst, 17 Deo. 191°; Gorst to Wingate, 29 Dec. 1910,SAD/298/3. 
^F0 867/2, p.8. ' ■
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During Kitchener1s period as consul-general, there were a number 
of clashes between.him and the council, but all about minor matters,
such as the payment of rent by government officials, or the increas-
• 1 
ed charges on the government steamers * On one occasion Kitchener
■ 2refused to approve the councils decision , and on severe,1 others 
ordinances passed by council had to be amended before Kitchener 
would sanction their publication • .
Judging by the record of the first seven years of its existence, 
the cotmcil's achievements were1 rather modest* It provided a perma­
nent framework for the exchange of opinions among the various heads 
of departments, and thus enabled them to gain a broader outlook 
over government affairs* It did not,, however*, diminish Wingate1 s 
private consultations with his closer associates about most of the 
subjects which were later brought to. the council* It ss therefore 
hardly surprising that Wingate very rarely found his views overruled 
by the council1s majority.
The relations between the Sudan government and the British 
consuls-general. in Cairo were hardly affected by the new couhcile 
It is true that a. definite set of rules now existed, but misunder­
standings occurred as before, and it is difficult to say that the
—   ! ■ ■ ■ — ! I |IM  ■ >  . ,        . I - , , ,  |      . . . I . . .  I . I . I . . . . .  . . 1 1 - ^ -  ■■■■■ I -  * ■ ■  I I I II I III  I l l . l l .  . . . . .
1I'bid, pp.85-6. :
2F0 867/3, 31. •
3F0 867/3, pp.70, 77-8; FO 867/4, pp021-2.
1consul-generalTs control over Sudan affairs increased in any way *
As for the people of the Sudan, for wMse benefit the government 
supposedly functioned, one can hardly see how ..the existence of a 
council, on which they had no representation and all of whose, mem­
bers, were British government officials, could .make any difference, 
to their well-being# Native affairs were Entrusted, as before,, to 
the advice of Slatin, who together with Clayton and Stack, formed 
the inner circle of the governor-general1 s advisers#'
finally, judging by the diminishing number of the■council1s 
meetings, it seems fair to assume that its functions declined 
rather than increased during that period. Whether it assumed a 
greater role following Wingate1s transfer, to Egypt is outside the 
scope of this thesis.
f • Wingate^ principles of governmehtu
In his seventeen years as governor-general and sirdar, IWingate
had imbued, these posts with his personality* He was a strong.
believer in the direct personal approach both in his relations with
his subordinates and his dealings■with the Sudanese people. His
relations with the British officials were cultivated during his
tours of inspection, the annual Cairo gathering, other visits to
Khartoum or Dunbar, and a voluminous correspondence, which in many
cases went beyond the official relationship of a governor-general
1 * '
MaoMichael's assertion that the ..inauguration of the council brought
abihut the loosening of the Cairo bonds, seems just, as unfoundedj
' H.MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, (London 1934)» pp.113-4*
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and his subordinates# Relations were, nevertheless, not familiar.
Wingate1s experience' and understanding were treated with respect,
even if some of them joked about his pompous appearance and strict.
1
morals . , His relations with the non-British officials were, of 
course, on a different and more formal level, yet even with them he 
showed concern for their private welfare, and in some cases helped 
them with their promotion, or when they x^ rere due for retirements • 
Wingate* s attitude to the Sudanese was paternal rather, than 
autocratic. He believed that he was in a better position than they 
were to know xtfhat was best for them. This manifested itself in his 
attitude to the Mahdia, and to the penetration of Egyptian nation­
alism into the Sudan, both of which were regarded by him. not only
as evil but as being contrary to the better aspirations of the
3 ‘ TT ' ' ‘ '
,Sudanese * Currie once said of Wingate, that he was 1. . .an advocate
for the improvement of the,native along the lines of his own insti­
tutions, and his customs and regulations.• •1 ^  This x^ras in fact 
the official;policy adopted by both Cromer and Wingate. In reality, 
however, it xxras not carried,out. 'Native institutions1 were, when­
ever necessary, determined by the authorities and 'the improvement
1Impressions of British officials about Wingate can be found in the 
private diaries which were kept by many of them. See for instance 
Butler's diary 1911-12, SAD/400/lQ; Willis's diary, SAD/210/2.
Wingate to Cromer, 9 May 1906, SAD/278/5; see also pp.l6l-2f.
E.R.Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudant(2nd edition London 1968) 
pp.466-9, 4915 see also pp#54“7.
^Currie to Wingate, 1 July 1901, SAD/271/7; Currie, Sir James. (l868- 
1937)? joined the Sudan civil service in 1900 as the first director 
of education, a post which he held until 1914? was member of the 
governor-general* s council 1910-14, DNBS, 193.1-40, pp. 31-4*
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of the natives1 was also guided by the government and on lines
1'determined by it *
In the .absence of any free expression of Sudanese public opinion
inuring Wingate's period; it is difficult to assess the popularity of
2 ' • 
these measures « The attacks launched ag&isst Wingate's policy in
the Egyptian press can hardly be regarded as an expression of public
opinion; as they were motive,ted primarily by Egyptian political con- 
3
siderations o The only criteria by which the government can be 
judged, therefore, are the results®
If one were to 100k ,for the predominant principle which guided 
Wingate as sirdar and governor-general, it would be his firm belief 
in the unity of civil administration and military command in the 
Sudan, and his conviction that interference from Egypt, in any form, 
should bp- reduced to the utmost minimum® He believed in the unity, 
of civil and military command not only as embodied in his own person 
but alsih in the lower echelons of the administration where provincial 
governors were also the military commanders of their districts* 
^Suggestions to separate these functions made by Cromer^, and by
"S'or details see pp.188-190; 305^-316.
2The only Sudanese newspapers at the time were the Sudan Times, which 
was founded in 1903 by Faris Nimr, the owner of al-Muqattam press in 
Cairo, and the Sudan Herald founded in 1912.by two Greeks. Both were 
under strong government influence and could not be regarded as a 
free expression of Sudanese public opinion. For details see Mahgoub 
,Mohamed Salih,'The Sudanese Press', .SNR Vol.48'(19^5)1 pp.1-3*
^See pp*54-5*
^Cromer to Lansdowne, (private) 9 Eeb* 1902, F0 800/123*
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1senior British officers in the Egyptian army , were rejected 'by 
Wingate as a b s u r d n o t  only should such an idea not be counte­
nanced for a moment but not even mooted® It would have a most
unsettling effect on everyone and would result in confusion and 
2
c h a o s o f • Wingate regarded the insecurity of the Sudan and the 
fact that most of the higher British officials were army officers 
as important reasons for maintaining the unity®
These rea-sons,.:however, are not sufficient* After the first few 
years of the Condominium, security was never really threatened® The 
Egyptian army undertook punitive patrols in the southern provinces 
and occasionally had to suppress religious insurrections® These did 
not, however, endanger security^®.. Moreover, two. of the adjutants- 
general who served in the Egyptian army during that period objected 
to this unity of command in the provinces which they regarded as 
detrimental to the army itself* They claimed, with justice, that 
civil administration took preference over army command and that as 
a result the army was being neglected^®' Lastly, Wingate himself 
devoted most, of his' time and energy to his work as governor-general
^Asser to Wingate, 16 Aug* 1911, SAD/3OI/3®
9 - - „
Wingate to Cromer, 23 May 1902, SAD/272/2. See also pp*143-5„ ' ■
3 • •
The only major military undertaking was the conquest of Darfur in
1916* A.B.Theobald, *A1T Dinar, pp. 162-207®
‘^Eerguson to Wingate, 9 Mar. 1901, SAd/271/3; Asser to Wingate, 16 
Aug. 1911, SAD/301/3.
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while the running of the Egyptian army was largely entrusted to a
1handful of British officers * This was probably partly owing to his
personal inclination, yet.had security conditions really been as
bad as he maintained, it is likely that he would have:played a more
active role in the day-to-day running of the army.
Wingate1s main reason for opposing the separation was probably
his belief that it was bound to increase control from Cairo and to
create' friction between the military and civil administration .
Instead of a unified general supervision exercised by the consul-
general over all Sudan affairs, there would have been an additional,
purely military control exercised by the G.O.C* Egypt and the War
3Office in London . .
Wingate1s cherished aim throughout his governor-generalship 
was to relieve the Sudan of control from Cairo, as exercised by 
the British consul-general, and to stop any Egyptian penetration 
into the Sudan* The unity of civil- and military command in hisoown 
hands, was regarded by him as the best way of achieving this aim.
^This can be assessed by the volume of correspondence in the Sudan 
archive in Durham, dealing with these spheres.
2This may be easier to understand if one considers the problem of 
the British detachment in'Khartoum, which belonged to the British 
army and was under the command of the G.O.C. Egypt. This arrangement . 
caused friction in the Sudan as pointed out by Cromer on numerous 
occasions - (see for instance Cromer’ to Lansdowne,10 Jan.1900,FO 633/8; 
l6 Feb.1903, E6 403/334)« Only in 1905 was the command transferred 
to the sirdar (see Findlay to Asser,.28 July 1905?. SAD/277/l)• Judging 
by .Wingate^ concern over this minor problem of command, one can-well 
understand his opposition to complete separation.
\fp to Dec* I898 the sirdar received all his instructions from the 
War Office through G.O.C* Egypt. See War Office to Foreign Office,
10 Dec. 1898, FO 407/147. Though officially the sirdar was under 
the command'of the Khedive, in reality he had hardly any influence
over the army^s command.
. Chapter II.
1Slatin Pasha, the inspector-general *
Among the inner circle of Wingate1 s. confidant s, Slatin Pasha
reigned supreme*
Slatin resigned from the Egyptian army following the battle of 
_2
Karari » As 3,ssistant-director of intelligence since March 1895» k©
had played a significant role in the reconquest particularly after
the capture of Omdurman when, as the only officer who was familiar
with the town and its people, he rendered indispensable advice in
3
establishing the new military administration .? Yet, despite this, 
he decided to ret ire» He felt that he was disliked by Kitchener a-nd 
that following the .setting up of the Condominium, his position .as 
the only officer who was neither Egyptian nor British would become 
unbearable^. Thus in February 1899 Slatin left Egypt as a private 
citizen, having served in the Sudan for tx^enty-two years. However, 
before sailing, he was recruited'by the Sudan Territories Exploration 
Syndicate to undertake a prospecting tour into the Nuba mountains and
1Two books, which have been recently published, describe in detail 
Slatin1s activities while,in the Sudan. R.Hill, Slatin Pasha (London 
1965) affords a true understanding of Slatin1s character and acti­
vities. AoB.Theobald, *Ali Dinar Last Sultan of Darfur 1898-1916, 
(London .1965) » analyses. Slatin* s policies and relations with Darfur. 
In this chapter it is intended to describe Slatin*s unique position 
within the Anglo-Egyptian administration, without going into details 
regarding his policy in Darfur or the Sudan.
‘'See p«4»
H^i'll, Slatin, p.60.
4Ibid, pp.57-8.
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in January 1900 he returned to Cairo in his new capacity as, pros-
? -
1pecting agent •
a* Slatin1s appointment.
In the *eleven months that passed since Slatin* s departure, from
the Sudan/ the situation had radically changed* Kitchener, whose
alleged antipathy was one of Slatin*s main reasons for resigning,
had himself left the Sudan* The new sirdar and governor-general
was Wingate, Slatin* s most intimate friend among the Britishs off?-
icers. Moreover, following the famine of 1898 and the Omdurman
mutiny in January 1900, Wingate felt in need of help as most of
2the experienced British officers had left the Sudan to take part 
in the Boer War. it was, therefore, only to he expected that 
shortly after Slatin*s arrival Wingate adked him to rejoin the 
Sudan government, promising *...to "create" any post Slatin would 
ask for...*^ Slatin did not accede to this request immediately, 
as he was still committed to prospecting. Yet his trip into the 
Nuba mountains can well he described as the first act of the future 
inspector-general. -
Slatin*s diary, describing the trip resembles an intelligence 
officer’s report rather that of a prospecting agent* On 20 Febru­
ary Slatin interrogated*Ali *Abd al-Karim and uncle of the Mahdi 
who was suspected of instigating a revolt. Though Slatin was
1Ibid, pp.63-4.
^See pp. 30-31*
^Slatin*s diary, 27 Feb. 1900, SAD/441*
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convinced that ?Abd al-Karim and his followers, meant no harm he
recommended they should he banished to Egypt as an example to oth- 
1ers * Slatin wrote a proclamation to the people of the Sudan, signed
by Wingate, in which he promised them peace and prosperity and ur-
2 ' ' 
ged them to cooperate with the government • He.advised Lady Wingate
. 3 . •
to give money to the poor women in Omdurman , and chaired a meeting
of the *ulama* concerning religious problems! En route to Kordofan
Slatin received petitions, settled cases and advised British offi-
. • . ■ ■ r
oers on the correct manner of administering their provinces •
Thus Slatin, a private citizen, on a prospecting tour, became Wingate1s 
travelling emissary even before he was appointed to a government post.
;0n his return -to Egypt in June 1900* Slatin had long confabu­
lations with Grower, Gorst, Mustafa Fahmx:, and others, all of whom;^
6
urged him to return to the Sudan • It seems that when Cromer, wrote
to Salisbury that he was 1• •.suggesting to Wingate.that Slating
7
services might perhaps be u t i l i z e d . j  the appointment was as
*^Ibid, 20-2 Feb. 1900; see also pp*199”200:.
2Ibid., 21 Feb. 1900.
3Ibid, 23 Feb. 19OC.
4Ibid, 1 Mar. 1900.
5Ibid, 14 Mar., .18 Mar.■, 20 Jatr. .1900.
Slatin to Wingate, 30 June 1900, SAD/270/6.
"^ Cromer. to Salisbury, 8 June 1900, P0 633/6. : .
r
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as good as settled.
Slatin received his appointment as inspector- general on 29
September 1900* His duties and the extent of his authority were
not clearly ddfined. He was intended to be a highly mobile officer
who would- travel.over the vast areas of the Sudan and act as the
1governor-general* s eyes and ears . There was also no decision 
regarding his salary. Wingate had offered him;£E 1800 per annum 
apart from the OJ 600 pension, which he received from Egypt for
his previous services. This was vetoed by Cromer and they agreed
- 1 2 on £E 1200 plus £E 200 travelling expenses and £E 600 pension •
By 19H ,  Slatin earned £E 1800 per. annum which, together with his 
Egyptian pension and travelling expenses, made him the highest 
paid official in the Sudan^., During his prospecting tour Slatin 
had arranged with Wingate that he■should receive land in Khartoum 
as compensation for his house in Omdurman which had been requisi­
tioned by the government^. Cromer's intervention forced him to
^Hill, Slatin. pp.71-2.
^Cromer to Wingate, 11 |?1 Aug. 1900, SAD/270/8j Memorandum by 
Wingate I n.d. Oct. 1907?!, SAD/281/4.
^Bernard to Stack, 9 Hov. 1919» EO 141/636$ according to Currie's 
suggestion, Slatin*s pay was not included in the general scale of 
officials' salaries, as his inclusion would have brought about a 
demand for increased salaries by the legal and financial secreta­
ries who were the highest paid officials. Se^memorandum by Currie , 
1 n.d. 1910?!,. SAD/282/5.
4Slatin's diary, 28 Feb. 1900, SAD/441,
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1return, the land and to live in a government-owned house .
Wingate.never regarded Slatin as a run-of-the-mill government
official. .He viewed his appointment as a personal post which ’...will
2
cease when Slatin leaves the service...' . Moreover, he confessed 
that even had he wanted to appoint another inspector-general it
3would have heen impossible to find a man of equal qualifications •
Thus following Slatin's resignation on .the outbreak of the first 
World War^ tji the post of inspector-general ceased to exist and the
5
work was divided between Symes , then Wingate's private secretary,
6
and the intelligence department .
• Following several incidents between Slatin and British officer- 
administrators, Wingate decided to define more accurately Slatin’s 
duties.' He instructed the civil secretary to prepare a draft proposal
1Cromer "to Wingate, 17 Jan. 1901; Wingate to Cromer (private), 21 
Jan. 1901, F0 141/364; Hill st ates that the gift of land was origi­
nally Kitchener's idea and that Slatin gave it up as he had no 
money to build, and would hage been unable to supervise its building 
even had the money been available. Hmll, Slatin, p.72.
^Memorandum by Wingate, 1 n.d. Oct. 1967?I » SAD/28l/4.
^Wingate to Asser, 29 Sep. 1909» SAD/288/5.
4Slatin to Wingate, ;, 30 Sep. 1914, SAD/223/l.
Symes, Sir Stn&et, (1882-1963). Jomnecl the Egyptian army in 1906;
1909-12 was A.D.I. Khartoum; 1913-18 was Wingate's private secretary 
and remained on his staff after he became high commissioner of Egypt 
in 1917» During the years 1920-34 be served in Egypt, Palestine, / 
Aden, and Tanganyika, and returned to the Sudan as governor-general 
in the years 1934-40.
6
Wingate to E.Milner, 11 Mar. 1915» SAD/l94/2» the post of inspector- 
general was revived for a short period in 1922, when Jackson Pasha 
filled the post. See SPS, p.6.
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to this' effect"*". The duties of the inspector-general as enumerated 
in this.document. did little to clarify the situation. ; Slatin was 
required:
., .To act as adviser generally to H.E. the Gov. Gen. on all 
matters concerning his duties.;, to acquaint himself with the 
names and characters of the principle Sheikhs and other per­
sons who either through their wealth, position, or for reasons 
■ connected with religion, have influence over the natives...
Slatin's. supreme authority in connection with religious affairs was 
.. emphasized in two articles which empowered him to advise an all 
legal problems connected with religion, and to be in touch with 
the 'Board of Ulema* and other religious leaders as Wingate's ad­
viser.. Article XI emphasized Slatin*s power regarding all tribal 
affairs, including taxation, and stressed his special responsibi­
lity for nomads. Several articles were intended to ensure amicable 
relations between Slatin and the British personnel. He was ins- 
..tructed to inform governors and inspectors before he undertook an 
inspection of their provinces. Again he was warned not to ’...issue 
direct orders to any employee under a Mudir, except in case of
One of;the incidents which convinced Wingate that this was neces­
sary was the ’Jackson affair', the details of which remain unknown; 
see Hill, Slatin« p.79» see also Wingate's Diary, 27 Feb. 1902, 
SAD/272/8 where he commented that Slatin was deeply involved in 
the Jackson affair.. This view was not shared by Jaokson hmmself, 
who wrote to. Slatin '...of one thing I can assure you and that is, 
that the Sirdar's idea that I am suspicious of you is not the case. 
We have always been the best of friends since our meeting at Assuan 
and always bhall remain so..,.', see Jackson to Slatin, 5 Mar. 1903, 
SAD/452/276. Wingate wrote in his diary on 9 Mar. 1902, SAD/272/8, 
that he had instructed Wason, who became civil secretary following 
the 'Jackson affair', to prepare a draft of Slatin*s duties. The 
draft itself is, however, in Slatin's own writing and the amendments 
are written by Wingate;, see .'Duties of Inspector General, Sudan',
4 Apr. I9O2, SAD/403/6. The following details are all quoted from 
this document.
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absolute urgency when the Mudir is too .far away to issue orders in 
time...' Lastly, Slatin was '...to examine and remark upon the 
Intelligence Report before it is submitted to the Sirdar and Gover. 
Gen..•'
These detailed instructions were sent by Wingate to all his.
provincial governors in the hope that the antagonism stimulated by
1Slatin's unique position would be reduced to a minimum • 
b. Slatin's policies.
.The inspector-general*s department was a one-man show. With a
2 • 
yearly budget of some, 2500 , Slatin toured the length and breadth.
3of. the Sudan, by foot, camel and train • An example of Slatin's 
method of work during one of :his tours is afforded by the following 
notes:
•.*31 January 1913.•.reach Singa at 7 a.m., meet on the way 
Taylor, Tippets, Dupuis, .Thompson.*.1 February.•.Have long 
meeting with-Omdehs Sheikhs, merchants, etc...2 February...
Have single interviews with Omdehs and Sheikhs...3 February 
...give Govt, officials my instructions and views on all . 
matters (shows in my notes at the end of this diary).....
The observations written by a British inspector during one of
Slatin's tours, make an interesting comparison:
Wingate's diary, 9 Mar. 1902, .SAD/272/8; Minutes to 'Duties of 
Inspector General, Sudan', 9 Apr. 1902, SAD/403/3J for details 
about Slatin's relations with the British officials see pp.95-100.
^Stone, p. 256.
^For ddtails see Slatin's diaries for the years 1900-1914fSAD/441• 
In 1909 for instance he covered some ,780 miles by camel and foot. 
Whenever he travelled by rail, he used.a special saloon which was 
attached to the train; see for instance Slatin's diary, 25 Dec. 
1911, Ibid.
^"Slatin's diary, 1913, Ibid
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.. .Slatin arrived on. 14th and I had no news of him. till he 
was only 7 miles off..•He. spent first day interviewing Ali 
Dinar's messengers - next day visited.the Nazirs - interes­
ting to hear him talk over Dervish times and pre Dervish 
times - He contrives to be amazingly tactless at times...
Next morning Savile^ turned up and had to see the Nazirs 
etc too...We spent most of the day ciphering P.O. telegrams 
re. French^ ...Following day we had gelsa3 of the Hamar 
Sheikhs, at which Slatin told them they would be put'on to 
taxes^. He managed to put it very badly, it would have been 
better to leave it alone and let me.and Blwi, do it...5
While Slatin clearly regarded his tours as.the only guarantee of 
a .Just administration, the recipients of his. views regarded them as 
a necessary evil which they had to bear. It was during these tours 
that Slatin compiled his lists .of recommendations which covered al­
most. every sphere of policy. His suggestions, or father orders, 
were given to the men of the spot and later communicated to Wingate^.
A detailed description of all the spheres covered by Slatin 
would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet. a brief resumfe of his
Savile, Lieut.-Colonel Robert V©sey; seconded to the Sudan govern­
ment in 19Q2; served as inspector in Kassala 1902-6; and Dongola 
1906-^7? governor of Bahr al-Ghazal 1908; governor of Kordofan 1909-
1917« SPS, p.11.
2 -Refers to the French advance in Wadai and Dar Tama and Masalit; see 
Theobald, A^ll Dinar. pp.81-118.
Gelsa (jalsa) - meeting, gathering.
^As nomads the Hamar tribe, had previously, paid tribute; see pp«364~5*
.^Willis's diary, Dec. 1910, SAD/210/2. Willis, Charles Armine (b.l88l) 
graduated from Oxford in !904j and came to the Sudan in 1905 with 
one of the first groups of civil-servants. He served in ICordofan 
1906-12,first as a junior inspector and following training at the 
legal department, he became the first legal inspector of Kordofan in ■ 
1909; 1913 - Senior inspector Red-Sea; 1914-5 “ Dongola; 19.15-9 - 
A.D.I.; 1920-6 - DMI. SPS, p.19.
^Slatin's annual reports were not printed in the Reports on the Admi­
nistration of the Sudan, but were incorporated in Wingate's annual 
memorandum and in the departmental and provincial reports;GGR-1902,p.113.
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major activities is clearly required in order to assess his impact 
on policy making. Slatin's own idea as to his responsibilities was 
clearly stated when he wrote to Wingate:.There are several quest­
ions which I like to manage myself - like Darfur - Kababiish raids - 
Seid el-Mekki affairs - increase of tribute and herd tax - Ulemas 
questions...*^
RSligious policy.
Islamic affairs were Slatin's prime responsibility. He lacked 
religious zeal of any kind and tended to steer clear of any spiri­
tual speculation. ,Yet, his experience as a Muslim duriiig the Mahdia,
had made him familiar with Islamic custom and enabled him to/under-
2
stand the Sudanese Muslims better than did his fellow officers
Slat in*s first premise was that no missionary activities should{ :
be allowed in Muslim provinces. In this he was, at one with most of 
his British colleagues^. But as a foreigner he was better able to 
speak up. '...Slatin Pasha...has just administered a heavy rebuke to 
those silly people who wish to shove the English Bibles down the 
throats of the African b l a c k s . . . I n  an interview with the Neue 
Ereie Fresse, given shortly before leaving Austria to take up his 
post in the Sudan, Slatin stated:'...Jede propaganda Christlicher
^Slatin to Wingate, 27 Apr. 1912, SAD/l8l/l/3.
2Hillf Slatin, pp.79-80., ‘
^Eor details see pp.220-239*
^Modern Society, 20 Oct. 1900.
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1Missionare unter dem Moslemischen Stamhien ist ausgeschlossdn.•.1 
His, tendency was to reduce the impact of every religion to the
best of his ability* In 19-01 he prepared a proclamation, to the Mus-
'• 2 
lims aimed at diminishing the influence of their religious leaders •
He mistrusted all the u^fi taricras. and attitude he probably inheri­
ted from his Mahdist overlords^. Even Sayyid *A1I al-MirghanT, the 
head of the. Khatmfygta order, who' was decorated by Cromer and received 
a monthly pay for his services^" was refused official recognition by
Slatin:’**.I told him that he cannot be. recognized, as the head of a
5Teriga which are. only tolerated...’ When H.C.Jackson, then a 
young inspector in Dongola, wanted to appoint Sayyid *Abd al-Mutaral 
as head of the Idrlsiyya order, Slatin reminded him ’...that Terikas 
are only tolerated but not officially recognized and that we neither 
appoinljnor dismiss ’’Khalifas’1...1 ^  In dealing with the taricras
^Neue Ereie Fresse. 10 Oct. 1900.
2Slatinfs diary, 26 May 1901, SAD/441*
^During the Mahdia Sufism was prohibited throughout the Sudan; see 
Hill, Slatin. p.87*
^"Slatin’s diary, Notes 1903, SAD/441? Slatin mentioned that Sayyid 
?Ali al-Mirghani received £E 65, whereas his father used to get £E 85 
in the Turco-Egyptian period.
5Slatin to Wingate, 27 Apr. 1912, SAT)/l8l/l/3.
Slatin to Wingate, 3 Apr. 1913, SAD/l86/l/l. H.C.Jackson joined
the Sudan government in 1907 and served in the administration for 
twenty-four years. He should not be confused with Brigadier-General 
Sir Herbert William Jackson, who was governor of Dongola for twenty - 
years and is referred to throughout, the thesis as Jackson.
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Slatin observed a great measure of neutrality. He strongly opposed
the favoured Khatmiya^ ; when they urged Wingate to expel one of the
leaders of the rival Majdhubiyar, order from the Sudan^.
Butler, who on being appointed to the intelligence department
was instructed by Slatin as to government policy, described the
latter1s views: * -
...A busy morning with Slatin...He does not approve of Savilefs \
action in appointing a^leader of the Morghanieh tarika in El 
Obeid...Says Govt, should have nothing to do with these tarikas 
as the heads are really only after the monetary profits...they 
are really frauds and Govt. cannot be responsible for their 
activities...The only religion recognized by Govt, is Orthodox 
Muhamedanism*..2
Consequently Slatin relied on the 'Board of Ulema1 which was insti­
tuted by the government in 1901, and on his three learned friends, 
Muhammad, al-Badawi^, al-Tayyi al~Safid^, and Idris Wad Ibrahim^.
Slatin to Wingate, 10 Apr. 1913f SAI)/l86/l/l; the Khatmiyaa leaders 
at Tokar had convinced Wingate that the Majdhubrya-v. were still propa­
gating Mahdism. Slatin was able to overcome these instigation by 
proving to Wingate that the hatred between the two orders dated to 
pre-Mahdist days; see also Wingate to Slatin, 12 Apr. 1913> SAD/l86/l/l 
where he wrote:1••.many thanks for your explanation...1 have no 
doubt you are quite correct...* When Slatin himself later proposed 
to expel three fakis. Wingate wrote ’...you can expel as many more 
as you ii]f:e, . they are an infernal nuisance...1, Wingate to Slatin,
5 Apr. 1913, SAD/108/15. 
Sutler's diary, 21 Uov. 1911, SED/400/lO. 
3Hill, BD, p.253. 
4It>Sd, p.353.;
5Hill, Slatin. p.86.
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- ■ 1 He asked their advice in problems of inheritance and consulted them
whenever a religious problem occurred* In fact they became the sole
2
interpreters of' orthodox Islam in the, Sudan . Slatin was also resp 
ponsible for the, appointment of qadis. many of whom were of Egyptian 
origin, and thus was in a position to supervise their.activities in 
the Sudani
In, his policy towards Mahdist insurrections Slatin.encouraged a 
cautious attitude. He was sceptical when a Mahdist rising was rep 
ported by Count Gleichen in 1901^“, and advised Wingate, that '...it 
isn't good to tickle religious people or questions...' unless the
' . R  . . . . . .
suspicions are proved beyond doubt . Following a report about a
new Mahdi in the Nuba mountains in 1903 Slatin wrote:*...I suppose
• ■ 6 
it was more a private- affair then a religious matter...,* . Even
after the Gezira rebellion in 1908, which was the most serious
1
Slatin to Wingate, 19 Mar. 1907, SAD/28o/3; in this instance, Slatin 
devised a way to overcome the rigidity of the Islamic law of 
inheritance.
O
See for instance Slatin to Wingate, 2 June 1 1908? I,SAH/45l/l24, 
where he insisted that before commuting the sentences of the Gezira 
rebels, Wingate should have consulted the 'Board of Ulema'; see 
also pp.180-190,199-200.
“^Wingate to Slatin, 24. July 1907; Slatin to Wingate, 9 Aug. 1907, 
SAD/281/l. In most cases Slatin consulted Mustafa Bey Bayram, of 
the Egyptian Shari *a Court, as to the suitability of Egyptian qadis. 
Bayram was a close friend of Harry Boyle, the oriental secretary at 
the British agency in Cairo. Boyle to Wingate, .6 Dec. 1907, SAD/ 
28l/6; see also pp.176-7.
^Gleichen to. Wingate, 25 July 1901, SAD/271/7j Count Gleichen was 
then Sudan agent- and head of intelligence.
^Slatin to Wingate, 13 Aug. 1901, SAD/271/8. 
^Slat.in to Wingate, 1 Sep. 1903, SAD/273/9*
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religious uprising during this period, Slatin did not join in the ge­
neral witchhunt. He demanded a death sentence for the rebels, hut 
at the same time warned against mass arrests amongst their followers
who he knew would be kept out of mischief by the beginning of the 
1rainy season • When a new religious movement was reported in 1911,. 
Slatin wrote:!...I got as usual the report on Nabi Alla Isa and as 
usual he appears at Sennar province - rott Isicl and nonsense...1 
Domestic slavery and intelligence Work.
The intelligence department remained Siatin's second home even 
after he became inspector-general. He supervised its work and visi­
ted it daily when in Khartoum. It was there that his interviews
with fAli Dinar's messengers, religious leaders, and other notables
3 • • .
took place • His preoccupation with intelligence work can be seen
by the lists of 'Trustworthy men' suited for intelligence work, which
he compiled in his diaries^.
Domestic slavery was also within Slatin's spheres of activity and.
' r
was dealt with by the intelligenceddepartment . Slatin's opinions on
^Wingate to Stack, 1 quoting Slatin I, 12 May 1908, ,SAD/284/13j
Slatin to Wingate, J n.d. May 1908? !, SAD/282/5.
2Slatin to Wingate, 15 S§p. 1911, SAD/301/3.
^Butler's Journal 1911, SAD/422/12; for details see:;pp«106-114* ■
^See for instance Slatin's diary, 1912,. SAD/44I, (the,list is at the : 
end of the diary).
^See Butler's diary, 21 Nov. 1911,. SAD/4OO/1O; The Labour Bureau 
which was organized to deal with freed slaves and to cope with the 
increased demand for labour, was also under Slatin's supervision.
See CAO -241, 18 Jan. 1905?: see also pp.3804397.
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slavery were formed during his ibong service in the Sudan, a country
.whose economy was largely based on slavery"*". During the reconquest
he stated that he regarded slaves as:
...godforsaken swine |who| do not deserve to be treated like 
free and independent men...the blacks should be made to remain 
under the protection of their former masters who were forced 
to treat them well.,.2
This attitude prevailed throughout Slatin's inspector-generalship.
When * AIT Dinar' s messenger- came to Omdurman in 1902 and sold fifteen
female slaves, with the government's full knowledge, Wingate asserted
that it '...was based on Slatin's advice...' In 19 06, Slatin fully
supported a claim by Sayyid al- Makki for the return of his runaway
slaves who had been caught in the Nuba mountains^*. Pie was Wingate* s
champion in his long drawn battle against the Egyptian department
for the repression of slavery, until the latter finally became part
R
of the Sudan government . Slatin realized that in order not to em­
barrass the,government he had to refrain from using the term domes­
tic slaves. In warning one of his subordinates he '...told him that
if in an official document I find again that he calls Sudanese ser-
6vants "slaves" - a finger from his right hand will be cut off...'
See Hill, Slatin, pp.103-7*
2Slatin to Bigge, 6 Sep. 18971 SAD/438/653; the letter was sent in 
reply to a letter written by Bigge to Prince Francis of Teck on 7 Aug. 
I8 9 7» Ibid; according to Hill, Slatin, pp.55”6, Bigge's letter was 
a forgery while Slatin's was written in his own hand*
^Wingate to Cromer,. 11 Dec. 1903, F0 141/37&*
^H.MacMichael, 'Reminiscences of Kordofan in 1906', SAD/294/l8*
^Por d&tails see pp.369~380.
6Slatin to Wingate, 2 Dec. 19 1 2, SAD/183/3.
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Despite hi ^ excessive freedom of expression Slatin1s views did not
differ from those of Wingate* He regarded domestic slavery as an
essential part of the Sudan1s economy and used all his influence to
1discourage runaway slaves *
Darfur*
Darfur, to all intents and purposes, was independent under Sultan
*Ali Dinar until its conquest in 1916. It® major problems during
that period were its western borders which were threatened by the
2
advancing French • Slatin, as the last general-governor of Darfur
in the Turco-Egyptian Sudan, was regarded as the greatest living
authority rim riits history and was entrusted with all ibs administrative
problems* The principles underlying the relationship between Sudan
and Darfur were laid down by Cromer in March 1900 when he vetoed
Wingate’s Suggestion that the British flag should be hoisted in 
3
Darfur • Cromer insisted that the administration of Darfur from 
Khartoum would be costly, useless and inefficient, and that ?Alii
1In 1900, Slatin wrote a memorandum on conditions in the Sudan* One 
of his suggestions was to release from the army all slaves who ©ould 
be induced to return to their masters in order to increase cultiva­
tion; Slatin to Wingate, 21 Jan* 1900, FO 78/5026* In 1901 Slatin 
again urged a firmer handling of runaway slaves* ’Notes Dongola’, 
Slatin’s diary 1901, SAD/441»
It is not intended to describe the problems of Darfur during rAli 
Dinar's rule; this account will be limited to questions affecting 
the Sudan, which were dealt with by Slatin. For a full account 
see A.B.Theobald, *Ali Dinar*
^Wingate to Cromer, 27 Mar. 1900, F0 78/5087
Dinar should be left in peace* This policy was endorsed by the
1 2
British government and was duly carried out by Slatin and Wingate '• 
Slatin's first aim was to establish cordial relations with Darfur 
which ;he hoped to achieve by visiting the country. *A1T Dinar thought, 
differently, and wrote to W i n g a t e . n o t  to send Slatin who, owing 
to his perspnality, would do more harm in Darfur than the, Khalifa 
did*..'^ In fact, no senior official of the Sudan government,.was 
allowed into Darfur during fAll Dinar's reign^. Communications with 
Darfur were carried on by messengers-and were conducted by Slatin 
until his retirement. His basic policy was not to interfere in Dai>- 
fur's internal affairs* The Arab tribes of Darfur, such as the 
Ma'aliya and the Ri^ayqat, who were constantly harassed-by the Fur 
army, were driven back across the borders whenever they sought.refu-.. 
ge in the Sudan • Slatin only agreed to write to *Ali Dinar advising
1Cromer to Salisbury, 29 Mar. 1900, Ibid; Sanderson to Cromer, 13 
Apr. 1900, Ibid.
2During 1901 Wingate claimed that Darfur*s independence was a threat 
to-the Sudan, Wingate, to Cromer, 3 Mar. 1901, FO 141/364*
3Wingate to Cromer, 3 Mar. 1901, Ibid.
^Theobald, *Ali Dinar, pp*39“42; In 1908 a rumour was spread in the 
British press that Slatin had been captured in Darfur by *A1T Dinar, 
The Times. 5 May 1908; In his last letter to Slatin, *AIT Dinar 
reiterated his hopes that, god willing, their long awaited meeting 
will soon take place. See Lewis to Slatin (quoting *Ali Dinar's 
letter), 14 July 1914» SAD/434/228.
^See Theobald, ’All Dinar. pp.45”50}126r-133; There were only few ex­
ceptions made to this rule. In 1901 a section of the Ma*alTya was^ 
allowed to settle in the Sudan, provided they leave the border region; 
SIR - 87, Oct. 1901; in 1913-4 & section of the ZayadTya who fled to 
Kordofan were forced to move to central Kordofan owing to Slatin's 
insistence* Theobald, ’All Dinart pp.133-6.
' - 86 - . - 
1
him to adopt a more lenient tribal policy . Yet, concurrently, he.
ordered the Darfur tribes to obey their ruler* rAli Dinar was paying
■ 2 ‘ . ‘ ‘ 
a yearly tribute to the Sudan government , and was in Slatin1 s..view
3
immune from any interference in his internal affairs • Thus Slatin, 
Who implemented a policy of free immigration; into the.Sudan from all 
the neighbouring, states, insisted on this very rigid attitude towards 
the tribes of Darfur^*
Numerous clashes also occurred between the.nomadic tribes of 
Kordofan and the Bahr al-Ghazal, and between tribes from Darfur and 
its army* In 1903 the Kordofan-Darfur border was agreed upon by
Slatin and rAlX Dinar's cousin, and thbugh border incidents persisted
: 5 - . .
they were somewhat easier to control
Several Mahdist amirs who escaped from the Sudan found refuge in
Darfur* Ostensibly the Sudan government had a right to demand their
^See for instance Mudir Kordofan to All Dianr,25 Sep* 1901> SIR- 87, 
Oct* 1901, Appendix 'A'.
2 'A special ' All. Dinar'Fund' was founded in 1901 to absorb Darfur's
yearly tribute* It was managed by Slatin and was used for expenses
outside the regular budget. See Slatin to Wingate, 28 July 19141 SAD/
273/lJ see also Theobald, ’A11 Dinar. , pp.42-317 7-80*
^Ibid, p.70*
^"Butler's diary, 21 Nov. 1911, SAD/400/lO; Slatin who initiated Butler 
into intelligence work], explained to him that immigration from all 
neighbour states was-to be encouraged as it proved hew ^ood the Sudan 
government was. As for Darfur, all immigrants were to: be forced 
back, due to their stealing cattle.
^Theobald, *A1T Dinar, pp*67~9i SIR - 149» Dec. 1906.
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extradition, or at least to be consulted regarding their fate.
Slatin, however, advised Wingate not to interfere, and when Karamallah 
Kurqusawi was executed by *Ali Dinar in 1903, advised Wingate 
against .any official censure"*"• Darfur affairs were, thus, conducted 
by Slatin without undue interference by Wingate or by other British 
officials*
o. Slatin1s tribal policy and his relations with non-British personnel*
In 1902, all the provincial governors were instructed that mat4
• 2 
ters concerning nomad Arab tribes were to be dealt with by Slatin •
Yet the difference between nomad and sedentary tribes was in many
cases obscure, so that Slatin in fact assumed full responsibility for
almost all tribal affairs, including appointments of shaykhs, tribal
justice, land ownership and taxation*
During his first year in office Slatin fixed the tribute of the
3
tribes in Kassala, Dongola, Berber, Khartoum and Fashoda . In 1901 
Slatin ruled that all people who had lived in Nahud for over three 
years were to keep their lands and a third of their tebeldi trees^,
■**Muhammad Khalid Zuqal and Muhammad fUthman Abu Qarja surrendered to
*A1T Dinar in 1901, *Arabi Dafaallah surrendered in 1902 and in 1909 
Faki Sanin, was killed in. action in ICabkabiya* Theobald, *Ali Dinar, 
PP*54, 75—6j see also SIR -88, Nov. 1901; SIR-98, Sep.1902; SIR - 
107, June 1903; SIR - 176, Mar. 1909.
2
■; GAO - 64, 17 Apr* 1902; for details about tribal policy see pp.
v  , 290-331.
Slat in1 s diary, 1900, SAD/441*
^Tebeldi trees were used for storing water in the arid areas of 
western Kordofan and Darfur* H.S.Blunt,*Tebeldis1, SMR - Vol.6 (1923), 
pp.114-116.
even if the previous land owners were to return * Following a tour
2of Kordofan in 1902, Slatin instructed the Hawazma to run a regular 
post service in the provinces; he lowered the *ushr fixed by the gov­
ernor and recommended that provincial governors should be enabled to
spend a certain amount of money without the prior consent of the fin-
3
ancial secretary • In 1903, Slatin forwarded a plan for the complete 
reorganization of the tribal administration in al-Qadarif, where 
hundreds of villages, scattered over vast areas, were supervised by 
a single nazir^-. A year later, Slatin telegraphed Henry, who was
acting governor-general in Wingate’s absence, to open the southern
■5 ~ ; . .
provinces to traders • He further objected to Shayqiya soldiers
participating in patrols in the south as they were known to be slave-
1SIR. - 82, May .1901, p.6* This order caused widespread dissatisfac­
tion among the Hamar tribe, who had deserted their lands during the 
Mahdia.
2 „  „
The Hawazma, a Baqqara tribe, were among the tribes who joined the
Mahdi before the siege of El Obeid. Holt, Mahdist State, pp*51-2; 
see also H.A.MacMichael, A history of the Arabs in the Sudan (2nd im­
pression London 1987), Vol.l.,pp.280-4*
^Notes on Kordofan, Slatin’s diary 1902, SAD/441? Slatin further 
complained about the high assessment of *ushr at al-Masalamiya in 
1903.? see Slatin to Wingate, 26 Jan. 1903, SAd/273/1.
^Slatin to Wingate, 16 Feb. 1903, SAD/273/2. Hazir (pl.nuzzar) 
inspector in charge of the administration of a tribe.
^Slatin to'Wingate, 18. July 190.4, SAd/275/5» When Mathhews,governor 
of the Upper-Nile, did not comply with this order, Wingate told Henry 
to send him. on leave; see Wingate to Henry, 4 Sep. 1904» SAD/275/7*
raiders and hence were feared by the local tribes’*".
Slatin’s system in dealing with.turbulent tribes was by collec­
tive punishment. He ordered members of the tribe to be arrested at 
random and kept in prison until the whole tribe paid the fine • He 
believed that the best way to dead with rebels was by martial law.
He wrote after the Gezira rebellion that ’...if our rebelles hsic! 
would have been tried by martial law - I would have hanged them 
before anybody in Europe would have known that they were under trial.•1^  
Slatin was also concerned with the projection of Sudanese 
landowners from land speculators and profiteers. He demanded that 
the government should develop pump irrigation on the Nile., as he 
feared ’...that "small Greeks" come in with pumps to take the whole
p r o f i t T h e s e  worries were clearly expressed when Slatin
. • ' ' 15 - ■
pointed out the dangers of the ’Zeidab Concession’ in Dongola to
local landowners.
■**Henry to Wingate, 29: July 1904, SAD/275/5i telling him of Slatin’s 
veto. . Slatin later waived his. ob jection, as the only alternative was
to cancel the whole expedition, and he agreed t h a t ’...fear is bet­
ter than love-...1 , Slatin to Wingate, 8 Sep. 1904, SAD/275/7*
2Slatin to Wingate, 19 Mar. 1906, SiU)/278/3!.
^Slatin to Wingate, 13 Aug. I908, SAEi/283/8/3.
4Slatih to Wingate, 19 Mar*! 1907, SAD/280/3.
For details of this concession, which was granted to an American 
capitalist, Leigh Hunt in 1904, see Gaitskell, Gezira, pp.51-5.
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•••The result*., will be that the Jaalin will evacuate their 
Sakiehsl and work for the comp. Before long they, will sell 
their lands fpr which they cannot pay the taxes and instead 
of lahd owners they will become tenants., it pays a man more 
to work where water and seed is supplied instead to worry 
behind his own Sakieh...^
These convictions should have brought Slatin to support the leaseh
hold system which was proposed by Currie for the town lands of
Omdurman in order to avoid speculation. Slatin, however, opposed
the scheme on the ground that leasehold was unpopular among the
inhabitants of the Sudan .
By and large, Slatin seems to have favoured tradition and to
have tried to restore the tribes to their position in pre-Mahdist
times. This applied to tribal customs as well as to th&phoice of
personnel. Slatin appointed nazirs and shaykhs whose families had
proved loyal and whom he had known personally, rather, than the men
favoured by the loc&l British officials^* Bashir Kanbal, was a cause
for bitter friction between Slatin and the British officialsitu
Kordofan. Bashir, of Shayqi origin, had served with Slatin in
Darfur in 1877 and was appointed after the regoncruest' as mu a win
^Sakieh (saqiya*^ - a wheel placed alongside the river and driven, 
by oxen in order to lift the water for irrigation.
^Slatin to Wingate, 17 Aug. 1908, SAD/283/8/4* In 1913 Slatin again 
Interfered on behalf of the tenants at the Taybiya farm and succe­
eded to increase their share of the crop. See Slatin1s diary,
4 Dec. 1913, SAD/441*
3GGC, 10 Feb. 1910, K) 867/3; see also pp.356-357.
See for instance K.D.D. Henderson,1 Some notes on the history of the
tribes living, south of Wadi el-Ghala* (Typescript n.d.),SAD/478/5, 
Henderson described how Muhammad al-Faqir was appointed as nazir of 
the Misirlya on Slatin*s recommendation, despite his tb&leration of 
slave raiding. Sir H.MacMichael confirmed thes& impressions in his- 
interview on €hJune 19^7, adding however that. Slatin*s judgement of 
men, was as a rule superior to that of his fellow officials.
5* Mu*awin of Arabs, was a special adjutant for Arab affairs.
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of '-is he Arabs in Kordofan* Slatin relied on his advice to the exclu- 
.smon ;ofeveryone .else, including'his, British colleagues • The same 
attitude was adopted towards *Abd al-Rahtm Abu-Daqal who, as minor 
Mahdist amir, received a letter of amnesty from Slatin in September
, ■ ’ ' ' ■ ' ' ' 2
1898, and was appointed naair of the; GharaysTyya branch of the Hamar • 
Despite the complaints that were,levied against Abu-Daqai by British 
inspectors, Slatin stood firmly by him^. In certain cases he also 
disregarded the authority of hisnominees within their own tribes*
He appointed. *Abbas Rahmatallah^as shaykh of the Ja*aliyyin in 
Omdurman, despite widespread opposition from his tribe •
Slatin1s special regard for his fellow-prisoners in Omdurman
• 6 ■ 
was clearly:proved by the letters of recommendation he gave them •
Following their appointments Slatin regarded their welfare as his
responsibility* He insisted that the remuneration of the tribal
1 :
See for instance Slatin1s diary, 28 Mar. 1900, SAD/441, where he 
wrote that he told O’Connel, one of the first inspectors in Kordofan, 
not to do anything without Bashir Kanbal’s advice; Willis1s diary,
1 Mar. 1909, SAD/210/2; see also Willis to CD., 6 June 1909, SAD/209/l, 
Willis wrote that the trouble between the Misiriya and Humr tribes 
of Kordofan 1*•.was got up by a gdng of Slatin’s followers...encour­
aged by Bashir Bey our so called Mamur of Arabs, who is Slatin’s 
chief star in Kordofan...1
IC.D.D.Henderson, ’Uoteon the History ;of the:Hamar Tribe of Western ; 
_ Kordofan',(:i932) , SAD/478/5/2; .see also Hill, p.15.
3SIR - 86, Sep. 19.01> ■
4Hill, 31, p.2. • ' :
^Ferguson to Wingate, 3 June 1902, SAB/272/4/l, reporting that Slatin
refused to receive the petitions; against Rahmatallah.'
Slatin to MacMichael, 21 Mar. 1909> recommending Shaykh al-Khi<Jr 
Wad al-TuhkT; see also Slatin to MacMichael,. 24 Mar. 1913, recommen­
ding Ahmad Muhammad al-Badawi; both of them were his former fellow 
■prisoners, SAD/403/8/2.
shaykhs and fumdas^~ was: not. adequate* By I9O7,, shaykhs were paid
*  2 ' ~ ' for assessing cushr , -and in 1912, the general remuneration of all
tribal tax collectors was raised* In both cases this was done fol­
lowing demands made by Slatin^. He also strongly urged Wingate to 
abolish the old, Ottoman custom which still prevailed in the Sudan, 
whereby all Sudanese had to dismount when meeting an officer.
•••the respectable Sudan merchant, Sheikh and Omdeh - hopps 
like a fly - up and down, because*..if he rides to the streets 
of Khart* and Omdurman he is bound to meet officers* If you 
.agree I would find a suitable working in your name to do 
away with this old Turkish custom..,4 .
There was, however, a certain ambiguity in this attitude*
Slatin trusted his nominees but mistrusted the Sudanese generally,
1 Sudanese are always .*.scoundrels - if they are not under con-
5 6
trol and under Kurbatsh the Isicl go wrong...1 Hence he insisted
that a British officer should be in charge of Sinkat during the
summer months 1•..and not leave thousands of subjects to the mercy
- ’. . . ■ ■ 7
.of Mohammed Bey Ahmed - although your favourite he is only native*.1
 ^rUmda (pl* yumad; Einglish form - tumdas): village headman, adminis­
trative head of a number of villages.
2Slatin's'diary, :Notes 1907, SAD/441.
GGC, 27. May 1912, FO 867/3; in his demands Slatin did not limit
himself to shaykhs but looked after the.welfare of the Sudanese 
policemen and ma*dhuns as.he put it to Wingate, f...we have to do 
something for the little m a n . S l a t i n  to Wingate, 27 Jan. 1903, 
SAD/273/iJ see also SlatinVs diary, Notes 1907, SAD/441? details 
see pp. 313-15*
^Slatin to Wingate, 10 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/l; according to Hill,
Slatin, p.81, a similar suggestion was made by .Slatin in 1903*
r ■ ■
•^Kurba.i, a whip usually made of hippopotamus hide, used for punish­
ing offenders*
6Slatin to Wingate, '27 Jan. 19Q3, SAD/273/1.
‘Slatin to Wingate, ,14 Apr. 1912, SAD/l8l/l/3.
An interest inside-light on Slatin1s traditional approach was shown 
in a memorandum he sent to all provincial governors, warning them 
against the excessive freedom of the young generation. He instruc­
ted the governors to explain to local parents that they were respon­
sible for their children until the age of eighteen, even should it
■ ‘ 1 , entail *...giving a good licking to lazy hoys and had girls...1
In his mistrust of the Egyptian personnel Slatin did not differ
largely from; his British colleagues. ..Yet, at the same time he tried
; ’ 2
to he fair and to support them whenever they had a gsemiine grievance . 
This was well expressed in a letter to Wingate, where Slatin com­
plained ahout a Britifeh administrator at Kassala.
...His 1 the British officialI main work was to spy after 
Egyptlianl officers and to impress on natives, that we 
consider all egyptians "scoundrels’*• • .1 am the last to 
trust a gyppy — but we have to pluck them up as long as 
nothing is against them...3
This-attitude prevailed when, in 1908, the Egyptian officers wished
to open a club in Khartoum. The intelligence department opposed the
project as they: feared subversive propaganda. Slatin convinced
Wingate that there was no harm in the club as * ...Arabs can never
keep secrets...1 and that the inherent suspiciousness of the British
"^Slatin to Wingate, 21 Mar. 1'913» SAD./185/3/3* This again is remi­
niscent of the Mahdi, who in one of his proclamations laid down a 
code of behaviour for the people of the Sudan. Manshurat al-Imam 
ai-Mahdi. Vol.Ill, (Khartoum 1964), pp.29-31.
2See for instance Slatin* s diary, June 19.01, SAD/441* where he rep­
orted favourably on the Egyptian ma’murs at al-Ru^ayrig; see also 
Slatin to Wingate,V30 Nov. 1902, SAD/272/8, where he asked for 
Wingate’s assistance for one of the Egyptian employees at Kodok; 
see also Note^Singa in Slatin*s diary 1913, SAD/441» where he com­
plained that one of the Egyptian officials in Sennar had not been 
ppromoted for six years* .
^Slatin to Wingate, 16 February 1903, SAD/273/2*
“  9 4  “
1officials should not be taken too seriously • Slatin also devised
a plan encouraging Egyptian officers to settle in the Sudan by
2selling them land at a special reduced rate •
On the other hand Slatin1s mistrust of Egyptians led him to
oppose their being entrusted todrth too much responsibility, ''*...1
have nothing special against Mah. II. I Mahmud Hu say ni who is a hard
working clever man - but it is my old complaint that he runs too 
' 3
much of.the show...1 Basically, therefore, Slatin regarded both 
Sudanese and Egyptians as untrustworthy unless kept under strict 
control. Slatin’s mistrust was reciprocated by the Egyptians and 
Sudanese; perhaps an inevitable repercussion. Wingate, who was 
aware of this, explained to Cromer that Slatin * ...is unpopular 
with native officers whose maladministrative practices he fearless­
ly discloses. . .;f 4 Butler, of the intelligence department, felt 
that the mistrust for Slatin was of a more general nature:*...He 
was not popular among the Sudanese as he was supposed to show fa­
vouritism to his pals among the tribes, and I dont think they 
trusted him...1 Sir Harold MacMichael added yet another aspect,
1 ■
Slatin to Wingate, 28 Aug* 1908; see also Wingate to Amery, 31
Aug. 1908, where he repeats Slatin*s arguments and tells Amery to
support the club, SAD/283/8/3*
2Slatin to Wingate, 19 Mar. 1907, SAD/280/3.
3Slatin to Wingate,30 Nov. 1902, SAD/272/8. . .
4Wingate to Cromer (secret)., 17 Jan. 1902, E0 141/371*
^Butler* s Journal, 1911, SAI)/422/i2; this did not stop Slatin from 
accusing Wingate of favouritism to his own nominees, *•..Do you think 
that actiois like this increase your prestige as the head of the Gov­
ernment who should be impartial.., see Slatin to Wingate, 20 Dec. 
1913, SAD/104/6.
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■by saying that many Muslims rejected Slatin as a renegade who. had
1changed his religion twice for reasons of political expediency *
While these were Slatin’s main spheres of action, he rendered
his advice in nearly every other field. In 1906 he advised estab-
2lishing a separate governorship of the Nuba mountains • In 1910 the
reorganization of the department of agriculture and lands was based
on Slatin’s suggestion^. Even speeches by British personalities
visiting the Sudan were prepared by Slatin. He suggested the main
points for Cromer’s speech to the ’Sheikhs and Notables’ in 1900 ,^
and dictated to.Wingate's secretary, his idesss for the King’s speech
to be delivered during George V’s visit to the Sudan in 1912 •
d. Slatin’s relations with Wingate and with British officials.
Slatin's unique position was largely responsible for his relati
ions with his fellow officials* He was an Austrian exercising:
...the second highest authority in a British Administration.
His English was peculiar...His.practical bent*•.inclined him 
to be impatient of academic ideas and gave him a very different
1
Interview with Sir H.MacMichael, 6 June 19^7? this seems to be born 
out. by a telegram Slatin received from the ’Union of Murder’ in Cairo 
on the 9 Apr. 1910, in which they threatened to kill him for becom­
ing a Christian. See Slatin's diary, 12 Apr. 1910, SAD/441*
2GGR - 1906, p.134* This was turned down owing to shortage of 
personnel and only in 1914 did the Nuba mountains become a separate 
province.
3Slatin to Clayton, 1 Aug. 1910, SAD/297/2.
4Slatin to Wingate, 26 Nov. 1900, SAD/270/ll.
Slatin's diary, 29 Nov. 1911, SAD/441; all the points mentioned hy 
Slatin, were in fact incorporated in the speech.
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. perspective to that of Inany of his colleagues.*
Furthermore, many of the provincial governors regarded their 
own knowledge of local affairs as superior to Slatin's and there­
fore objected to his supreme authority which was never questioned 
by Wingate. They accused Slatin of appointing his cronies from
the pre-Anglo-Egyptian period as shaykhs and nazirs. positions they
2did not deserve and which they often abused • Some criticized his 
double talk in dealing with the tribesj claiming that he promised the 
shaykhs one thing^while instructing the local inspector in the 
opposite sense^.
Basically the problem was that the men on the spot felt their 
authority was undermined by Slatin's interference^'* This feeling was 
apparently shared by both Cromer and Gorst. Following the 'Jackson 
affair', Cromer blamed Wingate for the '...injudicious manner in 
which Slatin's services have been utilized*.•' Gorst went even
■ 1Symes, Tour of Duty, (London 1946), p*l6.
^See pp.90-1.
3Billis to 0., 14 Apr. 1909, SAD/209/l.
Following a tou# of Kassala province, Slatin complained, of his dif—
ficulties with its governor, Henry Pasha,.H enr y accept I sicI 
almost my advice but he expresses his feeling as follow: Well - I 
will do what you suggest - but people will say - you ordered me to 
do so - or :why people send petitions to you? I. am Mudir and I_ have 
to look after them...'Slatin to Wingate, 16 Feb. 1903, SAD/273/2; 
Following a complaint from Henry, Wingate gave his full backing to 
Slatin's advice and added '...I quite understandshe irritation his 
'’shouting down” causes you. I can only say that I also suffer from 
him in that r e s p e c t ,Wingate to Henry, 1 Apr. 19^3, SAh/273/4*
^Cromer to Lansdowne, 19 Jan. 1902, FO 633/6.
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further in asserting, '••.that it is, of course, quite impossible
to get a man of his I Slatin1s I character to understand the point
1of view of the British public...1
Slatin was well aware of these views hut they did not inhibit
him from criticizing his British colleagues, both military and civil,
whenever necessary. Following one of the frequent revolts in the
Nuba mountains Slatin complained that the British officers had no
2
inkling as to the real situation in their district * In 1909 he 
complained that the governor of Kassala 1...had not seen notables of 
Berbera awlad Ahmed for two years...Never accepts any. complaints... 
nobody is allowed to come near him and order is given to drive away 
natives attempting to talk or to reach h i m . E v e n  mpr^mmiliating 
were Slatin*s charges that some of his British colleagues were ac~ , 
ting with undisguised injustice* He denounced them for administe­
ring public lashings to local dignitaries without adequate reason, 
and complained to Wingate that ,***it isnt pleasant to justify or 
to defend an action of a comrade publicly $ which one had to condemn
■^ Gorst to Grey (private), 31 May 1908, FO 800/47; this letter was 
written following Slatin*s views about the Geaira rebellion.
Bonham Carter and Gurrie-whose criticism of the British government's 
policy was even more blatant, were not accused for their un-British 
character.
^Slatin to Wingate, 4 June 1906, SAD/278/6.
^'Notes on Kassala*, Slatin's diary 1909i SAD/441*
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1secretly**.'
On another occasion Slatin condemned a military action in the
Nuba mountains insisting that it was undertaken for no better reason
than to satisfy the.British commandant’s dislike of the local 
2
shaykh • Even Morse was the case near al-Qadarif, when the local 
naggr was imprisoned, his wives ill-treated, and the whole village 
evacuated, for no adequate reason.whatsoever* Slatin promptly re­
instated the nasa&rrand blamed the British officer for a miscarriage 
3of justice •
Despite these numerous incidents Slatin on the whole preferred
the Britihh officers to their fellow civilians with whom he failed
to find a common language. He expressed his doubts about civilian
employees when the suggestion of their employment was first made^.
5He vetoed the suggestion that Kerr^ should ,be appointed as the first
"^Slatin to Wingate, 19 Dec. 1908* S.AD/284/12/2; Slatin’s complaint 
was against the governor of Kordofan, who had ordered the son of the 
nSzir of Bara to be lashed publicly; see also Slatin's diary, 20 Dec. 
1908, SAD/441* where he complained that a tribesman in Kordofan had 
been lashed to death by order of the British inspector.
^Slatin's diary, 6 Nov. 1910, SAD/441.
^Slatin to Wingate, 20 Dec. 1913, S.AD/104/6.
^Slatin to Wingate, 4 Jan. 1900, SAD/270/lO. .
^Kerr, Graham Campbell (1872-1913), joined the Sudan civil service 
in 1901, with the first group of British civilians recruited from 
universities. Following ei&ht years service as an inspector in the 
Bed Sea and Sennar provinces, he was appointed in 1909 as governor 
of the Red Sea province, the first civilian governor in the Anglo- 
Egyptian Sudan. Hill, BD, p.198.
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civilian governor in the Sudan and as a result the appointment was
1postponed for another year . Slatin constantly clashed with the 
senior civilian officials. He had no patience for their academic 
approach or" for their insistence on an abstract form of justice 
which held no meaning whatsoever for Slatin • He criticized them 
for their ’stand offish1 attitude towards the Sudanese, and never 
failed to mention their shortcomings* In 1910 Slatin wrote:1...I 
have been, at the Hamer Show ia yearly agricultural displayI.*.1 was 
rather sick that not one of the Civilians - who are so proud of their 
"liberal education" .thought it is worth while to go. ..’  ^ His
opinion of the civilians was concisely expressed when he wrote:
1..•The Red fla& for all civilians under C & B I Currie and Bonham 
Carter! guidance?*! I wish I would have got a "liberal education" to . 
be able to be useful and improve the s i t u a t i o n . H e e d l e s s  to 
say Slatin regarded his own usefulness as more than adequate and
1Slatin to Wingate, 15 lar. 1908, Biffi/282/3/l.
2  ' f —See for instance Slatin’s statement about Hasan Amir 1?I,In.d.Bec* 
1904?l, SAD/439/640, where he complained that Sterry, the chief 
judge, had'no right-to interfere in the dismissal of a certain *Umda 
and was even less justified in criticising Slatin’s decisions.
^Slatin to Wingate, 20 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/I; see also Slatin to
Wingate, 27 Mar. 1910, Ibid, where he reported that all the military
officers attended the Mawlid al-Nabi, but not one civilian.
^Ibid; Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, (187O-I956), was appointed first 
legal secretary of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1899 and held that 
post until 1917 when he was transferred to Iraq.
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looked upon a 'liberal education* as an obstacle rather than an 
asset* Wingate, however, hardly relied on Slatin's advice concer­
ning his British, personnel, and the volume of Slatin's complaints
1in this field adequately bears this out • The lack of complaints
in other fields proves yet another fact,. namely, that apart from
2personnel and finance^, Slatin's advice was generally accepted '* 
During his fourteen years as inspector-general Slatin contem­
plated resignation more than once* In 1906 Wingate overcame his 
threat by bending him on a libng holiday and assuring him of his 
absolute, confidence in his advice^* In 1908, Slatin sent Wingate 
an official letter of resignation on the grounds that the clemency 
extended to the Gezira rebels would endanger the Sudan^. Following
a strong appeal from Wingate Slatin again withdrew his resignation
■ V 15
stressing that he did so for Wingate's sake only .
See for instance Slatin to Wingate, 28 Nov* 1902; Wingate to Slatin,
22 Dec. 1902, SAd/272/8; see also Slatin to Wingate, 21 Mar* 1913, 
SAD/185/3/l) where Slatin complained that by doing away with the 
Selection Board, Wingate had become a virtual dictator. In 1913 
Slatin compiled a list of his complaints under the heading W I WingateI, 
most of which were concerned with problems of personnel; see Slatin's 
diary, 1913, SAD/441.
2
In the field of finances, Slatin apparently knew his shortcomings 
and hardly interfered* He complained, however, when the £3m* British 
guaranteed loan was announced in the Sudan Gazettet without his 
previous knowledge; see Slatin's diary 1913,(list of complaints at 
the end of diary), SAD/441*
^Wingate to Slatin, 28 Mar. 1906, SAD/43l/ll.
^Slatin to Halcimam 1 Hakim *Em:the Egyptian term for governor-generall ,
2 June 11908?!, SAD/451/124.
^Wingatd to Slatin, 3 June 1908; Slatin to Wingate, 4 June |1908?|,
SAD/451/124.
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The high regard in which Wingate held Slatin was; expressed, when 
he wrote to Stack *••.As for Slatin I look upon him as a very privi­
leged person and his value to the Sudan Govt* is so enormous that
: - i
I am quite ready to sacrifice my flAmour propre", for him**.’ Yet 
it was Slatin's 'very privileged' position which caused most of the 
difficulties. Here he was, a single Austrian in an Anglo-Egyptian 
administration, with a greater impact on policy making than any 
other official. He was consulted by Wingate on nearly all problems 
of Sudan administration, and in the majority of cases his opinions 
bacame government policy. It is.true that Wingate also asked for 
the.advice of his fellow British officials but in most cases they 
were only consulted regarding their immediate spheres of responsibi­
lity ..
I The explanation of Slati^s authority lies in a number of 
factors. His vast experience of Sudan affairs; his fearless 
criticism* and his position as inspector-general-which enabled him, 
alone among government officials, to gain an overall view of the 
country's administration* Yet all this does not explain the 
unlimited trust Wingate had in Slatin. To understand it one would 
have to study the characters of these two men who, above all else, 
were the closest of friends for nearly four decades.
'^ 'Wingate to Stack, 4 June 1908, SAD/284/13.
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Slatin was first and foremost a man of worldly wisdom and of 
highly practical bent* \ He, like Wingate, had little patience for 
the theoretical, manipulations and sophisticated arguments of his 
fellow civilians. But equally he discarded the purely military 
approach to .administrative problems. Both Slatin and Wingate 
regarded themselves as the bearers of civilization and progress to 
the unprivileged people of the Sudan. They treated the penetration 
of Egyptian nationalism into the country as a great calamity. Even 
in their personal tastes they were very much alike. Their love 
of pomp and state and their high esteem for royalty were a standing 
joke in Sudan government circles.
It was as a result of their similarity of views and characters, 
combined with the high esteem in which they held each other, that 
Slatin and Wingate worked in close collaboration throughout Slatin's 
service in the Sudan and remained close friends after his resignation 
in 1914.
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Chapter III.
- Government departments and provinces. ,
The administration of the Sudan was established during the 
Wingate era. Some of the central government departments had exis­
ted prior to the reoonquest, within the Egyptian army, and were later 
transferred to the Sudan government. Others were established when 
their services were required and the meagre Sudan budget could sup- 
port them. ‘Provincial administration also evolved gradually. Prom 
I.899 to 1918 the number of provinces increased from eight to fifteen 
through the extension, of territory-and the subdivision of existing 
provinces.
At the top of the administrative hierarchy was the governor- 
general followed by Slatin, the inspector-general. The Sudan agent 
in Cairo, who was also head of intelligence, served as a liaison 
between the Sudan .and Egypt and was selected from Wingate1s confida , 
ants. At the head of the central administration in Khartoum were
the financial, legal and civil secretaries, followed by the direot-
' • ' 1 
ors of the other departments and the provincial governors • A brief
account of some of these departments will have to suffice. Only
those whose duties had a direct bearing on.administrative policy will
be more fully discussed in later chapters.
1 .
A c c s c a l e  of salaries the inspector-general was at the
top. fhel9^$P with £E 2500 per annum. The other departmental heads 
and governors were divided into three categories: category 'A' - the 
legal and financial secretaries £E 1500- l800 p.a.; Category 'B* - 
the civil secretary and the directors of education, public works, 
agriculture and forests, railway and steamers, £E 1200-1500 p.a.; 
category IQ? - the Sudan agent, the directors of the remaining 
departments, and the provincial governors, £E 1080-1200. p.a.; 'Secret 
memorandum' - 1?0J, SAD/157/7.
   _ — '■ ■
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The post of inspector-general ceased to exist in 1914, following Slatin's resignation.
2 - 
The Labour Bureau was set up in 1905/ CA O— 241, 18 Jan. 1 9 0 5.
\)p to 1910 there was a department for agriculture ind lands and a department for woods and forests. 
In 1910 they were merged, and the lands section became part of the legal department; GGC - 1 Nov. 
1910, F0 867; SG - 190, 5 Jan. 1911.
^The customs department .was established in 1905 as an independent department and was affiliated to 
the financial secretary's office in 1914; CAO - 245, 18 Jan. 1905; Wingate to Clayton, 15 Dec. 1913, 
SAD/469/5 ; GGC - 3 Mar. 1914, FO 867/5 .
. 5
The prisons and police became part of the civil secretary’s office in 1905; see CAO - 230, 12 Dec.
1904. - .
The stores became part of the civil secretary's department in 1904 when the controller's department 
was abolished. CAO — 229, 12 Dec. I9O4 .
7
Until 1904 it was a military department. The civil department established in 1904 was only in 
charge of the Northern provinces, while the South remained under the Egyptian army. GGR -1904,p.83.
8
Up to tiie end of 1906 the Egyptia.n army works department was responsible for public works. In
1907 a separate public works department was established. GGR - 1906, p.59.
9The steamers department was transferred from the Egypt 1 an army in 1902; SG - 31, Jan. 1902. Up to
1909 it- was called the steamers and boats department, SG. - 147, Jan. 1 9 0 9.
10Until 1 Jan. 1910 this department was attached to the Egyptian ministry of Interior. In 1911 it
became a central Sudan government department. Vlingate to Gorst (secret), 6 Dec. 1910, SAD/298/2 .
11 •
The White Nile province was founded in 1905; SG - 6 9, 1 Jan. 1905
12 -
Mongalla province was founded in I9O6 from the Bor and Mongalla districts of the Upper Nile
province; GGR - 1906, p.7 0 7. In 1910 part of the Lado enclave was annexed to Mongalla.
3Ajp to Jan. 1905 it was called the Gezira province; SCI - 6 9, 1 Jan. 1905; the Gezira province was 
formed in 1902 out of the southern half of Khartoum province. CAO - 6 6, 1 May 1902.
 ^'The Bahr al-Ghazal was under military command until 1902, when it was transfered to the civil 
administration. SG. - 34, Apr. 1902.
~^The Nuba Mountains
1 Suakin was a separate governorate until 10 July 1899, when the Condominium Agreement extended over 
it. In 1906 its name was changed to the Red Sea province. GGR - 1905, p.55.
^The Upper uile *us called Fashoda district until 19o3« SG — 54, Dec. 1903; the name of the town 
Fashoda, was changed to Kodok.
18
During the first years of the Condominium there was a distincti >n between first class and second 
class provinces, (mudfrl.yya and muhafaza). Haifa, Fashoda, and Suakin were second class provinces 
while all other provinces were first class. SG - 4 5 , 1 Mar. 1903. This distinction appears to 
have been discontinued in the later years.
province was separated from Kordofan in 1914, GGR - 1914,- p.60.
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a. The Sudan agent and the intelligence department.
The intelligence department of the Egyptian army existed many
years prior to. the reconquest and Wingate acted as D.M.I. from I889
■ ’ . 1 • % '
until he became governor-general • After, the battle of Karari most
of the staff of the intelligence department was transferred to
Khartoum, while the head of intelligence remained in Cairo and bore
2the additional title of. Sudan agent •
The duties of the: Sudan agent and his relations with other depar­
tments were formulated in several circulars during the years 1903- 
1910* The 1903 circular stated:
•/•The Sudan agent will broadly be the channel of communication 
between the outer world and the Civil Administration of the 
Sudan Government•..He will be the channel between the Sudan and 
the various offices of the Egyptian Ministries and the Army of 
Occupation...He wild be the sole channel between, the Departments 
of the Sudan Government...and the British Agent and Consul 
General...3
As for the intelligence department, the Sudan agent was required only
1 . . - ■' ■ -V '• , .
See p*27; for,details see R.Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, pp.81-127
2 ■
Until 1903 the Sudan agent was Count Gleichen whose official title
was 'Assistant Civil Secretary and Sudan Agent1. In 1903*.the title
was changed to Agent General and since 1905 it reverted to Sudan
agent. CAO - 101, 30 Nov. 1903* See also diagrams, pp.104-5*
3 • •These circulars were, quoted in a confidential report on the Sudan- 
Agency submitted by the Sudan, agent to the First Secretary of the 
Residency in Cairo, 27 Oct. I925, EO 14l/448» I have not been able/, 
to locate the original.circulars. The following details are all 
from the confidential report•
to keep in close touch with its worker In November 1904» an add.iti-r* 
onal circular delineated, the intelligence duties of the department.
It .emphasized that it was impossible to divorce military.work from 
political-civil considerations* .She duties of, Gecil. , then agent- 
general, were- further .defined» and he was entrusted with the supreme 
command of all troops in Egypt in the sirdar1s absence .Throughout 
all these years the Sudan agency remained part of the civil secreta­
r y ^  office. Only in 1907> during Owen’s tenure of office as agent, , 
were the. two finally divorced • It was under Stack and Clayton 
that the Sudan agent achieved an even greater measure of author it y*. 
In 1910, Stack .complained that:
• 7*W*therto many cases have frequently .'occurred’, in which the 
Sudan Agentowing, to lack of precise information, has been 
unable to reply "at/once to enquiries by the British Agency, 
representatives of the foreign Governments in Cairo, commercial 
firms and others*>*4 . = : •
Wingate thereupon ordered that’ the Sudan agency should become an
independent office on lines similar to an agency of a colony. He
Lord Edward Herbert Gascoyne Cecil (1867-1918),, fourth son of the ‘
3rd Marquess of Salisbury, was seconded to the Egyptian army in 1896 
and took part in the Bongola campaign and in the battle of Karari; 
agent-general' 1903-5; under-secretary of:state in Egyptian ministry 
of finance 1905-12; financial adviser 1912-18. DNBS, 1912-21, pp.101-2.
2 . ' . V  • - - ‘ ■' ■
These military duties seem to have disappeared after Cecil’s repla­
cement by Owen in-1905..
.^OwenV Hoger Ga-rmichaei Robert (1866-1941) f was seconded to the 
Egyptian-army in 1902-and transferred to the Sudan government in 
1903* Sudan agent and director of intelligence 1905-8; governor of 
Mongalla province 1908“l8. Hill, BD, p.300.
^'Confideniial'R^por-t..:.1 , 27 Oct. 1925, FO 141/448, p.5. .
' '■ ; ■ -  1 0 8  -  . / \ .V ■ ,
\requested;'-hiX',]iie^ <3Ls-.b'f departments, to acquaint the agent with all m 
matters of importance so that he may become the sole representative , 
of the: Sudan goyernmehtlin Egypt. This order was 'circulated.•confi­
dentially h;t'o:• al 1' heads, of departments, but was not published for 
. Wingate regarded it ’ ...undesirable to ...draw unnecessary attention 
to this administrative change. * • ’ The Sudan agent thus became the 
major link between his- government and the. outside world. His duties
included commercial negotiations, the sale and.registration of Sudan
2 “ ■' ' : . ." - 
lands , and the recruiting of officials from other Arabic speaking
" l . - \ ■: -r :
countries . lie was also the legal representative t>cf the Sudan in ,
Hgypt and in charge of submitting Sudan government ordinances to
the consul-general and the Egyptian authorities^-.
As head of the intelligence department the. duties of the Sudan
agent were less numerous, as the department’s main work was done in.
Khartoum.; Certain functions were, however, performed in Cairo,
..where secret agents were employed to gain information about foreign
1i.bid, p p o -6. • ■
2SG - 93, I July 1906.
,-SAR - 3.902, p.79; see also SO - 24, 1 June 1901.
Agent General to Acting Agent, 21 Aug. 1905, FO 141/393, Sudan
Agent to Acting Agent,.7 July 1906, E0 141/402.
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missions in Egypt^• Others spied on Egyptian officers in Cairo in
order to ascertain whether they influenced *...native feelings in 
2
the Sudan,.,* During the World War, intelligence work in Cairo
3increased, Clayton, then Sudan agent, collaborated with Storrs in 
running the Arab Bureau and was also member of the Headquarters staff. 
He thus became immersed in the running of the Arab revolt and in 
intelligence work generally to the exclusion of many of his former 
activities^.
By and large the Sudan agency and intelligence department were 
ordinary government departments. Their budget was allocated by the
1See for instance Owen to Wingate, 22 Apr. 1906; and Owen to Wingate, 
25 Apr, 1906,. SAD/278/4, where Owen sent Wingate a report on a con­
versation between his intelligence agent, Najib -Aauri, and Dr.Oppen- 
heim, ostensibly head of a German scientific mission, but in real ■£ 
fact head of the German intelligence service in Egypt. Wajib ^Azuri 
of the intelligence department became private secretary to the 
Egyptian minister of war in I912 (Wingate to Cecil (secret), 13 Jan, 
1913, SAD/185/l/l)* On this evidence it Is hard to determine whether 
this is’the same 'AztTripf who founded the *Ligue de la Patrie Arabe* 
and published a monthly- review in Paris during 19Q7-8. According 
to S.Haim, Arab Nationalism# (U.S.A. 1962)., p.30, rAzuri was a shady 
character and was known to have had connections with the French 
intelligence.
^Channer to Wingate, 10 Aug. 1908, SAD/283/8/2j one of their duties 
was also to oonduct the Arabic examinations for British officials in 
Egyptj see Kitchener to Grey, 29 June 1912, FO 371/1364.
3 • • ' •Sir Ronald Storrs became oriental secretary at the British agency
in Cairo in I909 following Harry Boyle’s resignation.
^Wingate to Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General 3 
Staff, 31 Aug. 1916, SAD/20l/5; Wingate complained that.owing to 
pressure.of work, Clayton had.to neglect his duties as Sudan agent 
and suggested that he should be relieved of his responsibility on 
the Headquarters Staff.
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Sudan government though the Egyptian war office contributed annually
. ■ - • - l
for intelligence work carried on in Egypt • The Sudan agent submit­
ted an annual report on his activities. These reports were, however, 
never,published due to the confidential information they.contained v 
The non-confident,ial parts were included in Wingate’s annual memo­
randum?*/ ' t •
: The intelligence department in Khartoum was nominally under the
Sudan agent and- the; director of intelligence, Cairo. In reality, 
however, its work was done by an assistant director in Khartoum under 
the direct supervision of Slatin^". The. department received monthly 
intelligence reports from the provincial governors and from its own 
agent s.; These were compiled into official. intelligence reports and 
forwarded to the British war office. The, department compiled the 
Sudan Handbook series and its historical section prepared background 
material on Sudanese tribes, sufi tarleas and other; matters of 
importance . The:department was also responsible for the repatriation
^Maxwell (G 1.0.C. Egypt) to Wingate (secret), 28 Jan. 1911,SAI)/300/i.
Owen to Wingate, 7 Apr. 1907, SAD/280/4. ,
3Stack.to Wingate, 29 Beo. 1909, SAD/289/3. :
4See p.82. :
: <This section .was headed ■ since 1913 by MacMichael, who had previous­
ly been inspector in the Kordofan and Blue Nile/provinces. (Wingate 
to Phipps, 27 Mar. 1913, SAD/185/3/2); Historical research was also 
carried cut by Na*um Shuqayr, Wingate’s right hand man during the 
;Mahdia, who was still on the staff of the intelligence in Cairoj see 
for instance - Notes on the History of the Magdhubiya - by N.Shoucair, 
31 May 1915, ,SAD/i95/7.
of tribes who were dislocated during the Mahdia • In 1906 a special
labour bureau was established within the intelligence department to
cope with domestic slavery and with the growing demand of labour
resulting from various development projects’* This bureau was put
..under the direot supervision of Slatin '..’.who was the eminence
2girse...' of the department •
. The work of the department was carried, out by regular staff, 
mainly composed of Syrians with a Roumanian and a Maltese to under­
take special duties* The head agent was an old Sudanese officer
• ■ . , . • ■ • '   .. ■
and several prominent ex~Mahdists were included onlits payroll > .
Part-time employees included the :Shaykh of the Pallata in Omdurman,
and many local dignitaries.^
The routine of intelligence work was vividly described by
Butler shortly after he joined the department in 1911:
*..13th October 1911. I*ve been in the Intelligence Dept* 
mow about a month and have met quite an interesting lot of 
people* The Grand Mufti by name Sheikh al Tayyib Hashim..*.
He is I understand quite loyal to the Government and of 
assistance to us* He is the brother of*..Sheikh,Abdel Gasim,
^CAO « 225, 16 Nov. 1904| see also pp!* 303-4»
^Butler's Journal, 1911, SAD/422/12; see also pp.387-397*
^Butler's diary, 13 Oct. 1911, SAD/400/lO; among those employed was: 
the son-of the amir fAll Ahmad, brother of the amir Mahmud ; while 
Muddathir Ibrahim, the Khalifa1s,ex-secretary acted,as Slatin's. 
confidential adviser.
^Xbid. } see also Slatin to Wingate, 20 Dec* 1913, SAD/104/6, where 
he tells him that an old friend of his, al-Taj Sa*id cameto Kassala 
pretending he had to prepare an intelligence report on the tribes and 
shaykhs of the province. The result was that he received endless 
presents from the shaykhs, including camels
Cadi of Wad Medani, a great friend of mine...Sayyid al 'Mekki 
al Morgani - Head of the Ti$aniya Tarika.. • I don1t think he 
could be trusted very far, or would be loyaler'than suits his 
convenience ,orihis -purse* . .Omar Eff.; Abdullahi, eldest son of 
the Khalifa, d :pleasant young man,.dressed in European clothes, 
intelligent face He .Is now in the Fin* SecVs office* ..Son 
of Madi. J Mahdi l by name; Said Abd al Rahman. . .a dignified young . \ . 
Arab in Arab dress*.*1.am t61d4(.At'iya)'that• the'.,-people of the v 
Sudan revere* him and lots go to him at night, to‘be healed....
16 October 1911 full morning with Mudassa IMuddathirI Ibrahim., 
ex tutor of Mahdi's sons,- A;great, stand by and confidential 
advise# of Slatin's... 20 November* Visited Omdurman and 
surprised by the poor living conditions of well to.' do people 
like the Mufti*..21 October, A busy morning with Slatin...He 
outlined Govt, policy to me...24 Octoberi Interviewed Ismail 
El Azhari, Kadi of Sennar2y ■ A clever powerful mart. Was sent 
away from El-Obeid because he took an important part in the 
morghanieh tarika dispute...31 October - As always had to go 
on rounds wifh various important chiefs and take them to the 
palace*..8 November - Struve sent me down the amount of ... 
slave captures up at Roseires and their disposal...3
This descriptian affords a true understanding of the department's 
daily procedure. It acted as:a kind of tourist bureau for provin­
cial leaders visiting.the capital* Daily visitors included its 
own informers in Omdurman as well as religious leaders from hther 
provinces who had been banished from their region for various reasons^.
^Samuel Atiya, a Lebanese, was one of the old employees of the 
department, and the most experienced of the IChart ourn staff. He 
continued his;work in the intelligence department until his retire­
ment in 1928 when his post was given to his nephew Edward.Atiyah. .
See E.Atiyah, An Arab tells his story (Lohdon 1946), pp.156-9•
2Isma?xl Ahmad al-AzharT (1868-1947)* was mufti of the Sudan,1924-32, 
Isnia^Il al-Azhari, the President of the Republic of the Sudan, is 
his grandson. See Hill, BD, p.184*
^Butler's diary, Outober-November 1911, SAD/4OO/1O.,
^See for instance Wingate to Balfour, 20 Dec. 1915» SAD/197/3/2.
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A tour of visits to the notables of Omdurman was.part of its routine. 
The department's aim in these activities was to gauge public opinion 
in the country which, lacking representative bodies or a free press, 
had no way of expressing itself. Yet the question remains: how 
reliable were these local agents' reports, especially as their links 
with the intelligence department were probably well known.
Wingate's relations with the Sudan agent and the intelligence 
department were closer than with any of the other departments*
Partly this can be understood by his personal inclinations as a one 
time D.M.l. and by hies belief that intelligence was his most compre­
hensive yardstick for measuring public opinion*. Also, the Sudan
1agent was Wingate's main link to the outside and apart from his
official duties, supplied Wingate with confidential.information
regarding Egyptian politics and the inner workings of the British 
2
agency • Probably with this in mind Wingate selected the Sudan 
agents. Of the five agents during his tenure.of office, threevhad : 
served as his private secretaries prior to their appointment and one
^For many years Wingate tried to establish a direct link with London 
by appointing a permanent Sudan agent with a special office. How­
ever, he succeede&donly in establishing a Sudan advertising agency, 
dealing mainly with commercial affairs; see Wingate to Drage, 23 
Mar. 1912,' SAD/180/3.
See for instance Cecal to Wingate, 1 Mar. 1903, SAD/273/3, where he 
wrote about the deteriorating relations between Gorst and Cromer* 
This was especially so, when Clayton became Sudan agent in 1914-1$* 
His correspondence with Wingate during that period goes far beyond 
his duties as Sudan agent; see SAD/269; SAD/2?0.
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1wars Wingate’s close friend during the. Dongola campaign f* Apart from
their specified duties Wingate consulted them on all major adminis-
2
trative problems and held their advice second only to Slatin1 s *• 
Wihgate insisted that the Sudan agent should act only on his 
behalf and not as a free agent in his dealings .with the authorities 
in Egypt'* During Clayton1 s tenure of office Wingate clearly denoun­
ced his undue independence and reprimanded him for trying to serve 
three masters at once*. He also disapproved of Clayton signing his 
own name to his numerous reports instead of using Wingate’s, in 
which case 1• •.more attention wpuld have been paid to your appeals
3
and views which after all emanate in the main from myself*•*’
As for the intelligence department in Khartoum Wingate relied 
on Slatin’s views reather than on those of the British assistant - 
director of intelligence* Only after Seatin’s resignation in 1914 ■ 
did the department achieve a more prominent position*
1The Sudan agents were: Count Gleiohen 1901-3; Lord Edward Cecil 
1903-5; Owen 1905-8; Stack 1908-14; Clayton 1914-16. Cecil, Stack, 
and Clayton were Wingate’s private secretaries while Gleichen liras 
one of his closest friends*
2Wingate’s correspondence with the Sudan agents was more voluminous 
than with anyone else, and covered nearly all aspects of gevernment 
policy; see the Sudan Correspondence and the Clayton papers in the 
Sudan Archive, Durham*
"^Wingate to Clayton (private), 13 Sep* 1916, SAD/4T0/3«
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1 'b. The ’three secretaries’.
The financial, legal, and vicil secretaries, were known as the 
’three secretaries*. Unlike other directors of departments they 
were linked closely to the governor-general and acted as his advi­
sers in their respective fields* All three of them had been on the 
central government hoard since 1908, and later became ex-officisb
members of the governor-general*s council when it was constituted in 
2
1910 • Their respective departments had a direct bearing.on the 
welfare of the Sudanese people, while the civil secretary’s office 
was also responsible for the wellbeing of all government officials* 
The personalities of the three secretaries played an important 
role in moulding their departments and in formulating their, rela­
tions with the governor-general and with the other government offi­
cials* Bernard Pasha, the financial secretary from 1900-23, was a 
Catholic of Maltese origin, and hence regarded as an outsider by
Wingate and by most ftf the British officials in the Sudan, who
3attributed his shortcomings to his ’oriental1 characteristics f*
Sir Edgar Bonham CarterJ. the legal secretary from 1899-19171
was the only civilian among the three secretaries. Of the senior 
$
officials his closest associate was Currie, the director of educa­
tion, and together they became the spokesmen of the civil element 
within the Sudan Pol©1veil Service^. In drafting the legal system
^The functions of the legal secretary will be discussed in detail 
in chapter VI, pp. .260-289*
^See pp.58-61.
^See pp* 119-121.
^See pp.158-160.
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of the Sudan, Bonham Garter enjoyed the assistance of Sterry, the 
chief judge, and cooperated fully with the gatand cradlis who served 
under him*
Of the four civil secretaries who held office during Wingate1s
governor-generalship, possibly only Phipps (1905-14)» greatly affec-
1ted its character • Phipps was liked by most of his fellow offici­
als but failed to gain much respect owing to the weakness of his
character* Wingate regarded Phipps as his liaison officer with the 
2provinces '* Consequently, Phipps acted, as personnel officer but had 
little impact on policy making^. It was left to Lee Stack, who 
became civil secretary in 19141 give greater prominence to the 
civil secretary's office. Stack, a man of pronounced views and strong 
character, was in a much better position to assert his personality.
1
Jackson was civil secretary in 1900-1, but was dismissed following 
the incident in 1902 (see p.75)* His successor, Nason, held the post 
from 1901-5 &nd was succeeded by Phipps. Stack became civil secreta­
ry at the outbreak of the World War in 1914*
2Phipps was also entrusted with compiling the reports on the provin­
ces for Wingate's annual memorandum. See GGR - 1909, p.126.
3
Phipps character can best be assessed by reading through his 
correspondence at the Sudan Archive at Durham University. However, 
there are several more direct references to Phipps shortcomings'*
In 1910, Slatin wrote to Wingate that despite the latter's dislike 
for Bernard, he would make a better acting governor-general than 
Phipps, whose weak character made him unsuitable for the post;
Slatin to Wingate, 13 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/l. See also Wingate to 
Phipps, 6 Mar. 1910, Ibid, where he warned him not to be influenced 
too easily, while acting as governor-general. In his interview on 
6 June 1967, Sir Harold MacMichael confirmed the view that the 
civil secretary during these years was little more than a personnel 
officer.
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A former Sudan agent and Wingate?private secretary, he enjoyed the 
latter*s confidence and was entrusted with wider responsibility than
The financial secretary.
The duties performed by the financial secretary were amongst the 
hardest and most unpopular undertaken by any Sudan government offic­
ial* As a oonsequence of being under the direct supervision of 
both the British financial adviser in Egypt and the governor-general
of the Sudan, he was often called upon to reconcile views which
2were diametrically opposed Harman, the first financial secretary
3of the Sudan, could not cope with this task and resigned in May 1900 * 
He was followed by Colonel Bernard, who held that post until 1925.
1There is little written evidence to prove this, as both Stack and 
Wingate spent the War years in the Sudan and hance could communicate 
orally* However, there are a few instances which prove Stack’s, gre­
ater authority* He was in charge of relations with the missionary 
societies, a task previously held by Wingate. He was also responsi­
ble for the appointment and dismissal of tribal chiefs, which had 
previously been dealt with by Slatin. See for instance Wilson to 
Wingate, 28 Wov. 1915t SAD/197/2/2; see also Manley I secretary of the 
C.M.S.I to Stack, 24 Sep. 1915t CMSA/Sudan 1.
2For the Sudan*s’ financial relations with Egypt and Britain see 
J*Stone, The Finance of Government Economic Development in the Sudan 
1899-1913*;Sudan Economic Institute, Khartoum 1954 (unpublished); 
Abdel Wahab Abdel Rahim, An Economic History of the Sudan 1899-1956, 
M.A.thesis, Manchester, 1963; see also pp. 5°“1*
^SG - 14» 1 Aug. 1900. In fact it is clear that Harman was dismissed 
for being unable to cooperate with other senior officials. Jackson, 
then civil secretary, wrote about him as follows:*...He has no power < 
of organiation, is obstinate, and it is very difficult to get any 
decision from him.•.He has no manners and oannot work cordially with 
anyone...*, Jackson to Wingate (private), 1 Apr. 1900» SAD/270/4*
1
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1
During that period the Sudan increased its revenue from £E 124j500
to £E 3,766,133 . But, even more important, the country1 s revenue
after 1913 exceeded its expenditure, thus achieving economic viabi-
3
lity within fourteen years of the reconquest •
The duties and powers of the financial secretary were laid.down 
in the ’Finance Circular No l1 in October 1899^» He was to be respon­
sible for all revenue and expenditure, whether in kind or in money. 
Every expenditure, even if sanctioned in the budget, had to be autho­
rized by him. Appointments of officials, whether in central govern­
ment departments or in provinces, had to be authorised by the finan­
cial secretary if their monthly salary exceeded £E 9* The controller 
of stores, who was ir^iharge of all revenue in kind, and who supplied 
the requirements of all government departments and provinces, was 
under the direct control of the financial secretary* A special au­
dit office was established in Cairo to which all provincial governors
5had to send their monthly accounts and vouchers •
Soon after Wingate became governor-general he was warned by
i £
Maxwell about the excessive powers granted to the financial secretary • 
Consequently, certain functions were transferred from the financial,
1S£R - 1899, p.45.
2
H. MaoMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p.198.
^Ibid, pp{*91,122, 19B; see also Stone, pp. 19-21, 132-5} for an anaj^shs 
of the Sudan’s expenditure and revenue in the J'ears 1899-1913.
4SG - 5 , 2  Oct. 1899.
5SG - 6, 2 Hov. 1899.
^Maxwell to Wingate, 6 Jan. 1900, SAD/270/1/2.
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1secretary to the governor-^general, All appointments, except sarrStSs
and clerks* had to be sanctioned by the governor-general who also
approved the salaries; the controller of stores had to keep the fin-
2.
ancial secretary informed, but was not to be under his control •
Finally, applications by provincial governors for loans, had to be
3made directly to the governor-general • Yet despite the curtailment 
of his functions the financial secretary1s sphere of responsibility 
remained second to none, and was described by Cromer as '•••not only 
the most important but also by far the most arduous in the Soudan...'^ 
He continued to bear responsibility for the Sudan's budget and was 
thus in a position to object to any expenses or increases in salaries 
if he regarded them as unwarranted or imcompatible with the country's 
finances * Furthermore, the financial secretary's views on finance 
had more weight in Fgypt than those of any other Sudan government
1§arraf -c&ahier, money changer; assisted in the collection of taxes*
2
In 1904 the controller of stores became part of the civil secretary's 
office, see p.104*
3SG - 10, 1 Apr., 1900.
^Cromer to Wingate (private), 20 Apr. 1906, loopy sent to GreyI,
FO 800/46; Cromer's letter was written in reply to a request by Win­
gate that a C.M.G* should be granted to Bonham Carter and Bernard. 
Cromer suggested that if only one C.M.G. was granted, Bernard should 
receive it and not Bonham Carter*
^See for instance GGC, 26 Oct 1910; 26 Nov. 1910, FO 867/1, where 
over fifty new appointments, which had previously been approved for 
I9II, were cancelled following a request by Bernard; see also GGC,
29 Apr* 1911; 1-6 May 1911, FO 867/2; where following a suggestion 
by Bernard '...all proposals for new appointments or new services*..' 
for 1912, were disallowed.
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1
official including Wingate , so that when the financial secretary
opposed a majority decision of the governor-general1s council, his
views were in some cases accepted hy the British consuls-general in
2preference to those of his colleagues *
Under these circumstances it was hardly surprising thatBBernard 
had strained relations with nearly all the British officials'* Though 
this state of affairs was partly due to Bernard1 s character, the ma^ - 
jority of his difficulties were the direct result of his duties *
It was "because of this inherent tension "between Bernard and his col­
leagues that Wingate sought to ease the situation "by establishing
1This was well known to Wingate who naturally resented it and wrote 
to Cecil: *.. ."Ikey** iBernardl is at his old game of getting behind 
me to the Agency and I am naturally determined that his Dago methods 
shall not upset my relations with our present chief iKitohenerl - as 
he succeeded in doing with Lord Cromer•••1, Wingate to Cecil, (very 
private and confidenM&l), 20 Dec. 1912, SAD/l83/3» (Wingate later 
asked Stack not to deliver this letter; see Wingate to Stack, 30 
De&. 1912, Ibid.)
2See for instance Gorst to Wingate, 11 Apr. 1908, FO 141/46; see also 
GGC, 20 Feb. 1912, FO 867/3*. Following Bernard* s disapproval of a 
majority decision of the council, Kitchener wrote:*...in view of the 
facts stated in the d&ssent recorded by the Financial Secretary, I 
cannot approve of the decision of the Couhcil with regard to the 
remission of rents of Government Buildings...*
^There are numerous references to Bernard’s disagreeable character 
in the Sudan Archive, Durham. Wingate was not only fully aware of 
the situation, but took an active part in referring to Bernard’s 
character in his letters* He explained to Cromer that Bernard could 
not be promoted beyond his present position *...as a Maltese he. 
would not be tolerated by the British Officers...1, Wingate to Cromer, 
17 May 1905, SAD/276A; He complained that Bernard 1. .■*cannot see 
things like any ordi/nary Englishman...*, Wingate to Corbet, 4 May 
1905, Ibid. Furthermore, Bernard was excluded from acting as sirdar 
and governor-general during Wingate’s absence, although he was senior 
to those selected by Wingate; see Wingate to Slatin,. 5 Mar. 1910, SAD/ 
431/n, to which Slatin replied:*...it isn*t necessary to make unneces­
sary statements to hide something else - the main reason is - you 
don’t like Bernard...*, Slatin to Wingate, 13 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/l.
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the Central Economic Board in 1906, and the Central Government Board
1in 1908. Unfortunately this move did little to ease the friction •
When in 1914 Wingate decided to alter the regulations about finanoial ,
control in the Sudan, he referred to Bernard*s famour propre1 as one
of the major considerations*
.♦•Hitherto, and in most financial questions as between Egypt 
and the Sudan, the anomalous position of the Financial Secre­
tary.,.has always been a factor on which I have had to bestow 
an almost unnecessary amount of consideration...2
However, The World War intervened and the situation remained unchan­
ged. Despite,the general criticism, the overall impression of the 
financial department is one of efficiency and purpose. It remained 
throughout one of the most centralised departments in the Sudan and 
gave little scope to the initiative of individual governors or heads 
of departemnts^.
The civil secretary.
.The civil secretary’s office underwent several changes during 
its first few years of existence. Until 1903 the Sudan agent was 
assistant civil secretary, and much of the work was done at his office 
in Cairo^. In I904 the controller's department became a section of
1When Bernard attended the Central Government Board's meeting for the 
first time, Wingate wrote that despite the fact that '•••it lasted 
from ten till three*•.1 am confident that this Board will save a 
great deal of trouble and unnecessary friction*..', Wingate to Stack,
1 n.d. Nov. 1908? I, SAD/284/13.
^Wingate to Stack (private), 25 April 1914* SAU/l90/l/2.
^See pp. 138-141.
^See for instance Gleichen to Wingate, 17 July 1902, SAD/272/5/2.
From 1903-5 "khe civil secretary was called secretary-general, SG - 53i 
1 Nov. 1903| Wingate to Cromer, 10 Apr. 1905» SAD/276/4*
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the civil secretary’s office^and the department of prisons and
2
police was also incorporated under an assistant director •
The civil secretary was nominally in charge of the provinces and
had to sift the governors’ requests before submitting them to the
3
other departments • His office controlled the movements of foreign­
ers into the Sudan, and issued permits to trade in restricted provin-
4 5ces . It was also responsible for supplying dhurra to needy districts
Even requests for the erection of new pumps on the Nile, Which re­
quired a permit from the Egyptian publio works department, had to 
be sifted by the civil secretary^* His main responsibility, however, 
wqs in the field of government personnel* Any demands for transfers 
made by the governors, heads of departments, and other individual
1CAO - 229, 12 Deo. 1904.
2SAR - 1904* p*132; this was in line with the general trend of 
decentralization.
^See for instance Phipps to Wingate, 15 July 1907, SAI)/288/2; Phipps 
informed Wingate that he had received the lists of requirements and 
proposals from the governors.
^SG - 64, 1 July 1904» the restricted areas included the southern 
provihces. See also pp.240-2.
^See for instance Phipps to Wingate, 27 Aug. 1905 > SAD/277/2f where 
Phipps suggested that the government should accept *ushr onidhurrat 
in kind, as it is required by the army and the provinces; See also 
Jackson to Slatin, 30 June 1914» SAD/452/276, where Jackson complained 
that despite his repeated appeals to the civil secretary, nothing 
was being g;one to alleviate the plight of his famine-stricken provi 
rince (Dongola).
sa - 52, 1 Oct. 1903.
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officials, had of necessity to be directed to him'1', following con-;, 
sultations with Wingate these proposals were then brought to the
permanent appointments and promotions board. Yet, as in all spheres
■ - ' - 2 of administration, the final decision lay with Wingate
Police and prisons.were under the assistant civil secretary from
1904* The Sudan police force, which had been part of the Egyptian
army, assumed a civil, character after the r e c o n q u e s t I n  the first
few years its staff was recruited from the Egyptian arniy^y Yet from;
the very beginning the British officers had strong reservations
concerning the’ suitability of Egyptians for; police duties,, .and
governors were authorized to replace the .Egyptians by locally enlisted
^Phipps to Wingate, 15 July 1907, SAD/288/2. ‘
^See ghipps to Wingate, 15 July 1905 i. 4 Sep. 19 05, SAD/277/2, Phipps 
suggested that Kerr who had been acting, governor, should be appointed 
governor of fJ&tlakin* He, objected to Wingate’s proposal of 1 .. .Brin­
ging an army man.over our Senior Civil Inspector...’ His suggestion 
was however overruled* See Phipps to Kerr, 31 Oct. 1905, SAD/277/41 
where he informed him that a new military governor had been appoin­
ted* See also p.5 8.
^*W0tes on the. present organization* ,SAD/269/2 ; this undated memoran­
dum was probably written by Wingate in 1899* It contains interesting 
information about the Egyptian army as well as the police*
^GGR — 1902-, pp*141“2. An Egyptian company was drafted en masse in- 
fo the police force, while a Sudanese battalion became: the nucleus 
of the prisons* staff*
5 -
In 1902, the governor of Khartoum wr.ot e: * .. .The nature of the Egyp­
tian policeman is to appear to be doing his worlc while watched...*, . 
GGR - 1902, p.gllj following the enlistment of local Arabs into the 
police, the governor of Berber wrote:*...The Egyptian soldier had 
never been trusted by the Arabs,, and the Sudanese is only looked on 
as a slave...*, GGR — 1906, p.240.
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t
1men . In 1905 it was decided to decentralize the police department,
2and to place the police under the control of the provincial governors ••
The system of local enlistment was subequently generally accepted so
tsfr^ bby 1908 only 389 Egyptian remained in a police force totalling 
3
2,979 * Apart from the regular police, there was also a force of
locally enlisted ghaffirs in all provinces* They acted as watchmen
in towns, and were used by village *umdas as messengers for weekly
, A
contacts with the ma murl
In 1904 the department of prisons,also ceased its independent
5existence and became part of the Givil secretary*s office • At the 
same time the prisons,section was decentralized, leaving all crimin-
,&hs sentenced to, less than two years imprisonment in the charge of
/«• 6
the provinoepauthorities • Hence only long-term convicts were sent
to the central prison in Khartoum where they were usually employed
7in the prison workshop or by other departments'. During the first
^GGR - 1902, pp.156-7. In 1902 the police force consisted of 51 
officers, 541 Egyptian, 647 Sudanese, 80 locally enlisted men, and 
317 Arabs. (The classification ms not clear. The Sudanese were pro­
bably southern ex-soldiers of the Egyptian army, while locally en­
listed men were mostly town dwellers, and the Arabs were southern 
Sudanese^
^GGR - 1904, p.105; see also p.139*
3
GGR - 1908, p.308. Most of the Egyptians served in the big towns 
and in the customs department.
4GGR - 1904, p. 107;. GGR - 1906, p.577.
^See p. 104.
^CAO - 227, 16 Nov. 1904? GAO -231, 12 Dec. i904« Each province had 
its own dgbtiyya where these, prisoners were kept.
^See for instance GGR - 1902, p.l55f where the\L.ncome of the prisons* 
department from prisoners* work is stated as @E 4330. In 19H| a 
second oentral prison was opened in Port Sudan,SAR - 1911,pp.62-3.
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years of the Condominium, excessive administratioi^of corporal
punishment caused concern to both Wingate and Cromer^, hut by 1904*
2
. there had been a considerable reduction • Political prisoners inclu­
ding the Mahdist amxrs and their families, as well as those captured
in various religious uprisings since the reconquest, were in a class 
3by themselves • During the first few years thjpry were imprisoned in 
Damietta, but in 1908 Wingate decided to transfer them to Wadi Haifa, 
where they were kept in a special prison^-•
Ci Communications and agriculture*
Communications and agriculture were the main administrative 
problems of the Sudan. There were three departments directly concer­
ned with communications, namely the department of post and telegraph,
5the railways department, and the department of steamers • By the 
beginning of the first World War the post reached the remotest parts
1The excessive use of corporal punishment was justified as follows:
1...none of the wardens can read or write, which debars me from 
introducing the mark system by which ■ ■ syst^em- 'by-wh-i-ch- lesser
irregularities are dealt with in ordinary prisons. .** tGGR-19Q2.pp* 14-2-3.
2GGR - 1904j p.99* Following the decentralization of prisons there 
was again a temporary increase in corporal punishmentj GGR - 1908,
p.290.
3Prisoners were also classified according to their social classes*
Those of the upper classes were 1...considered entitled to a better 
class treatment than that of ordinary prisoners*..1, CAP - 226, 16 
Nov. 1904*
■ 4SAR - 1908, p.67; see also pp,210-2.
5^Por an extensive survey of the development of transport in the Sudan, 
see R.Hill. - Sudan Transport(London 1965)1 0*M*Osman Abdu, The develop­
ment of -transport' and economic growth in the Sudan 1898-1938. Ph.D. 
thesis London i960;. see also W.E.Longdtield, * The .Growth of Sudan 
Communications1, Hamilton, pp.310-338*
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of the country, by steamer, railway or camel, while the Sudan tele-
1graph lines covered over $000 miles • The railway, which had reached
Khartoum shortly after the battle of KararT, extended eastwards to
Port Sudan and to the south west via the Gezira to El Obeid. By
1916 nearly 1500 miles of railways were open to traffic.
During the same period the steamer department could boast of two
main routes. The first ran from Haifa to Shellal, thus connecting
the Egyptian railway system with that of the Sudan, while the second
route ran from Karima to Dongola and brought the produce of Dongola
to the Karima rail-head. A permanent steamer service also functioned
between Khartoum and Juba to connect the capital with the southern
provinces. Internal town transport was developed only in Omdurman
and Khartoum, where a combined steamer and tramway service was inau-
2
gurated in 1905 •
It can easily be seen that in spite of the developments listed
above, the communications-system for a country the size of the Sudan
was woefully inadequate. The southern provinces could only be reached
3
from the north during high Nile , while the overwhelming majority of 
roads were dirt tracks which could not be used during the rainy sea­
son. As a result a great deal of the transport in the south was
1SAR - 1909, p.70.
2GGR - 1905t p.97; an internal tramway functioned in Khartoum since 
1904, GGR - 1904, p.81.
^One of the major hazards which were only partially overcome was the 
blocking of the rivers by sadd; see for instance *Report on,Sudd cut­
ting expedition*, by Major M.P.Peake R.A. SIR - 77* Sep. 1900; GGR - 
1908, pp. 115, 458-9.
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dependent on porters or animals and only slight beginningsswere made
1in introducing machanic&Si, vehicles - . .
Of all the departments in the Sudan, that of public works was
the most highly and constantly criticized - a state of affairs which
2nearly brought about the dismissal of its director • Most of the 
criticism was levelled against the low standard of buildings erected 
by the department for provincial government officials. This critic­
ism increased as time went on but failed tocbring.about any apparent 
i m p r o v e m e n t T h e  department was also attacked for devoting most of 
its energy and money to Khartoum^", a criticism shared by most central
1
GGR - 1914i PP.30,59; The first inter-city motor way between Khartoum 
and ICassala was opened in 1909* The distance of 510 miles was cover­
ed by lorry in six and a half days. SAR - 1909» P*70; A previous ex­
periment to run a lorry service between Wau and Rumbek in the Bahr 
al-Ghaz,al, was discontinued owing to the unsuitability of the road.
GGR - 1907, p.59*
2
In 1909 a* special commission was appointed by Wingate to investi­
gate charges of negligence against Kennedy, the director of the P.W.D. 
Kennedy was cleared by the commission and was allowed to stay on.
See Gorst to Wingate, 12 May 1909* SAD/287/l.
In his report for 1906 Wingate tried to justify the department by 
saying that the low standard of building was dueeto budgetary reasons. 
See GGR - 1906, p.66. In 1911 however, Wingate made an inspection 
of the southern provinces following which he wrote that the government 
houses were:f...miserable huts which are tumbling down...1,Wingate to 
Stack, 18 Fek. 1911, Siffi/300/l; see also Asser's Memorandum, Sep.l9H| 
SAD/3O1/3, where he wrote that even the 1910 buildings in Bahr al- 
Ghazal were falling to pieces and ends his letter:1••.It really is 
quite extraordinary how deficient of ideas sapper officers a r e . . 
see Currie to Wingate, 26 May-1912, SAD/181/2/2, and Bonham.Carter 
to Wingate, 5 May 1914> SAD/190/2/2, both of whom complained bitterly 
about the housing situationiin the provinces.
^See for instance GGR - 1902, p.217; see also Cecil to Wingate, 14 
July 1905t SAD/277/l, where Cecil reported a conver^il^inwith Garstin, 
then inspector of irrigation, who '...got hold very strongly of the 
cry that everything is done for Khartoum and nothing for the outsta- 
tions...'
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departments^. In 1908 the public works department was decentralized. 
District engineers were appointed in' all the provinces, with instruc­
tions to submit their plans to the central department who would act
2as the supervisor and coordinator of the work • However the reorga­
nization did not prove successful, and a year later the whole system
. 3
had to be reversed • The failure of this department can be traced 
to a number of reasons. The budget was never sufficient, yet instead 
of limiting its projects, the department erected cheap buikdings of 
poor quality. Communications also hampered its progress, as in many 
cases building materials had to be transported by camel^. Lastly, 
most of the department's staff was either unqualified, or lacked the 
ability to adapt their knowledge to local conditions •
Prom the economic point of view the most important asset of the 
Sudan was clearly agriculture. Yet in spite of this fact, the first 
step in agricultural administration had to wait until 1903, and even
^See for instance Matthews to Wingate, 9 Jan. 1904» SAD/275/l* where 
Matthews complained that the civil secretary was absorbed in Khartoum 
affairs and neglected the provinces*
^GGH - 1908, pp.313-15* 326-31* Up to 1908 the governors received 
a budget for clearing roads and building rest houses. Apparently 
these roads, while serving the provinces, were not linked up and thus 
did not serve the general communications system. Hence,, since I908, 
all road building was coordinated by the public works department.
^Kennedy to Wingate, 27 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2. Kennedy insisted, 
however, that even after the department's centralization it remained 
more decentralized than any other P.W%I% he knew.
4GGR - 1904, pp. 59-60; SAR - 1904, p. 137.
Asser's memorandum, Sep. 1911, SAD/301/3; see also GGR - I904, p.6; 
SAR - 1907, p.65.
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then development lagged well behind other spheres of administration
1until after the first World War • Prior to 1910, the® were two
departments detailed to deal with agriculture* The department of
woods and forests was established in 1903 with one director and a
subordinate staff of six. However, owing to the shortage of manpower
it was '...considered best...for each Mudir to be ex officio Direc-
2tor of Woods and Porests within his own Province...* The depart­
ment of agriculture and lands fared even worse. Restricted to two
British officials and one clerk, it could hardly even cope with its
3clerical duties • Hence ail matters relating to lands and developm
ment had to be dealt with by the civil secretary's office^* The
Absence of a proper departmental head was rectified in 1905 when
it was decided to engage a professional director and to incorporate
5
the functions of agriculture and lands into one department . The new
X
Por a full account of agricultural development and administration 
during this period see Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira, A Story of Develop­
ment in the Sudan,(London 1959); Abdel Wahab Abdel Rahim is at present 
-writing a Ph.D. thesis for Manchester University entitled - An Econo­
mic History, of the Gezira Scheme190Q-1950; J.D.Tothill (ed •)', 
Agriculture in the Sudan,(London 1948)•
2GGR - 1903, p.154*
3GGR - 1904f PP*2-3; There was not even a director for the department?* 
Hence the head of the department of woods and forests was called 
upon to serve as acting director of agriculture.
^SGv- 54i 1 Dec. 1903; for full details of land policy in the Sudan, 
see pp*332-357•
^Wingate to Cromer, 24 Apr. 1905, SAD/276/4 ; see also CAP - 321, 18 
July 1902, which ordered that land settlement, hitherto dealt with 
by the civil secretary, would be undertaken by the department of 
agriculture and lands.
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director who was a British estate agent, turned the department into 
'...a Central Estate Office for Government properties...1 much to 
the detriment of agricultural development and agricultural education 
which continued to suffer from neglect. ; As a result the hoped-for 
improvements were negligible and in. 1910, when the director of the 
department resigned, it was therefore decided to try yet another 
reorganization. The lands section, .which had hitherto been the main 
stay of agricultural administration*:now .became part of the legal 
department, while agriculture and forests were united under the ;
A  : ■ - '• ' '• 2 ,  - "■
^directorship of a former provincial governor !* Detailed instructions 
regarding the functions of the new department were laid down by the 
governor-general1s council. .The main spheres of activity were to be 
agricultural development and education, while a.special committee was 
to be set up to deal with future; concessions^* The department, how­
ever, remained as weak as before, and was a constant cause for concern 
to Wingate and the central administration^. In 1915 the.department 
of agriculture and forests sviffered yet another upheaval. Following 
the resignation .of its director, it was decided to split it once 
again. The agricultural section was affiliated to the civil secre­
tary's office, while that of forests wad put under the financial ,
^GGR - 1906, Report of the Department of Agriculture and Lands, p.l68.
^Wingate to Gorst, 2 Jan. 1910, SAD/290/I; Wingate to Clayton, 1 Aug. 
1910, SAD/297/2.
3GGC, 1 Nov. .1910, ffO 867/1.
4Wingate to Stack, 29 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/3.
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secretary*1'. Thus seventeen years after'the, reconquest, ancl^ rith 
the.GeSira development scheme nearing realisation,' the Sudan govern­
ment was left without any department or personnel capable of under­
taking this major project. This was clearly one of the great failures 
of the hew administration. Luckily, for most-of that period the 
problem of land-settlement was dealt with by the legal department., 
while agricultural education andresearch were carried by the depar­
tment of education. Hence at least two major aspects of agricultu­
ral development were, being attended to, thus facilitating easier
' 2 • ■ 
future development • .
Of the other departments not much need be said. The department 
of education and its policy have been adequately described in nume­
rous theses and articles^. Hence it wild only be discussed in con­
nection with the training of Sudanese personnel^ and with regard to
■ ' 5 " '
the governments religious policy * Two major works have also been
written about the functions and policy of the medical department,
1GaC> 2 Mar. 19,15; ,7-8 May 1915r PO 867/6..
2 ' • • . , - • - ■ . ’ ' ■'..'
The/Central Research Farm at Khartoum North was managed by the edu-
cation department, whose officials also undertook research into 
cotton growing in the Gezira. See for instance Education Department, 
Anglo-Bgyptian Sudan, Bulletin No.1. Pump Irrigation in the Northern 
Sudan, with special reference to the cotton orop~ (Khartoum 1915)
See for instance,M.O.Beshir, Educational development in the Sudan, 
1898-1956, B.Litt. Oxford 1966; L.M.Sanderson - Education in the , t 
Southern Sudan,1898-1948, Ph.D. London 1966j J.Currie,*The educational 
experiment in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan1,Jcfe*nal of the African Soci- 
ety, (1934), Vol.33, pp.361-71; Vol.34,l>3>935) ,PP-41-59? Batdkr Badri, 
Ta rScfehHayatT, Vols. 1-3. (Omdurman 1959“6l)
^See p p .  174-182 . . .
^See pp.254-9*
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1which was part of the military administration until 1905 Yet even 
after the establishment of a civil department, the health of. the
. . 2
southern provinces was entrusted to the Egyptian army* The only
hospital where adequate medical facilities existed, was the central
hospital in Khartoum. The other provinces were provided with small
3
clinics which often had to exist without trained staff . The lask 
of communications with the outlying districts forced the government 
to use post offices as medicine stores and to' tirain sanitary bar­
bers for minor medical duties^* Progress was hampered by financial
considerations and by the tendency of the population to consult
5their traditional doctors .
The only other department whose policies and activities will be
fully discussed is the department for the repression of slave trade,
6
which was part of the Egyptian ministry of interior until 1910 '•
1H.C.Squire, The Sudan medical service, an experiment in social 
medioihe, (London 1958J7j*B.Christophers©^ Notes on Aedicine in 
■the Sudan, (typescript, n.d.), SAD/467/6.
2CAO - 368, 16 Nov. 1905.
3QGR - 1902. pp.120. 125-30,-136.
4GGR - 1908, pp.224-5; see also p|sl73.
. ^ E.R.J.Hassey, 'JUfikis Olinio', SNR - Vol.6, (1923), pp'.35~9«
See chapter 9, PP» 369-380.
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d. The provinces*
The; foundation of provincial administration was laid down during
the reconquest. Under the Khalifa's rule Dongola, Berber, and other
frontier regions were administered as military provinces and govern-
1ed hy military commanders • This system of government collapsed 
with the reconquest of Dongola in 1896 and of Berber in .1897* There 
was also little sense in reviving the pre-Mahdist Egyptian system of 
government-* On, the eve of the Mahdia the Egyptians planned to cont­
rol the Sudan more closely, they divided the country into three 
independent hulcumdari.y.yat;;, each consisting of several provinces, 
under the direct control of Egypt. A special Sudan minister was 
appointed in Cairo, who was responsible for the administration of 
the Sudan • Having discarded, this system, the British commanders 
of the Egyptian army regarded the Sudan as a tabula rasa, where the 
system of provincial administration could be determined by them. In 
April 1897t Kitchener presented a memorandum to Cromer, in which he 
stated his views on the future government of the country based on
5.
the following assumptions:
...That the Sudanese absolutely despise the Egyptians*..That 
there are forces in the Sudan that do not exist in Egypt...
That the Sudanese ...are not a difficult people to govern if 
the Government is one they respect.,.The present tendency is 
to govern Dongola Province exactly the same as any other pro­
vince of Egypt, and this will naturally extend to other
^"Holl, Mahdist State* pp.225-230* The distinction between military 
andme&ropolitan provinces is suggested by Holt, Ibid, p.225*
^Report on the Soudan by Lieutenant Colonel Stewart., (1883) , C.387O,.
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provinces when reconquered...1 look upon this form of govern­
ment 'as a grave danger to public security], and a very fertile 
cause of future discontent•.
Kitchener suggested therefore, that ’...the future administration
of the Sudan should be that of a orown colony of Egypt; and resemble
2
our form of colonial Govt...’ Kitchener’s intention was further 
clarified when he objected most strongly to a proposal to centra­
lize the Sudan administration and put it under Egyptian government 
supervision^. According to Kitchener, this system was tried in 
Tokar following its conquest in I89I;
...The result was that Tokar was flooded with most unsuitable 
Egyptian employees, these were not well received by the people 
...Things went on for abbut a year in this way the discontent 
of the people growing, until the Governor informed me that it 
was openly said by the natives that they preferred Dervish rule..4
Hence, Kitchener concluded, that the provinces should be administered
by ’...local administration suitable to the people, and that the
chain of responsibility should be through! competent officers having
local experience...1
The system suggested by Kitchener was adopted with certain
modifications in Dongola and Berber • Following the Italian evacuation
1Memorandum presented to Lord Cromer on the 4 April 1897 (signed) 
Sirdar, SAD/266/l/l.
2Ibid. 
3
This proposal was put forward by Sir E.Palmer, the financial advi­
ser, in a Minute to the Sirdar, 10 Apr. l897t Ibid.
^Memorandum presented to Lord Cromer, (signed) Sirdar, 10 Apr. 18971 
Ibid.
5Ibid.
£
The first governor of Dongola was General Hunter who divided the 
province into eleven districts. His directive to mavmurs is in many 
respects similar to Kitchener’s later ’Memorandum to Mudirs’.
J.S.R.Duncan, The Sudan a record of achievement.(London 1952), pp.64-6.
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of Kassala in December 1^97# a-third province was established'*'.
Thms with most of the Sudan still under the Khalifa’s rule, there
were already three provinces and two- districts under Anglo-Egyptian
2military administration • This system was later extended to other
provinces and prevailed throughout Kitchener’s and Wingate’s gover-
3nor-generalship •
When Wingate became governor-general in December 1899» the Sudan
was already divided into ten provinces. Another four provinces were
established between 1899“1914» while the reconquest of Darfur in
1916, added the fifteenth province to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan^*
Throughout these years there were constant changes in the internal
boundaries of the provinces * Many of these changes were instituted
6in order to facilitate closer administrative control • In other 
cases boundaries were changed so as to unify tribes who had been
7split by an arbitrary border in the early years of the Condominium • 
Parsons to Cromer, 30 Dec. 1897» EO 407/146.
2WSdiiHalfa and Suakin were known as districts until 1903* they had 
remained under Anglo-Egyptian rule throughout the Mahdia.
3
Eor details of the early administration under Kitchener, see pp.19-21. 
see also Talbot to Wingate, 4 Eeb. 1898, SAD/266/2.
^Eor\details see Handbook, pp.1-2; see also p.104*
5
The final delimitation of provincial and district boundaries was 
not completed until 1920, Handbook, pp.171-2.
. GGR - 1905, pp.23-4; in that year it was decided to form Mongalla 
province out of the southern half of the Upper Wile province, and the 
White Wile province was established from certain districts of Kordo- 
fan and the Blue Wile provinces.
7GGR - 1908, p.555; the splitting of tribes caused harm to taxation; 
for details see pp.364-5•
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Each province was divided into a number of districts (marakiz_), which
lin turn were divided into subp&istriots (ma’muriyat) . The number of 
districts and bub-districts depended largely on funds and on the 
availability of suitable officials. Until after the first World War, 
both of these were scarce. Hence, a single inspector in Wahud was 
in charge of 700 villages of the Hamar, and in addition was respon­
sible for two of the Baqqara tribes and a few Wuba Mountains. His 
administrative.jstaff consisted of two ma’murs and two sub-maVurs • 
Similarly, the Yambio and Tambura districts of Bahr al-Ghazcil, were
each administered by a single British officer assisted by an Egyptian 
, ^ 3
ma mur • Although the situation in the northern provinces was some­
what better they also suffered considerably. The provincial gover­
nors constantly complained about the shortage of staff, and insisted 
that the additional expenditure would be more than offset by an inc­
rease of revenue^* However, despite certain improvements, there was 
no major change. In 1912 the governor-general*s council decided
1.Por a full list of the districts and sub-districts of the provinces 
see Handbook, pp.383-5? see also SG - 451 Mar. 1903* There seems to 
have been a confusion in the terminology used for describing the 
subdivisions. The Arabic text in the Sudan Gazette refers to marakiz. 
while the English version refers to 1Mamurias1.
2ggr - 1908, p.601.
^Handbook BAG, pp.40-1.
^See for instance GGR - 1902, p. 318, Report on Kordofan; p.345, Re­
port on. Fashoda; GGR - 1903, p. 101, Report on the Upper Wile Provin- 
ce» QQE — 1904i P*106, Report on Kordofan.
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that no new appointments or services would be allowed 1 *• .-except
1such as are warranted by an increase in the revenue*.•' Thus the
country1s precarious finances dictated a course which, in reality,
2decreased its potential revenue »
The duties of governors, inspectors and ma^murs were laid down 
by Kitchener, in 1899* They included responsibility for public secu­
rity, the assessment and collection of taxes, the keeping=and render­
ing of accounts, administration of justice and the registration of 
law^. However, although these duties were rarely carried out during 
Kitchm©r*s govdrnor-generalship , they constituted the basis for 
future provincial administration^* The governors were also instruc­
ted to d&velop the agricultural and industrial resources of their 
provinces, and to supervise the functions of all other officials* .
They were warned not to purchase land in the Sudan, not to embark 
on trade, and not to have dealings with native women of their districts* 
An order published in 1902, forbade public servants to accept
1GGC, 6-7 Apr. 1912, FO 867/3.
2When in 19131 an addition to the staff of the Upper Wile province 
enabled the province to be divided into districts, the immediate 
result was an increase of £E 2000 in the tribute it had to bear* GGR - 
1914j P •65; Following a trip in Kordofan in 1914> Bonham Carter ar­
gued that ’...the proportion of British officials to the population 
is not low compared with.•.other colonies...inspectors waste much 
time on clerical work especially so-called confidential work...*,
Bonham Carter to Wingate, 7 June 19141 SAD/190/4/2.
^Memorandum to Mudirs - Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. l899» 
F0 78/5022.
^See pp.19-21
**•. .directly or indirectly any gift or any promise of gift from any 
native of the Sudan...1 This order did not apply tp non-European 
officials who were allowed to receive gifts from relatives. It also 
forbade European officials acquiring land in the Sudan 1 • .'.except 
land occupied merely by a residence for their own use...*^
The establishment of the provincial headquarters was also laid 
down. Yet.governors were warned that all appointments except sarrafsfe
and clerks at £E 5. per month* had to be authorised by the central
2 ,
government • Instructions were also sent to inspectors and ma murs.
The inspector was defined as:
JJ&.the Mudir*s staff officer in charge of the district to which 
he is appointed by the Mudir...He will not be a channel of com­
munication between Mamurs and the Mudirieh - that is, Mamurs will" 
forward direct to the Mudirieh all Reports and Returns called 
for.,.. '
The inspector* s duties were to supervise the administration of the
ma’muriygt within his district, and especially the operations of the
police. His only excutive task was in the administration of justice^*
The instructions sent by Kitchener to ma’murs were couched in
rather more general terms. They were Warned against taking bribes
^OAO - 41i 25 Feb. 1902; see also Wingate to Stanton, 24 Aug. 1908, 
SAD/283/8/4* Stanton governor of Khartoum since 1900,- was offered 
presents by the people of his province. Wingate objected and sugges­
ted that *...a.drinking fountain at the base of the Gordon Statue...* 
should be dedicated to him.
^Finance Circular. Wo.l; SG - 5> 2 Oct. 1899•
3 '
Memorandum to Mudirs, Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1899i
FO 78/5022. -
4Ibid.
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or molesting women, and instructed to “be just but severe in repres­
sing crimes. Ma^murs were given the power *...of sending offenders 
to prison for one day...1 All serious crimes had to be referred to 
the nearest British officer. The first duty of the ma^murs was to
prepare detailed reports about all the villages in their ma’muriya,
Xso as to enable tax to be assessed correctly '.
During the seventeen years of Wingate*® governor-generalship the
instructions laid down by Kitchener were generally followed. The
governors* administrative duties were further extended when the dep-
2artment of police and prisons was decentralized in 1905 • Following
this decentralization governors were made responsible for the enlist-
3
ment, training, discipline and pay of their police forces '• Finan­
cially, the governors were dependent on the central administration.
A certain relaxation of this dependency was afforded by the decentra­
lization of the department of stores: every governor had his own 
budget for stores with which he could b^y whatever he required^* *
XIbid; for detailed lists of the maVuriyat, towns and villages of 
Kordofan, the White Wile, and the Bahr al-Ghazal provinces, see 
Handbook« Kordofan, pp.131-45 Handbook BAG. pp*74-$J for a further 
elaboration of the duties of maVurs. see The Sub-Mamurs* Handbook. 
PP»335-6.
^GGR - 1904, p.105; The Police Ordinance 1908, enabled governors to 
issue special regulations for .the police forces of their provinces;
SG - 142, 1 Sep. 1908; see also pp. 123-4*
T^he. policeyorce of Bahr al-Ghazal was called Jiha&iya. Besides its 
police duties it also provided the military garrison for the western 
district. Most of the N.C.O.s and men were locally enlisted and 
owing to the multiplicity of tribes, served only in their own distr­
icts, see GGR - 1908, p.484.
4ggr - 1905, p .209
Yet in ither spheres of finance, the governors remained-as tightly 
“controlled ,as "before. Their financial independence was- limited to 
*...all expenditure of £E 10 - and under, for which provision exists 
in the Budget...1 In 1905» the financial secretary extended his 
control over the local provincial rates. .These rates were used for 
provincial services such as streets, sanitation, or ghaffirs. which 
had hitherto been spent by the governors without any supervision. 
Furthermore, thd amount;of rates collected in each province depended 
largely on.th^iMti^ttw^of the governor.. From I905 onwards gover­
nors were not, allowed, to impose local taxes without the, authorization 
of the financial department. The rates as well as the expenditure 
were included in the annual budget, thus increasing the cohthol of 
the central government f* However, in the-same way. as before, the 
sums collected ihvany one^province ;were spent on local services,of 
that province • Following.complaints the governors were authorized 
in 1906 to spend, the sums allocated to their provinces in the budget 
without further reference to the financial secretary^.
16A0 - 60, .17 Apr. 1902.
2GGR - '1-905,-. pp.274-6. : / ■;: •/
30ut of £1? 34i'324 allooaf fed to'provinpial services in 1905, £E 21,734
were spent in Khartoum, Khartoum Worth, and Omdurman. It was decided 
that certain provinces thatjcould not. raise the necessary sums lacally^ 
would be assisted by the central government. However, these sums v 
were given as a. loan on which 3% interest was charged. GGR - 19G5j
pp.274-5» 279; ggr - 1908, pp.699-700. • .
4GGR. - 1906. ,pp.664-6; GGR. - 1907. pp.45-6.
Governors' were, however, less controlled in their other spheres
1 ■' " - 2 • 
of activity. The administration of justice , tribal-affairs , assess-
3 . * A
ment of taxes and land settlement were largely the responsibility
of the.provincial staff. Here again the initiative of individual 
governors played an important role. Jackson , the governor of Don­
gola, completed the cadastral survey of his province in 1906, whereas
other provinces had to wait for many years before the central govern-
6
ment could undertake their survey • Similarly, in the field of irri­
gation, the invention of a special saqiya by Jacksnn facilitated a
7 'more rapid development in his provinoe f so that even Wingate whose
relations with Jackson were.never close, had to admit that-Dongola
was 1 ...one of the most prominent features in the success of our
8Sudan Administration...*
The duties of inspectors largely, corresponded to those, laid down 
by Kitchener in his memorandum. Most of their time was taken up with 
the assessment of taxes and the administration of justice'. In certain^ 
cases, where tribal organisation was weak}, the . inspectors played an
^For details see pp.268-272.
2For details see pp. 305-312.
3For details see pp. 312-13, 361-66.
^For details see pp. 337-342.
^Jackson Pasha, Sir Herbert William (186I-I931) was seconded to the 
Egyptian army 1888; commanded the Anglo-Egyptian force at; Fashoda 
during the Fashoda incident in 1898; governor of Berber 1899, civil 
secretary and deputy governor-general 1900-1; governor, of Berber 1902; 
governor of Dongola 1902-22; inspector general 1922; retired on 1 Jan. 
1923. Hill,. BD,-pp.188-9.
GGR - 1-904^  Appendix 'A', pp. 154-7; GGR - 1905, p.223. ,
7ggr - 1903, p.10.
Wingate to. Jackson, 25-Hov. 1914, SAD/192/2. > -
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active role jn the actual collection of taxes and in administering 
1tribal law • Yet the shortage of officials compelled inspectors to
2diversify their activities and deal with cattle plagues , distribution 
of medicines^ and the compiling of provincial reports^* Less infor­
mation is available as regard to non-British officials, and what does
5 .exist is not always reliable • The staff of a ma muriya included a
ma*mur. a §arra£, one or more clerks, sanitary barbbrs and &haffirs .^
The overall view of the non-British staff, as presented by their
British superiors, is not very flattering. They complained about
the unsuitability of the Egyptian ma*murs and constantly referred to
their untrustworthiness, and to their getting involved in local poli- 
7
tics • Hence, ma^murs were warned from clashing f...in any way with
8the exercise by Sheikhs of their proper responsibilities.••1
1See pp'. 284-89, 312-13, 364-65.
2Willis to 0., 15 Apr. 1909, SAD/209/l.
3
Handbook Kordofan, p.111.
^Willis’s diary, 22 Mar. .1910, SA3)/210/2; Willis complained that when­
ever he stopped at El Obeid, he was asked to do administrative work, 
outside his sphere of duties* See also BB.R.J.Hussey*Tropical Africa 
1908-1944.(London 1947)» p*20; Hussey, who was an inspector in Sennar 
in 1912, complained that most of,his time was spent f..,on matters 
of taxation, petitions from Sheikhs or from individuals...and lately 
to an increasing extent, answering queries from headquarters about 
matters which appeared to be of very little importance.• •*
R
^Most of the information about non-British personnel is taken from 
the diaries and letters of the British officials; see also pp.183-5•
Thompson's diary, 22 Jan. 1908, SAD/404/6; GGR - 1907, p.213.
See for instance Willis's diary, 1 Jan. 1912, SAD3210/2.
O
The Sub-Mamurs1 Handbook, pp.336-7•
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The major problem, however, was the shortage of suitable offici­
als. 1•..When a Merkaz has over seven hundred villages it is obvious 
a man must be either very stupid of very unlucky who pays his taxes...*'*' 
The areas most seriously affected by this shortage were the southern 
provinces and the Nuba Mountains. The vast territory of the south, 
combined with the lack of communications and the dfficult climate 
conditions, made s&rvice in these areas less pojbular than in the nor­
th. As a result the military character of the administration was more
predominant in the south. The governor and most of the inspectors
2were British officers ’* Military administrative expeditions took 
the place of permanent government posts which could not be established
3
due to lack of funds and a shortage of officials • The military com­
mand of each province, apart from Khartoum, was vested in its gover­
nor. However, the military duties of the governors of the northern 
provinces were purely nominal, so that in 1911, Asser, then adjutant 
general of the Egyptian army, was able to suggest a separ&tion of the
XGGR - 1908, p.592; see also GGR - 1907, pp.119,122, 132.
2
Sudan Political Service« PP»5™37; when a civilian was appointed to 
a post in the south, one of the provincial governors complained that 
he did not fit into the military establishment; see Matthews to
Wingate, 19 July 1903, SAB/273/7.
GAO — 6, 10 Jan. 1903, All officials serving in the south enjoyed 
a cliiaate allowance of 6-12 months per year. In 1910,^the system was 
unified and all officials serving south of latitude 12 were granted 
nine months climate allowance per year; GGR - 1910, p.144? Despite 
this material advantage most.officials did not serve in the south 
for any length of time,mainly owing to the deterioration of their 
health, GGR - 1911, p.87.
1military and administrative functions • Clayton, who was at that 
time Wingate’s private secretary^, carried the argument further* He 
asserted that .a governor has not the time, and every year has 
less of the knowledge, required to efficiently supervise the training, 
discipline and administration of the troops..*1 Hence he suggested 
that Wingate should .divide the.Sudan into a certain number of
districts, irrespective of provinces, and give each district a
2Commandant and staff...1 All these rsfuggestions, were rejected by
Wingate^* The only provinces where military commandants were
appointed were those whose governors were civilians^. The supremacy
of the governors1 authority in all military and civil administrative
matters concerning their provinces remained unchallenged throughout
5the Wingate era . Consequently, both military and civil administration
•j ' ■ •
Asser to Wingate, 1$ Aug. 1911, SAD/301/3; Asser suggested the 
separation of the civil from the military command in all provinces 
apart from the Bahr al-Ghazal and Mongalla; see also p* 105*
Clayton to Wingate, 11 Sep. "1911, SAD/301/3; see also Kitchener to 
Wingate, 10 Jan. 1912, Sffl/l80/1; Kitchener wrote:'...You can have 
a Governor and an Officer Commanding Troops in a district the Gover­
nor’s military powers are then purely nominal...1
-See pp.67-9*
^Monthly list of British Officers employed in the Egyptian Army.
Showing their stations on 1st December 1916, SAD/202/5.
5This was true even in those cases where the governor’s military rank 
was lower than that of another British officer serving;in his dis­
trict. Despite the difference in rank, the governor’s military sup- 
remany was upheld; See. Wingate to .Cameron, 1 Dec. 1912, SAD/18//3*
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suffered from a certain amount of neglect. In the northern pro­
vinces governors tended to neglect their military duties, whereas
in the south the civil administration was often subjugated to
1military requirements t
See for instance Savile to Wingate, 24 Oct* 1915» SAD/l97/l/2> 
where he admitted that all intelligence work in his province had 
been neglected; see also Asser to Wingate, 16 Aug* 1911, SAD/30l/3; 
Wingate to Stack, 5 dune 1914f SAD/190/3/2*
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Ghapt efc IV*
Government officials and the training of 
Sudanese personnel* 1
The administration of the Sudan emerged out of a military 
conquest* The British officers became administrators, and consti­
tuted the higher echelon of the country’s central and provincial - 
government until after the first World War'*
The necessity of including civilians inithe administration 
was brought home to the Sudan government by the Boer War* Kitchener 
and many of the British officers left the Sudan to pursue their 
military careers, leaving in their wake large gaps in the adminis­
tration"^ ** Henoe a policy of recruitment was instituted in 1900f 
in the hope of enticing young British civilians to serve in the 
intermediate grades of the administration*
The lower grades of the administration were filled by Egyp­
tians and Lebanese, while the Sudanese were left to fill those 
posts which needed no qualifications* However, an educational 
policy was evolved whereby the administration hoped to replace 
the Egyptian officials by Sudanese. 
a* The British military administrators*
The advantages $f British administBdbors were clearly defined 
by a British officer following a tour of inspection in the Sudan:
^"See p'p 26.
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•••The special genius of our countrymen in general, and of our 
soldiers in particular, to act as bear leaders to barbarians*., 
has never, and can never have, any better illustration than 
in the Sudan* .V^ *
The first list of appointees for the administration of the Anglo-
2
Egyptian Sudan included eighteen British officers and one civilian 
The# were appointed as heads of departments and as provihcial gover­
nors and inspectors* The only departments whiGh had civilian direc­
tors and civilian staff from the outset were the departments of
3justice and education ;* The qualifications, which, according to
Symes, enabled military commanders to become civilian administra^-
tors, were as follows:
*..Theywa?e quick to improvise and ready to tackle the most 
difficult situations with courage and common sense*..They 
laid foundations of public tranquility and popular goodwill 
on which the structure of a civilised administration could 
be built securely.*.4
The impoverished Sudan was not in a position to afford highl^y 
specialized, officials* It required men,, able and willing to under­
take any job whatsoever, even though the task was far removed from 
their basic qualifications* They had to open roads, make surveys, 
build their own stations, and lead military expeditions into the 
unpenetrated areasoc&’f their provinces. Duties of a more civilian
^Report by the Inspector General of the Overseas Forces of an 
inspection of the Soudan, 1913 (Secret), FO 37l/l639*
^SG - 1 , 7  Mar. 1899* The civilian was E.G.Harman, the first fin­
ancial secretary, Who was soon replaced by Colonel Bernard; see p*117*
^For details see pp. 158-9» 172-183, -260-8*
^S.Symes, Tour of Duty, p.13.
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character included.land-settlement, the assessment of taxes, and 
the establishment of provincial administration working in harmony 
with the tribal and religious leaders within its boundaries* Even 
Cromer, who was one of the first to advocate the establishment 6f 
a Sudanese civil service, stated that 1•••these officers constitute : 
..the best possible agents for the administration of a country in the 
present condition of the Soudan.. ..1X For Wingate there were addi­
tional advantages in appointing officers*. As an officer and admin- ■ : 
istrator he believed in the unity of civil and military duties •
Moreover, as he was the sirdar.of the Egyptian army, the choice of
. , - - ' :> 
British officers for service in the Sudan was at his sole discretion
Once the officers had been appointed Wingate, could renew their
contracts, or terminate them whenever he regarded it necessary 1^*
XSAR - 1899, 1.55.
2See pp.67-9.
3 * : ' ■
There was always a ling waiting list, of ..British officers who wanted
to be seconded to the Egyptian army; see for instance McNaughton to. 
Wingate, 20 July 1905,SAD/234/4> McNaughton suggested postponing Sy­
mes1 s secondment to the'Egyptian army f...as we have so many good 
men much senior who have been waiting for a long, time. ;When the 
officers who went to the Boer War asked to be re—employed in the 
Sudan, their acceptance; was at Wingate^s discretion; see Gorringe to 
Wingate, 3 Sep. 1900,SA3)/270/9 ; Watson to Wingate, 10 Sep.1900, Ibid; 
see alsso Wingate to L®in, 27 July 1908, SAD/283/7/1* Wingate, wrote ; 
that Butler had been recommended for service in the Sudan 1. ..He has 
a lot of varied experience, looks.as strong as a horse, and is a nice 
looking fellow as well, so I donnnt think you can do better than put 
him very high up on your list...* Butler was recruited.shortly after­
wards and was later ..employed in the intelligence department*.
^See for instance Wingate to War Office, 9 Jan.l900,SAD/270/l/l; Win­
gate objected to further British officers being sent to the Cape'. 
However,, he made one exception in asking for the, immediate'transfer of 
Colonel Maxwell; see also Wingate to Cromer, 21 Jan.1901,SAD/27l/l, 
Wingate had recommended the promotions of several officers and.hoped 
that 1...the snub to Gordon will be such that...he will resign...1 .
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However, it soon became clear that the officers' administration
had many disadvantages# Most of the officers regarded their sojourn
in the Sudan as a temporary phase# Those who wanted to pursue their
military careers had to revert to the British army in order to get a
1substantive colonelcy • Others, who were willing to extend their
contracts, had to go on half-pay and their work in the Sudan did not
2
count as full service towards a pension ■* Wingate wished to retain 
as many British officers as possible* He repeatedly tried to alter 
their conditions of service, and in May.1900 sent his proposals to 
Cromer* He suggested that the sirdar should be able to retain the 
services of British officers on full phy, for perio&d ranging from 
two to ten years, and also argued that those officers who were re­
tained beyond the period of ten years and were removed from the lists 
of their regiments should nevertheless remain eligible for promotion 
to brevet rank of colonel. Furthermore, according to Wingate, a 
gratuity of one month's pay for every complete year served in the
3Egyptian army, should be offered to officers serving beyond ten years •
XIt was for this reason that Mahon, the first governor of Kordofan, - 
left the Sudan; Mahon to Wingate, 1 June 1904, SAD/275/5.J Stanton, who 
had served for twelve years in the Egyptian army and in the Sudan 
administration, complained that his standing in the British army had 
been ruined as a result. Stanton to Wingate, 25 Aug*1914jFROt30/57/Wo.45*
2Wingate to Cromer, 25 Feb. 1902, FO 141/371.
Inclosures 1 and 2 in Cromer to Salisbury, 11 May 1900, FO 78/5087;
Cromer supported Wingate's proposals wholeheartedly; Salisbury also 
had expressed his full approval of the changed conditions* However, 
he had little trust in the logical decision being taken by the war 
office. See Salisbury to Cromer, 2 Mar. 1900, FO 633/H*
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lThe British war office only partially accepted these proposals ,
The limit of seven years service at full pay was retained, after
2which officers lost their claim for regimental promotion • In 1902,
Cromer appealed.again to Lansdowne to alter the conditions^. The
war office agreed that officers would go on half-pay only after ten
years service, provided that Egypt would hear the extra c o s t T h u s
a compromise was reached, at Egypt*s expense, which enabled Wingate
to increase the number of British officers serving in the Sudan,
In 1914» the war office decided to limit the number of British
officers serving in the Egyptian army to 184, unless their, training
and pension were paid by Egypt . Kitchener, then consul-general,
strongly objected to this proposal. He stated that the war office
suggestions would compel Egypt to pay for the training and pensions
of British officers serving in the Sudan administration *,..and would
£
fenevitabls lead to serious criticism.., * Yet despite Greyfs, support 
the war office refused to supply the required officers and suggested
■^Salisbury to Cromer, 30 Oct. 1900, EQ 78/5089.
2
Conditions service of British Officers in the Egyptian drmy;
War Office Cairo, 17 Nov. 1900, E0 78/5088.
■^Cromer to Lansdowne, 2 Jan. 1902, E0 407/157*
^War Office to Cromer, 3 Mar. 1902; Lansdowne to Cromer, 1? Oct. 1902, 
Ibid.
^War Office to Grey, 31 Jan. 1914, EO 37l/l966.
Kitchener to Grey, 1 Mar. 1914» Ibid.
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that Wingate should ask parliament for a grant in aid, instead of
1using ’...indirect subdidies from Army funds#**1 It is interesting
to note that even as late as 1914/ Wingate was still reluctant to
solve the Sudan*s:administrative problems by employing civilians.
He ordered Clayton to enlighten Kitchener about ’...the danger of >
introducing large numbers of civilians (which is the only alterna-
2tive if officers are refused)..*’
The World War which broke out a few months later radically 
altered the situation. By 1916 the Egyptian army and the Sudan 
government were 86 British officers short of the required numbers'^ 
while the Sudan was faced with a problem similar to that created by 
the Boer War at the beginning of the century.
It is quite clear that the employment of officers undermined 
the continuity of central and provincial administration# Very few 
officers were willing to sacrifice their military careers in order 
to extend their service in the Sudan# Thus, of the first thirteen 
officer governors of the Sudan provinces, only two, served for more 
than five years. In the seventeen years of Wingate’s governor- 
generalship there were forty-four military governors. Of thoBe, 
twenty-one served for 1-2 years; ten served for 3-5 years; and only ;
1Crowe to Secretary Army Council, 26 Mar. 1914, Ibid; War Office to 
Grey, 25 May 1914» Ibid;
^Wingate to Clayton, 29 Mar. 1914, SAB/469/6/ l see also Wingate to 
Kitchener, 29 Mar* 1914, E03W/1966.
^Wmngate to Clayton, 13 Jan. 1916, SAD/47©/l.
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1
thirteen served for.logger periods • While many of those officers 
lacked the qualifications of administrators, their abbreviated peri­
ods of service did little to enable them to get a proper training* 
Willis, the inspector in Kordofan complained that '...they try too
much to run the country as if it was a battalion - without the disci-
2pline of the ranksoor the sufficiency of staff*.'** . Similar criti­
cism was made by a correspondent of The Times who visited the Sudan 
in 1907'* He claimed that in the Sudan '...no one .other than a mili­
tary officer is of any, consequence...* This resulted in commerce and 
economic development being neglected, because the officers had little 
understanding of these subjects. '...Military despotism holds its
sway, and civilian residents are.kept in strict order* But there is
3 ; ;. ■ ■ 1 • . '
no trade...1 It was the combination of the shortcomings of many
military administrators and the: difficulty of retaining them £fr
longer periods of service which drove Cromer to propose the establish-,
ment of a Sudan civil service. In June 1900 he wrote to Salisbury:
'...The only remedy is gradually to train up a number of young English
1 - ‘ .
H.MacMichael1 The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Appendix to Chapter 6,
Governors of Provinces, 1898-1933* These changes were mentioned in
the an&ual reports of the Sudan. In 1908 Wingate reported changes
in the governorship of nine provinces. GGR - 1908, pp.!57f 161,170,
172, 177, 181, 185-,, 187-8*
Iwillis to 0., 29 Deoi. 1908., SAD/209/l. ,
The Times. Financial and Business Supplement, 22 July 1907; Commenting
on this article, Wingate.wrote that it was '*..clearly the grumbling 
of some disappointed concessionaire, and I am rather surprised that 
a paper of the ’’Times” standing should publish a statement of that 
sort*..', Wingate to Phipps,. 25 July 1907, SAD/28l/l.
civilians who will he prepared to stay in the country-and acquire a
1thorough knowledge of the language.*.1
h* The Sudan civil serviced
The first eight civilians, who were recruited in 1901, were appo-i-
2-nted as assistant inspectors in the provinces U A suggestion made 
hy Lansdowne to recruit retired civil servants from India for ser­
vice in the Sudan was rejected hy Cromer:1•«.They are less likely 
than younger men to. learn the language. Moreover, except as regards 
navigation, I have not found that Indian experience has heen of much 
use here***1 Cromer also reiterated his belief that the best way to 
establish a Sudan civil service was ,f*.*to bring in young civilians
at the bottom who will gradually take the place of the military 
3e l e m e n t * . A  system for recruiting young British university grad­
uates was accordingly initiated in 1905* Between 1905 and 1910 fifty
Cromer to Salisbury, 8 June 1900, F0 633/6; see also Cromer to Lans- 
downe, 14 Bov* 1900* Ibid; where he wrote 1..«I have found the univer­
sities, rather than the army the best recruiting ground..;*1 It is 
interesting to note that the first to propose the setting up of a 
Sudan civil service, was Colonel Maxwell. Maxwell to Wingate, 5 Bov.
1898, sad/266/ir.
^Cromer to Lansdownei 18 Nov. 1901, F0 403/313. By 1914, five of the
civilians appointed in 1901-2 had become provincial governors. Kerr 
became governor, of the Red Sea-province in 1909} lies, governor of 
the Blue Bile province since 1913; Lyal,More and Browne were appoin­
ted governors of Haifa, Khartoum and Berber respectively in 1914f»
BPS,pp.8-9 *11.
^Lansdowne to Cromer, 29 Jan.1902, F0 800/123; Cromer to Lansdowne,
9 Feb. 1902, Ibid; the only notable exception was; in the case of 
A^F.Brown, the director of the department of woods and forests,
Whtglt 19IO9 ^homwa^ t^aHslfferl^dOfrFS l$h/lSh£ian civil service; see 
Wingate to Cromer, 15 Feb. 1900, F0 141/356.
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university graduates from Oxford, Cambridge, and Trinity College,
1'Dublin were appointed to the Sudan civil service • Application
forms were available at the universities and were forwarded by the
universities1 appointments boards to Cairo. It was then the duty
of the Sudan agent to sift through the hundreds of application forms
and letters of recommendation, and select a short list of candidates
to invite to the meeting of the selection board, which met annually 
2 -
in London • The board was composed of British representatives of 
the Egyptian and Sudan governments* Wingate sat on the board in 
1904 and 1905 as one of the Sudan’s representatives, but following 
Cromer’s suggestion Wingate agreed that the Sudan should be repre- 
sented by its senior civilian official and an additional military 
or civilian member of the civil service Wingate continued, however, 
to play an active role in the process of selection!. He received 
hundreds of letters from friends asking him to recommend the appoint-
1SPS,. pp.17-37? Oat of those appointed, 32 were Oxford graduates,
14 were from Cambridge and 4 were from Dublin; although application 
was open to graduates from other universities, none were appointed. 
See Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Services', Information to Candidates, 
June 1913, SAD/152/7/7.
^See for instance Owen to Wingate, 22 May 1907, SAD/208/5J Owen com-
plained that there were some 160 applicants for the three posts off­
ered by the.Sudan; see alsoptack to Wingate, 17 May 1909, SAD/287/2; 
Stack wrote that out of hundreds of dossiers he had to pick ’...the 
12 gentlemen who are to appear before the Board which meets in Lon­
don for the selection of two candidates required for the Sudan...’
^Cromer to Wingate, 25 Nov. 1905» SAD/234/3; Wingate to Cromer, 30 
Nov. 1905,. SAD/277/51 The Sudan was.usually represented by the Sudan 
agent and by Bonham Carter or Currie.
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ment of their.relatives^• In most oases the requests were politely
2 ' ■ 
refused *» However, in certain cases these solicitations seem to
hqve had their effect. One of the candidates was accepted in the
Sudan civil service following a letter which read:S...his father is
the archdeacon of Exeter and all the hoys are athletic, public school
boys, and brought up under the best influence with strong religious 
3
belief...* In yet another case Wingate wrote to Phipps, the civil 
secretary:
..*1 enclose some correspondence I have had with Lady Tweeddale 
about her son Lord Edward Hay...X hope you and theather member 
of the Selection Board will use your influence to get him taken
on as I think he is the type of man we want...4
The following letter, to Cromer is even more illuminating, as it sug- .
gests that applicants were selected according to political considera-
5 ■tions, although this was clearly forbidden according to regulations :
...Will you carry your mind back years ago to the time when you
wrote me, at the request of Mr. Arthur Balfou^,to t-ake young
Edward Pease into the, Sudan Civil Service* It always struck 
me as a peculiar request as of cour&e the Pease family were 
political opponents of the Cecils, but there had been aome
1These letters are preserved in the Wingate papers at the Sudan Arch­
ive in Durham, andaare not the official letters of reference, which 
were required from every candidate.
See. for instance Wingate to Mahon, 15 Nov. 1903, SAD/273/ll; Mahon 
ex-governor of Kordofan, had recommended a friend for employment in 
the Sudan, but had his recommendation turned down on the grounds that 
the nominee was not qualified; see also Wingate to Colonel Sealy,
21 Feb. 1912, SAD/180/2/2.'
^Wilfrid Cummings,to Wingate, Karachi Christmas 1904, SAD/275/l*
^Wingate to Phipps, 6 July 1912, SAD/182/1/2.
5
Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Services, Information to Candidates,
June 1913, SAD/I52/7/7.
- 1 5 6 -
financial crisis in the family and you agreed that- an excep­
tion should be made in giving young Pease a nomination.*
Despite these irregularities* the general entry route to a Sudan
post was by application to the selection board, where nominees were
judged according to their merits* The Sudan authorities refused to
tie their hands by accepting civil servants according to the results
2of competitive examinations • The qualities required from nominees 
included academic and athletic achievements, robust health, and a 
general tendency towards outdoor activities^. Those selected as 
probationers had to undertake a one-year course of training, at 
their own expense, at Oxford or Cambridge^* Studies included Arabic,
Wingate to Gromer, 1 Aug. 1913, SAD/l87/2/3» Pease was appointed 
and served in the Sudan until 1911* In his letter Wingate asked 
Gromer to use his influence in order to get a post for Pease at the 
new School of Oriental Studies ai Landon University.
^Cecil to Wingate, 17 Sep. 1903, SAD/273/9, lack of competitive 
examinations for the Egyptian and Sudan civil services gave rise to 
questions in the .House of Commons on several occasions1* In. reply to 
a question asked by Mr.Weir on 4 Aug. 1904, the under-secretary of 
state for foreign affairs stated that this was a decision taken by 
the governments of Egypt and the Sudan with which the British govern­
ment saw no reason to ihterfere; E0 407/1^3*
^R.Davies,pp.8-14; E.R.J.Hussey, Tropical Arica 1908-1944* p.l.
Both relate how.they came to be chosen for service. Davies attribu­
ted it to his success in the Boat Race of 1910. The secretary of the 
Sudan selection board was the brother of his senior coach who recom­
mended his appointment. Hussey related that one of his reasons gor 
going to the Sudan was 1...that there was no special examination**•1 
In the Information to Candidates, published by the Egyptian and Suda­
nese Civil Services in 1913, candidates were told that .selection 
is based on the general fitness and capability of the candidates as 
well as on their intellectual and other attainments...1,SAD/l52/7/7.
^Ibid; the lists of the probationers and their class of honours were 
published in The Times. See for instance The Times* 8 Aug.1906; 7 June 
1909.
law, and surveying , while a special, course of anthropology was
' 2 ’ added to1 the curriculum in 1908 , When they arrived i& the Sudan.
they were appointed on probation as deputy inspectors, and remained 
in Khartoum for a further three months of instruction in Arabic, *, 
l$w ancipTOveying^* Most of them were then sent to the various pro­
vinces, and initiated into the service ppnoper^* During their second 
year of service all British officials had to pass examinations in 
Arabic,and law,, the results of which determined their seniority •* 
lost.of the university graduates remained in the Sudan until 
they retired* Some became provincial governors, or heads of dep­
artments, others reverted to the Egyptian civil service, and a few 
were seconded to the,British minister in Abyssinia for service on
"^Bonham Carter to Wingate, 19 Jan* 1906, SAD/278/l; Bonham Carter 
criticized the course at Oxford:V..VMargoliouth1s teaching seems to 
be almost useless*.**1, really think it is worth considering whether 
all candidates, should, not be made to go to Cambridge* j see also 
OCR - 1906, p*123'. . '
2 ' ,
GCR - 1908, p.160* An exception was made with regards to profes­
sional people such as agricultural graduates, who underwent their 
one yearfs training in the Sudan* Wingate to Cromer, 6 Apr. 1905, 
SAD/276/4.
^CAQ - 1451 17 Mar* 1904, H.C.Jacksony;Sudan Days and Ways, (London ,1954/ 
p*26; Davies, pp:*23-5*Erom 1912 the titles deputy and junior inspec­
tor were abolished. All inspectors were henceforth. graded‘according 
to pay, and the title of senior inspector was reserved for. one ins­
pector in each province; /see GGR - 1913; p*117*- '
^Davies, pp.25-32; of the 45 civilians employed in 1912. only V served ' 
in government departments; GGR - 1912,: p. 105* , '
Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Services, Information for Validates, /
June 1913V SAD/152/7/7; for other conditions see GGC,1 Nov*. 1910, E0 - 
867/1; see also Sudan Pension Ordinance,: 1904,, SAD/248/17 ; Sudan 
Pension Ordinance 1914, E^ 867/5*
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the Abyssinian side of. the<Sudan border * - Judging by achievements,
the system of selection:and the training provided in the Sudan civil
service were both well suited to the administrative requirements of
2 '• ■ ' : the country •
The civil service, was composed of university graduates,yet Brit-
- - * . ‘ 3ish officers were continuously added to its ranks - Officers, who
wanted to join had to resign their commission in the British army be­
fore being appointed to permanent pests in the administration^* As 
a rule, these officers had to complete ten years service in the Egyp-. 
tian army with at; least five being spent in service of. the Sudan 
government . However, these.rules were not always followed and the 
appointment of officers to the civil service hindered the civilians1 ' 
prospects of promotion* **..They see Military men being constantly 
brought, over their heads*.*1 am told.by some of the civilians that 
they find themselved lower on the.Seniority list after three or four
Of the 50 civilians appointed in the years 1901-6,, 29 had become 
governors and 10 heads of departments by 1929* SPS - pp*17-37»
p ' - ’ ' ’ • • :
For Wingate*s analysis of the success of the civilians in government
service, see GGR - 1907» pp*138~9i when a suggestion was made to ex­
change British civil servants between Egypt and the Sudan, Wingate 
objected* He stated that the Anglo-rEgyptians: **• .lack all those 
essentials of training which are so very important to the Sudan...*, 
Wingate to Currie, 11 Aug. 1911, SAD/297/l.
3CA0 - 84'. 14 June 1901.
^Wingate to Cromer,:. 3 Apr. 1905, SAD/276/3.
5GGC, 1 Wov. 1910, K> 867/1
years service than when they first joined...*/ In order to overcome
this problem Claytou proposed in 1914 to establish the Sudan Politi­
cal Service. All officers undertaking administrative work were to 
belong to the new service, while civilians, as before, would belong
many of the officers who were to have formed the nucleus.of the new
the result of problems of seniority* Some of the officers -
. ..*were inclined to look on the Varsity recruit/as a newly 
joined subaltern and expect the same attitude of mind as that5 
of a yourg soldier.. .In consequence these particular officers 
were out to teach these young; men where they got off...4
Bonham Carter to Wingate, 30 dune 1910, SAD/469/2/l; Wingate who 
commented oh .Bonham Garter* s letter, wrote:* i..You will; observe that 
Bonham Garter is on the war;path on behalf of the improved conditions 
for civilians..#*, Wingate to Glayton, 2 July 1910, SAB/469/2/2. 
Armbruster, one of the Sudan* s senior civilians, complained **..that 
the action of the government in filling up the senior administrative 
posts in the Civil Service by permanently appointing to them soldiers 
of our own age has completely.prejudiced such, chances as we had ori­
ginally of advancement in that service. ..#*, Armbruster to Cromerip 24 
Sep. 1910, PO 633/19. A case in point was the appointment of Major
c. ■
to the Sudan civii service • Despite Wingate*s agreement thet;
did not materialize^* As a result of the outbreak of the Wor
service, were called up. The only result of Clayton* s proposal was
that the administrative branch of the Sudan civil service became to
be known as the Sudan Political Service.
Clashes between military and civil administrators were not only
Howard as governor of the Red Sea province in 19051 the head of
Kerr, who was senior inspectorJ see Phipps to Wingate, 4 >>ep*1905t 
SAD/277/2.
^Clayton to Wingate, (private), 8 Apr. 1914, SAD/469/6/2.
^Wingate to Glajrton, (private), 16 Apr. 1914» Ibid.
^Memoirs of Ryder, 1905-1916, (typescript), SAD/4OO/8, p*66.
By and large, the military mistrusted the civilians an a class• This
i
attitude prevailed throughout Wingate1s governor-generalship and was 
shared by many of the senior military officials^.
Although there were no written regulations to exclude non-British 
Europeans from: the Sudan civil service, the accepted policy was aga­
inst accepting them* Thus when Wingate advertised for a director 
for the department of agriculture, Cromer wrote:1***! have erased the 
words "British Subjects”, not that there is any intention of engaging
■ 2others, but there is no necessity to say so in any official documents..1, 
One of the applicants for the post was a British subject who had ser­
ved for many years in Cyprus,1...there is smmething Levantine about :
3him and as you know that fact alone ,makes him undesirable... .3 • An 
applicant for the post of private secretary was turned down as he 
spoke !...English with a slightly foreign accent...1^ ' If this was
See for instance Mattite^ to Wingate, 19 July 1903, SAD/273/7f Wingate ., 
to Cromer, 22 Jan. 1904, SAD/275/lj Rein to Wingate, 15 Nov. 1909, 
SAD/448/l; Phipps to Wingate, 2 June 19-10, SAD/296/1/3, Phipps sugges­
ted getting rid of Armbruster, a senior civilian official, who had 
f...been trying to get up a feeling against the military man. I am 
to<ld they all call it the ”Armbruster League”...1 ; Wingate to Phipps,
16 Apr. 1911, SAD/300/4/l;.Phipps to Wingate, 2 Feb. 1913, S£d/i85/2/1: 
Phipps Suggested that although Currie was not yet qualified for pension 
'...it might suit the Government to let him go...1; see also Willis's 
diary, 28 March 1911; 25 Aug. 1911; 20,Bee. 1912;.12 Jan. 1913, SAB/210/2.: 
Sir,Harold MacMichael in his interview on 6 June 19^7, confirmed these 
remarks. He stated, however, that relations between the civilian ins­
pectors and their military superiors, were on the whole cordial. Eor 
Slatin's relations to the civilians see pp. 98-100.
^Cromer to Wingate, 10 Apr. 1905, SAD/234/3*
^Wingate to Cromer, 24 Apr, 1905, SAd/276/4*
^Stack's minutes to an application for private secretary by Mr. Alfred 
W.Allsworth, 10 Oct. 1905, SAD/234/4.
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the attitude towards British subjects with a foreign background,
it is hardly surprising that very few foreigners suceeded in
penetrating the Sudan civil service'**• The few Germans and Austrians
who held posts in the lower ranks of the Sudan administration were
2discharged and deported on. the outbreak of the World War
c. Egyptian and Syrian officials.
The lower echelons of the Sudan administration were staffed
2
with Egyptian, Lebanese and Sudanese officials, with a sprinkling 
of Greeks, Maltese and other nationalities added for good measure. 
During the Mahdia many Egyptians, Copts, and muwallading who had 
served in the Turco-Egyptian government, continued to serve in the
5
central administration . Following the reconquest, many of them 
made their way to Egypt, hoping for compensation from the Egyptian
^SPS'i Wingate to Bonus, 23 Aug. 1906, SAD/279/2; The only notable 
exception was Slatin, see p.101.
2 - Assistant Director of Intelligence, to all Heads of Departments,
3 Nov. 1914, SAD/192/2.
3In the official correspondence of the Sudan government the Leba^ - 
nese were generally referred to as Syrians.
'^Muwallad (pi Muwa&ladln) : the term by which persons of Egyptian 
or partially Egyptian origin were known in the Sudan where they 
constituted an important section of the towns' population;
^For details, see Holt, Mahdist State, pp.233-5; see also SIR - 60, 
25 May - 31 Dec. 1898, pp.54-8.
government^*. Most ot these old officials were unemployable, and the
new administration was forced to recruit new officials for most of
2. ■■ ' ' ‘ „ its services • //
The principle adopted during the reconquest was that 1...whenever 
sufficiently educated Sudanese have been found to place in official 
positions, they have invariably been given the preference and with : 
good results...1 There were only a few qualified Sudanese, hence a 
system was adopted f .. .of appointing Marnurs and police officers who 
have been brought up"in the military school under British supervi­
sion and who are directly responsible, to their superior British, of- 
ficers...1 The Britihh authorities attained several advantages by 
recruiting Egyptian army officers,; rather than civilians. Officers 
could more easily be replaced by Sudanese, by re-transferring them .
> Over 2000 Egyptian ex-officials and old soldiers came to Egypt in 
1898 to demand their arrears pay * .they received only a pound or 
two and were soon starving on the street s. Wingate who was then in 
charge, of the Sudan office in Cairo}, sent them, back to Khartoum. He 
was later informed by Talbot, then head of intelligence, that their 
resettlement in the Sudan was impossible, and that ’...a lot of the 
poor devils will die of starvation...1 As a result of representati­
ons by But rus Pasha Ghali, the Egyptian foreign minister., the Com­
missioners of the Debt granted £E 65,000 to solve the problem* See 
Wingate to Kitchener, 7 Feb. 1§99j SAD/269/2/l; Talbot to Wingate,
10 Feb. 1899? Ibid; Butrus G-hali to Cromer, 25 May 1899» F0 407/151? 
Cromer, to Salisbury, 8 Jan. 1900, F0 78/5086.
2 ■ ' ■ ' '
There were exceptions to this rule. Thus the pilots of the steamers
department, who:had served during the True©-Egyptian period and the
Mahdia, continued to serve under the Anglo-EgyptIan government *
R.Hill, Sudan Transport, p.58*
/Notes’ on Civil Administration in the Sudan I n.d. 1897? 1 » SAd/266/i/3j ; 
see also Cromer to. Salisbury, 4 D e c . 1898, F0 407/147*
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1to the army . Thus the Egyptians in the police force, who were
drafted en masse from the Egyptian army, were replaced hy Sudanese
2
as early as 1903 • The Sudan railways which were huilt during the
reconquest hy the Egyptian army were put on a civilian hasis hy re-
3cruiting and training1 Sudanese to replace the Egyptians • Eurtherm 
more, the Egyptian army officers did not receive their pensions from 
the Sudan government and hence were cheaper to maintain^*. Lastly, 
the British authorities had adopted a policy of transferring the 
Egyptians from post to post sa as to pires'ent them getting involved 
in local politics or deriving material benefits from their official 
standing. Clearly it was easier to transfer military men, who were 
more disciplined and less burdened hy family considerations, than
CAP - 138, 14 Dec. 1901* According to this order all Egyptian of­
ficers who had served in the Sudan administration for five years had 
to. revert to the army# The fact that an Egyptian officer due to 
promotion had to revert to the army or forego his promotion was an 
additional inducement to return to the army*
^GGR - 1902, p.141; CAQ - 3, 10 Jan. 1903* This order fixed,the rates 
of pay for the Sudan police. Sudanese of all ranks were granted hi­
gher pay than Egyptians ; see also pp.123-4*
■^Report on Soudan Railways hy Kaimakam G.B.Macaulay, 2 Bee. 1900,
EO 403/312. Macaulay reported that most of his staff were Egyptians 
soldiers'who would soon be transferred to the reserve, and sugges­
ted replacing them hy coolies. Parker, who joined the railways dep­
artment in 1903, reported that only a few Egyptian artisans were 
left. The engine drivers were British, Greek, Armenian, and Italian, 
while the lower ranks were mainly recruited from the Ta aisha; see 
A.C.Parker, Memoirs of the early days, I n*d. I , SAX)/294/lO*
^The Sudan Government Pension Ordinance 1904» excluded all officers 
od the Egyptian army from serving towards a Sudanese pension, SAX)/ 
248/17-
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civilians1*
Wingate reaffirmed the policy of transferring Egyptian ma?murs 
at short intervals when he wrote to Phipps:*...They lEgyptiansI in­
variably become involved with the local people in an undesirable man­
ner and their actions tend to throw discredit on the British Admin- .
2istration of the.Sudan*..1 Certain departments, however, required 
qualified personnel and could not be supplied by the Egyptian army*
Hence, most of the officials of the education and legal departments
~ 3had of.necessity to be recruited from Egyptian civilians • The Bri­
tish authorities' soon realized that the better class of Egyptian 
officials could not be induced to serve in the Sudan unless offered 
considerable financial benefits^. Currie complained that : fi*..the 
Egyptian school master well paid as he is in Egypt•..will not come 
to the Sudan for less than about 2|r times his pay - the good man I 
mean - Bonham I Carter the legal secretary 1 is g&venen greater
This can easily be ascertained by following the lists of appointments 
and transfers which were published regularly in the Sudan Gazette* To 
gave a few examples: Ismt?Il *Abd al-Ghaffar was appointed ma mur of 
IChartoum in July 1899» transferred to Wad Madanx in Dec. 1899» and re­
transferred into the army in May 1901* Muhammad Fahmx, was appointed 
ma?mur at Taqalx in Jab*1901, served for a few months at Karlcup and 
was transferred to Wad Madanx' in Sep. 1901.
^Wingate to Phipps, 5 Apr. 1913, SAD/i86'/i/2*
■^ For a full list of the personnel of the education department in 1902, 
see S G -  41, Nov. 1902, 1OpeningC&ggmony of the Gordon Memorial Col­
lege*. For details of the personnel of the legal department, see 
pp. 263, 268-270, 278-282.
^*The Sudan Pension Ordinance 1904*, included the Egyptians in Class 
XB* which entitled them to retire after the age of 45 &nd with a 
higher pension than Sudanese employed in similar posts, SAD/248/17*
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1diffioulties than I am*.*1 Thus following the death of the Egyptian 
civilian inspector of Arabic in 1908, Currie decided to fill the va­
cancy by employing an Egyptian army officer, after having failed to
2
secure the services of a qualified teacher i. The alternative course
of offering,higher salaries, in order to attract qualified Egyptians,
was dismissed on financial grounds. Some of the Egyptians who served
3
in the Sudan increased their income by accepting bribes * Others who 
did not resort, to corruption soon realized that there was no future 
in the Sudan for them’. The result was that many of the Better Egyp­
tian officials left the country as soon as they had earned sufficient 
funds to re-start their careers elsewhere^-.
Financial considerations were not the major reason for the reluc­
tance of the government to employ Egyptians* The British authorities 
questioned the loyalty of their Egyptian subordiaates and resented 
their nationalistic sympathies. Following the Omdurman mutiny of
^Currie to Wingate, 6 Sep. 1907i SAD/281/#*
2GGR - 1908, pp.147-8. -A correspondent of The Times* commenting on 
the unwillingness of Egyptians to serve in the Sudan wrote:’...I think 
that the Sudan will ultimately find reason to congratulate itself over 
their disinclination to go there..*’, The Times* 10 Jan. 1908.
^Bonham Garter to Wingate, 25 May 1909, SAD/287/3; ’...it was decided 
that a decent standard of competence should be insisted on and an ade­
quate salary paid, but the Financial office cannot resist cheap lab­
our.. .*j see also Bason to Wingate, 8 Aug. 1902, SAD/272/6; Nason sug­
gested- increasing the pay of Egyptian land measurers, who were accep­
ting bribes.
^See for instance GGR - 1907, p*l85; GGR - 1908, p.687; in both cases 
governors of southern provinces complained of the constant changes of 
personnel, caused by the low salaries; see also Willis’s diary, 27 
Sep. 1910, 1 Jan. 1912, SAD/210/2.
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11900, Sa^Id Shuqayr wrote, that Egyptian nationalists 1...mix with
2natives and transmit their spirit to .them.*.1 Cromer who was then 
consul-general shared this view when he wrote that the Egyptian of­
ficials were *...almost without exception, lazy, corrupt and tyran- 
3nical...* In consequence the Sudan authorities decided to reduce 
the Egyptian army and to increase the number of British supervisors 
in the civil administration^* Wingate was well aware that his poli­
cy was detrimental to the future of Egyptian administrators in the 
Sudan and wrote:
**.0ur principle is not to allow these young officers to hold 
any of the higher Civil appointments, which are reserved ex­
clusively for the young British Civilians* Therefore they 
have no hope of advancement in,the Civil Service**.5
This policy was consistently pursued throughout Wingate1s gover-
nor-generalship, and was intensified during the World War as a result
1Safid Pasha Shuqayr, Sir (1868-1938), Lebanese of a distinguished 
Protestant family. Graduate of the Syrian Protestant College (later 
renamed American University of Beirut); 1889-190C served in the Egyp­
tian ministry of finance in Cairo and Suakin; 1900-21 served in the 
Sudan financial department first as chief accountant and from 1907 as 
director general of accounts. Prom 1921 until his death he was finan­
cial adviser of the Sudan government. Hill, BD, p.326.
2Shoucair to Wingate, 27 Jan. 1900, F0 78/5086. ,
^Cromer to Salisbury, 8 June 1900, P0 633/6.
*^See for instance Wingate to Cromer, 28 Nov. 1900, P0 141/356? Wingate 
to Cromer, 14 Jan*. 1901, P0 141/364* Following the Wad Habuba rebellion 
in 1908, Wingate wrote:*...I am rather inclined to think that we shall 
be able to trace the troubles back to malpractices on the part of our 
Egyptian coadjutors.*.*, Bingate to Stack, 12 May; 1.908:r SAD/284/15; 
see also pp.56-7.
^Wingate to Cromer, 9 May 1906, SAD/278/5•
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of Wingate*s belief that a substantial number of Egyptian officials
and officers '...sympathise with the Turks, or at any rate they do
not sympathise with the new protectorate nor the appointment of the 
1
Sultan. *•'- The pronounced fear of Egyptian nationalism and of its
effects on the people of the Sudan, brought about a plan for the re-
2organization of Gordon College • The reasons for the proposal were
clearly stated by Wingate: ,
...The Egyptian teaching element in the College has undoubt­
edly introduced a good deal of noxious propaganda of the Na­
tionalistic type amongst the students*•.There are only two 
alternatives within the range of practical politics; wither 
we must leave things as they stand and thereby risk increasing 
the new spirit which werare doing our utmost to eradicate, or 
we must anglicise the teaching •••this wiibl enable me to re­
duce a few of the purely Egyptian staff - a step of which, the 
latter will not fail to realize the true significance; whereas 
parents will also understand our intentions and--will appreciate
^"Wingate to Savile (private), 19 Apr, 1915, ,SAl/195/2; see also 
Wingate to Pearson (private), 22 May 1915* SAh/l95/6*
2'Gordon College - Proposed reorganisation of the Upper School1, I 
dl* July 1915? 1» SAP/196/5. The plah was to reduce the Egyptian 
teaching staff by amalgamatingsthe three courses of the upper school*
It was justified by Crowfoot, the new director of education, on fin­
ancial grounds. It also proposed discontinuing the course for prima­
ry school teachers on the grounds that the supply of teachersexceeded 
the demand• In a private and confidential letter to Wingate, Crow­
foot was more specific:1...Neither on political grounds nor on educa­
tional grounds can we defend the continued use of Arabic as the medium 
of higher instruction*• •',Crowfoot to Wingate, 28 July, 1915? SAD/196/2. 
Another reason why the dismissal of the Egyptian teaching staff was 
only undertaken in 1915, was that Currie the previous director of 
education did not share Wingate*s views and defended his Egyptian 
subordinates on more than one occasion. In 1908 he wrote '•••TO. 
SUPPOSE THAT AN ENGLISH COMMUNITY can rule in Khartoum...is to imagine 
a vain thing. And for better or worse it is the Anglo-Egyptian Su­
dan • *•* f Currie to Wingate, 25 June 1908, SAL/282^6•
our efforts to prevent the Egyptianisation •••of their 
children*..!
In pursuing this policy the British authorities believed that they
were serving the best interests of the Sudanese. The racial anta-
gonism between the Egyptians and the Sudanese was regarded by the
British as an indisputable fact; and became one of the basic con-
2
siderations for the administration of the Sudan
...The fact is that the best class of Mohammedan Egyptians 
will not as a rule go to the S u d a n E v e r y  dishonest or 
imcompetent Egyptian official who is employed, tends to keep 
alive in the minds of the Sudanese the traditions of past- 
Egyptian mi sgovernment, and to widen the breach which ; 
unquestionably separates the two, races*.
With this in mind, the British authorities started looking for
1
Wingate to Kitchener (private), 3 Aug. 1915*: (26th Anniversary of 
the Battle of Toski) ,SAI)/l96/3* A similar policy was followed in the 
provinces, where Egyptian teachers were encouraged to resign; see 
Wingate to Wilson (private), 13 June 1915, SAD/l95/9; By Sep. 1915, 
Crowfoot was able.to report that seven Egyptian teachers had been 
dismissed or transferred from Gordon College, with the full agreem­
ent of the grand cradi, Crowfoot to Wingate, 18 Sep. 1915, SAD/196/5.
^Sayyid fAli al-Mxrghani, head of the Khatmxy^a was one of the main 
propagators of a&td-S'E#yptian views. ■ He stated on several occasions 
that the people of the Sudan would never be content as long as the 
Egyptians stood between them and the British administrators. See 
for instance Ferguson to Wingate,l6 June 1902,.., SAD/272/4/2; Hason to 
Wingate, 23 July 1903, SAI)/273/7« Whether this attitude was shared 
by the majority of the Sudanese, is open to grave doubts. MacMichael 
wrote in' 1932, when he was civil secretary, that in the years 1905-19 
the educated Sudanese, regarded the, Egyptians as their co-religionists 
who understood them more easily tli^ n the British.administrators did: 
f...The somewhat venal methods of the Egyptian official, moreover, 
consorted with their own indinations...*, MacMichael'to Campbell, 
(Acting High Commissioner Of Egypt), 10 Sep. 1932, SAD/403/7/4; see 
also pp.56-7.
^GGE - 1902, p.16; see also SAR - 1902, p.79,* Cromer quoted from the 
report of the Sudan agent, Count Gleichen, that most of the Mohamme­
dan Egyptians * .are absolute failures and ha^e to be replaced by 
Syrians or occasionally Copts...*
alternative officials to fill the gap until the Sudanese were ready
to undertake these duties themselves* Their choice fell .on two groups
ups who were felt to have more in common with British interests than
with Egyptian nationalism, namely the Copts and the Lebanese Christ- 
1ians • The Copts were first introduced into the Sudan by Muhammad 
*Ali in order to managd the country1s accounts U Many of them set­
tled in the Sudan and served subsequent governments remaining in
3.
service throughout the Mahdia i. The establishment of the Anglo- 
Egyptian administration brought many more Copts to the Sudan. They 
acted as head clerks, translators or sarrafs in many of the provin­
ces, and in several departments^* Of the 281 Egyptians permanently
employed in the post and telegraph department, more than half were
r -
Copts , and the proportion of Copts was even higher amonjij the appren^
6
tices ’• There were also many Copts in the financial and civil
1Cromer was reluctant to employ Copts or Lebanese in the Sudan, and 
it was following his criticism of their growing numbers in the ad­
ministration that Wingate w r o t e : . Y o u r  remarks on the Syrian and 
Coptic Bashkatibs a,re also entirely in accord with my own - I would 
certainly prefer Moslems...1, Wingate to Cromer, 13 Apr. 1903, SAD/ 
273/4» Wingate1s subsequent actions prove, however, that he did not 
persist in this view.
^Holt, Mahdist Statet pp.l4“5*
^Ibid, pp.229, 233”4j see also Yusuf Mikha’ili£ MS., 15 Dec. 1934 
l:CA0 - 401, 15 Mar. 1906.
5 G G R  -  1 9 0 8 ,  p . , 2 6 3 .
f\
Ibid, p.26lj Forty out of the fifty Egyptian apprentices who joined 
the department in 1908, were Copts. In.1906 there were twenty four 
Copts out of a to&al of forty six; GGR - 1906, p.418*
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lsecretaries1 departments , while Lebanese Christians predominated in
the governor-general*s office and in the intelligence and medical dep- 
2
artments > The only departments where, for obvious reasons, the ma­
jority of employees were Egyptian Muslims, were the education depart-
3
ment and the legal secretary*s office •
The importance of the Lebanese officials in the Sudan, was clearly 
expressed by Wingate in 1908* Following the Young Turk revolution, 
he feared that Lebanese would find employment in the Lebanon and 
would cease to come to.the Sudan, and wrote:*♦••so far they have 
been the backbone of our Sudan 01eriG&l Staff... *^ The Lebanese
1When Safid Shuqayr wanted to retire in 1910, Slatin opposed the ap­
pointment of a British director of accounts:*...1 don*t believe any 
European can be gogood D.of acc. in the office where Arabic is the 
dominant language - if Seid won*t stay try to get a Copte, a #ew or
another Syrian*.•*, Slatin to Wingate, 11 May 1910, SAD/296/2*
H.C.Scruires, The Sudan Medical Service, pp.3-4, 8» in 1908 there were 
over thirty Lebanese, on the staff of the medical department'* Of the 
ten listed officials employed in the governor-general*s office in the 
years 1903-6, nine were Christians. In the intelligence department 
there were two Muslim employees out of a total of eleven (these fig­
ures do not include the British personnel), CAP — 21, 7 Mar*1903;
CAO - |?|, 25 Jan. 1905; CAO - 401, 15 Mar. 1906; Owen to Wingate,
6 Feb. 1907, SAD/280/2, Owen wrote that Samuel Atiya and Nafum Shuqayr 
were the most informed men in the intelligence department; see also
pp. 111-2.
3CA0 - 21, 7 Mar. 1903; GAO - 1 ? I , 25 Jan. 1905; CAO - 401, 15 Mar:.
1906; see also pp.278-282.
- 1908, p.156. The Lebanese were also predominant in the cleri­
cal staff of the Egyptian army; see Memorandum on the Egyptian Army 
(typescript), by Naum Shoucair, 16 Mar. 1899» SAD/269/3; see also SC - 
43, Jan. 1903* On the occasion of the anniversary of the IChedive 
*Abbas*s accession, a levee and garden party were held at Khartoum*
Of those present from the governor-general *s off ice, the intelligence 
department, and the legal and civil secretaries* offices, eight were 
British officials, 19 were Lebanese and Copts, and only three were 
Muslims*
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Christians were well suited for the responsible positions they
held, both on account of their qualifications and on account of
their loyalty to Britain. They were vehemently opposed to the
Ottoman Empire, and supported the anti-nationalist political cir- 
1cles in Egypt . Their anti-Ottoman sentiments were clearly expres­
sed when the Syrian community of Khartoum offered its services to
2Britain at the outbreak of the First World War i. Moreover, they
wrote to Wingate:
...That until a just and upright government has been esta­
blished in our country, we, the Syrians in the Sudan shall 
be considered no longer as Ottoman subjects but as a sepa­
rate nationality owing allegiance only to Great Britain...3
In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the
Lebanese were regarded as second only to the British themselves
in their loyalty to the British authorities in the Sudan.
XThis is verified by Naeurn Shuqayr*s efforts to sponsor pro-British 
articles;in al-Muqattam; see also Wingate to Herbert, 23 Jan. 1908, 
SAD/282/l. Wingate directed Herbert to ask the Khedive to promote 
Sa*fd Shuqayr to the rank of Mirmaran *..*0f course I thoroughly 
understand that there may be objections to further promotions of 
Syrians..
^The Syrian Community in Khartoum, 11 Oct * 1914* . SAD/192/l. The 
letter was signed by George Shaheen, Ibrahim Dimitri, Samuel Atiya 
and nine others, and sent to Wingate.
^Syrian Community to Wingate, 29 Nov. 1914* SAD/192/2 (signed), , 
JTuredini (editor of the Sudan Times); the Syrian request was turned 
down by Wingate following Bonham Carter1s advice. Bonham Carter 
feared that it might compromise their position with Turkey and 
suggested to treat them as friendly aliens. Bonham Carter to Symes, 
30 Nov. 1914? Minutes by Wingate, 30 Nov. 1914* SAD/192/2. See also 
E.Atiyah, An Arab tells his story, pp.25-43* Atiyah relates how as 
a child in Omdurman he came to worship Britain and regard British 
administration as an ideal.
d. The training of Sudanese personnel*
The policy of gradual Sudanization of the administration was
laid down even before the reconquest was completed"**. Gromer defined
this policy more clearly when he visited Khartoum in 1903s
...It is, to say the least, very difficult to govern any country 
properly without some administrative assistance from its inhabi­
tants* In the Soudan the whole governing agency is practically 
foreign, for it must not be forgotten that the Egyptian is quite 
as much a foreigner as an Englishman. *. X do:.i not doubt, there­
fore,, that Sir Reginald Wingate...will do all in his power to 
create a class of Sudanese who will before long be capable of 
filling some of the subordinate posts under the Government.
High education is, of course, for the time being quite out of 
the question, but if we limit ouijfamhition to reading, writing, 
and arithmetic we ought to be able to produce some satisfacto­
ry results.
With this in view, the Sudanese authorities set about the establish­
ment of an educational system geared to provide Sudanese officials 
for the lower grades of the administration. They also decided to 
appoint as many Sudanese as possible to posts where education was
not regarded as essential*. f*..To satisfy religious feeling in each
3Mudiria, two Ulemas, one Imam, andjone Muaasin were appointed.* 
Efforts were made to reopen as many kuttabb as possible by offering 
government subsidies to the teachers^". In the area of central
■^Notes on Civil Administration in the Sudan I n.d. 1^97 7 1 » SAD/2 66/l/3*
^Lord Cromer*s Speech at Khartoum, 28 Jan. 1903, E0 633/25. (This 
speech was delivered at a dinner of the British officers, in honour 
of Captain Bailey)•
3m m  - 1902, p. 114'.
^SG - 6l, Apr. 1904» ^he monthly subsidy paid to teachers was £E 3*
The Sudanese kuttabs were traditionally known as Khalwas. However, 
in all the official documents, the term kuttab is used for the Qur an 
schools.
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government, the SudaneseJ filled the subordinate posts in the police
and prisons department"*'. The steamersd&epartment recruited ex-slaves
in Omdurman to man its wood stations and dockyards, while ’•••the
2sailors and the reises were all berberines..•* The Sudan medical 
department recruited Sudanese barbers (hallaq) to augment its servi- 
ces • By 1908 one hundred paid sanitary barbers were employed by 
the department throughout the Sudan. Their service included the 
registration of births and deaths, vaccination, and minor operations. 
Sudanese women were trained to become nurses but were reported to be 
1 ... indolent, incapable of learning and quite unfit to be left in 
charge... Ta^aisha played a predominant role in the Sudan rail-
5ways, while the Hadendowa became skilled! bridge builders • Even the 
intelligence department had several Sudanese on its pay-roll6. In
1GGR - 1904, pp.IO4-9.
^W.Scott Hill, Memoir,'Ten Years in the Sudan', In.d.l, SAD/466/4/4*
(Scott Hill arrived in the Sudan in 1904* &s deputy director of the 
steamers department. In 19.14 be rejoined the navy and later became 
admiral). The Berberines, were the Barbara who inhabited Sukkut and 
Maltas in the Wadi Haifa province.
3 ■ . .
GGR - 1902, p.120; the utilisation of barbers for sanitary duties,
was also common in Egypt. R.L.Tignor, Modernization and British Q0I0- ;
nial Rule in Egypt, l882-l|14» (Princeton 1966), pp7210-3*
4ggr - 1903, pp.224-5.
^GGR - 1908, p.628; for details regarding labour policy, see pp*387-97. 
^See p.Ill; see also Wingate to Savile, 15 Wov. 1914» SAD/192/2.
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the provinces Sudanese were appointed as shaykhs and nazirs, hut only
the^Low®st-paid clerks in the provincial headquarters were of Sudanese
. . 1
origin •
Education was therefore clearly required, and the director of the 
education department defined its aims in his first annual report*
These included the creation of an artisans1 class; the d&fifEsion of an 
elementary education to enable the masses to understand the elements
2.
of government; and the training of an indigenous administrative class 
In order to achieve these aims, different types of educational insti­
tutions were required* Instructional workshops were established in 
Kassala, Omdurman, and at the Gordon College, where pupils were ins­
tructed in metalwork, woodwork, stone-cutting, and in ginning of 
cotton* By 1908, the fifty-four boys who had graduated from the 
workshops had found employment in their respective trades^* However, 
the better class Sudanese refused to send their children to these 
workshops* The governor of Khartoum expressed his concern when he 
wrote:1..*1 lately tried to get some apprentices for the Cordon 
College Workshops but failed* All want to become Effendis...Are not 
the seeds of a second Indian experience I being 1 sowh...*^ Several
^See for instance CAO - 21, 7 Mar. 1903,1 Promotions and Increases of 
Pay1'*
2
SAR - 1900, p*76» see also J.Currie,fThe Educational Experiment in 
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan1, Journal of the African Society, Vol.33, 
1934, P.364.
3GGR - 1908, pp.149-50, 167-8; see also Handbook, p.314.
GGR - 1908, p.572; see also The Sudan, a Record of Progress. 1898- 
1M7.4. pp. 18-9.
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departments established their own workshops* Sudanese were trained
1
as telegraphists in a special school at Khartoum • The steamers and
2boats departmnet had over sixty trainees at its Khartoum workshop , 
while the railways trained their required artisans at Atbara . In 
1908, the first Sudanese youths, were sent to India to be trained as 
forest rangers^.
In order to disseminate the rudiments of education among the mass 
of the population, the government relied on the existing kuttabs1* A 
few model kuttabs were established in the northern provinces, with 
teachers trained and paid by the government^* Their syllabus inclu­
ded the traditional teaching of the Qur’an, to which the rudiments of 
writing, reading, arithmetic, and geography, were added^*
The third aim set down by Currie was the training of an adminis­
trative class* To achieve this aim, six primary schools were estab-
_  7
lished at Haifa, Suakin, Berber, Qmdurman, Khartoum, and Wad Madam U
XGGR - 1903, p.112.
2GGR - 1906, pp.494-5.
^R*Hill, Sudan Transport, pp*76-^*
“^Wingate to Cromer, 14 Feb* 1908, FO 141/416*
5^By 1912 there were forty-two-mchdel kuttabs in the northern provinces; 
GGR - 1912, p.292.
GGR - 1902,pp.75-6; GGR - 1903, p.225 GGR - 1904, P-38; GGR - 1908,
P.29B.
7GGR - 1912, p*292* There was no primary school in Dongola, owing to 
Jackson’s opposition to any English being taught in his province* He 
feared that the introduction of more advanced education, would tend 
to draw children away from agriculture* GGR - 1902, p*26l; GGR — 1910, 
P . 226*
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By 1903 there were 600 boys studying at these schools, all receiving 
an English education^. The graduates of these schools, were direc­
ted by the government, to take up employment in whatever department 
most required their services. In 1905 all the school graduates we­
re sent to the survey department to undertake the cadastral survey 
of Berber province. '...The saving effected.•.by the provision of
these native trained boys may be estimated at from £E 3000 to £E 4000
2per annum in wages...1 By the end of 1906, over seventy graduates
3had been absorbed in the central administration and in the provinces i. 
There were, however, two pressing needs which could not be met by 
these schools, namely the supply of teachers and of qadis. Consequen­
tly, a training course for young shaykhs was established in Omdurman 
in 1902. Its pupils were from selected Arab families, and went 
through a three years course of training to become teachers in the
government’s kuttabs^. In 1903 a qadis1 training course was set up
5at Gordon College * The qadis1 and teachers1 courses were combined
^GGR - 1903, pp.19-20. Subsidiary subjects such as geography and his­
tory were, however, taught in Arabic. Whereas in Egypt, English was 
the medium of instruction; GGR - 1904* P«3$.
2GGR - 1905, pp.503-1, 284-6.
GSR - 1906, pp.216—7; "the distribution of these graduates was as
follows:education - 10; religious courts - 8; survey - 13; post and 
telegraph - 25; railways - 12; Red Sea province - 2; and one each in 
the departments of justice, customs, and public works.
4GGR - 1902, p.7 6; GGR - 1903, p.19.
^ Ibid!.
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in the first three years of their studies, and two additional years
were added for specialization in the respective tffields. Up to 1908
Arabic was the medium of education. However, the standards achieved
were so low that the administration decided to send future candida^-
1tes to the primary schools for their initial education • The forty 
teachers and qadis who graduated up to the end of 1908, were all ab­
sorbed in the government service ’...Each of them represents a saving
of something like £E 100 a year in salary, as compared with the rate
2of pay of an Egyptian with corresponding qualifications...’ The 
immediate result was the dismissal of as many Egyptian qadis as pos­
sible. When Bonham Garter wanted to appoint Egyptian qadis in 1907
and in 1916, he had to overcome Wingate’s reluctance before the ap-
3
pointments were approved *
By 1904, Gurrie had come to realize that it would be necessary 
to open a secondary school in order to cope with the growing require­
ments biff the administration^. Currie argued that:
...in a country like this, if a man responsible for educatio­
nal development does not submit every phase of his policy to 
the test of what the economic needs of the country are...he
1GGR - 1908, p.154i the government’s reasons for not introducing an 
English education were ’...to prevent these young Sheikhs from being 
so Europeanised...that they may not become permanently out of touch 
with their subsequent environment and duties...’, Ibid.
2Ibid.
Bonham Carter to Wingate, 16 Jan. 1907, SAD/280/l; Wingate to Bonham 
Carter (private), 28 Sep. 1916, SAD/201/8.
4GGR - 1904, pp.34- 6.
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1
will merely walk in the old educational rut...
Hence, prior to the establishemnt of the secondary school, he surve­
yed the needs of the various government departments and concluded 
that a technical trend was more urgently required. Two courses were, 
therefore started in order to supply the needs of the departments of
survey, irrigation, and public works, a two-year course for surveyors
2
and a four-year course for subordinate engineers • Owing to financial 
difficulties in 1909--10, the final year of the engineers1 course had 
to be cancelled* Nevertheless, none of the graduates had difficulty 
in dCinding employment in government service^1*
The three southern provinces were not included in these educa­
tional schemes* The initiative taken by southern governors in esta­
blishing schools in hheir provinces was rebuked by Currie, who feared 
that the schools would help in spreading Islam^. The only educational 
facilities provided by the government for the inhabitants of the south 
were those required by the military administration. In 1903 the first 
thirty boys from the southern provinces were admitted to a three ye­
ars course at Gordon College. f...By this plan it is hoped that the
^GGR - 1905, p.§5.
^Xbid, pp.4?-'8*
3s ar - 1909, p.74; SAR - 1910, pp.90-1.
^Boulnois to Currie, Jan. 1904* SAD/103/7/2j Currie to Boulnois, Jan. 
1904, Ibid. When a similar suggestion was put forward in 1906, it 
was again turned down. Hill to Currie, 19 Dec. 1906, Ibid; Currie 
to Civil Secretary, 2 Feb. 1907, Ibid. See also GGR - 1902, pp.78-9* 
For details about missionary education, see pp. 230-9t 254-9*
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efficiency and status of the future black officer may be considera- 
1bly raised..•* The scheme was further developed a year later by
2the decision to establish a permanent military school at Khartoum • 
Thirty Sudanese graduates from the governments primary schools were 
admitted yearly into the cadets school for a three-year course* Fol­
lowing their graduation they were drafted as officers into the army, 
thus replacing Egyptian officers^. A special effort was made in the 
southern provinces to substitute Sudanese for the Egyptian Muslim 
army-clerks* By 1911, Asser reported that the army was '...on a 
fair way to the extinction of the Egyptian from such stations••.1^
He added, however, that;
•••the Sudanese Katibs of the Equatorial Companies, have*•.too 
much of the Effendi about them.•.Education seems to deprive the 
Oriental of any standing qualities he may have possessed and 
replaces them by an effeminacy which seeks for soft jobs*..5
The aims set down by Currie, on his assuming the directorship of
XGGR - 1903, p.18.
GGR - 1904, p.595 see also Historical Records - Military School
Khartoum, (Sudan), I n.d. 1 , SAD/106/4#
GCR - 1908, p.209; when in 1912 difficulties were experienced in fin­
ding suitable cadets, Wingate wrote, '...this looks as if Currie was 
confining his attention to Egyptians and half-breeds, of course we 
have to provide education for this class, but not at the expense of 
the Sudanese who are to be our real mainstay in the future#..1, Win- 
gate to Phipps, 21 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2.
Report hy Colonel Asser on his tour of Inspection in the Bahr-el 
Ghazal, 28 Aug.- 9 Sep. 1911, SAI)/30l/3; see also Wingate to Currie, 
21 Dec. 1912, SAD/l83/3j Currie was instructed to recruit suitable 
Sudanese graduates to act as clerks in the Equatorial battalion.
^Asser to Wingate, 15 Sep. 1912, SAD/l82/3/2
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Education in 1900, were partly achieved* By 1914 many graduates of
the government primary schools and of the higher educational courses
at Gordon College were employed in the lower ranks of the government
1
and army administration • Even the sons of the three khalifas and
of many prominent Mahdist amirs were absorbed in the government ser- 
2
vice • Shortly before retiring from his post, Currie proposed to 
make further changes by appointing Sudanese to higher administrative 
positions, even if efficiency suffered, as' a result * This suggestion 
however, was not implemented. Only a preliminary step was undertaken 
in 1915, when the first Sudanese were appointed as; sub-ma*murs*Thlhf ul1
InlimpOip&ientatioii of Currie’s proposal had to wait until 1924^*
\
Certain sections of the population viewed the introduction of 
government-sponsored education into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan with 
great suspicion. They believed that government schools would give 
a Christian education and that school graduates would be forced to
^By 1910, there was already a surplus of primary school graduates, 
seeking clerical jobs,*...If some of these youth...had only learned 
something about cotton how useful they might be...*, Asser to Wingate, 
12 Sep. 1910, SAD/297/3. - ■
2 'List of the family of the Mahdi, the Khalifa, and of leading Mahdist
Amirs, their place of residence and employment In.d.1914?I * SAD/l06/2*
None of the Mahdi1s sons were employed by the governments Of the
-three khalifas. ^Abdallahi had nine sons in the government service,
?Ali Wad Hilu - five, and Muhammad Sharif-•' three*.
^Currie to Wingate, 24 June 1914» SAD/190/3/2; Wingate to Currie, 1 
July 1914f Ibid.
^Memorandum on the Future Status of the Sudan^ Major General Sir L* 
Stack to Field Marshal Vis'count Allenby, 25 May 1924> _SAD/248/37; see 
also The Sudan a Record of Progress. pp*l6-7*
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1become soldiers of officers • These suspicions prevailed in some of 
the provinces and were particularly strong among the nomad tribes of
2Kordofan and the Red Sea, with the result that progress was retarded •'• 
In the towns and larger villages progress was generally mkre rapid*
Yet the fact that a high percentage of the pupils were Egyptians or 
muwalladin caused deep concern to the administration, whose feasor aim 
was to educate a bona fide Sudanese clerical class'^* Apart from Khar­
toum and Qmdurman, where the general attitude towards education was 
favourable, the Blue Kile and Sennar provinces were the strongest 
supporters of education^. It was in these two provinces that a volun­
tary education tax was first imposed, following a suggestion made by 
certain sections of the inhabitants • The Blue Kile pUDvince was also
1' Memorandum by Wingate on interview with Mudassir Ibrahim (late kateb 
of the Khalifa)1, Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 11 Apr* l|99j 
EO 407/151.
2GGR - 1902, p.317; GGR - 1903, pp.74,96; GGR - 1904, p.105; GGR - .1906, 
p*702; see also Willis's diary, 14 Oct. 1911, SAD/210/2, who wrote: 
'•••the parents are giving a lot of trouble over the children of the 
school, as a story had been circulated that the Govt* intends to take 
all the pupils to Egypt to be soldiers***'; see also Handbook Koddofan«
p.110*
^GGR - 1903, p.96, The governor of Suakin reported with concern that 
out of 69 pupils at the primary school oi!ft|k!.&4:lHere Arabs and Sudanese* 
The total number of pupils at the four government schools was 5771 out 
of whom only 180 were Sudanese; 179 muwalladin; 128 Egyptians and the 
remainder from numerous other nationalities* Ibid,Lpart III, Appen­
dix 'D'; see also Cromer to Wingate, 3 Eeb. 1904* SAO/275/2, Cromer 
who was deeply concerned, blamed Currie for the predominence of Egyp­
tians and muwalladin in the schools.
^See for instance GGR - 1902, p.310; GGR - 1904» p.121*
5GGR - 1905, pp.57-8; GGR - 1906, pp.222-4; GGR - 1906, pp.265-7.
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1the pioneer of girls1 education in the Sudan • This sphere was pre­
viously dominated by missionaries, and the government decided to get 
involved in it • In 1907? the first girls* school was opened in Eufara,
by Shaykh Babikr Badri and following, its inspection by Currie it re-
3
ceived a regular government subsidy . The rapid growth of education, 
however, had its hazards* There were many parents who regarded edu­
cation as a guarantee of a government post for their children. Hence 
the government, which was directly responsible for this attitude, was 
obkiged to warn the parents that there was no certainty that their 
offspring would obtain government employment^.
The conditions of service of Sudanese officials differed from tho­
se offered to Egyptians, Lebanese, or Europeans* According to the 
Sudan Pension Ordinance, all Sudanese officials belonged to ’Class A1, 
and had to serve a minimum peri&d of twenty-five years before retiring.
Furthermore, Sudanese earned their pension at a lower rate than that
5
offered to other officials • In 1914? ihe pension ordinan©e\was amended, 
so as to prevent Egyptians earning less than £E 16 per month becoming 
eligible for pension under the more favourable conditions^. The reason
1GGR - 1905, p.41.
2GGR - 1906, pp.223-4.
^Babikr Badri, TaVlkh Ha.yatI. Vol%2, pp.64-6.
4SG - 44, Feb. 1903.
^'The Sudan Government Pension Ordinance 1904', SilD/248/l^.
The Sudan Pension Ordinance 1914? OGC, 8-9 Apr. 1914? P0 867/5 •
- 183 -
was probably that by then there were sufficient Sudanese to fill 
these lower paid posts. In general, Sudanese were offered Slower sa­
laries than those paid to Egyptians or Syrians of equal qualifications. 
The reason for this was that the administration believed that an of­
ficial serving in his own country should not qualify for the extra
1remuneration offered to foreigners * Even on the Sudan railways, the
lower-paid Sudanese had to travel second or th&rd class while on du- 
2ty • In common with all other government officials, the Sudanese
3
were prohibited from engaging in trade . Sudanese whom the government 
wanted to reward for their services received robes of honour or reli­
gious robes, which were bestowed by the governor-general, in prefer­
ence to the Egyptian decorations, which were controlled by the Khedive^.
5
e. The relations between British and non-British officials .
The British community in Khartoum was on the whole a rather ex­
clusive society. The British officers had their own club, and pref- 
ered the company of their fellow-countrymen to that of the Sudanese 
or Egyptian officials • There were, however, certain occasions when
GGR - 1906, pp.216-7, By then the government saved over £E 4000 per 
annum, throughtthe lower rate of pay offered to Sudanese officials.
^CAO - 1, 1 Jan. 1902, All officials who earned more than £E 300 per 
annum were entitled to free first class railway travel.
3CA0 - 99,'14 Aug. 1901.
4See pp. 51» 196-7,314-15.
^For the relation of Wingate and Slatin to Egyptian and Sudanese 
officials, see pp. 56-7? 90-5*
£
Symes, Tour of Duty, p.14; Hussey, Tropical Africa 1908-1944* PP*4~5»
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the British officers felt obliged to mix with the Muslim officials.
Such an occasion was mawlid al-Nabi, and a description of the festi­
vities by Balfour, one of the British officers, indicated the gulf 
that existed between the two peoples:
...I went to the weirdest show last Wednesday the Mohammedan 
feast of Mouled el-Wabby•..we were led to a table completely 
covered with dishes, on each of which was some form of cake 
or sweet more impossibly unwholesome than the next^...In 
another crowd all held hands and jumped up and down making 
q noise like a dog barking in unison. This goes on until 
they get too giddy to stand or are sick...2
In the provinces, relations were closer, especially in the outlying 
districts, where weeks would pass before the Britihh inspector enjoy­
ed the company of one of his compatriots'* Yet the little evidence 
there is tends to show that the British inspectors did not regard 
their fellow officials very highly. The following passages from Wil­
lis1 s diary, written when he was inspector at the Wahud district in 
ICordofan, illustrate his attitude to, and treatment of his subordinates.
...20 Mar. 1909*..Had to beat el—Bashir for lying and playing 
the fool...Ali Gula is a fearful liar...l6 Jan. 1912...Abu Zaid 
Hagar who is supposed to be Omda of these hills does not know 
even where they are...31 January 1912...The show at Port Sudan 
(the King*s visit) seemsto have been no end of a fantasia - 
all the Wazirs got puttyjmedals and will all be too big for their 
boots...31 August 1912..iNazir l-Ali Julia I is up to every game -
Hussey, who had a similar experience, related how he offered the food 
given to him by a faki. to his dog Mussa. Hussey’s pony, was also 
honoured with a Muslim name, and was called Mufti, Ibid, pp.3,7.
^Balfour to Lady F.Balfour I his mbther 1 , 30 April 1907» SAD/303/6,
The last paragraph of Balfour’s description refers to the dhikr, a 
religious ceremony practiced by the sufl orders; see Trimingham, Islam.
pp.146-8.
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slavery, guns, female ivory, gunpowder - and has heen collec­
ting from all his folk to cover his expenses to Port Sudan 
which he says were £ 500 a-nA were as a matter of fact nil...
The absence of social relations between the British officials and 
the Egyptians and Sudanese is hardly surprising* They belonged to 
different civilizations and were of a different mentality and creed* 
Moreover, the British were taught to mistrust the Egyptians, and 
regarded the Sudanese as incompetent. Since many of the British 
believed that any sign of friendship or cordiality towards their co­
officials would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, it is no won­
der that they tended to place their relations with the inhabitants 
and non-British officials on an extremely autocratic and paternalis- 
tic footing * Nonetheless, the .Brithsh officials succeeded in 
establishing a direct link with the people of the Sudan, which was 
largely based on their sense of duty arid on their just treatment of 
the inhabitants* Summing up the achievements of sixteen years of 
British rule in the Sudan, Symes wrote the following about the 
British administrators:
...The British official is recognised as the deus ex machina 
of a regenerated Sudan* He is not omnipotent...but he is- just,
Willis's diary, SJffl/210/2; see also Colonel R.V.Savile, Diary of a 
tribute collecting tour in Kassala, Apr. 1903, SAD/427/3.
2
In summing up the governorship of Gorringe in Sennar, Wingate wroteL
f...He is severe, autocratic and determined and these epi&lities are 
very useful in this country up to a certain point...1 In this ins­
tance Wingate decided not to renew Gorringe,fs contract, as he was 
dreaded not only by the Sudanese but also by his fellow British of­
ficers. Wingate to Cecil, 7 May 1904r SAD/275/4; see also E.Atyyah, 
An Arab tells his story, pp.137-40. Atiyah described the arrogance 
of the British officials towards the Sudanese and Lebanese govern­
ment employees.
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; he can organise and supervise, he has a passion to prohe 
to the facts of a matter and, above all, in intention he 
is kindly and.well disposed. His mistakes are, as often 
as not, attributed to his subordinate non-British offic­
ials j and his virtues have undoubtedly built the fabric 
of the new Sudan...!
Wingate had a definitely political aim when this memorandum was written,
2namely to sever.jthe links between Elgypt and the Sudan • Yet, what­
ever view one may take of this policy, Wingate’s claim about the 
supreme position of the British administrators as compared to their 
fellow Egyptians, was fully corroborated by future events *
"^’Note on the Political State of the Sudan1, 17 Jan* 1918, SiUD/236/4* 
2See p.57'.
3
The comparative ease with which the Sudan administration was 
de-Egyptianiaed, following Stack’s assassination in 1924, proved 
the weakness of the Egyptian element within the administration. 
However, the collaboration between the White Flag and Egyptian 
nationalists proved that Wingate’s claim about the inherent hatred 
between Sudanese and Egyptians was no longer true* See Holt, The 
Sudan, pp*130-33»
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Chapter V.
Religious policy - Islam and Christi;
The religious policy to be pursued by the Sudan government was
1first enunciated by Lord Cromer in 1899j ln his speech at Omdurman •
It was further elaborated by Kitchener in him memorandum to the
provincial governors:
...Be careful to see that religious feelings are not in any way 
interfered with, and that, the Mohammedan religion is respected.
At the same time, Fikis teaching different Tariks Isiel...should 
not be allowed to resume their former tr-ade* In old days, these 
Fikis, who lived on the superstitious ignorance of the people, 
were one of the curses of the Soudan, and were responsible in a 
great measure for the rebellion*..Mosques in the principal towns 
will be rebuiltj but private mosques, takias, sawiyas, Sheikhs* 
tombs, & c.,cannot be allowed to be re-established, as they 
generally formed centres of unorthodox fanaticism...2
Cromer had also warned Salisbury against allowing Christian missionary
activities in the Muslim provinces of the Sudan, even before the
Condominium agreement was signed:
...It would in my opinion, be very unwise to take such action 
as would cause the extension of missionary enterprise to be 
regarded by the people of the Soudan as the first result of 
English interference...3
In propagating this policy Cromer enjoyed the full support of the
Ahglican Bishop of Jerusalem, who regarded it as wise *...to restrain
the undisciplined invasion of the Soudan by missionary agents...until
discount Cromer*s speech to the Sheikhs and Notables of the Soudan- 
at Omdurman, 4 Jan. 1899» ^0 833/25*
^Memorandum to Mudirs, Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar.1899, 
FO 78/5022; see also pp.20-1.
^Cromer to Salisbury, 11 Oct, 1898, FO 4°7/l47*
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1the Government of the country is fully and firmly settled..•’ These 
principles were followed, with certain modifications, throughout 
Wingate’s governor-generalship. Orthodox Islam was actively suppor­
ted, while Sufism, though unofficially regognized, was never comple­
tely trusted* The missionaries were allowed to proselytize in the 
southern provinces, hut in the north^they were restricted to educati­
onal and medical activities. This policy which implied the preser­
vation of the status quo in the Muslim north whilst encouraging the 
gradual Christianization of the pagan tribes, was the first step in
what in later years became known as Southern Policy*
2a* Islamic policy in the northern provinces •
The principle underlying the Sudan government1s policy towards 
Islam was to encourage orthodox Islam while striving to lessen the 
impact of &ufism. The government aimed at establishing a Sudanese 
Muslim leadership which would find itself aligned to the interests 
of the established administration. It regarded Sudtism as a movement 
based on superstition which could endanger the new regime by encour­
aging Mahdist uprisings. In order to promote its policy, the govern­
ment issued a proclamation which was widely circulated throughout the 
Sudan. In it the government undertook to do everything in its power 
to encourage what it regarded as the true Islamic religion, by
XBlyth to Cromer, 21 Feb. 1900, FO 407/155.
2
For a comprehensive study of Islam in the Sudan, see Trimingham, 
Islam.
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building mosques, encouraging waqfs, andby appointing ulama’ to
Xteach the Shari*a. and act as qadis in the various provinces • How­
ever, those who were not within the sphere of orthodox Islam were
2
warned against interfering in religious affairs * The proclamation
was defined by Cromer as:
•♦.an attempt on the part of the Sirdar to strengthen the or­
thodox body of Moslems which it had been his policy to form 
and support as against the numerous heretical Moslem sects of 
which the Sudan had ever been a hot-bed...3
Anofthdjfrr&'kep in the same direction was the appointment of theTBoard 
of Ulema* in June 1901^. All government decisions on matters regar­
ding Islam were henceforth to require the sanction of the board. Yet 
once again Wingate1s main worry was Sudism. *•..Tarikas...have been
rather on the increase but I hope with the aid of the Council I of Ule-
5mal, to quietly but firmly deal with them...1  ^ In practice all re­
ligious questions were within Slatin's sphere of responsibility• The 
1 Board of Ulema* consisted of some of his closest friends whom he of- 
ten consulted • By collaborating with the Board the government1s
1 _For the administration of Islamic law by the qadis see pp.272-82.
Wingate to Cromer, 17 Jan. 1902, FO 141/371? fhe proclamation which 
was discussed by Wingat^with the !Board of Ulema*,*...had a good ef­
fect in showing people that Govt, is generally opposed to the terika 
system which is a real danger requiring most careful attention...1 
The proclamation was published in the Egyptian Jounnal Officieli 14 
Wov. 1901.
^Adeney to Baylis, 21 Jan. 1902, CMSa/e/03/1902. Adeney, the secre­
tary of the CMS in Egypt, was reporting an interview he had with Cromer.
Wingate to Cromer, 13 June 1901, SAB/271/6.
^Ibid.
^See pp.79-81•
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decisions acquired an Islamic sanction. Reporting on certain of the 
Boards members, many years later, Willis wrote that they ’...conti­
nue to play the "Vicars of Bray". They have not very much influence,
1but then I imagine they were not meant to have...1 There were seve­
ral additional ways in which the government sought to propagate ortho­
dox Islam. The authorities aided the establishment and maintenance 
of mosques, and assisted Muslims who went on pilgrimage to Mecca.
The government also supported the teaching of the Qur’an in govern­
ment-approved and subsid&ted kuttabs. whose teachers studied under
2
orthodox Muslims • Lastly, the administration of justice in all 
spheres related to the personal status of Muslims was entrusted to 
the Muslim Shari^a Courts «
The erection of new mosques started immediately after the recon­
quest. In certain provinces most of the new mosques were privately 
built and financed by a method of subscription^. Others were
1Willis to Slatin, 15 Mar. 1921, SAD/438/653; see also Butler's diary, 
13 Oct. 1911, 21 Nov. 1911, SAD/400/10..
2In 1911| Wingate suggested to send Sudanese ^u^ma’ to study Muslim 
theology at Al-Azhar. As according to Slatin ’...the alternative of 
sending Egyptian Ulema to Khartoum in order to teach Moslem Theology 
to the Sudanese, would be more harmful..*1, Wingate to Kitbhener 
(private), 26 Oct. 1911, SAI)/30l/4; see also pp.l75~7*
^For details see pp. 272-8.
^"These mosques, which included suf 1 zawiyas. were referred to as 'pri­
vate mosques', in all the Sudan government reports, whilst the mosques 
subsidised by the government were defined as public. X have followed 
this terminology for reasons of clarity although this distinction 
does not exist in Islam.
officially recognized and received financial assistance from the
government* By 1904 there were 413 mosques in the Sudan distributed
over the northern provinces. Of these 189 were defined as 1 Public
1Mosques* and 224 as * Private Mosques* • Some of the public mowques
were not only subsidized by the government b^t also- built by the dep-
2
artment of public works '• Yet, by and large, the discrepancy in the 
number of mosques in the various provinces suggests that the initia­
tive of the inhabitants and their financial resources played an 
3
important role • Provinces like ICordofan and ICassala had very few 
mosques* When the governor of Kassala requested government assistance 
in order to build a mosque in the province*s capital, the government
offered a subsidy of £E 20 on condition that the inhabitants raised
4 5an equal sum * By 1905 there was still no mosque in Kassala , while
1gGR - 1904 , p.81. These mosques were distributed as follows:
Province* Public MosquesJ Private Mosques*
Berber 64 28
Dongola 7 150
Gezira 42 2
Haifa 66 2
Kassala 1 3
Khartoum 2 36
ICordofan 5 3
Sennar 2 -
2Ibid., p.34 •
The large concentration of mosques in the richer provinces is
comprehend* However, this fails to explain the large number of private 
mosques in Dongola as compared to Wadi Haifa, where most of the mosques 
were public* The re-establishment of * private mosgues* was a definite 
modification of Kitchener’s Memorandum to Mudirs, see p*l87*
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in El Gbeid the only mosque consisted of an open square with a
1straw shelter in its middle • The part played by awcraf in the 
building and maintenance of mpsques seems to have been insigni­
ficant!* -Wacrf was not a traditional institution in the Sudan and
seems to have been unknown in Sudanese land-tenure before the Tur-
2
oo-Egyptian conquest f. There were, however, a few exceptions'.
The central mosque of Khartoum, which was inaugurated in 1904» was
3
largely financed by Egyptian wacrf s u The same applied to the mos­
ques of galfa and Tokar^. In 1906, members of the Egyptian legis­
lative assembly purchased land in Khartoum in order to found a 
fiaqf khayri . Despite these exceptions most of the mosques were 
built and maintained by the local inhabitants aided by the
“^GGR - 1906,, p*-702-* Themmosque at El Obeid was finally built with 
the aid of a local wacrf* Meinhof, pp>.48-9!«
2P.M.Holt, Hol.v families and Islam in the Sudan# Princeton Hear East 
Papers, No.4 (19^7) r P*6? see also pp.276-7*
3 * -
GGR - 1904t p.8lf. When the foundation stone of the mosque was laid 
in 1900, Cromer wrote:*...a little unnecessary zeal has been shown by 
soqje of the English authorities in laying the foundation stone of a 
mosque at Khartoum...X shall endeavour to moderate any enthusiasm in 
these directions otherwise the Bishop of Jerusalem will want me to 
lay the foundation stone of a Sudanese Cathedral...*,see Cromer to 
Salisbury, 19 Oct', 1900, FO 633/6.
^GGR - 1903, p’,97; in 1912 Wingate wrote that heunever knew that the
Tokar mosque was maintained by the Egyptian wacrf and ordered Stack to 
terminate Egyptian contributions* However, in the annual report of 
1903, this was clearly stated* Wingate to Stack (private), 16 May 
1912, SAD/181/2/2; see also GOR - 1906, p.641.
•’Owen to Wingate, 3 Jan. 1906} 14 Jan. 1906; Wingate to Owen, 9 Jan1. 
1906, SAD/278/l; Wacrf khayri - a charitable endowment for religious 
purposes.
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1
government *• The government also assisted in providing and paying
for the personnel required hy the mosques and the kuttabs* Yet,
owing to the precarious government finances this was more a token
2of government support than substantial assistance :* The government 
could adford to be more generous in granting religious robes to the 
country*s religious headers. These were conferred by Wingate during 
the *Id al-fitr or al-*Id al-kabir. both of which were observed as 
official holidays ;. The class of ^ulama^, which came into existence 
as a result of these measures, depended on the government for its 
economic wellbeing as well as for its political powers, and became 
the most prominent supporter of the new regime.
An additional measure undertaken by the Sudan government to 
encourage orthodox Islam was the assistance it granted for the pil­
grimages to the holy places of Islam. Wingate knew that the Mahdi*s
&interdiction of the pilgrimage, had eaused considerable resentment •
1The government subsidies seem to have been mather small. In Bongo- 
la it took four years to complete the central mosque, which was largely 
financed by local contributions. GGR - 1905» P*63* In al-Kawwa, on the 
White Wile south of Dueim, the government*s contribution to the mos­
que amounted to £E 10 out of a total £E 700 spen^up.t)ol911* Wingate 
to Clayton, 13 Feb. 1911, SAD/300/2.
2 ^See for instance GGR 1905, p*63; Jackson complained that over two
years had passed since Wingate promised him to arrange for government
payment to the imam and the muezzin of the Merowe mosque; see also
SG - 36, June 1902, where a list of ^ulama* who were appointed by the
government is published. Their annual pay varied between £E l8-30:.
3
See for instance SG - 34? Special supplement in honour of the cele­
bration of the feast of Kurban Bairam 1al-* Id al—Kabir1 Apr* 1902.
This supplement was published every year and contained lists of officers, 
officials, and dignitaries who were decorated for their services.
^Shouoair,Ta?rilch. Vol.3»p*365; R*Wingate.Ten 3fears Qaptivit;y,pb*278-9.
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Hence, by encouraging the pilgrimage, the government hoped to gain 
local support and to strengthen the orthodox Muslim elements. In 
1900 Sir Rennell Rodd prepsntd a special report on the conditions 
of the pilgrimage to Mecca* He suggested that the Sudan government 
should be empowered to open a quarantine at Suakin, as by interna­
tional regulations all pilgrims had to travel to Tor, some seven 
hundred miles from Suakin, to the internationally controlled quaran­
tine* Rodd concluded:1• •.It is most undesirable that any obstacles 
should be placed in the way of the freedom of the Sudan pilgrimaged*.* 
However, the Sudan authorities were unable to overcome the regula­
tions imposed by the international conference of the quarantine
board at Venice* The result was that pilgrims avoided the quaran-
2tine and landed at Massawa or along the coast * In 19^7 the Sudan
3
government succeeded in opening its own quarantine at Smakin •
Hence, despite continued interference by the international quarantine 
board, the Sudan government was able to appoint its own officer and 
to provide its own arrangements for the pilgrims^* Special pilgrims* 
villages were built at Suakin where pilgrims were accommodated accor­
ding to tribal origin and where they lived under their own shaylchs
■'•Rodd. To Cromer, 29 Aug. 1900, FO 78/5088.
^Report by Cuthbert James, on problems connected with the pilgrimage 
 24 Apr. 1902, FO 141/3715 GGR - 1904, p.38.
3SG - 104, 1 Jan. 1907.
hoffi - 1908, pp.627—85 see also 'The Quarantine Ordinance 1908', SG - 
133, 21 May 1908.
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until they resumed their journey'*''. Throughout these years the govern­
ment assisted the indigent pilgrims by paying their quarantine fees 
and their upkeep in the Suakin villages. In the years 1911-13, the 
annual subsidy granted by the government amounted to over £E 3000,
while the pilgrims themselves contributed only about £1 400-600 per 
2
annum *• Even during the World War the pilgrimage was only stopped
3
for a few months and was resumed in July 1915 • Special precautions 
were, however, taken to stop enemy agents or propaganda from infilt­
rating into the Sudan^*
The reasons for the governments favourable attitude towards the 
pilgrimage are not hard to discover* Wingate was interested in gain­
ing the support of orthodox Islam. By hampering the pilgrimage he
knew that he would alienate those elements within the Muslim communi-
5
ty whom he was anxious to cultivate * Secondly, oiling to the sparse 
population of the Sudan and its meagre labour force, the Sudan gov­
ernment was keen on attracting immigrants from West Africa, who were 
popularly called Fallata and Takarir. Many of these settled in the
1 G 0 R  -  1 9 0 8 ,  p . 6 2 7 .
Note by Said Shoucair on cost of pilgrimage jn.d.l, SAD/493/3*
3SIR - 247, FeD. 1915; SIR - 252, July 1915.
~ 245, Dec. 1914; Wingate to Fitzgerald, 30 Dec. 1914,PEO/30/57/
No.45; Wingate wrote that 1 *..the pilgrims from Mecca...go through a 
course of moral disinfection at the hands of the loyal dikis...1;
For details see pp.213-6.
^Wingate to Harvey, 20 Oct. 1910, SAD/284/lO/l.
- 196 -
Sudan either before or after their pilgrimage"* Despite their slave-
dealing and religious fanaticism, these western immigrants made an
1important contribution to the country1s economy •
Despite the governments official rejection of SutfCism, it could
2not disregard its impact on the Muslim inhabitants of the Sudan '* 
Furthermore, the Khatmiygra order, which was widespread in the eastern 
and northern Sudan, was in a separate category* Its leader, during 
the early stages of the Mahdia, was Muhammad *Uthman al-MIrghani II,
3
who denounced the Mahdi and consequently escaped to Egypt >where he 
continued to receive government assistance^* Following his death in 
1886 he was succeeded by his son, fAlT al-Mirghani, as shaykh of the
R
Khatmly§rv> • The loyalty of the Khatmiyfta and its leaders was soon 
to be rewarded* Sayyid ?A1I al-Mirghani was awarded the C.M.G1. in 
1900, thus becoming the first and only notable of the Sudan to receive 
a British decoration until the first World War^. The central mosque 
of the Khatmiy^a which was destroyed during the Mahdia was rebuilt
^MWA, pp*19-35; C.A.Willis, Report on Slavery and the Pilgrimage (1926) 
SAD7212/2; see also p?395*
2
For details about Sufism in the Sudan see Trimingham, Islam« pp*l87- 
241; S*Hillelson,' Religion in the SudanJ,Hamilton, pp*209"214; G.A.Wil­
lis,'Religious Confraternities of the Sudani.SNR - Vol.4, Ho.4 (l92l), 
pp. 175-194.
3
Ibid, p.187; see also Holt, Mahdist State, pp*75, 147*
^Slatin's diary, Notes !Khatmiyya remuneration1 1903, SAD/441* 
^Trimingham, Islam, pp*233-4j Hill, BD, pp.278-9*
/T
See Wingate to Cromer, 7 Dec. 1914, SAD/l92/2*
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1by the government in the Khatmiyffcc. quarter of Kassala • Only the 
refusal of the British authorities to recognise him officially as the 
paramount shaykh of his tariga, caused Sayyid *A1T al-MIrghanl some 
bitterness* Yet despite constant appeals the government could hard­
ly appoint an official shaykh to a sufi tariqa which, although resp-
2ected, never acquired official recognition U In 1912, however, Wingate
twrote a letter to Sayyid All, which granted him semi-official recog­
nition as head of his family:
...•The Morghani family lives in various places and are there­
fore under the local authority of the district in which they 
are living; but I have no doubt that all of them, like the 
government, look upon you as their own head and chief*
The IChatmiy^a leadership continued to be divided between Sayyid *Ali
and his brother Ahmad al-Mirghani and was a cause of endless friction^*
The latter settled at the tariqa’s'headcruarters in Kassala, where he
5
enjoyed a dominant position * Both brothers continued on the
1Trimingham, Islam, p*234, see also Wingate to Cromer, 26 Feb* 1901, 
FO 141/364, where he suggested to give Sayyid fAli al-Mirghani a good 
site of government land in Khartoum in exchange for some land in 
Hal fay a (Khartoum Worth)'*
^Slatin to Wingate, 27 Apr. 1912, SA0/l8l/l/3; see also pp*79“80*
■^Wingate to Said Ali, 28 May 1912, SAD/lOl/17/4» notably, Wingate 
never mentioned the Khatmiyya order but referred throughout his 
letter to the MIrghani family*
^See for instance Wingate to Tcwnsend, 26 Aug* 1916, SAD/201/5.
In 1916 the governor of Kassala suggested giving Sayyid Ahmad an 
Egyptian decoration for his loyalty. He stressed the fact that 
Sayyid Ahmad1s influence in Kassala was far greater than his bro­
ther’s* Wingate who objected to Egyptian decorations on political 
grounds, sent him instead an enlarged photograph of himself* See 
Townsend to Wingate, 28 Jan* 1916; Wingate to lownsend, 15 Feb. 1916, 
sAD/199/11.
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governments payroll, and when Cecil in 1916 suggested to stop their
subsidy, Wingate objected strongly, stating that they were ’...amohgst /
1the few who are genuinely and entirely on our side...1 Wingate had 
good reasons for being grateful to the MIrghanis for they consisten-
2tly supported his policy of reducing Egyptian influence in the Sudan • 
Moreover, fearing the competition of other isufx tarxqas, notably the 
Majdhubxya, they were only too glad to inform against them\
The attitude of the government to the other tarxqas can be def­
ined as one of suspicious tolerance. Sufism, its teachings and 
rituals, wefe regarded as dangerous fanaticism by most of the British 
officials who had only a limited knowledge of its true significance^* 
Describing his impressions of the members of one of the tarxqas. a 
government inspector wrote:*...It is when one sees such men that one 
realises the difficulty of any truce with Isla m . . . A n o t h e r  inspec­
tor recorded his impressions of a sufx celebration of Mawlid al-Nabx;
...on all their faces is a sort of ’’far away”, rapt expression, 
not a pleasant dreamy peaceful look, but a look that makes one 
picture them waving blood stained swords, as they hack their way 
through the forces of ’’unbelievers” to the cry of ’’Allah Akbar” 
...their barbaric discords adding to the weirdness of the scene, 
and the pious ecstasy of the religious maniacs...5
■^Wingate to Cecil, 5 July 1916, SAD/201/2.
2See pp.56-7, 168;
See Slatin to Wingate, 12 Apr. 1913, SAD/l86/l/l, Slat in, warned.
Wingate from relying too much on the information he received' from one 
3>f the IChatmxyya leaders with regard to the Maj&hubiya. See also p.80.
^C.P.Browne, Writings (typescript) n.d.), SAD/422/141* .
^Butler’s Journal, 1911, SAD/422/12.
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Although officially the Sudan government did not change its policy
towards sufx orders, the reality of the Sudan forced it to modify its
policy over the years* This was most apparent in the case of sufx
zawiyas which were being rebuilt throughout the northern provinces «
Even the attitude towards sufx shaylchs was gradually modified and
with the outbreak of the World War, they were recognized by the
2
government as an essential part of Sudanese Muslim leadership u 
b» Religious uprisings and religious-political prisoners’*
Wingate was firmly convinced that considerable sections of Sudan­
ese Muslims were still Mahdists at heart* ’...The fact that Mohammed
Ahmed was an impostor has by no means driven out of their heads that
3
the ”expected Mahdi’1 will eventually come.**1 Hence the government 
was always on the alert*. Hardly a year passed without some religious 
uprising, or certain fakxs being arrested and deported* In 1900 ?Alx 
*Abd al-Karxm was arrested with twenty of his followers* !**.At a
■^ See pp. 190-1*
2One of the principles guiding the governments attitude towards sufx 
orders was not to interfere in their internal affairs* However, the 
important role played by the sufxs in local politics brought about an 
increasing interference by government officials in the appointment of 
gufx shaykhs* This happened in El Obeid in 1911, when Isma^xl al- 
Malckx died. Savile, then governor of ICordofan, appointed Shaykh Ibra­
him al-Mxrghanx as shaykh of the Isma'llxyya order as he was sure of 
the latter’s cooperation with the government; see Butler’s diary,
24 Oct. 1911t 21 Nov. 19M, SAD/400/10; see also pp.217“9»
^Wingate to Cromer, 24 Feb. 1901, SAB/271/2. Wingate’s claim was 
right, he did not mention, however, that Mahdist pretenders appeared 
throughout the Khalifa’s rule, and were thus no innovation. See 
Shoucair, Ta^rxkh. Vol•III,pp.460-3, 470-3* 548-95 for Slat in’s at­
titude, see pp*8l-2*
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meeting of the principle religious dignitaries*..the sect was den­
ounced a^fihtrerodox and dangerous *. •* and its members were deported
1to Haifa • In July 1901, the Sudan authorities were alarmed about
2* .Dervish like terikas.*.1 in the Gezira • Consequently, Shaykh 
cAbd al-Mahmud Wad Wur al-Da’im and several other religious leaders 
were arrested, only to be released a few weeks later when the alarm
proved a fa4.se one\ In August 1901 the 1 Board of Ulema1 was inst­
ructed to investigate the alleged anti-government preachings of a 
former Mahdist, Shaykh Mahdawi *Abd al-Rahman, who had recently re­
turned from banishment at Nasser^'. In 1903, a faki from Bornu, 
Muhammad al-Amxn, was reported to have declared himself as the mahdi. 
Nason, then civil secretary, suggested that f..*a little killing in 
the neighbourhood.•.will have a good effect...* Wingate, who was 
on holiday in England, approved of sending a puhitive expedition
Wingate to Cromer, 1 Mar. 1900, F0 141/356. In 1901 some members of 
the sect were released b$rfe had to be re-arrested as they '...were 
found to be again carrying on their old propaganda of the-millenium...* 
OCR•- 1902, p*303* The religious dignitaries who decided the case 
included several cradis as well as sufi shaykhs. Shoucair, Ta^rikh,
Vol.3, p*670. When the sect*s leaders were released in 1907, Slatin 
wrote,*.•.Abd al Kerim & Co. were tried by the board of Ulemas and 
therefore one or two of Ulemas should have been sent to Wadi Haifa.1*, 
before any action was taken...1, Slatin to Wingate, 24 July 1907, SAD/
28l/l; see also SIR - 67,1Jan.-8 Mar. 1900, App.C.
2SIR - 84, July 1901.
3Gleichen to Wingate, 25 July 1901, SAD/271/7; Slatin to Wingate, 13
Aug. 1901, SAD/271/8.
4SIR - 85, Aug. 1901.
Nason to Wingate, 18 Aug. 11903?I, SAD/273/8; see also Nason to
Wingate, 3 Sep* 1903, SAD/273/9*
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but urged that 1 . • .Mahon* •• 1 should! do all he can to establish Govt'*
1authority without unnecessary bloodshed..** Muhammad al-Amin was
arrested with his followers on 12 September and was hanged in public 
2
at El Obeid • In justifying this extreme sentence Wingate resorted
to arguments which were repeated in similar cases in the coming years
andf therefore, warrant-; some detailed explanation*
• •.The movement which he I Muhammad al-Amxn! had instigated was 
considerably more widespread and subversive of Government autho­
rity than had been anticipated**.Had he been left at large for 
even a very short time longer, he would have succeeded in alien­
ating a considerable number of tribes; and in view of the compa­
ratively small number of troops.*.it is not improbable that he 
would soon have acquired an influence in the country which would 
have jeopardized Government authority...Colonel Nason’s decision 
to carry out the extreme penalty of the law without delay shows 
how fully that officer realized the importance of dealing deci­
sively in a matter which would have only become more difficult 
had the question of execution been postponed...Colonel Nason’s 
prompt action will, in my opinion, act as a powerful deterrent 
to further disturbances...3
Slatin, who fully approved of the death sentence, maintained that 
the reports about the so called Mahdi were ’...very exaggerated..•1^  
In 1904 Muammad Adam declared himself as Nabx *Isa at Singa, in 
Sennar province. The Egyptian ma’mur who set out to arrest the pre­
tender, was killed and '...in the melee which ensued Mohammed Adam
^Wingate to Nason, 11 Sep. 1903, Ibid.
O
Findlay to Lansdowne, 29 Sep. 1903, Fo 403/334; For MatfmdsofO 
Ir~:regal opiiiiea of the case see also pp«8l.
3
Wingate to Cromer, 11 Oct. 1903, Inclosure in Cromer to Lansdowne, 
17 Oct. 1903, F0 403/334*
^GGR - 1903, pp.70-1; see also SIR - 110, Sep. 1903, Appendix A.
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1
and his followers lost their lives.. Thus read the official 
report which ,however, failed to mention that two of the Nabi fIsa’s 
followers#; who were captured alive, were executed against the ex­
pressed wishes of the acting consul-general in Egypt bjrb with Wingate’s 
2full approval >•
1905» was a year without religious disturbances. Wingate remar- 
•ked optimistically that ’...this is an indication that slowly but sor­
ely the effects of the mighty upheaval, for which the Mahdi and the 
Khalifa were mainly responsible, are gradually gying out...’  ^ A 
major incident which occurred in 1906 in the Nuba Mountains and 
which was first thought to have been instigated by religious or racial 
motives was discovered to have been prompted by the government’s mea-
A r
sures against slave raiding • However, early in 1907* two Nabx Isas
who declared themselves in al-Qadarif and Wad-Madanx, were promptly
5
banished to Haifa and Khartoum#
The major religious uprisings during Wingate’s governor-general- 
ship occurred in April 1908. A young British inspector and an 
Egyptian ma’mur were murdered by ?Abd al-Qadir Muhammad Imam Wad
1GGR - 1904, pp.9-10; see also SIR - 121, Aug'. 1904>.
2
Henry to Findlay, 16 Aug. 1904? Findlay to Henry, 17 Aug* 1904* FO
141/386; Wingate to Henry, 4 Sep. 1904, SAD/275/7* Henry to Wingate,
1 Sep. 1904* Ihid. Henry reported:’...the execution is over..The 
, numerous petitions, and appeals were getting very trying...’
3ggr - 1905, P.14.
^SIR — 143, June 1906; see also pp.325-6.
5SIR - 150, Jan. 1907.
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Jabuba and his followers in the Messelemia district of the Blue 
Nile province* In the battle which ensued ten men of the govern-
ft#
1 W 'ment troops and thirty-six rebels were killed • In the course of
the resulting interrogation Wad Habuba declared:
•••My desire is that the Sudan should be governed by M0slems 
according to the Mohammedan laws and the Mahdi doctrines and 
precepts,*.I know the people of the Sudan better than the 
government does; I have no hesitation in saying that their 
friendliness and flattery is nothing but hypocrisy and lies,
I am ready to swear that the people prefer Mahdism to the 
present government.. *^
Wad Habuba and twelve of his followers were sentenced to death1* 
However, only the leader was executed as the British foreign office 
intervened and instructed Wingate to commute the sentences^. Prac­
tically all of the Sudani British officials were united in condem­
ning the British governments decision, Currie wrote:1 ..,0nce again 
England falls back on the blood stained policy of attempting to con­
ciliate its enemies by giving away its friends***’^  Their main ob­
jection was that by commuting the sentences, the government gave in
to Egyptian nationalist pressures, which labelled the Wad Habuba
5
incident as ’Another Dinshawai in the Sudan* • The ’Board of Ulema*
*1
Slatin* s diary, 3 May 1908, SAD/44I* It is interesting to note that 
Slatin, who was informed of the incident while undertaking a tour of 
Mongalla, did not hurry back but continued to Lado and Gondokoro* 
Slatin’s diary, 30 Apr*-3 May 1908, SAD/441,
^SIR - 166, May 1908, Appendix D,
3Grey to Gorst, 30 May 1908, FO 141/416.
4Currie to Slatin, 4 July 1908, SAD/431/5O.
-'Article in al-Liwa , 28 May 1908, quoted in Graham to Grey, 8 Aug* 
1908, FO 407/172 ; see also pp*55“6»
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fully backed this view and stated that the Wad Habuba rebellion was 
a direct result of the government not carrying out *•••their (the Ule­
ma) decision, given at the time of the Milleniumists* trials,119011
1that all teachers of Mahdism should at once be put to death*••* The 
rulama* and other notables of the Blue Nile province sent a telegram 
to the government professing their loyalty. *••.May $od punish the 
evil doers for their deeds* We promise before $od and you that we
2
will inform the Governor at once of the first signs of such uprisings.*1
Wingate in his proclamation to the 1*..Ulema,Fikis, Omdehs, Sheikhs,
Notables, and people of the Sudan.••', warned that the government
f**.will feel compelled to modify its present policy of gentleness
and indulgence...and you will then learn the might of the Government
3and its powers to enforce its orders*••* In his. private correspon­
dence, Wingate reiterated his belief that had Wad Habuba succeeded 
in gaining a victory over the government troops,
...he would have been a prophet endowed with all sorts of 
miraculous gifts and we should have most of the Geaira at 
his heels. There is no doubt there is*plenty of latent 
Mahdism and until the generation born and brought up in .
that faith has died out we shall be subject to these outbreaks.’.
Wingate to Stack, (private), 12 May 1908, SAD/284/13; after quoting 
the above from a declaration of the *Board of Ulema*, Wingate wrote.: 
*•••1 wonder how the Egyptian Nationalists the Robertsons & c. would 
like us to publish such statements...*, Robertson was a leading mem­
ber of the Egyptian lobby in the House of Gommons.
2SIR - 167, June 1908.
3; Proclamation by Wingate, 26 May 1908, Inclosure 2 in Graham to Grey, 
6 Sep. i|08, FO 407/172.
^Wingate to Maxwell (private), 12 May 1908, SJU)/llO/8 .
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Wingate and Bonham Carter vehemently denied the rumours that the Wad 
Habuba rebellion was in any way connected with problems of land set­
tlement, and reaffirmed their contention that it was of a purely re- 
1ligious nature In a secret memorandum Wingate enumerated the new 
dangers threatening the Sudan, and demanded an immediate increase in
the military force in the country or an adequate system of internal
2 3
communications • Reports of a new Nabi *Isa filtered from Kordofan ,
and rumour had it that 12,000 pilgrims were invading the country from
the west^. The intelligence department was ordered to keep a careful
5watch over suspected religious notables
It is clear that the Wad Habuba incident was treated as a far 
more serious threat to the security of the Sudan than previous inci­
dents of a similar nature. An analysis of Wingate*s report suggests 
that he misinterpreted the facts. Wad^abuba and his supporters first 
murdered Scott-Moncrieff and Muhammad Sharif. They then surprised
1GGR - 1908, p.200.
p
Memorandum toy Sir R.Wingate, 9 Aug. 1908, (Strictly CondEidential) ,
FO 407/173.
3S1R - I67, June 1908; GGR - I9O8, p.590.
Asser to Wingate, 9 Aug. 19085 Slatin to Wingate, 9 Aug. 1908, SiU)/ 
283/8/4; this rumour was caused by a seasonal movement of nomad tribes.
^Wingate to Channer, 22 July 1908, SAD/283/7/l; Channer was ordered 
to watch al-Hajj Aljmad Muhammad ?Isa Azraq, brother of ?Uthman Azraq, 
the Mahdist amir. Suspicion also fell on al-Sharif al-Hindi, and 
Slatin ordered al-Tayyi Wad Sa?Id, to report on hinn. See Slatin to 
Wingate In.d. June 1908?i , SAd/282/5*
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the government troops “by attacking them on the night of the 2 May and 
inflicting on them heavy casualties. Tet on 4 May, without any fur­
ther military.action, Mad Habuba was captured by local villagers and 
brought in to the governor of the Blue Mile* As a result, the whole 
movement collapsed and most of those implicated in the rebellion were 
captured^1# The rebellion was broken, therefore, not as a result of 
a military victory by government troops, but by the lack of support 
afforded to the rebels by the local inhabitants* This clearly im­
plied that the people of the Blue Nile were more interested in pur­
suing their personal welfare and cultivating their land than in any 
renewed religious uprising* The explanation of the extremely serious 
view taken by Wingate and the British officers of the Wad Habuba 
rebellion should be sought in a different direction* Firstly, it 
was the first Muslim uprising since the reconquest in which a Bri­
tish official was murdered and a great number of losses were incur-
2
red by the government in the ensuing battle ?• Secondly, since 1904 
there had been no Muslim rebellion and Wingate had therefore hoped 
that Mahdism was a thing of the past* Lastly, Wingate realized that 
without adequate communications the chances of attaining real security
1GGR - 1908, pp.49-52. f
2Scott-Moncrieff, the British inspector who was killed, had joined 
the Sudan civil service in 1906, having graduated from Oxford a year 
earlier. His father, Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff had been in charge 
of Egyptian irrigation since I$i3* As early as 1902 another British 
inspector by the name of Scott-Barbour was murdered by the Aggar Din- 
ka* However, and uprising by a southern tribe which had not yet been 
brought under government control and was regarded as savage, was not 
viewed in the same light as the Wad Habuba revolt:* See pp.317-8.
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were slight* Hence he decided to exploit the opportunities afforded
by the Wad Habuba rising in order to press the British government
1
for a substantial loan •
There were no major religious rebellions in the following years,
but nabi fIsas continued to appear periodically while a close watch
was kept on many sufl shaykhs* In 1909 suspicion fell on Sayyid *Abd
al—Muta'al, leader of the Idrisiya in Dongola, whose nephew had dec-
2lared himself Mahdi in Yemen !* In the same year two of Wad Habuba* s 
followers were captured and executed^. Religious unrest continued 
in 1910, only to be explained away by the appearance of Hailey’s 
comet* Phipps, who was acting governor-general at the time, arrested 
several Tafaisha near Singa and reported that * * •'•the bag of 267 
spears and 7 Fikis seems very mixed*..*^ At the same time a new nabi 
*Isa appeared at Shanabla in the White Nile province. The policemen 
who were to arrest the faki and his son were ’...compelled to fire at
^Wingate to Gorst, (strictly confidential),9 Aug. 1908, FO 407/l73; 
Gorst supported Wingate in his official letter to Grey, but wrote 
privately that Wingate was an alarmist and his glooming views about 
the Sudan&s security need not be taken too seriously* Gorst to Grey,
9 Aug1. 1908, Ibid; Gorst to Grey (private), 22 June 1908, FO 800/47‘*
^Channer to Wingate, 13 Sep. 1909, SAD/288/5*
^Wingate to Stack (private), 3 Jan. 1909, SAD/286/l* In irder hot to 
risk interference from London, Wingate did not refer the sentences 
to Gorst for approval.
^Phipps fo Wingate, 14 July 1910; Wingate to Phipps, 28 July 1910, 
SAD/297/l» The arrested fakis had the Mahdi* s Rat.ib in their poss­
ession; SIR - 192, July 1910.
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them, with the result that the son was shot dead and the fiki mortally 
1
wounded**.1 In August 1910, a faki and his three sons were arrested
in Berber on charges of religious fanaticism culminating in the mur-
c 2der of an umda and a policeman. All three were sentenced to death '•
Towards the end of 1910, the government became aware, for the
first time, of the dangers of the Fallata and Takrurl immigrants.
Najm al-DIn, proclaimed himself mahdi at Shaykh Talha on the Blue
Nile. In consequence, tension ensued between the Takruris and the 
3
local Mahdists • Najm al-DIn himself succeeded in escaping, but was
shot dead in 1914 in Kassala province^* Many of the Fallata who
arrived in the Sudan after 1906 were political refugees fleeing from
5the British administration in Nigeria * The Sudan government welcom­
ed them on account of their thrift and industry^* However, in the
years following 1910, these immigrants were responsible for many
religious uprisings. In 1914, one of the Fallata gathered some
G^CrR - 1910, pp.66-7J the fakt later died of his woundstSIR-190*May 1910'.
2SIR - 193, Aug. 1910; SIR- 195, Oct. 1910; the sentence of one of
the sons was later commuted to life imprisonment.
3Wingate to Gorst, 19 Nov. 1910, SAD/298/2; SIR - 196, Nov. 1910:.
^SIR - 246, Jan. 1915.
R
DMA, p*41, this memorandum traces the origins of West African immi­
gration to the Sudan, to the times of'uthman Dan Fodio (1754-1817), 
who prophecied a Fulani empire on the Nile. After the battle of 
Burmi in 1905 large numbers of Fulani fugitives arrived in the Sudan 
led by Mauwurno Muhammad Bello,a^descendant of *Ulhman Dan Fodio.
^See p.395*
- 209 -
followers and killed the British officer who tried to arrest him^.
The following year, Ahmad 'Umar, a Fallata from Sokoto who had set­
tled in Omdurman, proclaimed himself nabi *Isa, and retreated with 
his followers!'to Jabal Qadir. He sent messengers to all the Fallata 
villages to join him but met with little success* He was finally
p
caught with thirty-one of hks followers near Jabal Qadxr • By 1916,
the Fallata*s reputation for religious unrest was so deep rooted,that
the government stationed a special garrison in Sennar during the
3Darfur campaign •
Only two other religious uprisings need be mentioned* Both 
occurred in 1912 and were caused by Muslim pilgrims1. In April 1912, 
a Tunisian fakl proclaimed himself mahdi near Jabal Qadir and was 
duly shot dead with seven of his followers^. In June of the same :/ 
year a Tripolitan faki was deported from the Sudan for preaching 
pan-Islamic propaganda^*
The rather extensive list of religious uprisings during the first
1MWA, p.41.
^Ibid; see also SIR - 249, Apr# 1915? SIR — 250, May 1915? Wingate to 
Savile (private), 19 Apr. 1915, SAD/195/2, the similarity of his ac­
tions to those of the Mahdi is very striking. See Holt, Mahdist 
State, pp.47-50.
3MWA. p.41.
4GSR - 1912, p.9; Wingate to Wilson, 13 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2.
Butler to Wingate, 12 June 1912, SAD/l8l/3; the date suggestse.a pos- 
sible connection with the Italian conquest of Tripoli and Gyrenaica 
and its possible repercussions in the Sudan which greatly concerned 
Wingate; see Wingate to Kitchener, 9 Nov* 1911, SAD/301/5.
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seventeen years of the Condominium is noteworthy for the following 
reasons. It proved that resentment of foreign rule prevailed throu­
ghout that period. However, the comparative ease with which these 
upheavals were overcome, despite inadequate communications and mili­
tary forces, proved that they failed to gain popular support* This 
was probably due to the fact that most of the Muslims of the old 
generation were still under the impact of the Khalifa1s crushing
defeat and were not inclined to risk their welfare, or indeed their
1lives, by participating in a religious rebellion •
The government’s attitude towards the Mahdist prisoners and their
families was a direct result of its general religious policy, and
therefore warrants a brief survey* The principal Mahdist amirs were
imprisoned in Damietta until 1908. Prisoners caught in later reli-
2
gious uprisings were kept in the Haifa prison • Many of the less 
important amirs, as well as those who changed sides before the battle
of ICarari, were not imprisoned, and some of them even held government
3 eposts '• When Muhammad Uthman Abu Qarja returned from captivity in
1
When in 1924 a rebellion broke out in the Sudan, its reasons were 
primarily.political and its leaders belonged to the young generation 
which had matured after the Mahdia* See Holt, The Sudan, pp.129-131; 
See also M.Abdel Rahim, ’Early Sudanese Nationalism:1900-1938*, SNR - 
47 (1966), pp.39-64; Abdel Rahim’s assertion that the early religious 
risings failed owing to the government’s military superiority is only 
partially true. None of the revolts gained sufficient popular support 
to challenge the government’s authority, Ibid, p*39*
^GGR — 1907, p*74; GGR - 1908, p.534* other Mahdist amirs escaped to 
Darfur and some of them were killed or imprisoned by *A1I Dinar, see
pp.86-7*
3See p.180.
— 2X1 —
Darfur in 1907 he was also allowed to settle on his lands in the White 
1Wile province *
In 1908 the government decided to move the Mhadist amirs from
Damietta to Haifa and Port Sudan.- Thus placing them out of the reach
of the Egyptian nationalist press, while at the same time removing
them from the eyes of inquisitive British Liberal M.P.s-who persis-
2
tently worried about the health and wellbeing of these prisoners • 
Parliamentary questions about the prisoners1 prospects of release re­
ceived similar answers year by year, namely that by releasing these
amirs the peace of the Sudan would be threatened and the lives of the
3amirs would be endangered by a hostile population . In 1909, Slatin
XQGR - 1907, P.135.
See Phipps to Wingate, 15 Mar. 1908; Wingate to Phipps, 20 Mar. 1908, 
SAD/282/3/2; following the transfer Wingate commented:1...1 hope that 
these beastly Cairo rags will cease to worry any more &bout the mat­
ter...1, Wingate to Stack, 16 Apr* 1908, SAD/284/13; see also Hasan 
Dafalla, fA Wote on the political prisoners of Wadi Haifa} SNR - 47 
(1966), pp.I48-I5O* Dafalla1s assertion that hhe prisoners were moved 
to Haifa owing to the pressure of the British liberals and of the 
Egyptian nationalist press, fails to take into account the evidence 
afforded by the Wingate and Slatin papers. In fact Wingate ^"suggested 
moving the prisoners secretly, so as to avoid an Egyptian nationalist 
campaign against their transfer. Slatin, however, objected to secrecy: 
'...Dervishes, asked to be transferred to a climate less damp - there­
fore we send them to Haifa - finish - we have their petition to prove 
it*..1, Slatin to Wingate, 2 Apr. 1908, SAD/282/3/2.
See for instance Questions in Parliament by Mr Gooch M.P* and Gray's 
reply thereto, The Times» 7 February 1908; see also Questions in Par­
liament by Mr Robertson M.P*, 14 Aug. 1911 and reply by Mr McICennon 
Wood, FO 371/1115.
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agreed that all Mahdist amirs« except fUthman Diqna, should he re-*
1
leased from their chains*• In 1912 the government allowed twelve
of the amirs to reside in specified towns in the Sudan* By then the
2alleged danger to their lives had apparently disappeared • fUthman
Diqna, who was reported to he *...quite crazy and lives just like an
animal*..1, continued to reside in the Haifa prison"^ .'
While the government viewed the prospects of rehabilitating the
older generation of amirs with certain misgivings, it tried its best
to educate their offspring as useful citizens. After the reconquest
several of the amirs* children were sent to Egypt to receive a proper
education^. Many of them were later absorbed in government departments
5and in provincial administration where they proved quite satisfactory . 
The only instance where one of the young generation of amirs involved 
himself in a religious, anti-government movement occurred in 1915*
Biasan Sharif, son tf the Khalifa Muhammad Sharif, was involved in a
1Winga-te to Gorst, 26 Deo. 1909, FO 141/423.
2
SIR - 219, June 1912, their release took place on the occasion of 
the King’s birthday.
3
Minutes by E.G. Vans it tart on a Parliamentary question by Mr PonsoSj>y
M.P., 6 Pet). 1913, PO 371/1637.
^By 1908 Wingate regretted having sent them to Egypt, as they absorbed
Egyptian nationalist ideas, and decided to transfer them to the Sudan, 
Wingate to Stack, 16 Apr. 1908, SAD/284/13*
R
^List of the Family of the Mahdi, the Khalifa, & c. with place of re­
sidence and employment 1 n.d.I ,SAX)/l06/2. Of the Khalifa *Abdallahi*s 
sons, nine were employed in government service. However, the majori­
ty were reported to be *... a lazy lot, and mostly unemployable*..*, 
Willis to Slatin, 15 Mar. 1921, SiD/438/653; see also p.l80.
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3_
conspiracy in Omdurman, and was duly banished to Mongalla province * 
Thus the principal Mahdist amirs and their families,caused little 
trouble to the new administration, and many of them were absorbed 
within its ranks.
c. Government policy during the First World War.
At the outbreak of the World War the Sudan government was gravely
2concerned about the loyalty of its Muslim inhabitants • It published 
a proclamation warning the inhabitants that according to the Condomi- 
nium agreement the country was still under martial law • Internal 
censorship was imposed throughout the Sudan, and all enemy aliens 
except missionaries were deported^. Special arrangements were made to 
'...prevent Turco-German Jehad propaganda from the west#..* from be-
R
ing smuggled into the Sudan . A scheme fan? military tribal levies
Wingate to Owen, 20 Apr. 1915» SAD/l95/l» Thus the Anglo-Egyptian 
administration was following Mahdist and Turco-Egyptian precedents, in 
banishing criminals to the south. Owen remarked '•••I tell him 1 Hasan 
Sharifl he is lucky to come &nd see this part of the Sudan for nothing, 
when tourists pay hundreds of pounds...1 fear he doesn^ see the 
joke...1, Owen to Wingate, 3 June 1915» SAI)/l95/3»
3In 1906* when there was a danger that a war might break out between 
Britain and Turkey over the SiJB&i peninsula, Wingate wrote:1...If re­
ligion is made the pretext for coming to blows we must be prepared 
for trouble on the part of the inhabitants in spite of their hatred 
for|the Turks...1, Wingate to Cromer, 8 May 1906, FO 141/402.
3SG - 266, 16 Nov. 19x4; GGR - 1914, p.43.
4SIR - 247, Feb. 1915; see also Wingate to Clayton, 28 Oct. 1914, SAD/
269/7J Wingate wrote that '...out of about 50,000 letters open&d I do
not think there were more than a dozen at the outside that contained 
anything undesirable...'
5SIR - 260, Mar. 1916. Wingate, however, insisted on reopening the 
pilgrimage route and on renewing trade with Jedda* See Wingate to Wil­
son, 20 May 1915i SAD/l95/5i Wingate asked Wilson to gauge public opi­
nion in Port Sudan, with regard to the reopening of trade with Jedda.
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was prepared by the adjutant-general and included those tribes regar-
1ded as trustworthy • Spacial precautions were taken with some of the
sufx shaylchs and the arrest of .several extremists ’...had a sobering
2
effect on hotheaded youths...’ The major steps undertaken by the 
Sudan government were of a rather more conciliatory nature. Upon his 
return to the Sudan, Wingate delivered a speech to the rulama* at 
Khartoum. In it he tried to convince them that the war was not bet­
ween Muslims and Christians, but against the misguided rulers of 
Turkey who had aligned themselves to Germany in order to fight Brit­
ain ’...the one power who, by her actions and the sentiments of her
people, has ever been a true and sympathetic friend to the Moslems
a
and to Islam*.*’ Thousands of copies of hhis speech were distributed
A.G.Khartoum to Private Secretary the palace, 18 Mar. 19l6,SAI)/l99/3; 
trustworthy tribes included: the Hamar, Humr, MisirTya, Kababxsh, and 
Kawahla in Kordofan; the Shukrlya and Takarir in Qallabat; the Haden- 
dowa, Banx *£mir, and Halenga in Kassala. However in the Blue Nile 
province ’...neither Sheikhs nor tribes sufficiently.trustworthy to 
arm...1, probably still as a result of the Wad Habuba rebellion.
^SIR - 249* Apr. 1915; Wingate to Pearson (privatjb), 22 May 1915*SAD/ 
195/8. Wingate ordered Pearson to exercise vigilence over the FallSta 
at Shaykh Talha; Wingate to Clacton, 14 May 1916, SAD/470/2, Wingate 
wrote that according to fAli al-Mirghani’s advice, Muhammd Idrxsx 
would not be allowed to return to the Idrlsiya in Dongola owing to 
the position of the Sanusx and ?Alx Dxnar*
^H.S.Governor-General’s Speech to the Ulema at Khartoum, 8 Novf.1914*
SIR - 244, Nov. 1914» Wingate’s speech included a passage referring 
to the rulers of Turkey as a ’... syndicate of Jews, financiers and 
low born intriguers*..’ The speech was published in The Times of 29 
Dec. 1914f caused an immediate protest by Anglo-Jewry. The editor 
of The Jewish Chronicle, on 1 Jan. 1915 f stated that despite the allo­
wance one had to make for Britain’s embarrassing position in Egypt, 
Wingate’s insult to the Jewish people, many of whom were fighting on 
Britain’s side, was beyond excuse*’ He concluded by demanding that: 
’...this incendiary document should be recalled without delay...*
The foreign office which had endorsed Wingate’s speech in Nov. and 
had marked the passage ’...This Syndicate of Jews...’ as ’auite nice*
(signed)L.O. lOliphantl, Minute to SIR - Hov. 1914,’FO 371/2349, (oont.)
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2throughout the Sudan • A speech on similar lines was delivered "by
2Wingate to the Egyptian officers some of whom were of Turkish origin 
’More important, however, was the personal approach. Wingate travel­
led to many provinces where he met the principal trihal and religious 
leaders and was assured of their loyalty. This was accompanied by 
a government inspired press campaign, followed up hy a tour of all 
the provinces by their respective governors during which protestations 
of loyalty were collected from the dignitaries*^* One of the more 
practical measures undertaken by the government was not mentioned in 
the official dispatches, and had litt&e to do with its religious 
policy. The years 1912-14 were bad drought yeats in the Sudan. The
(continued from §.214i n.3) 
suddenly inquired whether Wingate had in fact made these remarks (Cro­
we to Cheetham, 7 Jan* 1915» SAD/194/1)• Wingate rendered apologies 
tc\th±h Jewish Chronicle* through Symes, (Symes to Editor of the Jewish 
Chronicle. 23 Mar. 1915j SAD/194/3/2), who assumed the editor that 
WingateWs intention had been misinterpreted* Wingate also akked his 
cousin Sir Andrew Wingate, to use his good offices with the editors 
of the Jewish papers in London* He added1...had I known that a trans­
lation of my address was going to be published in the London papers 
I should hav&e censored out the obnoxious wor&s...1 Wingate to A.Win- 
gate, 23 Eeb. 1915» SAL/194/2; Wingate*s speech was originally prepar­
ed by Symes, his private secretary; see Wingate to Clayton, 7 Nov.
1914, sAD/469/7.
■'"Wingate to Clayton, 11 Nov. 1914» Ibid.
r  s,1
2SIR - 244, Nov. 1914.
3
A full description of all these actions was sent by Wingate to Cro­
mer, 27 Nov. 1914i EO 633/23* In a note attached to a copy of fchis
letter Wingate wrote:1...As I can get no notice taken in Cairo of
the Sudan loyalty I have replied fairly fully to C*s I Cromer*si query..* 
SAD/192/2. Apart from the 11 pages of his letter Wingate sent Cromer 
the following: Copies of his speech to the Vlama’ and to the Egyptian 
officers; A translation of a government inspired anonymous article 
written by the Egyptian grand cradl of the Sudan; copy of a report 
of the governor of the! White Wile province, including letters of
*ulama* and tribal leaders. See also SIR - 243» Octt 1914? GGR - 1914t
pp.2-3.
- 2X6 -
government, therefore, imported large quantities of dhurra from India,
and when the War buoke out it was able to distribute cheap dhurra to
1the poverty stricken provinces • Consequently, f.*.the majority of
2cultivators hardly realised there is a war at all..-1 The distribu­
tion of dhurra and the supply of pumps for irrigation had a conside­
rable effect on their sense of loyalty^. The result was that apart 
fronn a few insignificant incidents the Sudan remained quiet^*
The only uprising of any importance was that of Kiki rAlI in 1915* 
Fiki *Alx was one of the most powerful and loyal Nuba makks* However 
rumours spread by a Nubawi who had returned to the Nuba mountains from 
imprisonment in Khartoum convinced him that the British were on the
5
verge of ddfeat and were about to be replaced by a Muslim government • 
Fiki *A1T was captured and sentenced to death, but succeeded in escaping
1GGR - 1914, pp.11-12.
^Balfour to Wingate, 28.Nov. 1914, SAD/192/2; see also SIR — 257, Deo. 
1915. . 0
See for instance The Cultivators of Zeidab to Wingate In.d. Feb'.1915?l 
Symes to Browne, 3 Mar. 1915* SAD/194/3/3. In his letter Symes con­
veys Wingate1 s appreciation for the Zeidab cultivators expression 3>f 
loyalty. The latter emphasised their gratitude to the government on 
account of the irrigation facilities which enabled them to supply 
dhurra to other parts of the country, despite the drought.
^A slight affray occurred at Sinlcat in Oct. 1915? SIR - 256, Nov. 1915?
2 fakis were arrested in June 1916 for spreading seditious propaganda* 
In Feb. 1915 Turkish propaganda was discovered to have been sent to 
several religious leaders who brought it in to the governors* The 
Egyptian officer who was accused of being responsible for it, was 
caught and deported to Cairo. Wingate to Clayton, 13 Feb. 1915? 20 
Feb. 1915, SAD/469/8.
•■’Balfour to Lady Balfour, 21 July 1915, SAD/303/6; Wingate to Clayton, 
25 Mar. 1915, SAD/469/8.
- 217 -
en route to El Obeid'*'. An arrangement made by the British inspec-
torsenabled the makk to give himself up on the condition that , his
2
sentence would be commuted • Those implicated in the uprising inclu­
ded a few men of the Nuba Territorials^, as well as Muhammad Faqxr 
the nazir of the Misirxya^*
With the coming of the World War, the government also modified 
its attitude towards the sufx tarlcras and soughth. the support of ma­
ny of the religious leaders who had hitherto been treated with sus­
picion* Al-Sharxf Yusuf al-Hindx, who in 1909 was publicly.charged
and condemned by the 'Board of Ulema* for interfering in tribal aff-
5 6 airs | became person grata and was recommended for a C*M*G. * The
shaylchs of the Idrxsxy^, who had previously been under government
surveillance, were acting on behalf of the intelligence department
in its communication with the Sanusx* Jackson, the governor of
Dongola, was asked by Wingate 1...to keep them in good humour*..it
^SIR - 251» June 1915? P*6; see also Wingate to Wilson, 30 Sep. 1915? 
SAI>7l96/6.
2Wingate to Balfour, 20 Deo. 1915, SAD/197/3/2.
^Balfour to Wingate, 20 Aug. 1915i SAD/196/3.
Pearson to Wingate, 26 May 1915, SAD/195/6; Wingate to Savile, 19
June 1915, SAD/195/lO.
5SIR - 175, Pel). 1909.
£
Wingate to Grey (private), 8 Oct. 1916, SAD/202/l; see also al-Sharxf 
Yusuf al-Hindx to Wingate, 14 Shawwal 1334? 113 Aug* 19151,SAD/20l/4; 
al-Hindx wrote that he saw in a vision that Wingate was about to 
become a Lord. Symes !?1 minuted the letter:1.. .Y*el H. has nothing
to learn of the gentle art..•f
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would be a good thing to show some special mark of consideration for
1 fthe family. ..* Sayyid -Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, who for years had
2
been in retirement at Aba Island , emerged as one of the staunchest 
government supporters. When a religious Mahdist uprising occurred at 
Jabal Qadir in 1915* Wingate was able to report:1. I am glad wee 
knocked out the Gedir Fiki - (private)' the man who informed about 
him was Abderrahman the late Mahdi*s son - rather satisfactory..•1 
Sayyid -Abd al-Rahman, and five hundred other religious and tribal 
leaders signed the Sudan Book of Loyalty, pledging their full sup­
port for Great Britain and her allies during the war^.
The loyalty of the Sudanese Muslims during the First World War 
was regarded by the British authorities} as absolute proof of the 
rightness of the governments policy and, moreover, as a personal 
triumph for Wingate. Cromer speaking in the House of Lords, said:
...The state of affairs in the Sudan, was one of the greatest 
indirect compliments that had ever been paid to the wisdom 
and bene license-.; of English administration.. .The main credit 
for the success achieved was unquestionably due to Sir Reginald 
Wingate and the officers under his command...5
Symes, then Wingate*s private secretary, stated the Sudan govern­
ment* s view when he wrote that the loyalty of the Sudan will continue
^Wingate to Jackson, (private and confidential), 21 Sep* 1915* SAD/ 
196/5.
2Wingate to Gorst, 1 Jan. 1910, SAI»/300/l.
^Wingate to Clayton, (private), 24 Apr. 1915* SAD/469/9*
^Sudan Times. 14 Aug. 1915* see also Juredini (editor of the Sudan 
Times) to Wingate, 20 Aug. 1915* SAD/196/3.
5yThe Times, 28 June 191^* quoting Lord Cromer*s speech. See also 
speeches by Lord Greifell and Viscount Bryce in praise of Wingate,Ibid.
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’•..so long as the population knows that their religious interests are
1being preserved intact and that the present government is permanent...1
The general impression ore gets by reading the correspondence
between the British officials and Wingate is that the mass of the
Sudanese were loyal to their own interests, and showed little concern
for the wah or its outcome. By looking after the material welfare
of the inhabitants the government probably gained more loyalty than
2by its attitude to Islam • As for the religious leaders, the govern­
ment gained their support by modifying its previous policy. The
non—orthodox Muslim leaders who were previously viewed with suspi—
■a
cion became a part of the government*s establishment • The inherent 
suspicion of Egypt and Turkey, which was shared by many of the Suda­
nese leaders of the older generation, and the conviction that Bri­
tish rule was better and more permanent thah that of its predecessors, 
were probably the major factors which rallied the Sudanese leaders 
to the British cause.
^*Wote on the Political State of The Sudan*, 17 Jan. 1916, SAD/236/4.
2
Wingate claimed that Britain’s support of an Arab Khalifate, in 
1915f had considerable effect on Muslim opinion in the Sudan. How­
ever there is no reason to assume that the loyalty of the Sudanese 
depended on British Middle Eastern policy either in 1915 or when 
Britain supported the Arab revolt in the following years. See -AIT 
al-MIrghani to Wingate, 25 Apr. 11915?I, SAD/194/3/3; Wingate to 
McMahon, 15 May 1915, SAD/195/6.
The climax of this support came in 1919 when *Abd al-Rahman al—Mahdi, 
Yusuf al—Hindi, and Isma^il al-Azhari were included by Stack in the 
Sudanese delegation to Britain. All three of them had been previous­
ly suspected by the same government whose cause they were now called 
upon to serve. See Stack to Wingate, 3 July 1919* SAD/237/H*
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d. Christianity in the Muslim provinces and the role of Bishop Gwynne^.
In its relations towards missionaries and Christianity the Bri­
tish authorities found themselves in an awkward position. Most of 
the higher and intermediate officials, whether British, Syrian, or 
Egyptian Copts, were of the Christian faith* However, the govern­
ment firmly believed that any attempts to proselytize the Muslims
were not only hound to fail but would create an atmosphere of Muslim 
2
fanaticism >• Hence, the government tried to draw a line between the 
observance of its own Christian beliefs and the activities of mission­
aries* The latter were regarded as a necessary evil and their work 
was limited as much as possible*
The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan had been since 1899 nominally included 
in the Anglican diocese of Jerusalem* However, Bishop Blyth of Jeru­
salem was warned not to ’...exercise active episcopal functions in 
that country...1 and only in 1903 was the rule relaxed, and Gwynne 
was appointed as the first archdeacon of the Sudan • Even then it
The only biography of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne is H.C.Jackson, Pastor 
on the Nile.(London i960), which is more a work of piety than of 
critical scholarship. Gwynne’s private papers are split between the 
Sudan archive in Durham and the CMS archive in London, both of which 
have been used in writing this thesis1.
2
In an interview with Gwynne, Wingate said that the downfall of Islam 
will not come by converting Muslims to Christianity but by planting 
the truth in their heads without giving it a name. Gwynne to Baylis, 
24 Feb• 1903, CMSA/E/03/1903*
^Cromer to Blyth, 26 Oct. 1902, FO 633/8; Gwynne to Rev. Gelsthorpe,
5 Apr. 19471 SAD/419» see also F.Cantaur, the Archbishop of Canter­
bury to Cromer, 25 Sep. 19GG> PC 78/5088; The Archbishop supported 
Cromer’s ruling that nothing should be done in the Sudan until the 
government pronounced it permissible.
-  221 -
was considered as desirable to develop a separate Anglican bishopric
1
in the Sudan, and funds were raised in order to make this possible i« 
By 1908, £19,000 had been collected for the new bishopric, and Gwyn­
ne was appointed as the suffragan bishop of the Sudani* A proposal 
by Gorst to establish a united bishopric of Egypt and the Sudan was
rejected by Wingate on political grounds with the able support of 
3Bishop Blyth In 1912, the Sudan became a separate and independent 
bishopric and Gwynne was appointed as its first bishop and dean of 
the newly consecrated Khartoum Cathedral^. Thus, from the very 
beginning, the development of the Anglican church was intimately 
connected with Gwynne who was also a prominent member of the CMSU 
Gwynne and Harpur of the CMS arrived in the Sudan in December 
18991 following an agreement between Cromer, Kitchener, and the CMS 
headquarters, that the society would establish its first missionary 
station at. Fashoda The CMS, however, did not adhere to this
^Bishop Blyth to *My dear Brother1, Deb* 1903, * Appeal for £10,000 
for the Bishopric of Khartoum, SAD/420/3*
^Blyth to Archbishop of Canterbury, 18 Mar* 1908, SAD/282/3/L.
^Gorst to Wingate (private), 22 Dec* 1910; Wingate to Gorst, 29 Dec. 
1910, SAD/298/3; Blyth to Wingate, 28 Jan. 1911, SAD/300/l; Blyth 
to Bishop Wilkinson, 11 Feb. 1911, SAD/420/2; see also p,
^Blyth to Gwynne, 3 Jan, 1912; Blyth to Wingate, 10 Jan* 1912, 
SAD/420/3.
5^Report on Interview with Lord Cromer and Sir Herbert Kitchener, 11 
Oct. I898, CMSA/E/03/l898/no,.5l5 see also Memorandum of interview 
accorded by Lord Kitchener to the Rev.F.Baylis and Dr*F.J.Harpur,
18 July 1899, CMSA/E/03/1899:.
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1agreement and instructed its missionaries to remain in Omdurman
Kitchener, then governor-general, on being informed by Gwynne of
the CMS deeision, was very * *..surprised to hear that our Committee
had instructed us to remain in Omdurman,..* However, Kitchener did
not object to the CMS missionaries remaining in the northeand
2
f...showing friendliness to the Copts‘...f When Wingate became gov­
ernor-general a few weeks later he was informed that Gwynne and Har­
pur had f...found a few tame Christians to whom they administer all
3
that is necessary...1 In March 1900, a Coptic bishop arrived in
Omdurman and the two CMS missionaries had to seek new venues for
their missionary zeal^* Once again the CMS missionaries insisted
5that the missionaries stay in Khartoum and as a result of these
circumstances Gwynne became chaplain of the British detachment in
Khartoum Cromer quite rightly suspected Gwynne^s motives for
wanting to obtain this appointment. He wrote to Salisbury and Lans-
downe that gwynne would now have an excuse to further his missionary
7ambitions among the Muslims * These were also the motives which
^Adeney to General Committee CMS, 12 Dec* 1899» and Minutes of the 
General Committee instructing Gwynne and Harpur to remain in Omdur­
man and not to proceed to Fashoda, CMSA/Egypt/l899/l25f.
^Gwynne and Harpur to Adeney, 22 Dec. l899» CMSA/e/03/1899• This in­
formation does not agree with Hillrs version that the CMS missiona­
ries were stopped from proceeding to the south by the authorities.
Hill, Missions, p.118.
^Maxwell to Wingate, 19 Jan. 1900, SAD/270/1/2.
4Harpur to Baylis, 19 Mar. 1900, CMSA/e/03/1900‘.
5 CMS Headquarters minutes, 31 July 1900, CMSA/Egypt/l900/78i.
Cromer to Salisbury, 9 Nov. 1900, PO 78/508®*
r \
^Cromer to Lansdowne, 9 Mar* 1900,Fo 633/8; Cromer to Salisbury,27 Apr5. 
1900, FO 407/155.
prompted the CMS to agree that one of its missionaries should under­
take the duties of chaplain which were clearly outside the missiona- 
1ry sphere • Wingate’s decision to appoint Gwynne as chaplain was
probably the result of a number of reasons. The British detachment
in Khartoum required an Anglican priest but was too small in numbers
to warrant, the appointment of an army chaplain, Gwynne had in the
meantime gained the confidence of the British officers who strongly
2recommended his appointment i. Lastly, Wingate may already then have 
toyed with the idea that by offering Gwynne an official appointment 
he would become part of the Anglican establishment and forsake his 
missionary ambitions^*
Gwynne himself was in no doubt as th where his loyalty lay. When 
in 1901 he was asked by Cromer to help in raising funds for an Angli­
can church in Khartoum, he complied knowing that his services to
future CMS activities would be enhanced by his accepting the offer\
Similar motives induced the CMS to accept Gwynne's appointment as
5
archdeacon of the Sudan in 1905 , despite Wingate’s insisting that 
in order to secure the appointment Gwynne had to resign from the CMS*
Baylis to Harpur, 31 July 1900, CISA/Egypt/Vol •2; see also Baylis 
to Gwynne, 25 Oct. 1901, Ibid. Baylis wrote that the CMS decided 
’...to keep you knocking at the door which is not yet open...*
^Ferguson to Wingate, 1 Nov. 1900, FO 78/5088**
^See pp. 224-7*
^Gwynne to Adeney, 18 Jan* 1901, CMSA/E!g/03/l901 *
^Baylis to Gwynne, lp Feb. 1905» CMSA/HJg/Vol.3.
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Wingate argued that a missionary oould not be head of the church in
a country where proselytizing was forbidden* However, he promised
thattthe severence of Gwynne*s relations with the CMS would be only 
1nominal • The CMS concluded that Gwynne should resign his membership 
as he would *...be able to do more for the Society and at less expen­
se than if he had remained a member*..at the same time he is to be in
2a much more prominent and recognised position*.*1 When, a few mon­
ths later, the CMS decided to establish its first missionary station 
in the south, Gwynne, the archdeacon of the Sudan, was appointed as
3
* Head of the Gordon Memorial Mission* f* Although Gwynne was hardly 
in a position to undertake active missionary work!*: he tried his ut­
most to help his fellow missionaries, and to further missionary 
enterprise. In some cases this led to Wingate rebuking him for 
neglecting his duties as head of the Anglican community.^ It was 
not, however, until 1912 that Wingate became really worried about
1Wingate to Baylis, 11 May 1905, CMSA/Eg/03/1905; see also Wingate 
to Cromer, 19 Apr. 1905, PO 141/393.
^Maclnnes to Baylis, 13 May 1905, CMSA/Eg/03/1905; see also Baylis 
to Gwynne, 7 Apr. 1905, CMSA/Eg/Vol.3.
^Baylis to Gwynne, 17 Nov. 1905, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.l; until May 1906,
all correspondence with the new mission was conducted through Gwynne*
See Baylis to Gwynne, 23 Feb. 1906, Ibid. See also ppf*250~3* Gwynne 
also remained in charge of the CMS educational activities in the 
northern provinces and continued to draw £100 per annum for his ser­
vices, from the GMS, see Wingate to GMS, 20 Apr. 1905* CMSA/Egypt/Vol!*3*
^Wingate to Gwynne, 22 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/3; Wingate to Phipps, 17 
Mar. 1910, Ibid. In 1913, Wingate vetoed GwynneEFs proposed trip to 
Abyssinia on similar grounds. Wingate to Kitchener, 25 Feb. 1913* 
Wingate to Gwynne, 27 Pet. 1913, PO 37l/l638.
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Gwynne1 s ambitions. He opposed Gwynne*s appointment as an indepen”
dent bishop of the Sudan, fearing that he might be tempted to assert
1
his independence from the government 5* The appointment was, therefor^,
postponed until Wingate was certain of his own authority over church 
2
affairs U In 1914 Gwynne tried once more to alter the relations bet-
weeh church and state in the Sudan. He proposed the establishment of
a Qhurch Gouncil in which voting would be by proxy and in which Gwy~
3
nne himself would be empowered with the veto f* Wingate*s main worry was
about the support given to Gwynne by a number of prominent officials:
.*.1 need hardly say that I view with grave apprehension any in­
dependents power being given to the Clerical party...which will 
require to be very carefully curbed if we are to keep missiona^- 
ry and other propaganda matters within safe limits...4
Once again it was Bishop Blyth who came to Wingate1s aid in limiting
5
Gwynne*s independence to purely clerical matters Satisfied with
On 3 Jan. 1912 Blyth informed Gwynne of his appointment as first 
bishop of the Sudan and dean of the Cathedral; on 20 Jan., Wingate 
sent a telegram to Blyth to suspend Gwynne*s appointment, this was 
followed by a letter from Wingate to Blyth on 22 Jan., explaining 
his reasons. One of the main issues was that Gwynne insisted o'n 
dissolving the Cathedral committee headed by Wingate, once the Cath­
edral was handed to him as the new dean, SAD/420/3*
2Blyth, who fully supported Wingate, ordered Gwynne to withdraw his 
demand, and an agreement was reached. Blyth to Gwynne, 23 Jan. 1912; 
Wingate to Blyth, 1 Feb. 1912, SAD/420/3; see also Wingate to ICitche- 
ner,. 11 Feb. 1912,,SAD/180/2/2.
Wingate to Gwynne, 27 Jan. 1914, SAD/189/l; Wingate to Clayton,
14 Feb. 1914, SAD/469/6/l?.
^Wingate to Clayton, 14 Feb. 1914, Ibid; among those supporting Gwynne
were Midwinter, Director of the Sudan railways, Robins, &nd Parsons*
^Blyth to Gwynne, 3 Mar. 1914» SAD/420/3; Wingate to Kitchener (pri­
vate), 19 Mar. 1914, SAD/189/3 .
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this achievement Wingate noted:1...It only emphasized the wisdom of
our decision years ago, that the head of the Anglican Church in the
Sudan should nn no account have any direct attachment to any missio- 
1nayy body...1
All the evidence tends to show that it would have greatly sim­
plified matters had the bishop of the Sudan lacked proselytising 
ambitions* For Gwynne, despite his resignation from the CMS-remained 
at heart a missionary. The CMS headquarters in London made constant 
efforts to lift the Sudan government’s restrictions on missionary 
activities. However, despit eG^Gwynne1 s influential position in the
Sudan, these efforts failed owing to the political weakness of the 
2CMS in Britain U Wingate himself was by all accounts a religious 
3man t although he believed that any interference by missionaries in 
the Muslim north was bound to result in trouble^'* He was, therefore} 
quite prepared to play an active part in any Christian activity which 
had no missionary contents Bishop Blyth, who visited the Sudan in 
1906, was very impressed by the sincere religious atmosphere among 
the government officials, ’...The fact that they are not ashamed of
■^Wingate to Clayton, (private), 7 Mar. 1914* SAD/469/6/l.
2 - 
Gwynne left the Sudan and became Bishop Chaplain in the British
army for the duration of the World War* See Gwynne to Wingate, 5
Sep. 1914, SAD/191/3. ' '
See pp.36-7 •
4Wingate to Gwynne, 17 lay 1911, S/0 /300/5 .
- 227 -
1
their own religion impresses the natives who respect them for thatj.1 
On the other hand, Bishop Gwynne wrote, *...1 maintain that the Mos-
Q
lems despise us for neglecting the observance of our faith..*1 The 
truth was that the British officials of the Sudan, whose Christian
belief was centred around the moral content of their religion, had
3no desire to impose their beliefs upon others ;* HencefBlyth, aso'an 
Anglican Bishop, expressed his satisfaction, while Gwynne regarded 
any religion without missionary oonnotations as bordering on heresy^* 
Khartoum Gathedral was built through the efforts of Wingate and 
his fellow officers who regarded it as proof of the permanency of
5
British rule in the Sudan • Princess Henry of Battenberg laid the 
foundation stone in 1904^, and Wingate appealed to the British people
7
to raise the necessary funds * Gwynne, as bishop, had to take an 
active part in the fund raising and was pitied by his fellow
^Blyth to Archbishop Davidson, 17 Mar. 1906, SAD/42Q/2>
^Gwynne to Wingate, 19 Nov* 1911, SAD/301/5*
3 .
Hill, Missions, pp.114-5*
^Gwynne to Wingate, 19 Nov. 1911» SAD/30|i/5; Gwynne claimed that the 
Muslims *...look upon us as "KofEa*1 ikuffar 1 and I am not surprised*.1
5
^A pamphlet published by the fund faising committee, under Wingate*s 
chairmanship claimed the Cathedral *...will, more than anything else, 
prove to the Oriental mind the permanent nature of our occupation.*.1 
Khartoum Cathedral In.d.l, SAD/lOjf/31*
6Laying the Foundation Stone of All Saints Church - Khartoum, 7 Jan. 
1904, by Princess Henry of Battenberg, SAd/275/2; GGR - 1904>
p.81.
7By 1908 £22,000 were collected by the Church fund raising committee. 
English Church at Khartoum, 1899-1907» SAd /420/6*
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missionaries who regarded the building of a Cathedral as 1•••perfec­
tly mad.*, when money is urgently needed for real necessit ies.. * ’ *■
By 1912, the Cathedral was completed and the Bishop of London was
2
invited to attend the consecration ceremony u To Wingate’s dismay 
the Bishop attacked Islam in a sermon he delivered to CMS missiona­
ries in the Albert Hall shortly before his intended visit to the 
3
Sudan • Wingate wrote to Gwynne:*...the Bishop of London puts him­
self on a level with the fanatical Sheikh Ali Youssef of "El-Moayyad**
4 5. .*’ Kitchener proposed cancelling the Bishpp*s visit ■* However,
the consecration took place on 26 January 1912, and no further inci-
dents occurred • Wingate was firmly convinced that the consecration
ceremony and the Bishop’s visit ’...was to be made a peg on which
to develop a strong anti Govt* policy as regards religious matters,
^Maclnnes to Baylis, 13 May 1905, CMSA/E/03/1905.
2Hill, Missions, p.128*
^The Times, 28 Sep. 1911$ see also Gleichen to Wingate, 1 Oct. 1911, 
SAD/301/4, Gleichen, a one time Sudan agent, sent Wingate the press 
cutting of the Bishop’s speech and suggested the cancellation of his 
visit',
^"Wingate to Gwynne, 9 Oct. 1911, SAD/301/4.
^Wingate to Gwynne, 12 Oct, 1911, Ibid,
£
Wingate to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 30 Jan, 1912, SAD/l^o/l; 
Wingate to Stack (very private), 31 Jan* 1912, Ibid* In his letter 
to Stack Wingate wrote that the Bishop was the wrong man to send to 
the East, about which he knew nothing* To the Archbishop he wrote: 
’...except for yourself, no more popular prelate could have been de­
signated to carry out the consecration...’
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1more especially missions, education & c...1 Hence, He decided to
p
revise and stiffen all regulations regarding.^ missionary activities **
A previous decision to have Sunday as a day of rest for British offi­
cials was cancelled as a result of the Bishop1s London sermon\ 
Officially, therefore, Friday remained the day of rest for all govern­
ment officials except in the southern provinces and Port Sudan^, al­
though, the observance of Sunday by Christians was encouraged by Win-
5
gate whenever possible Church of England services were held in all 
towns where the number of British officials was sufficient to justify 
it;. The special link between the government and the Church of Eng­
land was clearly demonstrated by the fact that services, were held
in the government houses and in the governor-general*s palace until
6the churches were erected U
1 \ ■Wingate to Kitchener (private)please destroyl) , ; 11 Feb* 1912,
SAD/180/2/2.
^Ibid; see also pp.237-8.
^Wingate to Kitchener, 28 Nov* 1911, SAD/301/5; Gwynne to Wingate,
19 Nov* 1911, Ibid* Gwynne wrote:*...I would rather ten thousand ti­
mes the bishop of London stayed at home thah he should jeopardise 
our chance of having a Sunday*.•*
^Circular Memorandum No*244» Port Sudan, 19 Mar* 1910, SAI)/402/l3; 
the reason for introducing Sunday as weekly holiday in Port Sudan was 
probably because it was a new town and with a very cosmopolitan po­
pulation. In 1906 there were 2725 foreigners in Port Sudan, out of a 
total population of 4289, OGR - 1906, p.720* For Sunday observance in 
the south, see pp* 255-9*
^See for instance Wingate to Wilson, 26 Nov. 1912, SAI)/l83/2; Wingate 
objected to the fact that public concerts were taking place on Sunday 
nights at the Khartoum Skating Rink.
^GGR - 1906, p.722; Journal No.l* by Rev.F*B*Hadow M.A*,CMS 
Missionary Lower Sudan; Hadow reported on the services in Khartoum; 
see also p.36*
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Other Christian denominations had their respective Churches in 
Khartoum. A free grant of land was given to the Greek Orthodox com­
munity in 1901 to builda ohurch*^. Similar grants were made to the
2
Copts and to the Church of England • The Austrian missionaries built 
a Cathedral and opened schools in Khartoum and Omdurman^i. The §reek 
communities in Khartoum and Port Sudan, formed societies which under­
took religious and educational functions as well as offering assis­
tance to their poorer compatriots^. The large Coptic community also 
established its own school in Khartoum . However, constant troubles 
between the Coptic Bishop and his flock hampered the development of 
more comprehensive communal services^. The only other religious 
community to be founded in the Sudan was the Jewish community, whose 
synagogue and communal services were inaugurated by the ifrand £abbi 
of Alexandria in 1908^!*
e. Missionary activities in the northern provinces.
The government *s polciy of forbidding missionary freedom of prea^ - 
ching north of the 10th parallel was set down by Cromer and maintained
1SG - 26, 1 Aug. 1901.
^Wingate to Cromer, 16 May 1901, F0 141/364.
3 /-Hill, Missions, pp.115-6; see also p.231*
4IPergus.sn to Wingate, 1 July 1902, SAD/272/5/2; GGR - 1908, p.623'.
Kyrillus - Patriarch of the Copts Catholique to Slatin, 1900 Iri.d.l, 
S&D/272/5/2.
wynne to Wingate, 14 Aug. 1902, SAD/272/6i Wingate to Clayton, 
(private), 15 Dec. 1913, SAD/469/5.
^Wingate to Grand Rabbi Hazan of Alexandria, 1 Feb. 1908, SAD/282/2.
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with, slight modifications throughout Wingate's governor-generalship5.
The missionary societies were allowed to establish medical stations
1and to open schools in the Muslim provinces U There were three mis­
sionary societies which functioned in the Sudan during the early pe­
riod* The Verona fathers, usually referred to as the Austrian mis­
sionaries, had worked in the Sudan since 1848^* During the Mahdia 
their stations were closed and some of the missionaries were impri­
soned^1* The Verona fathers were the first to arrive in the recon­
quered Sudan and undertook to comply with the governments policy 
of non-proselytization^l* Hence, although they opened schools and
medical stations in the northothey concentrated their efforts in the
5southern, non-Muslim provinces !* The American Preshyterians arrived
in the Sudan in 1899 ancL established their first station on the
6river Sobat In 1901 * The CMS connection with the Sudan began after,
^SAR - 1902, pp.89-9C; J * S * T rimingham, The Christian Approach io Islam 
in the Sudan, (London 1949)1 pp.12-21*
^R*Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan,, 1839—1889« (London 1961), 
pp’*23-6.
Among those imprisoned were Fathers Ohrwalder, Rosignoli, and Bonomi; 
Wingate, Ten years captivity, pp*22-3*
^Hill, Missions, pp.115-6; Hill described how following certain initial 
suspicions between Kitchener and Raveggio, head of the Austrian mis­
sion, relations improved and remained cordial throughout Wingate’s 
governor-generalship, especially after the appointment of Bishop Geyer 
in I903* See also Wingate to Cromer, 17 Feb* 1900, FO 141/35^*
^See pp1* 245-50*
£
J*K*Giffen, The Egyptian Sudan, (New York 19^5) » ppl*60-8‘*
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Gordon’s death in I885, when, at a meeting in London, £3000 were
1allocated to a Gordon Memorial Mission in the Sudan . Following
the reconquest the society repeatedly requested permission to open
missionary stations in the northern Sudan*
Despite the government's refusal the CMS ordered its members to
0
stay in Khartoum and undertake what work they could find The soc­
iety built its headquarters in Khartoum on land leased from the gov- 
3
ernment . Yet, although this land was granted for building the 
society’s depot for its future activities in the south, the CMS bided 
its time and waited for its chance to undertake missionary activities 
among the Muslims. In July 1900, the CMS managing committee decided: 
’...That the Committee do not see their way to near prospect of man­
ning two Mi'ssabns^'in the Eastern Soudan.. .They decidedly prefer to 
aim at opening and maintaining a Mission at Khattoum...’^  The CMS, 
in fact, was less justified in keeping its missionaries in Khartoum
*^Hill, Missions. p*117:.
2
The CMS honorary secretary was asked by the Archbishop of Canterbury 
why the society, instead of going to the south ’...persisted in for­
cing itself against this closed door...The best answer that could be 
given was that the Society believed that God had sent it there...’ 
Interview of Honorary Secretary CMS with Archbkshop of Canterbury, 
Lambeth Palace, 6 July 1901, CMSA/e/03/1901; see also pp. 221-3*
■^Drage to Adeney, 4 Sep. 1900» CMSA/Eg/Vol.3/l900; Similar facilities 
were offered to other Christian denominations as well as to the Muslims.
^Minutes of CMS Managing Committee, 31 July 1900, CMSA/EG/3/19OO; see 
also Adeney, Harpur, and Hall to CMS, 18 Apr. 1901, Ibid, 1901.
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than the other missionary societies'* The Presbyterian and Austrian
missions had many adherents among the Christian population and were,
therefore, allowed to start schools and medical stations in the north*
The CMS, however, did t.J**not hatfe a single native adherent and no
children of adherents to educate*.*1 Hence they were not permitted
1to undertake Educational and medical work '* Only in 1903, following
Cromer’s visit to the Sudan, were the restrictions on missionary
education relaxed* The CMS was allowed to open a school in Khartoum
provided that Muslim children were enabled to withdraw from Christian
2religious education • A government order forbidding missionaries to
preach privately to Muslims was also relaxed. The CMS was allowed to
preach to their domestic servants or at their mission, provided they
3did not hold public meetings •* But the government’s continued pres­
sure on the CMS to establish a mission in the south went unheeded^* 
Instead, the CMS proposed to prepare:
Gwynne to Adeney, 16 Apr. 1901,- CMSA/e/03/1901J A memorandum was sent 
by the CMS to Lansdowne, then secretary for foreign affairs, deman­
ding the liberty $0 preach in the northern Sudan5* The memorandum as 
well as Lansdowne* s evasive reply ^phb&ihhedhbyTTherxTimes,
19 Aug* 1901.
^Gwynne to Baylis, 31 Jan. 1903, CMSA/e/03/1903V Following an inter­
view with Cromer in 1902, Gwynne wrote:* *•.1 had an interview with 
the great Lord C* last week. He knows nothing of education still 
less of the work of Christian missions and yet his opinion on both 
is final here...*, Gwynne to Baylis, 12 Mov* 1902, CMSA/e/03/1902*
See also S M  - 1902, pp.89-90.
^Baylis to Gwynne, May 1903, CMSA/eg/Vo1.2. GwynneWs report to 
the Egyptian Missionary Conference, 20 May 1903, CMSA/e/03/1903»
^Baylis to Gwynne, 30) June 1904, CMSA/Eg/Vol.2*
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*.*a carefully worded memorial to the Sirdar referring to his 
admirable civil government of the Sudan and embodying the many 
urgent reasons.•.for Christian Mission work amongst its Moham­
medan population...The memorial should be signed by a very 
large number of influential people, including as many members 
of the Royal family as it is possible to induce to do so...l
In 1905 *the CMS tried to appeal to the Muslims by distributing
its paper Orient and Occident. The government again intervened and
2forbade its distribution in the northern provinces f. It was only
in 1906 that the CMS at last complied with the government’s wish to
3establish a missionary station in the south • Yet, even in later 
years its major efforts were in the sphere of educational and medi­
cal missions in the Muslim provinces^.
The CMS founded a girls’ school at Khartoum in 1903, shobtly 
after receiving Cromer’s permissionU The society, however, had no 
intention of complying with Cromer’s request that every Muslim par­
ent should give his written consent to his child receiving religious
1Spence to Secretary of Foreign Department, CMS, 15 Sep. 1903,
dSA/E/03/1903.
2Cecil -to Wingate, 15 Jan. 1905, SAD/276/l; Maclnnes to Baylis, Rep­
ort on interview with the Sirdar and Lord Cromer, Mar. 1905, CMSA/e/-
03/1905. The CMS were, told that those who wanted to receive the paper 
had to send an application to the director of intelligence in Cairo?.
^For details see pp. 250-2.
^¥hen in 1914i Gwynne approached Wingate on behalf of the CMS, nearly 
all his requests referred to the extension of activities in the nor­
thern provinces, see Wingate to Stack (private), 18 Apr. 1914» SAD/- 
190/l/2.
^Cromer to Gwynne, 13 Mar. 1903, F0 633/8? Bote by Rev.L.Gwynne, 
Khartoum Girls' Scholl In.d. 1<?06?| , SAD/l03/6.
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educat i oia^  . Hence, Gwynne expressed his satisfaction when Wingate
2failed to press this point and instead relied on. G^rynne^s good will !.
The result was that the CMS concentrated its efforts on getting Mus­
lim girls to attend its schools. As for their participating in reli­
gious education, f*..a few parents have occasionally said that they 
do not wish their children to do so, hut they generally attend in 
the end...1 Nevertheless, the CMS managing committee suggested that 
Muslims who were exempted from Scripture lessons should pay extra 
school fees. Maclnnes refused to demand this charge on the ground 
that only four out of fifty-five girls did not attend Scripture lessons^. 
An article in al-Mu^ayyad, in December 1906, convinced the Sudan
authorities and Cromer, that stricter measures had to be applied to
5
the missionary schools This article accused those responsible for 
the CMS gffirls* school of breaking their promise to Muslim parents 
whose daughters attended the Christian religious education despite
^Henry to Wingate, 7 July 19°4t SAD/275/5*
2Gwynne to Baylis, 24 Feb. 1903, CMSA/e/03/1903*
■^Maclnnes, Report on the Sudan, Nov.-Dee* 1903, CMSA/e/03/1904«
^"Maclnnes to CMS, 20 Apr. I9O4, CMSA/Eg/03/l904* When Cromer reitera­
ted his demand that Muslim parents should sign a document allowing 
their children to attend Christian religious lessons, Maclnnes warned 
Gwynne notjto pledge himself * ...to a document which might be used to 
the prejudice of the School...1, Maclnnes to Parent Committee, 4 Nov.
1904, CMSA/E/03/1904.
5 .yAl-Mu ayyad, 17 Dec. 1906. The article was translated by Shahin 
from the intelligence department, who later reported that it had been 
written by one of the Egyptian teachers at Gordon College. Shahin to 
Wingate, 14 Jan. 1907, SAD/103/7/41.
1the "undertaking that they would be exempt ,
‘Rhere is no doubt that the accusations were "^ justified, and that
2the Sudan authorities were aware of the true situation • A special 
government committee which investigated the situation in the missio­
nary schools proposed the imposition of government inspection on all
3
missionary schools • Stricter conditions were laid down for conduc­
ting the schools, and a special clause stipulated that no child would 
be allowed to attend religious education without the written consent 
of its parents^*. In January 1907 Phipps, than civil secretary, under­
took an inspection af all missionary schools- His report revealed 
that all the Muslims at the Catholic schools were exempt from reli­
gious instruction* However, there were eleven Muslim boys at the 
Presbyterian school, and 59 Muslim girls at the CMS girls1 school,
^ Al-Mu * ayyad * 17 Dec* 1906*
Gwynne to Wingate, 29 Dec. 1906, SAD/103/6; Gwynne did not deny the 
charge* He stated, however, that the article represented an opinion 
of a minority of Egyptians whose sole motive was to arouse anti-Bri­
tish feelings* He therefore suggested inviting the Egyptian Muslims 
to open a school for their own girls, as the government had no funds 
to open one* See also Gwynne to Wingate, 2 Feb. 1907» Ibid*
^Confidential Report on Missionary Schools in the Northern Sudan, 2 
Dec. 1906, (signed) Sterry, Currie, Bonus; the original report was 
sent to Wingate and a copy to Cromer, SAD/103/6* According to the 
report the Austrian Mission had always welcomed inspections of its 
schools, whereas the CMS 1 *..had forfeited the confidence of a large 
sectihn of Mohammedan parents, and would welcome the possibility of 
any guarantee that might revive such confidence.-*f
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1who were subject to religious instruction • Cromer, realizing that
the major problem was the CMS girls* school, proposed opening a gov- 
> 2
ernment school instead Wingate was reluctant to accede^o Cromer* s 
request* He argued that if the government was to open a girls* school 
the CMS would agitate in the British press and would also object to
3
government inspection of their schools • Thus the government decided 
not to persist with this project and the CMS opened additional gibrls* 
schools at Omdurman and Atbara*
By 1912 there were seventeen missionary schools in the Muslim 
provinces, whereas in the south, which should have been the missiona­
ries* mainstay, There were only four schools, all run by the Austrian 
Catholics^* In the same year Wingate introduced even stricter cont­
rol over missionary education as a counter-measure Gwynne*s increa­
sed authority following the consecration of the Khartoum Cathedral. 
Missionary schools were now to be inspected regularly by the governor- 
general*s representatives. Their syllabus and teaching staff had to
^"Phipps to Wingate, 19 Jan. 19^71 SAD/103/6.
^Cromer to Wingate, 6 Feb. 1907, PO 141/409*
^Wingate to Cromer, 19 Mar. 1907, SAD/l03/7/lJ Gwynne to Wingate, 13 
Mar. 1907t SAD/103/7/2; Gwynne warned Wingate against this project 
which would compel/ the CMS to close its own school in Khartoum; See 
also Extract from Annual Report of Education Department (1906),SAD/l03/6*
^GGR - 1912, pp.289“9Gi there were nearly 1000 pupils educated in mis­
sionary schools. Out of the 21 schools, eight belonged to the Austrian 
GathQlaioryMishiohs, six to the Presbyterians, four to the Orthodox 
Copts, and three to the CMS. The schools of the CMS and the Presby­
terians at their southern stations were so inadequate that they could 
not be listed as proper schools.
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be approved by the authorities and, as previously, any child had to
bring the written approval of his parents if he wanted to participate
1in religious education f*
The.relations between the government and the other missionary 
societies were less strained then with the CMS1* Giffen, of the Pres­
byterian mission, who arrived in the Sudan in 1899? related that re­
lations between government officials and missionaries were very frien­
dly. However, many of these officials regarded missionary activities 
as superfluous or even harmful* 1..."The religion the people already
have1', it was said, ,fis good enough for them; it is all they need,
2and all they can comprehend"*.** The British officers found the 
Catholic mission most to their liiking\ The Austrian missionaries 
complied with government orders, undertook the work in the southern 
sphere which wars alloted to them and concentrated on industrial edu­
cation which the government was anxious to develop. The reasons for 
this more worldly attitude were probably that the Catholics, as for­
eigners, were less likely to interfere in administrative problems, 
or indeed to expect aid from the government. Also during the Turco- 
Egyptian period, the Verona fathers had made no attempt to proselytise
11 Instructions as to the procedure to be carried out by individuals 
or societies desirous of opening schools in the Sudan1,(signed)
R.Wingate, 31 Jan. 1912, CMSA/Sudan/l, The instructions applied to 
all private schools, except kuttabs.
^Ji.E.Giffen, The Egyptian Sudan, p'*57*
^In 1912 the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal asked Wingate to send the 
Catholics to his province rather than the CMS; see p»253; see also 
Wingate to Feilden, 21 Feb. 1913, SAD/185/2/2.
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Muslims and had concentrated in the pagan south so that the new res-
1trictions did not interfere with their work :*
As for relations between the missionaries and the Muslim popula­
tion, there is no evidence to show that they were strained, apart from
2occasional anti-missionary articles in the Egyptian press U Most of
the missionaries had a very low opinion of Islam, which they expres-
3
sed; quite openly ?• Even Gwynne, who spent many years among the 
Muslims and was on friendly terms with many of them, persisted in these 
views and regarded Islam as a major factor in the country's backwardness^* 
f* Islam in the southern provinces*
The process of Islamiaation of the southern provinces made consi­
derable progress during the Turco-Egyptian period as a result of tra­
ding penetration* During the Mahdia the penetration of Islam into
the south suffered a set-back owing to the brutality of Mahdist raids
5and its fanaticism ■* Thus the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, by virtue of the 
1
R.Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan* p.24jsee also Hill, Missions.
2 pp*129-30*
See for instance al-Liwa*, 7 Eeb, 1900; 3 May 1900; see also pp’* 55*
When in 1915 Wingate asked Rashid Rida to stop '...his diatribes ag­
ainst missionaries*..1, Rida replied that /he only did so as the 
missionaries 1.*•"write books and publish articles against the Prophet, 
the ICuran and the Mohammedan faith" *.1 ,quoted in Wingate to Cromer,
28 Apr. 19X5, SAD/195/2.
See for instance Dr.Lloyd's Journal, Apr. 1908, SAd /203/9/12; see 
alssb Giffen, The Egyptian Sudan, pp.53-4*
^H.C*Jackson, Pastor on the Nile* pp*27, 47» 193-4*
5
-'Eor a comprehensive study of these provinces during the Mahdia see 
R*0*Collins, The Southern Sudan 1883-1898t(Yale 19^2), see also 
Collins, Sudan Link, pp.362-9*
9
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Islamic character of its army and the lower ranks of its administra­
tion, became an agent for spreading Islam in these provinces*
During the early years of the Condominium there was no *onsistent 
government action to halt the spreading of Islam in the south* The
posts which were occupied by the Egyptian army attracted the northern 
1.iallaba and became centres for propagating Islam* Wingate was aware:
•••that for one Christian officer or official who goes into the 
Southern districts there are hundreds of Moslems each one of 
whom is, by the very nature of his religion, an embryonic 
missionary; moreover, The Moslem religibn appeals to the blacks 
very much more than the Christian religion can*..2
However,apart from throwing the south open to missionaries, there was
little he could do* The government, fearing the effects of Muslim
education, decided not to extend its educational facilities to the
south* When, Im 1904, the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal started a school
for the children of the provincial staff, he was ordered by Currie
to close it* Currie argued that by employing a Muslim teacher f.:*.the
3net result of his teaching must tend towards Mohammedanism*.*1 
Wingate who supported Currie suggested the employment of a Lebanese 
teacher and stated his views about the government's religious policy 
in clear terms:
1Jailab:trader; the Jallaba were traders mainly from the riverain -p 
tribes of the Sudan. During the Turco-Egyptian period many of them 
acted as intermediaries in the slave trade and some of them continued 
this practice during the early years of the Condominium* See also p.371»
0 *
Wingate to Gwynne, (private), 4 Dec. 1910, SAD/298/3*
^Boulnois to Currie, Jan* 1904; Currie to Boulnois, Jan* 1904, SAD/ 
103/7/2.
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•••I am not at all keen to propagate Mohammedanism in countries 
in which that religion is not the religion of the inhabitants.
As a Govt. I do not intend interfering with religious beliefor 
and prefer to leave all that in the hands of the Missionaries.. 
Then again the language question comes in; the language of the 
Bahr-el-Ghazal is not really Arabic, and therefore if any 
foreign language is taught, it ou&ht to BegEhfeJtishi..1
Towards the end of 1904 it became clear that Islamization was .
2
progressing • In consequence the governor deaided to stop the teach-
ing of reading, writing and arithmetic A proposal made in 1906 to
re-open the school for the children of government employees was again
rejected by Currie who instead suggested that '...any eligible boy
of decent parents...1 shall be educated in Khartoum^*. These purely
negative measures designed to discourage Muslim education soon proved
5a complete failure. Islam made rapid progress in the Bahr al-Ghazal
6 7
as well as in the Nuba mountains and in the Mongalla province .
Stack, then Sudan agent in Cairo, commented:
...It is sad to think that when by our admihistrative and
1Wjngate to Boulnois (private), 3 Feb. I9O4, SAD/103/7/2.
P
Despite the precaution of employing a Syrian teacher, all the schools' 
pupils had become Muslims by the end of 1904.’ Wingate to Mudir Bahr- 
El-Ghazal (confidential), 21 Nov. 1904, Ibid.
^Boulnois to Wingate, 7 Deo. 1904, SAD/275/9.
Hill to Civil Secretary, 19 Deo. 1906; Currie to Civil Secretary,
2 Feb. 190jr>, SAD/lO3/7/2.
5GGR - 1907, pp.183-4; GGR - 1908, p.466.
SIR - 179, June 1909.
^Shaw to Baylis, 9 Aug. 1910, CMSA/Sudan/0l/l910; Shaw reported on
an interview he had with Owen, governor of Mongalla*
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civilizing efforts we are able to induce the heathen tribes of 
the Sudan to live at peace with their hereditary foes, the 
Arabs, the former incline at onee to Mohammedanism...!
Bishop Gwynne proposed '...to clear out the Egyptian Mamours and
replace the Sudanese troops by police raised and employed locally A
2
and the encouragement kf good British trading companies...* Further­
more, he accused some of the British officers of aiding the progress
3of Islam by building mosques in the southern provinces '• Wingate, 
whilst admitting the fault of some of his officers, reiterated his 
belief that only the missionaries could provide the antidote to Mus­
lim propaganda^. It is interesting to note that Gordon, the British 
officer bl&med for building the mosque at Wau, stated that '...in 1899* 
when the Sudan Government re-occupied the Bahr el-Ghazal, the province 
was in a marked degree more Mohammedan than it is today...1
The years after 1910 witnessed an increased attempt by the govern­
ment to repulse the progress of Islam. The .iallaba were restricted 
by government orders and needed a special permit to trade in the south
■^Stack to Wingate, 25 Mar. 1912, SAD/l8o/3; see also GilantNubastP.12.
O
Gwynne to Wingate, 29 Aug. 19II, SAB/301/2; Gwynne had just returned 
from an inspection of the Lado Enclave, Bahr al-Ghazal and Mongalla.
^Ibid; see also GGR - 1908, p.466. The governor of Bahr al-Ghazal 
reported that a|mosque was built in Wau by The Egyptian officers and 
officials, and by the traders.
^Wingate to Gwynne, 9 Oct* 1911, SAD/301/4- 
5
^Gordon to Wingate, 30 June 1910, enclosed in Gwynne to Baylis, 4 
Aug. 1910, CMSA/Sudan/oi/1910.
Bee for instance SG - 204, Nov. 1911; SG - 226, Djgc. 1912; SG - 243,
15 Bee. 1913.
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In March 1911 Wingate took an important step in insitituting what la­
ter same to be known as the 'Southern Policy'. Following a tour of 
inspection of the southern provinces he suggested replacing the Egyp­
tian army in the south by locally recnuited territorials.. He stated 
that this would aid recruiting. His main argument was that it 
'...would afford of getting rid of the Moslemizing influence in the 
shape of the Egyptian Officers...* Wingate pledged Gorst to complete
secrecy and asked him to '...avoid any reference to the religious 
1aspect... *
2Thus the Equatorial Battalion came into being The official
reasons for recruiting the new battalions were stated to be financial
and territorial. The Equatorials were cheaper than regular army un-
3
its 1 and their services were required in occupying the Lado Enclave • 
By 1914 there were five Equatorial companies, and the number of Egyp­
tian armji units was accordingly decreased^. However, Wingate's int­
ention of excluding Muslim officers could not be realized as there
"^Wingate to Gorst (private), 1 Mar. 19II, SAD/300/3; Collins, Sudan 
Link, p.379* Collins stated that the Equatorial battalion was first 
suggested by Owen, governor of Mongalla, on 29 Mar. 1911* Wingate's 
letter to Gorst may have been the result of his tour in Mongalla which, 
howefer preceded Owen’s memorandum by four weeks.
^Asser To Wingate, 16 Aug* 1911, SAD/301/2.
3
SIR - 210, Jan. 1912; The Equatorial battalions received less pay 
than the army units and were expected to grow their own food; see 
Conditions of Service, Equatorial Battalion, 27 Feb. 1912, SAD/106/4.
L l R  - 236, Mar. 1914} see also SIR - 220, Nov. 1912* where it was
reported that a battalion of the Egyptian army was disbanded for 
reasons of economy.
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lwere-not enough educated southerners ■ •
The only area where the government succeeded in excluding Muslim
influence from the territorial battalions were the new districts of
Gondokoro and Nimule which were ceded to the Sudan following the bor—
2der settlement with Uganda f. In the other southern provinces the 
government persisted in trying to eliminate the Muslim element as 
••••quite apart from the religious question per se« it would of course
t
3
be politically undesirable for the Squatorials*..to beoome Moslems*••
This process of elimination was Slightly retarded owing to the World
War and to a mutiny of the Equatorials at Yambio in 1915^•
In April 1912, a few months after the first Equqtorial battalion
5was raised, Wingate suggested a similar plan for the Nuba mountains f. 
Recruiting started in March 1913 and a year later the first company
^Wingate to Phipps, 6 Sep* 1911, SAD/301/3; Asser to Wingate, 15 Sep. 
1912, SAD/182/3/2; In 1914 Ur* Stone from the CMS wrote that ••..the 
new Aziandi soldiers are j?afeiihder the influence of Sudanese mohamme- 
dan ...officers; are taught a little Arabic; keep the mohammedan Sab­
bath and holidays and often are given mohammedan names.•*’, Report by 
Ur. R.Y.Stone on the Yambio district, Mar.-Apr* 1914* CMSA/s/oi/l5.
2Wingate to Asser, 29 Aug. 1913, SAD/187/2/2; Owen to Wingate, 26 Jan. 
1914, SAD/189/l; Owen to Wingate, 28 Mar. 1914, SAD/189/3.
Wingate to Fielden, 28 Mar. 1914, Ibid.
4O.C. Bahr-el-Ghazal to A.G. Khartoum, 2$ May 1915, 31 May 1915i A.G. 
to O.C. Bahr-el-Ghazal, 2 June 1915, SAD/195/ll; Wingate to Owen, 21 
Oct. 1915, SAD/197/1/2; there were also difficulties of recruiting
owing to the discovery of sleeping sickness in that area*
^Wingate to Kitchener, (private), 15 Apr. 1912, SAU/l8l/l/3.
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1of the Nuba Territorials assembled at Kadugli • Most of the company 
consisted of ex-slaves from Jabal Miri, while the makks of the other 
mountains dissuaded their men from joining fearing that this would 
result in a loss of authority The rising of Eiki *A1T, Makk of Ja­
bal Miri in 1915» afforded ample proof of the company*s loyalty, as
3
only two of his former slaves joined in the revolt * Wingate wrote 
optimistically that he hoped the Nub& Territorials would soon *y*ae~ 
quire such a reputation as not to merit the term "abid** • •.1 ^
Thus the Sudan government pursued an active policy of resisting 
the Islamization of the south. A further step in this direction was 
taken in 1911 when English became the official language of the southern 
provinces. However, this new departure was connected with the deve -
5
lopment of missionary activities ^ 
g. Missionary societies in the south.
The southern provinces were opendd to missionary activities shortly 
after the reconquest. It was not however until 1900-1901 that the 
first missionaries proceeded to the south to survey their future areas 
of activity • Following a suggestion made by the representatives of
Historical Records - Nuba Territorial Company, SAD/1O6/5.
2iMa.
hbid; Mingate to Balfour, 24 July 1915, SAD/196/2.
4Wingate to Balfour, 2 Nov. 1915, SAD/197/2/2.
5See pp. 255-9.
Trimingham, The Christian approach to Islam in the Sudan, pp.12-14; 
Giffen, The E^yptain Sudan, pp.63-6*
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the CMS and the Presbyterians, the Sudan government divided the areas
south of parallel 10° into three spheres^". The Austrian mission was
allocated the left hank of the White Wile; the American Presbyterians
were allowed to operate in the Sobat and Zaraf valleys; whilst the
CMS received permission to work in the Babir al-Jabal and in the area
2
between the American and Austrian societies • Other missionary soc­
ieties were discouraged by the government from operating in the 
3
Sudan • Only in 1913 was the Sudan United Mission allowed to open 
a station at Melut, south of Kodok, following the failure of the GMS 
to occupy its sphere effectively^* The Lado Enclave, which reverted 
to the Sudan in 1910, was claimed by both the Austrian mission and 
the CMS • As a result of the CMS*s poor record, Wingate decided to
^Hall to Adeney, 12 Mar. 1901, CMSA/e/03/1901; the suggestion was at 
first turned down by the government who did not want to be tied down 
to any written agreement* Nason to Roman Catholic Mission, 17 Feb*
1902, po. 403/322.
2ggr - 1904, p.37.
^Owen to Wingate, 25 June 1905* SAD/276/6*
^Wingate to Stack, 14 June 1913> SAD/186/3; Wingate to Sir Andrew 
Wingate, 25 July 1913, SAD/l87/l/l; Sir Andrew Wihgate was Wingate1s 
cousin and head of the Sudan United Mission; see also J*L*Maxwell,
Half a Century of Grace* A .jubilee history of the Sudan United Mission, 
(London n.d.), p.104•
^Baylis to Gwynne, 6 May 1910, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.1; Gwynne to Phipps,
19 Feb. 1912, CMSA/s/OI/1912; Geyer to Wingate, 14 Feb. 1912, 
SAD/180/2/2.
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1allot the area to the Austrian mission U Furthermore, he warned the
CMS that had the sphere system not been adopted they would have been 
2
the main losers . However, Wingate compensated the CMS by granting
3them part of the Azande district in the Bahr al-Ghazal province f*
In 1913 the government followed a new departure by allowing missio­
nary activities north of latitude 10°'. Following an appeal by Gwynne, 
Wingate allowed the Sudan United Mission to open a station at Melut, 
nort of Kodok^. He also enabled the Austrian mission to re-open its
station at Hilling, which had been closed an the Mahdi*s order in 
51883 • In both cases the areas were regarded by Wingate as non-Mus­
lim, and missionaries were introduced in order to check the advance 
of IslanrV A year later the Austrian missionaries declared that
Wingate to Baylis, 23 May 1912, CMSA/s/0l/l912; in a private letter 
to Phipps, Wingate strongly criticised Gwynne for having joined the 
CMS in denying the Austrian claim /.••unless he can take a states­
manlike view instead of that of a last-joined petty missionary, he 
is practically useless to me...1 Wingate to Phipps (private),
24 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3.
2WingaW to -Baylis, 23 May 1912, CMSA/s/0l/l912.
The CMS had previously suggested to abolish the sphere system.Follow- 
ing Wingatefs letter they changed their minds; Baylis to Wingate, 10 
May 1912, CMSA/s/Ol/1912; Baylis to Wingate, 16 July 1912, Ibid*
^Gwynne to Parent Committee, 4 Jan. 1913, CMSA/s/0l/l913; Wingate to 
Phipps, 29 July 1913, SAD/187/1/2.
^Wingate to Kitchener, 20 Mar. 1912, SAD/l8o/3; see also Wingate,
Ten Years Captivity, pp.23-30'•
^Wingate to Kitchener, 20 Mar. 1912, SAD/180/3; Wingate to Sir Andrew 
Wingate, 25 July 1913, SAD/187/l/l; see also Gwynne to Blyth, 19 Oct. 
1913, SAD/420/3; Gwynne who had accompanied the new missionaries to 
Melut, wrote as follows:1...1 came here a fortnight-ago to start a 
new mission and try and thwart Islam in its threatened hold on the 
pagans...1
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x
f...Gebel Lilling had become rather too Mohammedan for them*..1 , and
in 1916 the station was closed for the duration of the World War •
The division into spheres did not apply in these new areas, or in the
. ^
frontier districts which were ceded to the Sudan from Uganda in 1913 • 
But in other parts of the southern Sudan the divisiion into spheres 
continued to he applied.
The government set down a number of regulations to which all 
missionary societies had to adhere. Missions were instructed to 
!...place themselves unreservedely Isic| under control of its local 
head in the country...1 They were further ordered to f*.,act only 
with the approval and permission of the Governor General of the Su­
dan*..1 Missionaries were forb&dden to trade, except for bartering
for their immediate necessities. They were ordered not 1 ...to act 
as intermediaries between natives and the Government...1^  Although 
these regulations were formalized only in 1912, they developed in 
the preceding years primarily as a result of practical requirements.
In 1905 "the Austrian missionaries were granted government payment 
for their educational work in the Bahr al-Ghazal . The following
^Wingate to Wilson, 3 July 1913, Ibid.
2SIR - 261, Apr. 1916.
Wingate to Stack (private), 18 Apr. 1914, SAD/l90/l/2; Manley to 
Wingate, 12 Jan. 1914, CMSA/s/oi/1914.
^Regulations and conditions under which, missionary work is permitted
in the Sudan (signed) R.Wingate, 31 Jan. 1912, GMSA/s/0l/l912; see 
also GGR - 1905, pp.151-2.
^Wingate to Henry, 6 Aug. 1905t SAl/277/3; see also p.255*
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year Gwynne suggested that all missionaries should he granted a spe­
cial reduction on the Sudan railways and steamers* He argued that
’...Missionaries are doing more than any other Englishman to develop
1their part of the Soudan...’ The government accepted his suggestion 
and a reduction of ^0% was granted to all missionaries travelling in 
the Sudan • Th^order forbidding missionaries to trade was based on 
Wingate’s belief that ’...the Boxer movement i n _China'was to a large 
extent caused by Missionaries becoming extensive traders*..’^ In 
1912 Wingate realized that missionaries could not exist in the outly­
ing districts without being permitted to barter* Hence, he ordered
trade regulations to be relaxed^* Wingate also decided to exempt the
5
Austrian missionary stations from paying animal tax . These regula­
tions indicated that while striving to keep a clear distinction be­
tween missionary and government activities, the Sudan authorities 
attempted to assist the missionaries wherever they could*
The government’s attitude to the different societies stemmed from 
their usefulness to the government rather than their creed* The Bri­
tish officials were, in the main, adherents of the Church of England* 
However, once it became clear that the Roman Catholics provided the
^Gwynne to Parent Committee, 16 Aug. 1906, CMSA/s/oi/1906.
^Owen to Thornton, 12 June 1907, SAD/208/6.
^Wingate to Phipps, 3 Aug. 1908, SAD/^pf3/8/3*
^Wingate to Phipps, 18 Wov. 1912, SAD/183/2.
^Wingate to Phipps, 19 Nov. 1912, SAD/l83/l*
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only effective missionary services in the Sudan, the government 
showed its gratitude by granting preference to the Austrian miss­
ionaries. Upon the opening of the. south to the missionary socie­
ties, the Austrians established several stations in the Bahr al- 
Ghazal and on the White Wile, while the Americans opened' a sta­
tion on the river Sobat^.
Constant efforts of the Sudan government to urge the CMS to occ­
upy its sphere in the south failed to produce results. In 1904 
Wingate warned Gwynne that unless the CMS made a start he would 
have to apportion the districts of Gondokoro and Wadelai to the Aus­
trians. The CMS headquarters excused their inability to occupy the
2south owing to lack of men • Cromer went even further than Wingate
exhorting the CMS to bring to the southern provinces the English
3
language and the Bible •
In 1905» thh GMS decided to establish its first station in the
1 nSAR - 1902, pp.89”90* By 1909, the Austrian mission had established 
five stations in the southern provinces, as compared to one station 
of the American Presbyterians and one of the CMS; see SAR - 1909* PP* 
63-4? Until 1914 the Austrians increased the number of their stations 
to seven, while the CMS opened a medical station in the -Azande dis­
trict, see GGR - 1914t pp.9»6l* ‘the development of missionary 
activities in the south, see also H.C.Jackson, Pastor on the Nile, 
PP*54“86; Giffen, The Egyptian Sudan« pp*92-122, 192-215*
^Gwynne to Parent Committee, 30 May 1904» an<I minutes of the P.O.,
30 June 1904, CMSA/E/03/1904*
3
Maclnnes to Baylis, 4 Nov. 1904» Ibid. Reporting an interview with 
Cromer; see also Kennaway to Cromer, 25 Nov. 1904» Ibidf where he 
thanked Cromer for his clear call to the CMS. Cromer, however, warned 
the CMS not to use his words in the society1s propaganda as it would 
antagonize Muslim feelings; see Cromer to Kennaway, 1 Dec. 1904* Ibid.
- 251 -
Mongalla province^* The CMS proclaimed:
...the course of history by which the British rule is estab- 
: lished as a rule of peace in the Bile Basin; the remarkable
Gall,to the Society from the ruling authorities in that land
to send a Mission there...all combine to make the Committee feel 
that the hand of God is manifest in the ordering of this new 
venture of faith*.,2
The CMS decided to link the work in the southern Sudan with their ac­
tivities in Uganda, and instructed Dr Cook, one of its missionaries
in Uganda, to stay in Mongalla for six months^. It was probably as 
a result of the vehement views held by Cook that the new missionaries 
viewed the government officials with suspicions bordering on hostili­
ty^* Hadow, the secretary of the mission, failed to reaGh an under-
5standing with the governor of Mongalla * Before long he suggested 
leaving only two missionaries at Malek and transferring the rest to 
other countries J* Despite Gwynne* s protests the CMS decided to
1Interview between Wingate and Kennaway at CMS headquarters London, 14 
July 1905f CMSA/Sudan/Vol.l; An interesting insight into the workings 
of a missionary society is afforded by the monthly journals of Rev* 
Hadow, and Dr Lloyd who were among the first CMS missionaries at 
Malek,, SJU3/203/9/1-20.
2
Instructions the Committee to Missionaries proceeding to the Gor­
don Memorial Soudan Mission, 5 Oct. 1905* CMSA/Sudan/Vol.l•
^Baylis to Gwynne, 6 Jan. 1905* CMSA/E/03/1905; Baylis to Dr A.Cook,
27 Oct. 1905, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.l; see also Bote by Rev.L.Gwynne 1 n.df* 
1907'?I • The work of British Missions in the Sudan, SAD/103/6. Gwynne, 
who accompanied the missionaries for a few weeks, reported on their 
progress and problems.
^Baylis to Cook, 27 Oct. 1905? CMSA/Sudan/\To2).l; Baylis warned Cook 
from making public his views on the undesirability of cooperating 
with the government.
Hadow -to Baylis, 15 Jan. 1907, 30 May 1907, CMSA/s/0l/l907.
Hadow to Parent Committee, 1 Deo. 1906,CMSA/s/l0/l906. Hadow argued
that the CMS sphere was too small for six missionaries, and that they 
were too *...high class for the work...*, Gwynne dismissed these ar­
guments as untrue. Gwynne to Baylis, 19 June 1907? CMSA/s/d/1907•
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aooept Hadow*s proposals and withdrew most of its missionaries^. In
1908, the CMS was compelled to abandon'-its station for a short period,
and asked Gwynne to arrange for the government to supervise the mis™
2
sion*s property • By this time Gwynne was thoroughly disillusioned
with the CMS. He wrote to Wingate:1...1 shall tell them when I get
home that I either have a voice in the management of the mission or
3
1 wash my hands of the whole business...* Constant appeals by Win­
gate, Gwynne, and the two CMS missionaries in Mongalla failed to in­
duce the CMS headquarters to extend their missionary activities^.
It was only in 1913, that the CMS decided to opem a new station at
5Xambio aided by two Australian missionaries *
In those circumstances it was hardly surprising that the Sudan 
government refused to extend the sphere granted to the CMS and
^Gwynne to Baylis, Baylis to Hadow, 31 May 1907, CMS A/Sudan/Vo I'll*
2
Baylis to Gwynne, 10 Apr. 1908, Ibid.
^Gwynne to Wingate, 20 Apr. I9O8, SAD/282/4.
^Wingate to Baylis (private), 4 Mar. 1911? 29 Mar. 1911, CMSA/S/01/19II* 
The Times. 16 Sep. 1909, Gwynne appealed for volunteers to come to 
the CMS station; see also Gwynne to Parent Committee, 11 Feb. 1910;
Shaw to Parent Committee, 1 Mar. 1910, 30 Mar. 1910, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.l; 
see also Minute VII, 6 May 1910, by Parent Committee, Ibid, where it 
admitted that there was little hope of finding men or means to extend 
their activities.
^The Times« 25 Jan. 1913*
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preferred the work of the Austrian mission^. This view was clearly
expressed by Wingate in 1912, when he tried to convince the CMS to
forego their rights in the Azande district:
...I £ave no hesitation in saying that I should infinitely prefer 
to see the Roman Catholic Mission allowed to exte&d their sta­
tions into the Riketa and Tambio districts. .'.The CMS...have nei­
ther the means nor the organization to be anything like as use­
ful to the Government as the Roman Catholics are...^
Owen, governor of Mongalla and one of the few protagonists of the
CMS, tried to assist the CMS in acquiring new spheres in the Lado
Enclave. He was rebuked by Wingate in no uncertain terms:
...you must, however, remember that you only see one side, and 
that a rather prejudiced one...there is no question that the 
Austrian Mission have acquired rights which I regognised as 
long as six years ago...3
Wingate’s reliance on the Austrian Mission was clearly demonstra­
ted during the World War* Most of the Catholic missionaries were 
technically enemy aliens, and as such should have been interned or 
deported^*. Wingate, however, declined to treat them as other aliens,
1It is, however, surprising that Gwynne who shared many of the criti­
cisms of the CMS, failed to see this point. In 1913 he wrote to Man­
ley, secretary of the CMS ’...Why he lWingatel favours the Roman 
Catholics I cannot tell, for the majority of the R.C. missionaries^*, 
are lay brothers, the lowest class of R.C. workers - when he lWingatel 
asked me what was the difference between ours and theirs, I answered 
'’breed” at which he exploded. ••1 ,Gwynne to Manley, 1 Sep. 1913, 
GMSA/s/01/1913.
^Wingate to Feilden, (private), 27 May 1912, SAD/l8l/3/2;A year later 
Wingate asked Feilden to compile a list of all his complaints against 
the CMS; Wingate to Feilden, 28 June 1913, SAD/186/3.
3Wingate to Owen (private), 4 Apr. 1912, SAD/l8l/l/3.
According to a government order (signed Willis), ? Mar. 1915, all
alien enemy subjects were ordered to leave the Sudan within fourteen 
days, SAD/194/3/2.
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as Cromer, had suggested, ancjfihstead decided, to place them under gov-
1ernment observation by concentrating them in certain stations • In 
a report prepared by Willis after the War, there was nothing bpt pra­
ise for the Austrian mission# As for the CMS, lie proposed that
f...the best thing to do with this Mission is to, get it to go away*..
2
The GMS is too slow and bullies too much.**1
h» Missionary education in the south*
Until 1926 education in the southern provinces was based exclu-
3
sively on missionary initiative ;* The government refrained from 
opening schools, even in cases where there was a genuine demand for 
education, on the grounds of lack of finance and fear of Islam^*
Every encouragement add inducement was offered to the missionary so­
cieties to open elementary and technical schools. Consequently, the 
Austrian mission opened four schools in the Bahr al-Ghazal and two
£7
in the Upper Wile province * The CMS opened its first school in
n
Wingate to Savile, 5 Mar. 1915* SAD/194/3/l; Wingate to Bishop Geyer,
17 Mar. 1915, SAD/194/2; Cromer to Wingate, 2 Sep. 1916, SAD/103/3; 
Report by the Aliens Committee as to the Austrian Mission, in the Su­
dan, 1916,(signed) Bonham Carter, Stack, Willis, SAd/i03/3; see also 
The Conduct of our Missionaries during the present crisis (signed)
Bishop Geyer, 21 Sep. 1914* SAD/23§/3* Geyer a German himself, urged 
all his fellow missionaries to help the government to observe order , 
in the Sudan, and to refrain from any reference to the war in their 
correspondence, or in their dealings with local inhabitants.
2Report on Missionaries in the Upper Nile,(signed) Willis In.d.l, 
SAD/212/9.
2
L.Sanderson,'Educational development in the Southern Sudan, 1900-1948', 
SNR - Vol.43 (1962), pp.105-17.
4GGR - 1904, p.141; GGR - I9O5, p.158; see also pp.240-1.
5GGR - 1908, p.4“5! L.Sanderson,1 Educational development in the Southern 
Sudan:1900-1948’, SNR- 43,(1962), p.109.
-  255
/* ' lMalek in I9O0 and a second one at Bor in 1915 • The American Pres-
' * 2byterians opened a school at Doleib Hill in the Sobat valley in 1902 !. 
However, only the Austrian missionary schools were treated as govern­
ment establishments and their teachers were paid by the education 
department3* Hill, then governor of Bahr al-Ghasal, defined the 
government's aims as follows:
...The Government does not want to make more Moslems, it wishes 
to technically instruct the natives, thrpugh the,medium of their 
own language teaching them a certain amount of English*.♦reli­
gious education can be given to those whose parents desire it 
in the Missionary schools...4
Thus, the government's priorities were clearly defined* The prin­
cipal aim was to stop the process of Islamization while the prosely­
tising efforts of the missionaries were treated as being only of se­
condary importance* The government was not altogether successful in 
pursuing this policy. The missionaries complained, justifiably, about 
the government's inconsistency and insisted that it was impossible to
induce the southerners to learn English, as long as Arabic remained
5the official government language :* Wingate admitted the soundness
^Ibid, p.107; Owen to Wingate, 22 Aug* 1915» SAD/196/4; Manley to 
Shaw, 26 Jan. 1916, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.l*
2L.Sanderson, 'Educational development,SHR - 43, p.107; Neither 
the CMS school at Malek nor that of the American Presbyterians were 
regarded by the government as proper schools; GGR - 1912, pp*289-90» 
see also p.237•
3Wingate to Hill, 21 Eeb. I907, SAI)/l03/7/2*
^Hill to Wingate, 30 Mar. 1907» Ibid.
^Gwynne to Wingate, 26 Dec. 1910, SAD/103/7/2; Gwynne wrote that at 
a consultation between Bishop Geyer, Shaw of the CMS, and himself they 
agreed that Islam could only be stopped from spreading if English 
became the official language in the south*
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of these arguments and suggested making English the official language
in the Bahr al-Ghazal:
•••if the new system is started very quietly and tentatively - 
without any fuss and without putting the dots on the i's too 
prominently - the desideratum may become a fait accompli 
almost before anyone has realised that a change has taken 
place* It is very much easier to deal dith an accomplished 
fact should opposition be eventually raised...-1-
At the same time Wingate proposed introducing Sunday as a weekly
holiday in the remote districts of the Bahr al-Ghazal and Mongalla 
Zprovinces *• He wrote to Peilden that although he realised that the
introduction of English and of the Christian Sunday might cause
Muslim resentment ,
. .:.we must remember that the bulk of the inhabitants of both 
yours and Owen1s Provinces are not Moslems at all, that the 
whole of Uganda has accepted Christianity almost without a 
murmur, and that furthermore English is a very much easier 
language to learn than Arabic...3
By April 19Hj Sunday had been introduced as a day of rest in the
Lado Enclave^* In the following years English became the official
Wingate to Peilden (private), 27 Dec. 1910, SAD/103/7/2; see also 
Hill, Missions, pp.130-1. Hill states that in the matter of English 
Wingate supported the missionary attitude. In fact Wingate opposed 
the teaching of Arabic as early as 1904* stating quite clearly -that 
Arabic would he|>p the spreading of Islam; see pp*240-1.
^Wingate to Peilden (private), 27 Dec. 1910, SAD/103/7/2.
3Ibid.
Sunday had in fact been the official day of rest during the Bel-
gian rule of the Lado Enclave; see Collins, Sudan Link, p*379*
See also Wingate to Peilden (private), 15 Apr. 1911* SAB/300/4/2*
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1means of communication in the south The enforcement of Sunday as
the official day of rest was not pursued as vigorously as the mis-
2
sionaries would have li^ed ••
Thus the foundations of the Southern Policy were M i d  during
3
the Wingate era • In the early years of the Condominium this policy 
could hastily have been implemented* The threat of the Belgians in 
the Lado Enclave and the punitive expeditions against turbulent tri­
bes required the presence of Egyptian and northern Sudanese Batta^- 
lions in the south'^. Hence, Arabic and Islam were enabled to pene­
trate the southern provinces* The turning point arrived in 1910*
The transfer of the Lado Enclave and the organisation of-the Equa­
torial battalions allowed the British authorities to pursuw an ac­
tive anti-Islamic policy. Aided by exclusive missionary; education, 
the government took its first decisive step by introducing English 
as the semi-official language of the south. This laid the foundation
"^Wingate to Feilden, Ibid; see also Shaw to Baylis, 10 May 1912, 
CMSA/s/oi/1912; Owen to Wingate, 28 Aug. 1915, SAD/I96/4, Owen repor­
ted that English had been introduced in Mongalla1. When education 
was started in the Nuba mountains in 1923, English was introduced 
from the outset, L.M. Sander son, Educational development*. • .in the 
Nuba Mountains Region of the Sudan1 , Journal of African HistorytYol.A. 
No.2 (1963), pp!.233-48; see also C.H.Stigand, Equatoria, the Lado 
Enclave,(London 1923), p.204*
^Report on Missionaries in the Upper Nile, (signed) Willis, |n.d.l926?|,
sAD/212/9.
3
For details about the development of Southern Policy after the World 
War, see M.Abdel Rahim, fThe development of British Policy in the Sou­
thern Sudan l899~1947f , Middle Eastern Studies« Vol.2,No3 (19^6),pp?* 
227-47; Collins, Sudan Link, pp.381-404*
4 Ibid.t pp.370- 380.
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of a separate political and administrative entity in the southern 
Sudani.
The governments aim was political rather than religious. It was 
primarily concerned with the containment of Islam, and not with aid­
ing Christianity. The introduction of English was regarded as essen­
tial, while the imposing of Sunday as a day of rest was of lesser
importance. Despite the complaints of missionaries who were const-
2antly agitating in favour of stricter anti-Islamic measures , the
3
advance of Islam into the south was largely contained . An additio­
nal argument justifying the Southern Policy was forwarded by Stigand, 
the first British inspector of the Lado Enclave, who argued that a 
complete separation of the south was essential for the economic 
development of that area:
...Little can be done for the Negro provinces whilst they are 
starved so as to turn over all available funds to the Arab 
provinces, and whilst they are subject to laws or regulations 
made for the benefit of the latter...So the Negro provinces
1Suggestions to link the southern Sudan to Uganda were made duf&ng 
the first World War, although not as official statements. See for 
instance Willis to 0., 15 Oct. 1914* SAD/209/7; Gwynne to Parent 
Committee, 8 Sep. 1914, CMSA/s/oi/1914; see also The Sudan .a Record 
of Progress. $898-1947« P*12, where these allegations were denied.
^Gwynne to Manley, 17 Mar. 1914, CMSA/s/oi/l913; Manley to Maclnnes, 
15 Dec. 1915» CMSA/Sudan/Vol.l; Memorandum on the future policy of 
Sudan Missions, by Rev.G.T.M. I ManleyI, Jan. 1916, Ibid*
Trimingham, Isl&m, pp.242-51jTrimingham stated that whilst Islam 
had hardly penetrated south of latitude 10 it had made considerable 
advance in the Nuba Mountains.
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should be put in a class by themselves, under a vice-governor 
..•and allowed to work out their own salvation...1
During Wingate's governor-generalship ther^was very little criti­
cism of the policy he adopted in the southern provinces* Even had 
such criticism existed, the lack of a free press in the Sudan did n 
not enable the inhabitants to express their views. The Egyptian 
nationalist press was pre-occupied with Egyptian problems* When 
it ventured into Sudanese politics it was more concerned with criti­
cizing British supremacy, with denouncing the treatment of Muslims
in the north, and the activities of the missionaries in the Muslim 
2provinces • However, the government's Southern Policy was challen­
ged in 1907 by a British Liberal M.B. He demanded that the pro­
motion of missionary activities in the south be stopped and that
3
the separatist policy be abandoned •
1
C.H.Stigand, Equatoria, the Lado Enclave, pp*201-2.
2See pp’. 54-6.
3
The Times, 26 Apr. 1907 * Parliamentary Question by Mr. J!.M.Robertson 
M.P.
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Chapter VI.
The administration of .justice.
Justice was one of the first requirements of the reconquered
Sudan. The Condominium Agreement was not in itself a constitutioh.
It gave formal recognition to the prevailing situation following the
reconquest. At the same time its preamble stated the necessity of
providing laws for the country, and set down the procedure by which
1they, were to be enacted '• It excluded the enforcement of Egyptian
• 2 
laws or decrees in the Sudan and barred the Jurisdiction of the
. . 3
Egyptian mixed tribunals from the country '• The Agreement stated 
that Europeans would not enjoy any special privileges, thereby 
excluding the extension of the 0apitulations the Sudab* It further 
, laid down the procedure for the enactment of laws* Complete powers 
were granted to the governor-general to promulgate laws and regulat­
ions, and change them whenever necessary. Finally, it imposed martial
1
, 1 Agreement between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Govern­
ment of His Highness the Khedive Of Egypt, relative to the future 
administration of the Soudan1, J.C.Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near 
Middle -East. (U.S.A. 19?6), pp.21'6-8; see also pp.15-7.
2 ■ ■ ■ ■ ' .
The Egyptian Judgement Ordinance 1901, gave power to judgements given 
in the Egyptian; native tribunals people residing in the Sudan. SG - 
23, 1 May.1901} a further arrangement made in 1902 enabled the mutual 
extradition of fugitives between the two countries, SG - 36, 1 June
1902.
3 .
In 1900 the Egyptian mixed tribunals passed judgement in a case 
involving the Sudan. However, the court's claim to jurisdiction 
was based bn the fact.that the case occurred prior to the signing 
of*the Condominium Agreement, thereby recognizing its validity.
See Cromer to Salisbury, 2.May 19OQ, EO 78/5.087•
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law over the Sudan, thereby extending even further the powers of
1
the governor-general .
The first law to be enacted by the Anglo-Egyptian authorities
2
dealt with land ownership in the Sudan • Following that, the Sudan
Penal Code and the Code of Criminal procedure were drafted by Brunyate,
3the legal adviser of the Egyptian government f* No Civil Code was
enacted, instead the Civil Justice Ordinance was promulgated in 1900,
having been drafted by Bonham Carter, the newly appointed legal
secretary^. The Sudan was thus provided with legal codes, largely
based on those of India, but following the Egyptian procedure with
regard to the hearing of cases* The Sudan Penal Code followed the
Indian Penal Code of 1837j a&cl the Civil Justice Ordinance was based
on the Indian Civil Procedure Code as adapted in Burma* Questions
concerning the personal status of Muslims were to be decided according 
1 5to the Shari a • Customary law was to be applied whenever possible,
^In an article in al-AhrcEm, 1 July 1914» its correspondent claimed 
that as a result of the Capitulations not being extended to the 
Sudan, foreigners were unprotected* It further claimed that compared 
with the unlimited powers vested in the Sudan1s legal secretary, 
Capitulations were a blessing*
2SS - 1, 7 Mar. 1899; for details see pp. 333-34, 349-51.
3
Commenting on Brunyate1s work, Wingate wrote:1..*his drafting of our 
original codes was a work of which every Gov* Gen* must alwai^ gg be 
grateful to him**,1, Wingate to Cromer, 6 Apr* 1905» &AD/276/4*
4S M  - 1900, P.73.
R
Handbook, pp*288-9* This was confirmed by the Mohammedan Law Courts 
Ordinance 1902* For details see pp. 273“74*
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’♦••courts were instructed to decide cases, in ddfault of local
legislation, in accordance with ’‘justice, equity, and good conscience” ••1
Gases of conflict of jurisdiction, between the civil and Mohammedan
2
Gourts were to he decided by a special council *
The cod&s and ordinances were at first only extended to the 
provinces of Khartoum, Dongola, Berber, Sennar, Kassala, and Wadi
„3
Haifa • In the Bahr al-Ghazal and the Upper Wile provinces, justice 
was administered according to tribal law, and martial law was resorted 
to whenever necessary^. In Kordofan, the vast areas and scarcity of 
government officials, made the enactment of the new laws impossible '• 
Only in 1906 were the Sudan Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
and the Civil Justice Ordinance, declared to ’...be in force in all 
Provinces except the Bahr El Ghazal Province...* The governors of the 
Upper Wile and Mongalla were authorized to decide in what cases to 
take proceedings according to the above codes^.
1J.W.D.Anderson, The modernisation of Islamic law in the Sudan, The 
Sudan Law Journal and Reports (i960), p.294*
^The Sub Mamurs Handbook (Khartoum 1926), p.107; In 1910 Wingate 
stated his views about the Sudan legal system as f o l l o w s : . I n  the 
Sudan we have endeavoured to graft the experience gained in India on 
the system we found existing in the Sudan and so far I have every 
reason to believe we have evolved something which is acceptable to 
the natives..’ Wingate to Mitchell Innes, 7 Aug. 1910, SAD/297/3•
3SG - 5, 2 Oct. 1899.
4ggr - 1904, P.53.
Ibid., p.104.
SG - 86, 1 Jan. 1906; a year later the Codes were enforced in the 
Bab.r al-Ghazal; SG - 107, 7 Feb. 1907.
Thus three legal systems developed side "by side* The first was 
based on the legal codes and administered by government officials*
Shari*a law was administered by Mohammedan law courts, and super­
vised by the grand cradi and by the British legal secretary. The 
customary or tribal law was administered by tribal chiefs under the 
supervision of government officials. An additional way of obtaining 
justice was by petitions* The people of the Sudan were encouraged 
to petition their nearest government official, but could also appeal 
to the inspector-general, the legal secretary or the governor-general* 
Officials and judges were instructed *...to see personally every
petitioner however unreasonable or obviously misdirected his petition
1may be, and to hear what he had to say.*,*
The central judicial staff consisted of the legal secretary,
2three judges, and the advocate general, all of whom were British •
In 1904 civil courts were established at Khartoum and Suakih* Other 
centres such as Berber, Dongola, and Ha$fa were visited by the civil 
judges three times a year (* In 1908 the Sudan courts of justice 
were inaugurated in Khartoum and it was decided to institute a £righ
1GGR - 1905, p.79; CAO - 104, 30 Nov. 1903; see also pp. 34-5.
2GGR - 1904, p.52; 'The Civil Judges Ordinance>1901' enabled judges .
to try cases both under the code of Criminal,procedure and the Civil 
Justice Ordinance. It gave judges ’...all the judicial powers of a 
Mudir in all civil and criminal matters, which may be referred to him 
• * .by- the Mudir...1, see SCJ - 26, 1 Aug* 1901.
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court and a court of appeal^*.
Justice was, however, mainly administered by hon-qualified 
officials acting as magistrates. Every province, including Khartoum, 
had a governorfs court consisting of three magistrates. It was pre­
sided over by the governor or his nominee, acting as a magistrate of 
the first class. These courts were authorised to pass any sentence 
within the law. The minor district courts were also constituted of 
three magistrates and qualified to pass sentences not exceeding seven 
years imprisonment,or a fine not exceeding £E 50* Magistrates1 courts 
of the second and third class could only hear cases summarily and pass 
sentences not exceeding two month's imprisonment, or a fine not exceed­
ing £E
In 1908, a special court was established in Khartoum, to hear all 
cases connected with land ownership. At the same time five British 
officials were appointed as land settlement officials in the provinces
The opening ceremony of the courts was performed by the Duke of 
Connaught!'* In his opening speech Wingate quoted the following from 
the B i b l e : . W h a t  does the Lord require of thee but to love mercy 
and to do justice and walk humbly with thy God...1 In the Arabic 
translation of Wingate’s speech this quotation was not included; SG - 
132, May 1908.
2GGR - 1903, p.29; All governors and some inspectors were magistrates 
of the first class. Inspectors and other British officials, as well 
as a few non-British employees, were magistrates of the second class. 
Egyptian ma’murs and other non-British officials were magistrates of 
the third class. Up to 1905 only officers could be appointed as 
magistrates. In 19@5 ’The Magisterial and Police Powers Ordinance1 
enabled the governor-general to appoint also civilians and inspectors 
of the slavery repression department who were previously excluded*
SG - 73, 1 Mar. 1905* The governor-general could confer magisterial 
powers of a higher class than that stipulated by virtue of office.
SG - 91, 1 Mar. 1906.
1
of Berber, Blue Wile, White Wile, Haifa, and Dongola • It became
clear that provincial judges over-extended the budget, so that
special, non-qualified, judicial inspectors were appointed, whose
duty it was to hear all the cases in the provinces, by travelling
2
to the various district headquarters •
By and large, the agreed practice was to try criminal cases,
wherever they occurred, by provincial staff, leaving the generally
3
more complicated civil suits to legally-trained officials f. The
logic behind this practice was that punishment for a criminal offence
varied according to ideas, habits, and the degree of civilization,
’•..The same crime committed by a Sudanese black, a Jaalin Arab, or
a Kababish nomad would probably not be fairly met by the same 
4punishment...’ Inspectors of the nomad Arabs were told that 
’...camel stealing and raiding even if murder results, are, as once 
were cattle lifting on the Scottish border, but manly exercises'.*
The fact that punishment was in the hands of the local administrator, 
also tended to boost the latter’s authority in his district. Governors 
were allowed a wide lattitude in interpreting the Sudan Penal Code as
1qSR - 1907, p.86; GGR - 1908, p.193; For details see pp.337-43.
GGR. - 1908, p.193. The first three to he appointed were Willis in 
Kordofan, Bond in the Blue Wile, and Osborne in Berber. All three 
were civilians who had come to the Sudan in 1905 as junior inspectors.
SPS, pp.17, 19.
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a tribal society could ill afford to lose the benefits of blobd money
Las a result of imprisonment or execution f. Another principle was that
’♦•.claims, other than those connected with land, arising out of events
2
taking place during the Mahdia should be refused... ’ As years passed,
3
new legislation was introduced ’...creating new offences.••’ Some
ordinances applied to non-Muslims only^ ", while others were limited to
5one or two provinces . New ordinances were published in the Sudan 
Gazette, and explained in the annual reports of the legal department i•
•j
GGR - 1906, p.700. Officially the Sudan Penal Code was introduced in 
Kordofan in 1901, however '...as elsewhere in the Southern Sudan the. 
application of rigid code is a matter requiring considerable tact and 
discretion...’, Handbook Kordofan, p.108.According to the Penal Code, 
capital punishment or life imprisonment had to be imposed for murder. 
However, '...what usually happened...was a petition to the Governor 
General to remit the death penalty...The Governor General would then 
refer the matter to the provincial Governor to try and make a settle­
ment between the two sides...’ Following the payment of blood money, 
the death sentence would be substituted for a *...moderate term of 
imprisonment, so that the people might recognize that the Government 
has its right too...’ See Wasey Sterry,’Some notes on the administra­
tion of justice in Africa’ , Reale Accademia I)* Italia —Fill Convegno 
"Volta". (Roma 4-11 Ottobre 1938), p.41.
2
CAP - 133, Feb. 1904; as to lands, five years continuous possession 
was regarded as proof of ownership5. See also pp.333-34*
3ggr - 1908, p.148.
See for instance SG - 113, X June 1907, where provision was made for 
the administration of estates of deceased persons, excluding Muslims; 
in 1906,'The Sudan Non-Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance’was promulgated, 
SG - 105, 8 Feb. 1907.
^See Memoirs of Ryder 1905-16 (typescript), SAD/400/8, where he wrote 
about an ordinance dealing with the fight against mosquitoes which 
was enacted only for Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North.
See for instance GGR - 1903, p.80, where Bonham Carter stated the 
reasons for the 'Land Acquisition Ordinance* and the ’Taxation of 
Animals Ordinance’, 1903.
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By virtue of the Condominium Agreement, Wingate exercised complete 
authority over new legislation. Despite his control, which might have 
caused friction, his relations with the senior staff of the legal 
department were on the whole good. Yet, he expected them to cooperate 
fully with other branches of government administration and had little 
patience with legal technicalities. Hence, when Sterry, the chief 
judge, ddcided a case contrary to what Wingate regarded as in the best 
interests of the country he complained that it was '...quite useless*, 
tb argue with these legal people on matters of expediency, policy,etc, 
etc. - they no more understand it than the man on the moon...* What 
the Sudan required were law officials ’...who were capable of looking 
at a situation from the point of view in which those actually respon­
sible for the administration have to consider them...1 Heedless to 
say, Wingate’s view prevailed, and cases were decided according to the
principle that legal considerations had to be waived whenever adminis-
2trative policy so required u
An additional defect was that there was no separation between the
3
judiciary and the executive • 'Phis was remedied in 1908 by the
^Wingate to Stack (private), 10 May 1912, SJU)/l8l/2/2.
Wingate to Stack (private), 19 May 1912, Ibid; the dispute was between
Wingate and Sterry about a sentence the latter passed on an Egyptian
officer. Many years later Sterry wrote that '...Judicial Staff nhcv.r.d 
should not be selected entirely from the ranks of professional lawyers, 
but partly also from the Administrative staff, who are likely...to be 
much better acquainted with native ideas, customs, and language than 
the professional lawyer...1, Wasejpy Sterry, 'Some notes on the admi­
nistration of justice in Africa1, Reale Accademia D1Italia - VIII 
Convegno "Volta", (Roma 4 - H  Ottobre 1938) »~P*4•
3GGR - 1905, p.174; GGR - 1906, p.349.
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1
establishment of a high court and a court of appeal * However, Sterry 
claimed that it was unlikely that a Sudan law court would pass judge­
ment against government officials and that 1 •••justice is best
2
obtained as a resultant of the executive and the judiciary**.1
a* The administration of justice in the provinces*
The administration of justice in the provinces, was by and large,
entrusted to the provincial officials* Hussey, commenting on the
legal functions of the inspectors many years later, wrote:
•*.in a primitive society no distingtion is generally made 
between administrative and judicial functions* They are 
both part of the single functional the chief or ruler.•• 
in some respects the District Commissioner^ in a primitive 
society is in the same position*.*4
This, and the scarcity of legally trained officials, forced many an
inexperienced junior inspector to settle cases ranging from trespass-
5ing and cattle thieving to adultery and murder * Writing on the 
situation in Suakin, a British inspector complained that 1•••the
1SAR - 1908, p.60.
2Sterry to Wiiigate, 24 Jan. 1910, SAD/290/l.
3
District Commissioners was the term used for inspectors after the 
W ingat e era *
^E*R.J.Hussey, Tropical Africa 1908-1944* (London 1959)» PP*45“6; 
Hussey was an Oxford graduate who served in the Sudan from 1908-25 
mostly in the education department*
^In 1903, the director of the department of agriculture suggested that 
a permanent scale of fees be fixed for trespassing, which could be 
collected by the shaykh or *umda without reference to a magistrate. 
The system then prevailing, meant that in order to prosecute trepass- 
ers, cultivators had to go to the nearest dabtiya, sometimes over 
twenty miles * GGR - 1903, p*175«
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only legal machinery here is a clerk unable to speak a word of 
1English,*.* Hence, the inspectors* duties comprised,1...those of
Judge, Magistrate, Mayor, Registrar (he can marry and divorce you)
2
and almost every kind of civil work,..* The legal training given
to these young inspectors was nominal. Following their appointment,
they spent the first few months in Khartoum, where they were trained
in the various government departments and were made familiar with the
3Sudan’s legal system » Only in 1908, when the first judicial ins­
pectors were appointed, was a more comprehensive legal training 
recjuired. One of the first legal inspectors in Berber province 
described his duties as follows:
...My job was to sit in the Civil Court in El Darner and hear 
the civil cases and also to keep the register of lands up to 
date which had taken us four years to compile, I also visited 
AtbarayBerber and Shendi once every month to hear civil cases 
...Also when the Governor so directed I sat as one of the
members of a Mudir*s court (three magistrates) to try some
serious crime...4
In Kordofan the judicial inspector’s job was not so straightforward. 
He spent most of his time roaming around\bhe districts, allotted'-to
him. His duties varied from one district to another, and depended
largely upon the competence of the shaykhs, nazirs» or other tribal
Norton to Nason, 26 Sep. 1903, SAD/273/9.
^Balfour to Lady P.Balfour, 25 Nov. 1906, SAD/303/6.
^SAR — 1904» p.128; see also Davies, pp.22-41*
■^’Memoirs of Ryder, 1905-1916* , SAD/400/8, p.66; Ryder started his 
career in the Sudan in 1905 as a surveyor. In 1906 he was appointed 
land settlement officer in Berber, and from 1908-12 he became 
judicial inspector of Berber province.
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chiefs. He was called upon to settle divorce cases concerning Dinlcas
which ought to have been decided by the tribal chiefs, according to 
1customary law . In the absence of qadls and Shari ga courts he also
2
had to settle cases concerning the personal status of Muslims '•
Generally, the tasks of the judicial inspectors in Kordofan seem
to have been very much those of ordinary inspectors. They assessed
the tribute, appointed shaykhs, and were generally in charge of 
2administration '• Their short legal training enabled them to critic­
ise the judicial proceedings of their untrained colleagues. Yet, as 
long as a greater number of qualified staff couldjnot be afforded, 
nothing could be done to overcome these deficiencies^.
A typical mishap occurred in Talodi, in the Wuba Mountains in 
1906. Two tribal chiefs, who had led an attack against the local 
government post were court-martialled and hanged without reference
1Willis,s diary, 12-16 Mar. 1909, SAD/210/2.
^E.R.J.Husssy, Tropical Africa 1908-194-4-. p.46; Hussey wrote of a case
of adultery brought before a young British inspector 1...Such cases 
are more usually triable in the court of the Sudanese "Kadis”...1; 
see also Davies, pp.117-8. Sir Harold MacMichael, interview 6 June 
1967, said that the general practice of inspectors was to refer all 
those cases to the nearest qadx.
3See Willis's diary, 10-12 Nov. 1911, SAD/210/2.
Ibid, 10 Sep. 1911* '••.Nahud...1 am finding all sorts of horrors
on the legal side-cases tried summarily which ought not to be, 
floggings given without justification & c...*; see also Davies, pp*52-4« 
I)avies who was stationed in Kordofan in the years 1912-20, commented 
on the same judicial problems, experienced by his predecessor, Willis.
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to Khartoum or Cairo. The sole reason for this hasty justice was
1
that there were *.•.no effective means of safeguarding the prisoners..*
The court consisted of one British and two Egyptian officers who,
having heard twelve witnesses for the prosecution and two for the
2defence, sentenced the accused to he hanged . Bonham Carter critic­
ized severely this action, and demanded that Hutchinson, the command-
3
ing officer at Talodi, he reprimanded • He stated *...that it is 
dangerous if officers think that the summoning and confirming of
court martial can he justified merely on the ground of local
4 5
convenience...* Slatin reacted in much the same manner and Cromer
concluded *...that apart from hadty procedure, and the wholly undefend­
able reasons given for hanging the Sheikhs, it is even questionable 
whether they deserved hanging at all...* With the extension of the
^"Findlay (acting consul-general) to Grey, 29 Aug. 1906, FO 407/167* 
Findlay quoted from a letter he received from Wingate.
Proceedings of Court Martial held at Talodi*, 28-9 July 1906; en­
closed in Cromer to Grey, 25 Oct. 1906, Ibid.
^Bonham Carter to Wingate, 27 Aug. 1906, SAI)/279/2.
^Bonham Carter to Wingate, 5 Oct. 1906, SAD/279/4*
^Wingate to Cromer, 7 Sep. 1906, SAD/279/3| quoting from Slatin*s 
letters. Matthews, then governor of the Upper Wile province, wrote 
that according to the Arabs at Kodok, the Talodi incident was pro­
voked by government officials whose treatment of *...native women is 
no better than in Dervish or, O.Gf* | old government I times...*,
Matthews to Wingate, 6 June 1906, SAD/278/6.
Cromer to Wingate, 9 Sep. 1906, SAD/279/3j this however, did not stop 
both Wingate and Cromer from justifying the proceedings in their 
correspondence with the foreign office; Cromer to Grey, 25 Oct. 1906,
FO 407/167.
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railways and telegraph to Kordofan, hastyexscutions were avoided in 
later years* Yet the judges were as amateurish as before, and when 
in 19151 another rebel was tried in the Nuba Mountains a local
1inspector was appointed to act as president of the mudir* s court •
2
b* The administration of Islamic law •
In 1882, Colftnel Stewart reported:
•..There is in each province a Mehkeme or Sheriyat Court with a 
Cadi on a monthly salary varying from 100 to 1250 piastres. This 
official cannot inquire into criminal cases, but in civil suits, 
should both parties agree, he can be appealed to. His chief 
business is, however, connected with inheritances, marriages, 
divorce, & c...3
The part played by the Shari*a courts was subordinate to that of the 
provincial courts and the central court at Khartoum^*. During the 
Mahdia, the secular courts ceased to exist. The Mahdi, and afterwards 
the IChalifa, asserted a personal paramountcy in all matters of law. 
Justice was based on the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the edicts and decis­
ions of the Mahdi. Next to the Mahdi was the qadi al-Islam who
provided the channel of communication between the Mahdi and the pro- 
5vincial.^gadls, * Most of theBe qadis were laymen, as the qadis who
-1
Wingate to Wilson, 30 Sep. 1915» SAD/196/6; the inspector was Balfour 
who had just been transferred to the Nuba Mountains. The rebel was 
Fiki *Ali, who managed to escape en route to prisonf see ps.
2
For the governments policy towards Islam see pp.188-213,239-245*
Report on the Soudan» by Lieutenant-Golonel Stewart, 1883, C.367O.
^Ibid, the provincial court was called ma.jlis mahalli and the central 
court - ma.jlis al-ahkam.
^Under the Khalifa, the office of qadi al-Islam lost its importance, 
and after 1894 seems to have been cancelled; Holt, Mahdist State, 
pp.115-6, 243.
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1
were trained in Egypt were not trusted by the Mahdi * Throughout the
Mahdia the judiciary was dependent upon the administration. In the
provinces the governors were dominant, and no qadi could be appointed
without their approval. While in the centre ’...the will of the
Khalifa was predominant over all other considerations and the judic-
2iary was a subservient tool...1
This had been the Situation when,after the reconquest,the Anglo- 
Egyptian authorities decided to re-establish the Muslim judiciary, 
much on the lines that existed prior to the Mahdia.
The Sudan Mohammedan Larw Courts Ordinance was promulgated in 1902^*
It provided for the establishment of a high court consisting of the
4 5grand qadi, the mufti. and one or more other members . The mudiriya,
muhafaaa, and district courts were to consist of one qadi each. The
’Mohammedan Law Courts’ were competent to deal with any question
regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, guardianship, awqaf, and
all problems concerning the personal status of Muslims. They were
also competent to decide upon any question other than those mentioned,
1Ibid, pp'.115~6; Luring the Khalifa’s rule, the provincial and 
district qadis were called nuwwab.
****** ' in—  . ......nm— m i
2Holt, The Khalifa, p.237.
SG - 35t 1902; all the following details are from the above
ordinance.
^Qadi al-qud&t was called grand qadi by the British authorities.
r _
uPhe functions of the hfcgh court were exercised by the grand qadi
himself until 1904, when a properly constituted high court was est­
ablished. SG - 6l, 1 Apr. 1904*
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provided that all parties, whether Muslims or not, made a formal
demand to he bound by the ruling ibf the Islamic law. Conflicts of
jurisdiction between the civil and Shari*a courts were to be decided
by a council consisting of the legal secretary, the grand qadit and
1the judicial commissioner ;*
In 1915 the Sudan was to become one of the first Muslim countries, 
following the Hanafi school, which introduced a reform of the divorce 
law. ’The Mohammedan Law Courts organisation and procedure regulat­
ions1 enabled the grand qadi of the Sudan to order a departure from
2Hanafi jurisdiction whenever he thought necessary • As a result, the 
reform of family law in the Sudan, much on the lines advocated by 
Qdsim Amin and Muhammad rAbduh, anticipated that of Egypt^. The 
Sudan Judicial Circular, No-17, provided for judicial divorce for a 
wife whose husband failed to support her. It enabled a wife whose 
husband was presumed dead, to remarry, and granted judicial divorce 
to wives deserted for more than one year. It also granted divorce
1Until 1916 no judicial commissioner was appointed. Hence the third 
member of the council was appointed by the governor-general and was 
invariably of the senior British officials of the legal department.
^SG - 284, 31 Aug. 1915* Several of the annual reports of the legal 
secretary mentioned Muslim divorce. In 1907 a judicial circular was 
published enabling qadis to grant judicial divorce against absentees;
GGR - I907, p.86; in the report of the Mohammedan Law Courts for 1911, 
Bonham Carter explained that divorce by husbands did not need a qadi 
and had only to be registered. However, ’...wives, to‘obtain a divorce 
...must briing an action before the ICadi... * ,GGR - 1911, p.141* A 
precedent of granting divorce .to women whose husbands were outside 
the Sudan was set by the Mahdi, sed Mahshurat al-imam al-mahdi, Vol.Ill,
P-5*
3
J.N.D.Anderson, ’The Modernisation of Islamic Law in the Sudan’, The 
Sudan Law Journal and Reports (i960), pp.295-6.
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to wives whose matrimonial discord, was such that only divorce 
provided a solution. Thus the family law, which represents the very
heart of the Shari*at was Reformed at last, and followed the less
_ x
rigid jurisdiction of the Maliki school '.
fThe Mohammedan Law Courts Organization Regulations1 of 1905,
were of a purely administrative nature. They enabled the grand
cradi to hear and decide any case whether previously heard by a
Mohammedan court of not. It also fixed the fees of the Mohammedan
courts and ordered that all suits should be heard in the district
2
where the defendants resided • fThe Procedure Regulations for 
Mohammedan Courts1, published in 1906, stated that any judgement
passed by a Mohammedan court should be executed by the government
3
officials or police officers, whenever required • In 1912, the 
!Maazun Regulations1 were published. Ma^dhuns^ were to be accepted 
on recommendations by shaylchs, rumdas or notables and had to register 
1Ibid; see also J.N.D.Anderson, Islamic law in Africa, (London 1954), 
pp.312-3.
^SG - 7^» 1 May 19^5? sea also CAP - 43, 21 May 1903, which allowed 
qadis to send summonses to persons residing in another m^amuriya.
3
SG - 98, 1 July 1900; This was however not always adhered to.
In 1912 the grand qadi complained that ’.,.some of the Administrative
officials who are entrusted with the execution of the judgements of... 
Law Courts place impediments in the way of e x e c u t i o n s . , GGR - 1912, 
p . 3 6 5 .
~^Ma1 dhun - official authorized by the qadi to perform and register 
marriages and divorces.
- 276 -
all marriages and divorces within their district^.
A special inquiry about the waqfs of the Sudan was ordered in
1901* The few wacrfs that existed were **..not properly registered
in the Mehlcemehs Sharieh and., .the produce thereof is being misappro- 
2
priated...* The management of these awqaf was entrusted to the
3
Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts , as Wingate decided to stop any
interference in Sudanese awqaf by the 1 Egyptian Wakfs Administration*^?.
Apparently this was not.fully implemented. The awqaf of Kordofan
were managed by the provincial headquarters at El Obeid, who built
the central market on waqf property.and used its rent for building 
5a mosque . Even in Khartoum the awqaf were transferred to the 
supervision of the grand qadx only in 1911* The annual income of
1SG - 227, 28 Deo. 1912; In 1914 there were 313 ma’ahnns in the
Sudan and the number of marriages and divorces registered was 8,707 
and 6,641 respectively. Commenting on this high rate of divorces, 
Wingate wrote that it was a 1 ... striking and sad evidence of the 
want which existed among a considerable portion of the people...1,
GGR - 1914i P*44* The grand qadx regarded the remuneration of £E 1 
per annum, granted to the ma*dhuns as inadequate, and the low standard 
of marriage registration was the result, GGR - 19°7? p*86. When the 
situation did not improve, the grand qadx wrote that as long as 
payments continued to be as low *...we cannot expect to obtain men 
of sufficient education, nor can one be surprised if some of them 
supplement their earningsby dishonest methods...*, GGR - 1908, p.203. 
In 19121 the grand qadx complained that ma9dhuns -Were appointed 
without examinations and did not carry out their duties, GGR - 1912,
p.364.
2SG - 19, 1 Jan. 1901.
3Sg.,- 35, 1 May 1902.
^Wingate to Gorst, (private), 22 Dec. 1908, SM)/284/l5 *
See Meinhof-, pp. 48—9 *
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these awqaf was £E 250 and was used for the maintenance and construc­
tion of mosques^".
All the legislation and regulations connected with the
Mohammedan courts were issued "by the grand qad,i subject to their
2approval by the governor-general • The grand qadi also submitted 
annual reports, the summaries of which were included in the reports 
of the legal department^. Most of these reports dealt with the 
administration of Islamio law in the provinces and with problems of 
personnel. Commenting on the low standard of the qadis, Bonham Carter 
noted that f ...the salaries paid to them are wretched and would be 
disgraceful if regarded as a normal salaryfor a legal official...1 
He added, however, that 1••,their decisions,•.though probably wrong 
in form and possible in law are based on a knowledge of the people 
and are usually regarded by them as just...1^  In 1904» the grand 
qadx introduced a new scale of fees for the Shari*a courts, 1,..The 
scale of fees which was undoubtedly too high for a poor country like
1
GGR - 1911, p.141• In 1907i Bonham Carter proposed the establishment 
of a Sudanese Board of Awqaf, following his discovery that waqf land 
in Khartoum had been built upon by the government through lack of 
knowledge. Bonham Carter to Wingate, 13 July 1907 j SAD/281/I; 
see also p.192.
^SG - 35j 1 May 1902; see also Bonham Carter to Wingate, 21 Aug. 1912> 
SAD/182/2/2, where he asked him to approve the regulations for 
ma? dhuns.
ri
In the years 1899-1916, these summaries were always included in the 
report of the legal secretary. Only once, in 1912, was the full 
report of Shaykh Muhammad Mustafa al—Maraghi printed separately;
GGR - 1912, pp.355-366.
4ggr - 1903, p.7 9.
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1
the Sudan was considerably reduced...* In 1905* the grand qadi 
suggested ’•..that the registration of transactions relating to 
land he left entirely in the hands of Mohammedan Courts...1 The 
reason for his suggestion was that *.♦.the Mohammedan Law Courts have 
lost more than half of their original jurisdiction and are now confined 
to matters arising out of family relations...* Clearly, the grand qadi 
felf that this diminishing range of jurisdiction, undermined the
2
authority of Islamic law, which he regarded as superior to all others •
_ .  3
The grand qadi.s, the inspectors of the Shan a courts , and the 
majority of the provincial qadis were Egyptians. The only Sudanese 
holding a central position in the judicial hierarchy was Shaykh al~ 
Tayib Ahmad Hashim, Muf11 of the Sudan^. The first grand qadi of the 
Sudan was Muhammad Shakir, who resigned in 1904* having been appointed 
head of the ^ulama* of Alexandria. He was followed by Muhammad Harun,
]_
GGR - 1904* p.60. The decrease was offset by an increase in the 
number of courts /from 34 1904* to 40 ln 1908. See GGR - 1904*
p.77? GGR - 1906j p.378.
2
The grand qadi at that time was Muhammad Harun, who was later critic­
ized by Cromer for his conservative views; Bonham Carter, though clear­
ly opposed to granting any additional powers to the Mohammedan Courts, 
tried to achieve some form of cooperation with them, GGR — 1905* p«88.
3 - rShaykh Mustafa Husayn Fulayfil was inspector of the Sudan Shari a 
courts from 1907-14* when he reverted to the Egyptian ministry of 
justice , GGR — 1914* P*43*
^Al-Tayib Ahmad Hashim (c.1857-1924) was born at Berber of Ja^ali 
origin, studied in the idialwa of Shaykh Muhammad al-Khayr Khujali and 
was-a clerk in the Shari a court at Berber when the Mahdists took over. 
During the Mah&ia-he became secretary to the Khalifa’s brother and 
tutur to his son al-Sayyid Muhammad rAbdallahi. After the reconquest 
he became the first judge at the Shari*a court of Khartoum. Prom 1900- 
1924* he was Muft1 of the Sudan. Hill, BD, p.354*
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1late inspector of the Mohammedan law courts . He belonged to the
conservative trend in Islam, and stated that .Mohammedan law is
founded on equity...and does not require at any time any alteration
2
or amendment *..* Cromer, who held very definite views on Islamic
rdform and was a great admirer of Muhammad *Abduh, stated that though:
•..it is natural that a conservative Mohammedan should hold 
these opinions.*.but of course...they are sheer nonsense. 
Mohammedan law requires a great deal of alteration or amend­
ment".,.! am inclined to think that a Kadi who holds the views 5 
set forth in the report I have just been reading is not alto­
gether the man you want...3
Whether as a resultof Cromer*s pressure or not, Muhammad Harun re­
signed in 1908, and was replaced by Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi who 
held the post of grand qadi until 1919• Al-Maraghi, an Azharite and 
a disciple of fAbduh, had previously served as qadi of Dongola and 
Khartoum, and was on the Egyptian waqf administration^. His reform­
ing zeal was brought to bear on the Islamic laws and earned him the
5
respect of all the British judges It was probably due to him that
6the Sudan reformed its marriage and divorce laws prior to Egypt
1GQR - 1904, p.60.
2Quoted by Cromer from a confidential report by the grand qadi; see 
Cromer to Wingate, 11 Feb. 1907, SAD/280/2.
3 ?Ibid; on the 17 Dec. 1906, al-Mu ayyad published an article attacking
the missionary education given to Muslim girls. According to Shahin,
a Lebanese employee of the intelligence department, Muhammad Harun
instigated the writer of the article. Shahin to Wingate (private and
secret), 14 Jan. 1907, SAD/103/7/4; see also p.235*
^OrGR - 1908, p. 148; al-Maraghi later became rector of al-Azhar and 
supported the 1936 law which modernized the teachings of that institute.
^*Sheikh Maraghi as I knew him1, by Bishop Crwynne, (n.d.),SAD/466/9/8.
6
See pp.274-75.
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All of the provincial qadis during the formative period were 
also Egyptians. Yet, hy 1912, twelve of the district qadis and twen­
ty-two assistant qadis were graduates of the qadis* course at Gordon 
College The number of provincial and district Sharira courts in­
creased from twenty-eight in 1903 to forty-five in. 1912• Of these,
eleven were provincial coufcts, and the others, district and sub- 
2district courts. In 1908, the grand qad.i decided not to increase
the number of courts, despite ever-growing pressure of work, as he
3regarded the raising of qgdis* wages as more essential i. The depart­
ment 1 s budget did not provide for the inspection of the provincial 
Shari*a courts, and their qadis had to cope as best they could^.
The result was that many districts remained without courts and were 
visited by a qadi only once or twice a year Hence, many cases,
which should have been settled by Shari *a courts, were referred to
6
the British inspectors •
^GGR - 1912, p.94; see also pp.176-7.
^GGR - 1903, p.93; GGR 1912, p*94? the courts* staff comprised of 
48 qEdis and 82 clerks.
3GGR - 1908, p.203.
GGR - 1907) p.86; a system of judicial examinations of all the
Mohammedan courts, by examining their monthly returns, was introduced 
with great success in 1912. In the same year the Mohammedan courts 
at ICassala were inspected. GGR - 1912, pp.360-1.
^See for instance SG - 208, 26 Dec. 1911, 1 Circuit of Kadis of 
Mohammedan Law Courts, During 1912*.
See p.270.
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Administratively, the qadis were under the supervision of the
British governors and inspectors. It was through the governors that
1the qadis applied for leave , while the inspectors forwarded their
2
confidential reports on qitdis to the legal secretary • Governors
were not allowed to communicate with either the grand qadi or the
inspector of the Mohammedan courts and had to refer always to the 
3legal secretary u The appointment of qadis for the central adminis­
tration and the provinces was entrusted to Slatin and Bonham Carter^. 
Muhammad fAbduh, who visited the Sudan in 1904-5* advised its autho­
rities on the suitability of Egyptian qadis. It was on his recommend­
ation that Mustafa Sultan and Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi were 
appointed to serve in the Sudan • The avowed aim of the Sudan 
authorities was to train Sudanese qadis in sufficient numbers, in 
order to forego the services of the Egyptians, who were regarded 
as unreliable and expensive^* From 1908 onwards this aim was neatly
^CAO - 257, 10 Mar. 1905. The grand qadi was to be kept informed of 
leave arrangements.
^GAO - 345» 20 Sep. 1905* No reference was made to the grand qadi.
^See Wingate to Sutherland, 28 Feb. 1907, SAD/280/2, where he instructed 
him to apologise to the legal secretary, for having referred a complaint 
about a qadi in his province, to the inspector of Mohammedan Courts1* 
Following that incident Slatin sent a memorandun to &11 the governors 
instructing them to refer all their complaints to the legal secretary, 
f...We have to keep our Kadis in order from the Central administra­
tion...1, Slating to Wingate, 6 Aug. 1907, SAI)/28l/2.
^See also p.81.
^Bonham Garter to Wingate, 15 Aug. 1904, SAD/275/6; see also 1 Sheikh 
Maraghi as I knew him1, by Bishop Gwynne, ln.d.1, SAD/466/9/8.
Muhammad *Abduh was at that time the Mufti of Egypt*
6See pp.176-7.
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achieved. All junior posts were filled by Sudanese cradis and only a
1
few senior positions continued to be held by Egyptians *
Karl Meinhof, who visited the Sudan in 19&4» expressed his reserva­
tions on the wisdom of the Sudan government's attitude towards Islamic 
law* He asserted that the Shari*a« which was never practiced in its
entirety in any Muslim country, had been introduced into the Sudan
2by a European government '. This criticism cannot be substantiated*
The role of the Shari *a courts in the Sudan was not bigger than in 
other Muslim countries. Moreover, their importance in the Sudan 
itself had declined since the reconquest, and their scope of 
jurisdiction was limited by the establishment of a system of civil 
justice.
The government's policy of entrusting all matters concerning the 
personal status of Muslims to the Shari*a courts was both necessary 
and wise. It enabled the government to avoid unnecessary friction 
with the Muslim inhabitants and helped establish an orthodox Muslim 
leadership whose interests were bound up with those of their British 
rulers.
^See for instance Slatin to Wingate, 10 May 1912, SAD/l82/l/2.
Slatin informed Wingate that he appointed two new Egyptian qadis 
following consultations with Fathi Zaghlul, then Egyptian minister 
of justice1. After Slatin's resignation in 1914* Wingate's permission 
was required in order to appoint Egyptian qadis. See Wingate to 
Bonham Garter (private), 28 Sep. 1916, SAD/201/8•
^Meinhof, p.4 8 .
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1o. ‘Tribal ^ and customary law*
The civil law courts had only partial jurisdiction over the
2southern provinces and over the nomadic tribes of the north • The 
Shariya courts were also not extended to the non-Muslim southern 
provinces^. The jurisdiction of these vast areas was to be left to 
tribal and customary law and to be administered by shaykhs and chiefs 
recognized by the government. Their decisions were liable to review 
by a British magistrate, and no sentence of capital punishment could 
be passed by them^. Among the nomadic tribes of the north, justice 
was administered by the naair according to the accepted tribal laws, 
while:
...the weight of influence on an important decision exercised 
by a British Inspector depends largely on the regard in which 
he is held. In the south, amongst the primitive Nuba hillmen 
and Nilotic tribes, few cases come under the codes. But the 
increasing acquiescence in the interpretation by the British 
officials of tribal and communal law and custom...is a 
hopeful sign of the times...5
X
For tribal administration, see pp. 290-331.
2For the extension of the Sudan civil codes over the southern provin­
ces, see p.262.
3GGR — 1903, p*112. In his report on the Upper Nile province, the 
governor stated that no mosques or Shari*a courts existed in his 
province as apart from the Salim Arabs there were no Muslims. By 
1906 there was a provincial Mohammedan court in the Upper Nile, 
while the Bahr al-Ghazal and Mongalla provinces remained without 
courts. GGR - 1906, p.376.
^Handbook. p.293; Handbook BAG, pp.43-4•
^Handbook Kordofan, pp.108-9.
The governments assumption was that customary law could he
interpreted and overruled by British officials, and that tribal chiefs
could become part of the administrative hierarchy without losing
their influence over their people* Governors could imprison or
remove tribal chiefs for excesses, thereby undermining the latter1s
authority. Moreover, the very existence of government posts where
ompst cases could be settled, enabled the tribesmen to flout the
authority of their chiefs regardless of the intentions of the local
government officials. Finally, the gradual pacification of the
southern provinces also tended to make the need for strong tribal
1leaders less apparent •
2Matthews , the governor of the Upper Nile province, was a staunch
supporter of customary law which he regarded as f...worthy of deep
consideration, and after purgation of Dervish contamination, of
3
general adoption...1 In 1908, he wrote:
...as long as we decide cases according to equity.and common 
sense, and avoid legal technicalities, we shall hold the 
confidence of these tribes.*.Provided neither cruelty nor 
extortion is practiced we should be careful to avoid the 
danger of robbing chiefs of their power...4
^R.O.Collins, Sudan Link, pp.371“5*
Q
Matthews Pasha, Godfrey Escoui't (1866-1917) , was seconded to the 
Egyptian army in 1896 and took part in the Nile campaigns. After 
one year as assistant, civil secretary, he headed an expedition in 1901, 
to clear the sadd on the White Nile; In 1902-3, he was administrator 
of Fashoda.. district and in 1904-10, governor of the Upper Nile 
province which included Fashoda (later renamed Kodok); in 1911-13 
he commanded the military district of Khartoum. Hill,BD,p.235*
3ggr - 1904, p.132.
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Yet by deposing the rnalck of the Shilluks for .Misappropriation 
and unjust treatment of his tribe...1, Matthews undermined the 
authority of his successor. The newly appointed rnalck was not expected . 
to rule his tribe according to his own standards * ...Major Matthews 
is endeavouring by every means in his power to inculcate in this 
somewhat uncivilised potentate the elements of justice and honesty.*’  ^
The governor of Bahr al-Ghazal was less enthusiastic about customary 
law. Consequently, the powers of the tribal leaders were f...limited 
to one month’s imprisonment, all cases for which such punishment is
2
considered inadequate being dealt with by the nearest Inspector...1
In deciding these cases inspectors did not necessarily comply with
the Sudan codes: ’...and cases are tried by courts not legally
empowered to deal with such cases...what is principally needed is
3
for the punishment to be just and prompt...’
It is hardly surprising that the powers of tribal chiefs diminished 
constantly to the dismay of the British inspectors. Following a tour 
of the Dengkur district in 1905, the inspector complained that most 
of his time was taken up by deciding cases which never get settled
until an inspector goes round, instead of being decided right off by 
the Sheikh or elders...1^  Similarly, another inspector complained
1GGR - 1903, pp.9-10; when the Shilluks stated their desire to have 
their shaykhs appointed by the governor, rather than by the rnalckt it 
was regarded as ’..a consummation to be encouraged..’GGR-1902,p.346.
2ggr - 1908, p.463.
3Ibid.
Oameron to Wilson, 9 May 1905, in SIR - 130, May 1905* Dengkur was part
of Sennar province until 1906, when it became part of Mongalla.
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that the Dinka shaykhs had no control over their men and he was called
upon to settle all their cases^. Paradoxically, only those tribal
leaders who owed their allegiance to the government were accepted by
the provincial authorities, yet the fact that they were bound to the
government undermined their authority within their tribes. When
Yambio, chief of the Azande, was killed in battle, the British
inspector decided to appoint Oku, who * ...openly stated that his
following was so small that he could not maintain his position if
2
the troops were withdrawn.••* The natural successors to the chief-
3
tainship, were turned down for fear of their excessive powers It 
is small wonder that by 1908, the powers of the Azande chiefs had 
declined to such an extent that the British inspector had to settle 
’...a large number of cases nearly all being questions of ownership 
of women.. and clearly falling within the jurisdiction of 
customary law. The chiefs refused to hold court,for they did not 
know the government’s rules and were afraid of exceeding their powers. 
Hence, the administraters were forced to conduct tribal affairs by
1SIR - 139, Feb. 1906, Appendix A.
2SIR - 138, Jan. 1906.
3SIR - 131, June 1905.
4sir -
0
 
t— 1 1 Sep. 19 08; SIR - 1791 June 19^9* Appendix A, ’Mongallaprovince diary’ by R.C.R.Owen. Owen stated that in Mar. 1909*
Bimbashi Bromly, a British inspector visited Kongor district and set­
tled all its cases. However, the eases of the two most powerful shaykhs 
were left for Owen to settle. One of them was deported to Mongalla,
1...where he could stay a few months in open arrest until "his head 
is alright".. .and then I wouihd see if he could return to his village...*
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dealing directly with the tribes . By 1911, the Sultan of the Azande
had lost most of his power, and was openly disobeyed by his sons and 
2
people • It is therefore hardly surprising that the administration
of justice in the Bahr al-Ghazal was summed up as follows: 1••.An
increasing preference for the decision of an inspector is noticeable
throughout the province, andjin the Eastern district, especially,
3
every petty case is submitted to him for adjustment...1
The deterioration of customary law in the.Nuba mountains follox^ed 
a similar pattern. During the first few years administrators hardly 
ventured into the mountains, and only the Arab tribes who inhabited 
the valleys came to settle their cases in the scattered government 
stations. The Maklc of Taqali stopped his people from bringing their 
cases to the government as he feared ’...that he will lose his 
authority and power over his subjects.. . The administration of 
customary law remained in the hands of thh Nuba makks who were assist— 
ed by the ku.jurs (priests) and by the councils of elders. Among some 
of the tribes the ku.jurs1 position was paramount. They vehemently
^Conrad G.Reining, The Zande Scheme.(U.S.A. 1966) , pp.17-8; see also 
GGR - 1907, p.168, where the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal reported that 
he had to replace the Sultan of the Azande '...as he was regarded 
with contempt by all Zandes...’
2SIR - 201, Apr. 1911.
•^Handbook BAG, p.44»
4SIR - 179, June I9O9 .
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1resisted any government encroachment upon their authority • However,
by 1915, military expeditions had subjugated ma;ny of the Nubas and
had broken the powers of both makks and ku.jurs* Consequently, the
2administration of justice passed into the hands of the inspectors
Only those tribes, remote enough from a government post to be
left in peace could administer their own customary law. The Nuer of
the Upper Nile were rarely visited by government inspectors1. Moreover,
the area they roamed was so vast that many of them never saw an
English inspector until 1922, The supreme authority continued to
rest with the witch doctors, who were regarded '...as much a curse
3
in the Southern Sudan as the illiterate fiki is in the North,.,1
Once the governments control was extended, both civil and customary
law were administered by its officials. In some provinces customary
law had deteriorated yet the introduction of civil codes was regarded
as premature.. The governor, therefore, devised his own scale of
punishments much to the embarrassment of the central government',
Wingate commented on the high percentage of corporal punishment in
Mongalla when he wrote to its governor:
see that the infliction of this form of punishment in 
your provinces Isicl is not only greatly in excess of the 
other provinces quoted, but has also, in several cases, been
J.W'.Sagar, !Notes on the History, Religion and Customs of the Nuba1,
SIR - 186, Jan. 1910, Appendix A; these notes were published as an 
article in SNR — Vol.5 (1922),pp,137”15^i see also P.D.Kauczor, 'The 
Af^tti Nuba of Gebel Hair and their relation to the Nuba proper1,
snr - vol.6 (1923), pp.1-34.
2SIR - 226, May 1913, see also pp.325-28.
^H.C.Jackson, ’The Nuer of the Upper Nile province', SNR - Vol.6 (1923),
p.91, Captain Eerguson who wss an inspector in the Nuer district of 
Bahr al-Ghasal, 1919”27» regarded the witch-doctors ’...very fair ,., 
and ready to take extreme trouble over cases...1,Ibid, p.107.
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illegally administered - notably in the case of the flogging 
of a woman in the Bor district which, although possibly not 
repugnant to native custom and conditions, is wholly contrary 
to British administrative methods and principles,.
Another pitfall of the administration of tribal law by government
2 ; 
officials was their tendency to codify these laws • A compendium of
all Dinlca laws was prepared by the British inspector, and tribal
law was administered by government officials aiming '...to govern the j
3 i
inhabitants of the Southern Sudan entirely by their own "tribal codes".*,1 j
The obvious dangers of codifying these laws were soon pointed out to j
the Sudan government:
..•Such a code can scarcely escape destroying ar at least damag­
ing the capacity of traditional laws and customs to mould them­
selves to new circumstances; and it runs the risk of perpetuating 
misunderstandings which are sometimes inevitable when people of 
higher civilization attempt to grasp the principles underlying 
the legislation of tribes with whom they are imperfectly 
acquainted.•.4
Despite this warning Sudan government officials continued to administer 
tribal justice according to their own interpretation, thus undermining 
tribal leadership and obstructing the natural course of development 
of tribal laws and customs*
^Wingate to Owen, 21 June 1915, SAD/l95/ll*
2
C,H.Stigand, Equatoria. the Lado Enclave. pp.134-149, J.W.Sagar, 
'Notes on the History, Religion and Customs of the Nuba', SNR -Vol.5t 
(1922), pp.137-156; SIR - 104, Mar, 1903.
^GGR - 1906, p.743; in the years 1903-8 more than 1600 cases were de­
cided by government officials according to Dinlca laws. However, 
decisions were sometimes contrary to tribal law owing to the superfi­
cial knowledge of the officials concerned.
^E.S.Hartland to Russel Rea, 29 Jan. I9O8, SAD/282/l. This letter
was written after Hartland had read the code of Dimka laws prepared 
by Captain O'Sullivan, a Sudan government inspector.
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Chapter VII.
Tribal administration'.
The population of the Sudan at the time of the reconquest was 
largely a tribal one. Despite the dislocation of tribes during the 
Mahdia and the weakening of their economic and social structure, the 
tribes continued to perform a major function in society* . Hence the 
British authorities in the Sudan realized that the reconstruction of 
the country depended first and foremost on the pacification of the 
tribes, their resettlement and their loyalty to the new regime* To 
achieve these aims with a minimum of administration and expense, the 
authorities used different measures in the northern and southern 
provinces* The northern Sudan, with its Muslim and largely Arabic­
speaking population, was the more easily accessible to the new 
administrators* Moreover, most of the government's officials were 
either Egyptians or Lebanese, who had a common language with, and in 
many cases the same religion as, the indigenous inhabitants* Conse­
quently, after an initial period of pacification, the government
could establish direct administrative control over most of this area
1
with little recourse to military expeditions
1For a detailed survey of the Arab tribes see H*Al*MacMichael, A His­
tory of the Arabs in the Sudan, Vol.l, part 3, (2nd impression,London 
1987), pp.195-347; Holt/The Sudan, pp.5-12; Handbook, pp.188-220; 
for a more detailed study of certain tribes see A.Paul, A history of 
the Be.ia tribes of the Sudan, (London 1954) 1 L.Cunison, .Baggara Arabs, 
power and the lineage of a Sudanese nomad tribe, (London 1986)*
The administration of the towns will only be referred to in the 
chapter dealing with ll&hdownership and taxation. Omdurman, the 
largest town in the Sudan, was organized on a tribal' basis and ad­
ministered by tribal shaykhs under government supervision.
F.Rehfish, 'An unrecorded population count of Omdurman1, SNR - Vol.48,
(1965), pp.33-9.
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The southern provinces were in a different category. The negroid
tribes of the Sudan occupied the area roughly south of latitude 10°,
with the Bahr al-*Arab forming a natural frontier between them and
the Muslim north* Inhabited by a multiplicity of' tribes without a
common language, culture, or religion, the vast areas df the south
had defied the continuous efforts of the Turco-Egyptians and the
Mahdist state to establish a semblance of organized government in 
1that region • Ravaged by successive waves of invaders, the tribal
society of the south was not only dislocated but in many cases on
the verge of a complete breakdown. Hence the Anglo-Egyptian forces,
who began to penetrate the south two years after the reconquest, had
th rely on military stations and armed expeditions to a far greater
extent than in the northern provinces. The process of gradual
pacification was not completed even by the end of Wingate’s governor-
2generalship and continued well into the 1920s !*
a. Pacification and resettlement.
Collaboration between several of the northern tribes and the
Anglo-Egyptian forces started in 1896-7, during the Dongola campaign.
Seeking relief from the Ta?aishi autocracy, some of the riverain
tribes raised tribal levies who participated in the final stages of
‘hf'or details see Seligman,Pagan Tribes of the Miotic Sudan (London 
1932); Evans Pritchard,1 Ethnological Survey of the Sudan1,Hamilton,pp. 
85-93; R.O.Gollins, The Southern Sudan.1883-1898,(New York 1962); 
Handbook.PP.221-239; R.Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan.
2For an analysis-of the southern administrative policy see Collins, 
Sudan Link; M.Abdel Rahim,’The development of British policy in the 
Southern Sudan 1899-1946’»Middle Eastern Studies (1966)Vol.2,no*3,pp* 
227-47; for studies of southern tribes see E.E*Evans Pritchard, The 
Nuer...(London 1940)J 0.Reining, The Zande Scheme. (U.S.A. 1966).
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1the advance on Khartoum • The intelligence department under Wingate
and Slatin did not rely merely on chance* Letters offering aman
(clemency) to tribes and individuals were sent by the intelligence
department to all the provinces and to the Mahdist amirs who were not
2
of Baqqara origin • Although some of these letters found their way 
to the Khalifa cAbdallahi^, the intelligence department was well 
rewarded and received numerous request sjtor aman^*
Following the battle of Karari, the government was in a position 
to extend its authority over several provinces and to order Its 
British and Egyptian officials to undertake the gradual pacification 
of the country* The occupation of Kordofan in December 1899 completed
SIR - 60, 25 May-31 Dec. 1898; the tribal force consisted of 2081 men 
from six tribes of whom 830 were Jafaliyln* This was hardly surpris­
ing, bearing in mind the/massacre of the Ja*alTyin at al-Matamma in 
July 1§97? see Holt, Mahdist State, pp-*214-5* Ja'aliyin who
participated in the reconquest were paid for doing so; see Talbot to 
Wingate, 4 ®eb. 1898, SAD/266/2.
o
For an English version of these letters, signed Kitchener, 28 June 
1897? see SAD/101/1.
 ^After the battle of Umm Diwaykarat on 24 Nov. 1899» 19 these letters 
all addressed to shaykhs and makks of the Nuba mountains, were found 
in the Khalifa’s leather pouch. This implies either that the 
messengers were caught or that the recepients were unwilling to betray 
the Khalifa. The letters and the pouch are in SAD/lOl/l.
A *
See for instance Abu Sinn Walad Habuba, Shaykh Urban qism al-Khartum 
to Muhafia Dongola, 25 Sha'ban 1314, 129 Jan. 1897» the date seems 
to be wrong as the letter was written in reply to a letter from Slatin 
dated 8 Apr* 18971 J see also Ibrahim Muhammad al-Natufi i?| to 
Kitchener, 22 Sha'ban 1314, I 26 Jan. 1897i , SAD/lOl/l; see also al- 
Nur Bey cAnqara to Slatin, 17 Jumada Ial-ula?I 1316 I 23 Sep. I898I,
SAD/438/675; al-Nur fAnqara surrendered to the commandant of Kassala 
following Slatin*s letters offering him aman. For al-Nur *Anqara*s 
surrender to the Mahdi’s army in Jan. 1883, see Holt, Mahdist State, 
pp.55-6.
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the reconquest of the northern provinces and enabled Wingate, the
newly appointed governor-general, to implement the necessary adminis-
1trative measures • The principles of tribal administration had been 
defined by Kitchener in his Memorandum to Mudirs. Governors, inspec­
tors and ma*murs were instructed to '...acquire the confidence of 
the people, to develop their resources, and to raise them to a higher 
level...1 They were further advised to seek the cooperation of
'...the better class of native, through whom we may^iope gradually to
2
influence the whole population*..' The first step was the establish­
ment of government posts throughout the Sudan, the number of which 
was limited only by the state of the country's finances and the 
availability of personnel^. These stations were manned by units of 
the Egyptian army or the camel corps and administered by British or 
Egyptian officers^. They were entrusted with the establishment of 
law and order, and also assisted in the Resettlement of the tribes 
in order to increase the area of cultivation*
In the southern Sudan progress was less rapid* Fashodawas the 
only district over which the government extended its authority during
1SIR - 66, 21 Nov.-31 Dec. 1899.
2
Memorandum to Mudirs, Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1899, 
FO 78/5022; see also pp.19-21, 137-9•
^See pp.141-5*
^See for instance Handbook Kordofan, pp.90-2; SIR — 82, May 1901;
SIR - 86, Sep. 1901. In some cases the stations were manned by Bash! 
bazuks and without any supervision; see SIR - 83, June 1901*
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11899 • The prospects of establishing a proper administration in these
areas must have seemed rather gloomy. Maxwell wrote:1...the country
2is only fit for Hippos, mosquitoes and Nuers to live in...1 The 
government had neither the power nor the means to establish its 
authority in the south. Salisbury's suggestion to occupy Bahr al- 
Ghazal from Uganda was turned down by Cromer on political graunds * 
Instead, in 1900, Wingate sent agents to several southern tribal 
leaders inviting them to Khartoum '...where matters could be explained 
to them, and flags issued to them to hoist in their territories. Four 
representatives arrived in Khartoum on the 14th April 19OO...represent­
ing eleven chiefs of the Bahr-El-Ghasal•.•'^
In the winter of 1900, the first government expedition was dis- 
patched to the Bahr al-Ghazal and several posts were set up • But a 
patrol which was sent to the province in November 1901 met with 
resistance and resulted in considerable loss of life, including that 
of a British inspector^* The punitive expedition which followed
SAR - 1899, P*59* The control of the three police posts in the Fashoda 
district was entrusted to a single British officer who toured the Nile 
in a gunboat.
^Maxwell to Wingate, 17 Jan. I899, SAD/269/r.
^Cromer to Salisbury, 11 Dec. 1899, ^0 78/5024*
^Inclosure (signed - Sparkes and Gleichen) in Cromer to Lansdowne, 14 
Oct. 1902, F0 403/323; as a result several British and Egyptian flags 
were hoisted in the French side of the border; see Lansdowne to Cromer, 
3 Oct. 1902, Ibid.
m. - 1900, p.67; SIR- 76, Nov.-Dee. 1900; SIR - 78, Jan.-Feb.1901;
Most of these posts were manned by .jihadiya; SIR - 105, Apr. 1903?
SIR - 91, Feb. 1902.
SIR - 92, Mar. 1902.
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this murder was ruthless in its methods,, and set a pattern for future 
relations between administrators and inhabitants^. Many of the 
southern tribes viewed any form of government with the utmost 
suspicion and withdrew into the interior whenever they sighted a
government patrol. By 1905 there were nine military posts in the 3
— 2 Bahr al-Ghazal and a total force of some 1300 men and 64 officers '»
The military character of the province was clearly visible, and it
was only after the Equatorial battalions replaced the Egyptian army
in 1912-13that the administration assumed ajlnore civilian character •
When Bishop Gwynne visited the Zande district in 1911 in order to
establish a CMS station, he was given an Azande interpretation of
British rule in the southern Sudan:
...You put the Egyptians in the fromt when you- conquered the 
dervishes and you put the ex-dervishes in front rank when you 
conquered us and now one or two British rule many hundreds all 
over the Sudan...4
. The situation in the Upper Nile province, which until 1906 in­
cluded Mongalla, was much the same. The southernmost;-pcistwas
^SIR - 93, Apr. 1902; for details see pp.316-331.
2
SIR - 126, Jan. 1905; 51 of the officers were Egyptians and 13 British.
3
The first civilian administrator arrived in the Zande district of 
Bahr al-Ghazal in 1911; C.Reining, The Zande Scheme, p.8$see pp.243-4*
^"Gwynne to Wingate, 29 Aug. 1911, SAD/301/2; Gwynne quoted from a 
conversation with-jone of the Zande shaykhs, who tried to illustrate 
the similarity between the Avungara, the ruling clan of the Azande, 
and the British officers.
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established at Mongalla in 1901^. However, government control did
2
not extend beyond the immediate vicinity of the posts . Of the major
tribes of the province only the Shilluks were brought under effective 
3
control • The Hinka kept aloof from the government, and were regarded
as * ...a lawless people... I who| only understand the strong arm...’^
As for the Nuer, they maintained an openly hostile attitude towards
governinent interference in their tribal affairs, and resented the
government’s attempt to stop the internecine strife between them 
5and the Hinka . The most turbulent tribes, however, were the Beir
and Anuak who inhabited the area betx^ reen the Bahr al-Zaraf and the
Abyssinian border. In 1912 the government launched a punitive
expedition against these tribes and decided to establish its
6
administration om purely military lines f.
The pattern of government penetration intoothe Nuba mountains 
followed a similar line. The few government posts were not able to
1
SIR 82, May 1901} the station was first established further south 
but it turned out to be Belgian territory.
2GGR — 1903, p.lOlj the reasons set down by the governor for his lack 
of control, were : bad communications, shortage of staff, and the 
enmity of the Nuer.
^SIR - 92, Mar. 1902. In 1906 Matthews, governor of the Upper Nile 
province wrote that the Shilluks ’...have learnt to believe that the 
British are the friends of black humanity...*, GGR - 1906, pi7441*
^Phipps to Wingate, 7 Sep. 1904, SAB/234/2*
5SIR - 94, May 1902, pp.8-9; Siffi - 1905, p.153; Even in the late
1920s the Nuer and Hinka had not yet been brought under effective 
administration; see Willis to Financial secretary, 31 May 1928, SAD/ 
212/9; see also ppi321-24.
^Wingate to Kitchener (private), 7 Apr. 1912, SAh/i8i/i/3; Wingate
to Asser, 31 Aug. 1912, SAI)/l82/2/l; see ppi321-23.
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control the intertribal fights between the various mountains, let a 
alone the constant raids between the Nubas and their Arab neighbours* 
Slatin, who visited the Nuba mountains in 1900, witnessed the out­
break of hostilities between the 5awazma an(l Makk Nasir of KawalXb^l* 
Wingate, who knew that some of these intertribal feuds had been going 
on for mahy generations, wrote to Cromer,*...I have categorically
2refused to allow Government to be drawn into intertribal quarrels'*. •* 
However, the underlying reason appears to have been that the govern­
ment feared an intertribal coalition which might revolt against its 
authority* An intelligence report on Kordofan stated:1*..there is 
little chance of a combination between the tribes without the
introduction of some powerful object of common interest such as 
3
religion*. * This argument was carried even further in the case of
the Nuba mountains whioh were part of Kordofan province until 1914'*
Instead of improving the communications between the Nuba mountains
and El Obeid, the provincial capital, Asser, the adjutant-general,
ordered the improvement of the road from Talodi in the Nuba mountains
to Tonga on the Bahr al-Ghazal.
••.You then have a force which is not dependent on the railway 
or on the North of Kordofan, and in case of the Arabs threaten­
ing the railway or Obeid, you can with the Southern and
■^Slatin1 s diary, 6 Apr. 1900, 4 May 1900, Siffl/441.
Wingate to Cromer, 24 Apr. 1902, SAD/272/2; for a history of the
Nuba and their relations with the Arabs, see Sagar,*Notes on the 
History,Religion and Customs of the Nuba1, SNR- Voi.5 (1922),pp*137”5^*
3SIR - 171, Oot. 1908.
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independent force turn the tables on them by threatening 
their houses and lines of communication..
While the government generally refrained from interfering in
intertribal feuds, it did insist that its own atithority should be
respected* In the Nuba mountains, as in other southern provinces,
this was partly achieved by punitive expeditions. When Wingate paid
his first visit to the Nuba mountains in 1912 he wrote,1•..This is
the first time in which this country had been at rest or that it has
had any chance of developing its resources...1 Two years later
Wingate again reported that the peace and prosperity of the Nubas
3
had reached a new peak . However, successive punitive expeditions 
during the years 1908-1914 and the revolt of Eiki *A1T in 1915t tend 
to suggest that Wingate's optimism was premature^1*
In order to pacify the tribes the government tried to limit the 
large quantities of arms and amunition which had been abandoned by 
the defeated Egyptian and Mahdist armies and had subsequently come 
into possession of the tribes. An ordinance for regulating the 
carrying of firearms was among the first laws to be promulgated by 
the Anglo-Egyptian authorities However, the government continued
^"Asser to Wingate,' (private), 15 July 1909* SAD/288/l.
2Wingate to Kitchener, 20 Mar. 1912, SAD/180/3.
3GGR - 1914, p.61.
4See pp. 325-28.
” 2, 27 May 1899 i this was superceded by the* Eire Arms Ordinance 
19031 which imposed higher fines; SG - 49» July 1903*
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to hand out firearms '•••as free gifts to sheikhs and others as a
1reward for services to Government^..* Further legislation limiting
the import and use of arms and amunition was enacted in the following 
2years . Yet, despite the increased fines and imprisonment, the 
legislation seemed to have had little effect. Arms smuggling con­
tinued, especially on the Abyssinian and the western borders^*. In 
the southern provinces the .jailaba were implicated in the illegal - 
arms trade^, in spite of the restrictions the government imposed on
5
their movements • But by far the largest concentration of illegal 
firearms was in the Nuba mountains. Many Nubas had served in the 
Khalifa1 s ,iihadi.ya and had retained their arms following his defeat?* 
in 1908 it was estimated that trhere were 20,000 Remington rifles in 
the Nuba mountains alone The increased number of government posts 
and the greater security they brought enabled the authorities in 
Kordofan to undertake the disarmament of the tribes, and by 1911 the 
1CAP - 92, 10 July 1901; although the order stated that this practice 
should be discontinued *•».exceptwhere military considerations suggest 
its propriety...1, governors continued to issue arms to shaykhs and 
tribal leaders; see for instance SIR — 225, Apr. 1913*
2SG - 105, 8 Jan. 1907,1 Ordinance for regulating the import of amunition*,; 
SG - 123, 1 Jan. 1908, 1 Arms Ordinance 1907'; SG - 128, 1 Mar. 1908, 
fThe Sudan explosives Ordinance1.
3
Gases of the arm smugglers who were caught were reported in the 
Sudan intelligence reports. See for instance SIR - 178, May 1909;
SIR - 179, June 1909; SIR - 183, Oct. 1909; SIR - 217, Aug. 1912:.
4SIR - 169, Aug. 1908.
- 471 1 May 1903.
SIR - 171, Oct. 1908.
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1number of illegal weapons had decreased to 65OO *
Legislation concerning the import and sale of alcoholic liquor
was first introduced in 1899* To hegin with it had little effect on
the tribal population as it did not apply to merissa (millet beer),
2
or palm wine, the most popular drinks • Provincial governors were
3
ordered ’...to ensure that no liquor is sold to natives*..1 Cromer, 
however,continued to be concerned about the excessive consumption of 
alcoholic drinks in the Sudan* He wrote:1..*We don’t want to demoral­
ise the population by d r i n k . . . A s  a result, ’The Native Liquors 
Ordinance, 1903* was promulgated* It forbade the manufacture and 
sale of all liquors, including merissa. without a licence* It further
stipulated that ’...any person having over 30 litres of Merissa shall
5be deemed to have some for sale unless he proves otherwise.’ In 
the following months this ordinance was enforced in most of the
***The total number of illegal firearms in the Sudan was estimated by 
the governors as 12,030 whereas the number of licensed weapons was 
only 447* SIR - 208, Nov. 1911. During the revolt of Piki \&li in 
1915, 221 illegal rifles were captured in one battle, SIR - 251,
June 1915*
^SG - 2,,27 May 1899» * An Ordinance for regulating and licensing the 
sale of alcoholic drinks’; see also Gromer to Salisbury, 15 Nov,l899»
po 78/5024.
3Memorandum by Bonham Carter about the sale of liquors in the Sudan,
15 Nov., Ibid.
^Cromer to Wingate, 11 Peb. 1902, SAD/272/l; Cromer wrote that the 
250 tons of spirits imported into the Sudan in 1901, seemed excessive. 
Gromer’s concern was largely the result of pressure by the foreign 
office which in turn was caused by the lobbying of the Anti-Slavery- 
Societies.
q
” 49» July 1903; it was in accordance with this ordinance that 
Yusuf Milcha^il was imprisoned.
- 301 ~
1northern provinces as well as in Fashoda and the Bahr al-Ghazal »
Wingate, however, was continuously pestered by the English press
and by questions in the House of Commons'.concerning the excessive
consumption of liquor in the Sudan* Although these allegations
2
*/to ere- denied by Wingate , Lyall, then senior-inspector of the White
Nile province, admitted that many crimes were caused by drunkenness
3among the tribes of his province » Consequently, a new ordinance 
for the prevention of dunkenness was promulgated in 1907* ^  gave
the right to any police officer or ma?mur to arrest drunkards with­
out a warrant and to impose on them a specified fine or imprisonment^. 
Further legislation was introduced in 1908 which forbade the selling 
of 1...any alcoholic liquors to any native of the Sudan*..1 During 
all these years Wingate maintained that no alcoholic liquors were 
sold to Sudanese and that the many cases of drunkenness reported 
were the result, of excessive consumption of merissa. Dty: 1912 Wingate 
had to admit that large quantities of imported liquor were in fact
1§s. - 5°f Aug. 19°3; §G - 51, Sep. 1903; §G - 52, Oct. 1903; SG - 53, 
Nov. 1903*
^See for instance Parker to Findlay, 29 Sep* 1906, F0 141/402; Parker 
wr&te in reply to a question in the House of Commons that Wingate was
1.*.thoroughly satisfied that no imported alcoholic liquors are being 
sold to natives of the Sudani..1; see also GGR - 1906, p.661.
^SAR - 1906, p.146; in 1904 the import of alcoholic liquor into the
Sudan was 613 tons, Ibid, p.133
^SG - 115, July 1907; see also Wingate to Gorst, 18 July 1907» F0 141/-
409; Wingate stated that the excessive consumption of merissa was
caused by the cheap dhurra prices.
5SG - 129, Mar. 1908.
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1.
sold to the Anuak and the Nuer f. He therefore issued an order
* ...to totally prohibit the transport of liquor, except for the reason-
2able consumption of Europeans...1 The more practical method of im­
posing heavier import duties on liquors was suggested by the director 
of customs, and was adopted by the governor-general1s council in 1914 *^ 
While arms and liquor were the two main spheres in which legisla­
tion was thought to have a direct bearing on the pacification of the 
country, several other ordinances also had a direct effect on tribal
4
administration • !The Wild Animals Preservation Ordinance* of 1900
sought to regulate the hunting habits of the Sudanese and to impose
5taxes on Europeans hunting for pleasure * Legislation to protect the
country*s forests was passed in the following year^, and the 1 Contra-
7
band Goods Ordinance* was promulgated in 1902 . Finally, a special
-1
Butler to Wingate, 27 July 1912, SAD/182/1/1; Wingate to Phipps,
19 Aug. 1912, SAD/l82/2/l. According to Wingate the Sudan agent, whp 
was in charge of the import of liquors, only supervised the consign­
ments through Wadi Haifa and had no control over those which were 
imported via Port Sudan1. f
2Wingate -to Phipps, 25 Aug. 1912, SAD/182/2/l.
^Hayes Sadler to Wingate, 28 Mar. 1913, SAI)/l85/3/2; Hayes Sadler 
complained about the low prices of liquor in the Sudan,1...a bottle .
.of whisky...after paying 3% Customs duty can be sold in the souk 
I market I for 10 P.T. (s 2/-,)...'; see also GGC, 13 Mar. 1914,FO 867/5.
For legislation concerning land ownership, see pp.333-38; taxation, 
pp.358“64 i ihe administration of justice, pp.260-8.
5SG - 9, Feb. 1900.
c
SG - 26, 1 Aug. 1901.
7SG - 31, 1 Jan. 1902.
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ordinance f*..for preventing the import sale and use of Hashish...1
1was enacted in 1907 •
Following the initial period of pacification the resettlement of
the tribes, which had been dislocated during the Mahdia, "became a
2dominant feature of tribal policy • In 1900 the government called
3
on the Baqqara tribes in the Gezira to return to ICordofan , and in
the following months nearly 30,000 made their way to the west^.
Many Hinka and Shilluk refugees were also assisted in making their
5way back to the south . Emmigration continued ovdr a number of years,
6
organized and assisted by the intelligence department '* The govern­
ment *s aim in encouraging this mass migration was threefold: to dec­
rease the population of Omdurman; to encourage cultivation; and to 
restore the tribal map of the Sudan to what it had been before the 
Mahdia. The population of Omdurman, which continued to be the larg-
est town in the Sudan, decreased from approximately 150,000 in 1892
8to about 40,000 in 1906 • Although the decrease can be partially
XSa - 110, 1 Apr. 1907.
SAR - 1899, pp.43-4'. For the Khalifa's policy of forcing the Ta'aisha
and other Baqqara tribes to settle in Omdurman see Holt, Mahdist State,
pp.141-6.
^SIR - 711 9 June-8July 1900. The tribes received an allocation of 
dhurra from the government, to assist them on their way.
4SIR - 75, 8 Oct.-8 Nov. 1900} SAR - 1901, p.69.
^See for instance SIR - 73, 6 Aug.-7 Sep. 1900; SIR - 77, 9 Dec.1900- 
8 Jan.1901.
CAP - 225, 16 Hov. 1904.
7Wingate, Ten Years Captivity, p.283.
Q
The Times, 30 Mar. 1900.
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attributed to the death-toll resulting from the reconquest, internal 
emigration too accounted for this sharp decline in population
In order to encourage cultivation the government. made available 
agricultural loans to assist landowners to erect saqiyas and to pur- 
chase cattle !* Returning tribes were also provided with cheap dhurra 
for the first few months and with good seeds to^tart cultivation^*
On resuming cultivation the newcomers were exempted from paying taxes
4 5during the first year *. As a result of these, and other measures ,
cultivation increased rapidly, and in 1908 it was realized that with­
out additional irrigation facilities there was no further scope for
expansion Furthermore, efforts to improve agricultural techniques
'■ 7
were frustrated by the apathy and total indifference of ma$y tribes1*
In 1903 the governor of Kordofan reported an ever increasing stream 
of immigrants returning to ICordofan and estimated the population of 
his province as 530,000, GGR - 1903, p*71*
^GGR - 1905, pp'*289-91* The total sum issued up to the end of 1905 
was £33. 20,000*
^See for instance Drage to Wingate, 9 June 1900, SAD/270/6; SIR - 241, 
Aug. 1914*
^For the taxation of sedentaries and nomads see pp. 357-68*
5
Among the measures, undertaken to encourage resettlement was the colo­
nization of released Sudanese soldiers who were settled in military- 
agrbultural settlements on the Blue and White Wiles* This scheme was 
started in 1900 (SAR - 19OO, p*71;CA0 - 71,12 June 190l),and by 1913 
all these colonies were reported to be flourishing and no longer 
required government assistance.(Report on tour of inspection of the 
Blue Wile province (sigmed Charlton) 28 Wov.-9 Dec* 1913,SAD/l08/6)'*
A further measure was the encouragement of immigrants from the border­
ing countries to settle in the Sudan.(See for instance Slatin's diary 
9 June 1901, SAD/44I , £GR - 1903, p.82; GGR - 1905, p.l52> GGR - 1907, 
PP*95,190; GGR - I9O8, p.626). However, the Fallata were by far the 
most numerous group among the immigrants. By 1912 there were over 
16,000 Fallata who had settled permanently in the Sudan. SIR - 220, 
Wov. 1912; MWA; see also pp. 387-95*
GGR - 1908, p.695.
?GGR - 1902, p.305; GGR - 1905, p.121.
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b1* Tribal leadership*
Tribal leadership was disrupted during the Mahdia, which made a
claim to loyalty superseding tribal boundaries and in certain cases
1
interfered in tribal leadership f.
After the reconquest the Anglo-Egyptian authorities sought the 
cooperation of the shaykhs in order to impose the new administration 
upon the tribes, and to hasten their return to agriculture* Govern­
ment officials were therefore instructed to remember that:
•••not only are Sheikhs "Public Servants" but they perform 
work of the greatest importance and responsibility.„.I it I 
M s  the general aim of the Government to associate them 
as a class with the work of the administration. • .2
However, the government made it quite clear that it would determine
the functions of the shaykhs and that government officials would
3
have the authority to overrule their decisions u Thus from the 
outset the government regarded the shaykhs as its tribal agents who 
could be appointed, overruled, and dismissed just as any government 
official* A government order of 1902 appertaining to the procedure 
of appointing new shaykhs stated!
Holt, Mahdist State, pp*134“ 6; Holt described the Khalifa1s actions 
against the Kababish and the Rizayqat whose shaykhs were killed*. The 
appointment of Khalifa *Abdallahi as the Mahdi*s successor, instead 
of Muhammad Sharif, who was of the Mahdi!s own tribe, also proves 
that tribal connections were not as highly regarded as the qualities 
of religious leadership* Ibid, pp1.119-121. According to Seligman, 
certain sections of the Kababish remained loyal to the Khalifa despite 
the revolt of their head shaylch Salih Eadlal-lah Salim. See Corres­
pondence by C.G.Seligman, SHR - Vol.4* (l92l)t PP*53-6.
 ^Sub-Mamurs Handbookt p*33^.
^Handbook BAG, p.37.
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...Mudirs and Administrators should.. .send, their recommendations 
in this respect, with full details as to hereditary title, 
influence & c. of the particular Sheikh to the Assistant Birector 
of Intelligence Khartoum, for the approval of H.E. the Governor 
General...probationary Commissions will be made out...^
This procedure was followed throughout Wingatefs governor-general- 
ship. Shaykhs were judged according to government standards of ability 
and their readiness to comply with orders. In 1900 Maxwell appointed 
*Ali al-Tom as head shaykh of the Kababish although he doubted whether 
the latter was capable of undertaking the work. He defended the app­
ointment on the ground that tAli al-Tom was 1•..the proper man by 
birth, secondly the other sheikhs have agreed to accept him, thirdly
because there is no better man, at any rate...he cannot do much harm
2and it may be successful...! , Full details about the appointed shaykhs 
and their qualifications were published in the annual reports of the
3
provinces; and, in the case of important shaykhs, in the Sudan Gazette >» 
Some of these shajrkhs failed to pass their period of probation^*, while
1CA0 - 7, 18 Jan. 1902.
^Maxwell "to Wingate, 19 Jan. 1900, SAD/270/1/2; Several shaykhs who
were appointed immediately after the reconquest for services rendered 
during the advance on Khartoum, were later dismissed because they 
lacked the qualifications and the authority; see GGR - 1908, p.557* 
fAli al-Tom, however, was later appointed as Nazir *Umum of the 
Kababish and served until his death in 1938. Hill,BB.,p.52.
3See for instance SG - 18, 1 Dec. 1900; OGR - 1902, pp.315-338. The
governor of the Blue Nile province appointed 50 shaykhs in-1905, and 
57 in 1907. GGR - 1905, p.26; GGR- 1907, p.220.
^See for instance GGR - 1902, p.338. The governor of Suakin reported 
that he appointed Muhammad Hammad Mahmud as nazir of the *Amarar tribe. 
In the following year he dismissed him, following his failure to 
qualify; <■GGR - 1903, p.91«
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others were dismissed for a great variety of reasons ranging from
incompetence and lack of authority to malpractices and autocratic 
1-behaviour i. In certain cases the provincial governors decided that
the number of shaykhs 1...was out of proportion with the population..1
2and hence had to be reduced '• The governors argued that by having
fewer shaykhs those who remained would tend to work harder and increase
3
their efficiency ;* Thus tribal leadership became fully dependent
upon government administration*
*•*The policy adopted has been to raise the status of the Sheikh 
as far as possible in the eyes of his people by trying to impress 
on them (and,on him) that he is the representative in his own 
village of the-Government
Tribal leaders who tried to assert their independent authority 
were not trusted by the government even if their loyalty was beyond
doubt, as it was conceivable that their powefr , not derived from the
5 -government, might be directed against it . In certain cases the nazir
of the tribe was officially approached before one of his shaykhs was
dismissed* However, there is no evidence to suggest that the nazir*s
See for instance Ferguson to Wingate, 16 June 1902, SAD/272/4/2; 
Ferguson informed Wingate that he dismissed the hereditary shaykh of 
the Hamran tribe for lack of authority; see also GGR - 1902, p.305;
GGR - 1903, pp.9,34,54,77-8,104; GGR - 1904,pp.l09~10,126* In I905 
the governor of Berber reported the dismissal of six umdas and 48 
shaykhs, while in the Blue Wile province 28 shaykhs were dismissed 
and 8 resigned. GGR - 1905, pp.15,26; GGR - I9O8, ppF.456,522-4,540, 673.
2ggr - 1902, p.242.
3ggr - 1905, p.14.
4GGR - 1906, p.710.
5GGR - 1907, p.320.
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view could have swayed the governments decision^. Consultations
with the elders of the tribe were also undertaken when new shaykhs
had to be appointed. Tet, once again, the final decision rested
with the government official:
...Muglad 12 November 1911**.Had a strenous moment with ten 
gentle Arabs, who as usual wanted to have their own way 
whatever happened.•.However got them into line & swore in 
several new sheikhs1. • .Idris el-Sakin was the only man his 
people stuck to...2
With regard to nazirs and head shaykhs, the governments policy
was to undermine their authority and to strengthen the heads of the
subordinate tribal units. U^mdas were introduced in the Baqqara ?
tribes of Kordofan in 1911 in order to decrease the influence of their
nazirs and to make the tribes dependent on direct government authority
The result was that while the nadirs lost much of their influence,
the *umdas» who had no hereditary powers, were not strong enough to 
3
assume contgpl • The same policy prevailed in the Nuba mountains 
and in the southern provinces.
See for instance Wingate to Dumbell, 12 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/3;Win­
gate to Wilson, 15 Nov. 1915* SAD/197/2/2; In both cases Wingate 
consulted Shaykh Ibrahim Musa, nazir of the Hadendowa, about the 
replacement of one of the tribe's shaykhs.
^Willis's diary, 12 Nov. 1911,SAD/210/2; according to Willis the real­
ly influential man in the tribe was one Abu al-IChalil who was not 
appointed.
3K.D.D.Henderson, * Some notes on the history of the tribes living 
south of the Wadi el Ghala! , (typescript) , ppf*9-ll; SAD/478/5; 
G.D.Lampen, 'The Bag&ara Tribes1, Hamilton, pp*136-7j SIR - 191,
June 1910. MacMichael who inspected the Dar Hamid tribe in Kordofan 
objected to the appointment of a nazir, and suggested to let the 
fumdas deal independently with their respective sections; see also 
Gunnison, Baggara Arab s..♦t pp.108-9•Cunnison stated that the *umdas 
of the Humr were appointed in order to reduce the excessive powers 
of their nazir rAli Julia.
- 309 -
...Meks of the pliant Merkaz hanger-on type were appointed 
who were net only personally unsuitable and unacceptable to 
the people, but who were often impossible of acceptance to 
the people as not being of correct royal lineage...The 
equivalent of the Arab type of Omda scurrilously known as 
ICelb el Halcuma | sicl was by no means uncommon.
Amongt the southern tribes the deposing of the Makk of the Shil-
luks was probably the most noteworthy example, in 1899 Jackson, who
2
had been in Fashoda, appointed ICoor as makk of the Shilluks By 
1903, however, Makk ICoor was found to '...have been guilty of mis­
appropriation and unjust treatment of his subjects...and was in
3
consequence deposed and banished from the country...' The new makk, 
who was duly appointed, had to accept '...the "XI condition£"of Mek- 
ship...1 which were laid down by the British governor in order '..to 
show the power of Government...*^ Consequently, the powers of the 
new makk were so diminished that the governor himself complained of 
the makk' s lack of authority f. The inevitable result of this policy 
was the further deterioration of tribal leadership'.
There were certain exceptions, notably amongst the camel owning
1Gillan, Nuba, p*13*
^Jackson to Wingate, 6 Jan. 1§99* SAD/269/l.
3 _
GGR - 1903, pp.9-10. Makk ICoor died in the Haifa prison and when
his successor was invited to IChartoum to attend the festivities of
King George V*s visit in 1912, he refused fearing that he wfoould
share his predecessor's fate; see Slatin's diary, 20 Dec.l911,SAI)/441*
^Matthews to Wingate, 19 July 1903, SAD/273/?.
^Matthews to Wingate, 9 Jan. I904, SAD/275/l» in 19^5 situation
had apparently improved as Matthews reported that the makk had gained 
authority within his tribe; GGR — 1905, p.149* disintegration
of tribal leadership amongst the Zande tribe in the Bahr al-Ghazal,
followed a similar course* C.Reining, The Zande Scheme  ^ pp.17-22; 
see also pp.284-7*
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tribes of Kordofan. *All-Wad al-Tom, the naxir of the Kababish
throughout this period, enjoyed a large measure of autonomy in
1administering his tribe '• This was probably the result of a number
of factors* Firstly, the Kababish remained a truly nomadic tribe which
by virtue of its greater mobility could maintain a larger measure of
independence. Secondly, the Kababish, who had been staunch opponents
of the Khalifa, had to be rewarded by the British authorities; and
lastly, fAli Wad al-Tom was by all accounts an extremely capable
leader who knew how to remain in the government’s good books without
2losing his independence. Tet the Kababish were by all accounts an
exception, and the weakening of central tribal leadership which was
extended to most of the other tribes was a logical conclusion of the
3
government’s policy of undermining tribal coalitions '*
Many of the nazirs were dismissed during this period for a great 
variety of reasons. ^Abdallah Jadallah, the nazir of the Kawahla in 
Kordofan, was dismissed in 1909* For years he had collected tribute
^Davies, pp.59”62, 181-2.
2The Kababish and the §amar both belong to the Juhayna group of tribes. 
It is therefore interesting to note that while the Kababish maintained 
their nomadic character and independence, the Hamar who became largely 
sedentary, lost their independence. Ibid, pp.187-9.; see also MacMichael, 
A history of the Arabs in the Sudan, Vo1.1,pp.314”6, 319™21.
^In 1913 the government decided to appoint a special inspector for 
Bar KabcTblsh. However, the World War interfered and it was only in 
1915 that the government started imposing its* control over this 
tribe. Bavies, pp.61-2. The southern tribes, with the exception of 
the Shilluks and the Zande, had no paramount chief and were generally 
ruled by the tribes’ elders; see L.F.Nalder,’The Two Sudans: some 
aspects of the South’, Hamilton, pp.101-2; Evans Pritchard, The Nuer...,
p.147*
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from his tribe and used part of it for the mahr (bridal money) he was
1required to pay for marrying thie Mahdi's daughter :• The new nazir
was elected by a council of elders, and gained the confidence of
2
his tribe as well as that of the government '• Muhammad al-Faqir, >, 
nazir of the Misiriya, who had for years been suspected for malprac­
tices and slave trading, was dismissed in 1915 being implicated 
in Filci rAli*s revolt^* Yet, however justified these dismissals were, 
they could not fail to undermine the stability of tribal leadership 
which had already suffered during the Mahdia*
With the decreasing powers of shaykhs and nazirs one could hardly 
expect that the duties performed by them would be of major signifi-^ 
cance* The area of jurisdiction of the numerous shaykhs was determined 
by the government according to its own consideration^'* *...Owing to 
administrative exigencies, the Beja tribes were at first partitioned 
between three provinces: Berber, Red Sea, and Kassala* Tribal unity... 
naturally suffered**.1 Along the borders the situation was even
XSIR - 184, lov. 1909; Willis's diary, 22 Oct., 22 Mov. 1909fSJU)/210/2; 
see alsx> Hill, BD, P*5» Hill’s statement that Jadallah was-dismissed 
in 1916 is wrong*
^SIR - 1911 June 1910; Interview with Sir Harold MacMichael, 6 June 19'$7^
^The new nazir* Muhammad Dafarallah, was appointed by Savile follow­
ing a meeting with the shaykhs and umdas of the tribe* Savile*s
diary, 4 Jan* 1916, SAD/427/7.
^See for instance Slatin to Wingate, 16 Feb. 1903,SAD/273/2; Slatin 
reported that he had divided the tribes in the district of al-Qadarif 
into numerous sections and had appointed *umdas and shaykhs to each 
of them*
^D.Fewbold,* The Beja Tribes of the Red Sea Hinterland*,Hamilton,p.l6o* '
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worse, as'the artificially drawn borders cut across many tribes"**1.
Numerous duties were entrusted to the shaylchs* These included:
the digging of wells; the building of roads and rest houses; the
guarding of communications; and various tasks of an administrative
2nature such as reporting deaths • The major functions, however, were 
to assist the government in the administration of justice and in the 
collection of taxes* In both these spheres the shaykhs held a sub­
ordinate position^* The assessment of taxes was performed by the 
provincial inspectors and governors with the.active participation of 
Slatin^*, while the shaykhs could only appeal against the government's 
decisions. It---was then their duty to divide the agreed tax or tribute
am©ng the various sections of the tribe and to be responsible for its 
5
collection '• The diarizes of several government inspectors indicate
1See for instance SIR - 139, Pet). 1906,pp.ll-2;SIR - 172,Nov.l908,p.5.
2GOR - 1904, pp.5-6}•17-8, 70-1; GGR- 1902, p.235; SIR- 238,May 1914, 
p*2; GAO - 400* 15 Mar. 1906; Wingate to Jackson (private),31 Dec.1915,
sAD/19773/3.
3
The administration of tribal law, see pp.283-9if°r taxation - pp.357-68
^For Slatin's role in tribal administration see pp.87-95*
^E.R.J.Hussey, Tropical Africa 1908-1944. p.26. Savile's diary, 1 Apr. 
1905, SAD/427/6; Savile related his meeting with the Shukriya shaykhs 
whom he informed that failing an agreement among them with regard to 
the division of tribute among the different sections, he would decide 
upon the matter himself; see also Willis's diary, 1909-10, SAD/210/2; 
GGR 1902, pp.293-4. In 1905 the governor of the Upper Nile province 
reported that one of his inspectors had collected '...Herd Tax, which 
exceeded four times the vallue of the original tribute proposed...*
GGR.;- 1905> p. 148. Once again the position of the nazirs and-shaykhs 
of the Kababish was quite different. The nominal tribute levied on 
the Kababish up to 1915 > was apportioned and collected by the nazir 
withoutvany government interference. In 1915j Kababish were put 
on Herd Tax and as a result the assessment was performed by govern­
ment officials and the nazir's position was weakened. Davies,pp.62-5.
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that even this duty was often performed by the officials rather
than hy the shaykhs. Savile, whilst inspector in northern Kassala,
described his methods of collecting’ tribute. His entourage included
an officer and twenty-five soldiers. On arrival at a well, where
the cattle had to be brought for watering, he erected a zariba,
(cattle pen), and when the tribes arrived with their cattle he -
...took a portion of each herd of cattle and drove them into 
the zariba and kept them as hostages for the tribute; taking 
care to take about three times the value of tribute in live 
st o ck...1
Following this procedure the tribes had little alternative but to 
redeem their flock by paying the tribute demanded from them.T...The 
tribute was chiefly in gold nose rings and beads all absolutely
2filthy. The people almost all assured me that they had no money...1
When one of the tribesmen tried to cheat Savile out of he duly
3
confiscated his sheep and gave it to his soldiers as extra rations • 
The rewards which the government offered the tribal leaders 
were inadequate throughout the period. Initially, the government 
granted the shaykhs minor tax exemptions* Thus a shaykh was not
1
Colonel R.V.Savile, Diary of a tribute collecting tour in northern 
ICassala, 7 Apr. 1903, SAD/427/3.
2Ibia, 14 Apr. 1903.
Ibid., 10-11 Apr. 1903; R.Hill, Egypt in the Sudan... .pp.41-2; Hill
described the brutality of the Shayqiya irregulars, who were used for 
collecting tribute from the nomads; see also J.Bruce, Travels to 
discover the source of the Nile,(ed)C.F.Bechingham,(Edinburgh 1964)* 
p.231* Bruce related hew the Funj extracted taxes from the Arabs 
as the latter left the Atbara to protect•their cattle from the fly.
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liable for land tax on one feddan if he cultivated 100 feddans, or 
1
more • When the 'Taxation of Animals Ordinance* was amended in 1903,
the legal adviser wrote that its main object -
• ••was to enable the Governor-General to eeaempt Omdas and 
Sheikhs, a class who do much work for the Government without 
pay, and have frequently to move about, frmm the payment of 
tax in respect to one riding animal...^
In addition, shaykhs who provided detailed lists of the owners
of animals within-their tribes were granted a remission of 5$ on the
taxes they collected^* In 1903 the government ordered that all
shaykhs should receive an equal and fixed percentage of all taxes
collected by them *.#.provided the Mudir is satisfied that.the Omdas
and Sheikhs have performed their regular duties in a satisfactory 
.4manner..*1
The government*s failure to compensate the 'umdas and shaykhs for 
their labours was quite apparent . Jackson demanded that the remune­
ration granted to the shaykhs of nomad tribes should be fixed at 20%
6
of the tribute they collected • Even Wingate, who was well aware of
XCA0 - 3, 17 Jan. 1900; CAO - 28, 16 Feb. 1902.
GGR - 1903, p.80; see also SG_ - 86, 1 Jan,1906, where the same order
was repeated.
3CA0 - 29, 16 Feb. 1902.
CAP — 46, May 1903; CAP - 92, 25 Oct. 1903; according to these orders
* umdas and shaykhs were to receive between them: 1$ of land and date
tax;'2^ fo of the *ushr; 5$ of ‘fcke herd tax; and 10$ of the^tribute. The 
latter applied only to nomad tribes.See also GAO - 224, 16 Wov.1904*
^Slatin*s diary, Notes on Kordmfan 1903, SAD/44I; see also p.91-2.
Slatin to Wingate, Sunday In.d.Mar. 1908?l, SAD/282/3/l; Slatin who 
was inspecting Dongola wrote rather cynically:1...Dongola is I am 
afraid the centre of humanity...1
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the government's financial difficulties, had to agree with his pro­
vincial governors that the remuneration of shaykhs was insufficient^** 
Nazirs, who during the Turco-Egyptian period had been exempted from 
taxation, and in addition derived numerous benefits from their
tribesmen, lost their privileged position under the new regime and
2received instead a low monthly salary • Hence, they continued to
levy internal tribal taxes which were not recognized by the govern—
3
meht • The government, though fully aware of the situation, failed 
to rectify it owing to financial considerations* Instead it rewarded 
its shaykhs by granting them 1Robes of Honour* and by making them 
part of the administrative establishment without incurring heavy'/
4.expenses V*
Wingate to Clayton, 13 Feb* 1911, Siil)/469/3; Wingate who was inspect­
ing the White Nile province wrote that *...out of over £30,000 collec­
ted in Taxes only about £1000 are given in remuneration - a small 
percentage indeed*.**
2C.E.Lyall,'Rights dues and customs prevailing among Arab tribes in 
the White Nile Province1, SNR - V0I.4 (l92l) pp!*199-203; Willis* s 
diary, 1 Mar. 1909, 6 Nov. 1909, 16 Nov. 1911, SAD/210/2; see also 
GAO - 46, 21 May 1903.
Willis’s diary, 6 Nov. 1911i SA3)/210/2; internal t axes such as tulba 
and fitr were paid by the shaykhs of smaller tribal units to the 
nazir* while dayfa was levied on clients from other tribes; see also 
SIR - 130, May 1905; SIR - 135, Oct.1905.
"^The ’Robes of Honour1, were divided into three classes and were 
awarded by Wingate* The names of the recepients were published in 
the Sudan Gazette; see for instance SG - 19 (supplement), 19 Nov.1901; 
SG - 34* (supplement),Apr* 1902; SG - 44, Jan* 1903; see also Wingate*s 
diary, 10 Mar* 1902, SAD/272/8; Robes of honour could be withdrawn by 
the governor-general '...if the holder of the same ceases to be worthy 
of the honour bestowed upon him*..1 SG - 59, 1 Feb* 1904* One of the 
more amusing incidents was reported by the governor of Sennar who 
initiated the shaykhs *.*.into the game of polo on donkeys*..*, GGR -
1906, p.732.
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The government clearly failed to establish the authority of 
tribal leaders which was one of its declared aims* The disruption 
of tribal cohesion and the loss of leadership during the Mahdia 
made the achievement of this aim extremely difficult* The general 
impression obtained from reading the provincial reports, as well as 
the private correspondence and diaries of British officials, is one 
of confusion* The government constantly claimed to be interested in 
furthering the independence of tribal leaders, whereas the inspectors 
and governors undertook an ever increasing share of their responsi­
bilities*1'.
• ••The ambiguo-usjposition of the Sudan chiefs had resulted 
from the assumption that they could be used as part of the 
administrative hierarchy and still maintain their tradition 
nal relationship with their people*..The attempt in the 
early days to utilize them as part of the Government 
machinery while withdrawing some of their powers had 
resulted in a chaotic situation *...^
c* Punitive expeditions*
Armed expeditions were a permanent feature of tribal administra­
tion throughout Wingate's governor-generalship* They were aimed 
primarily at subduing turbulent tribes and protecting their tax- 
paying neighbours* In the frontier areas they had the additional 
task of fighting against the slave trade and arms runners* The
This was only realized in 1926 when a new tribal policy was being 
advocated* A note on Government policy toward the Native population, 
pp.5-7; see also B.K.Cooke, 'Native administration in practice: 
Historical outline*, Hamilton, pp.191-203*
2
G.Reining, The Zande Scheme* p*35*
government could not afford to establish military posts in the remote
districts of the southern provinces* Hence armed administrative
patrols were undertaken by the government in order to demonstrate its
power to the tribal population who otherwise would not have known of
1
the governments existence •
During the early years of the Condominium the government was con­
cerned with establishing posts and with opening a way through the
2
sadd to the Bahr al-Ghazal • Once a semblance of government w&s
established, tribal resistance started, and was soon punished by
military expeditions* A minor affray with the Dinka near Rumbek
towards the .end of 1901, was followed by a more serious conflict
with the Agar Dinka, culminating with the murder of Scott-Barbour,
3a British inspector • Wingate, who it the time was inspecting the 
White Nile province, ordered the British officer commanding the 
punitive expedition ‘ ...to deal without mercy with all those he 
captures who were present at S.B's IScott-Barbouri murder..,*^ 
Consequently, *...the villages of Sheikhs and headmen implicated 
were bufnt and their cattle and grain confiscated and the men them- 
selves shot when taken, and beyond all doubt, found guilty...1
^For a brief survey of these expeditions see Handbook, pp.180-3j
for expeditions against religious movements and revolts see pp.199-210*
^See for instance SIR - 77* 9 Dec*190.0- 8 Jan. 1901, Report on the 
Sudd Cutting Expedition, by Major M.Peake R*A. (Sep. 1900)'.
3SIR - 88, Nov. 1901; GGR - 1902, p.229.
Wingate's diary, 2 Mar. 1902, SAD/272/8 .
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Stacie, who was sent to reinforce the expedition, reported that 
1 .. .punishment was inflicted "by "burning the houses. •.I should say
1there are not more than a dosen houses l&ft in the whole district..1
But, a few months later, the Agar Dinka struck again. They attacked
the tribes who had been friendly to the government, burnt their
villages and stole themr cattle. A new punitive expedition was there-
2fore launched and several more tribesmen were shot • The British 
officer in charge of the expedition reported optimistically that the
3
Agar Dinka had now become truly friendly to the government ,
A similar procedure was followed in the first government expedi­
tion against the Nuer in the Pashoda district, in April 1902. The 
British officer in charge of Fashoda sent a message to Denkur, one 
of the^tribal leaders of the Buer, that he should come to offer his 
submission to the new government. When no reply was received, a 
punitive expedition was undertaken:
...about 250 head of cattle were captui'ed, 400-500 sheep and 
and goats, and about 50 tusks of ivory, which should more 
than pay all expenses incurred. Estimated value of loot £600 
...Many of Denkur1s villages were burnt...he himself must 
have lost all prestige...4
Three months later.the Nuer retaliated by attacking their neighbours,
5
the Dinka, who had assisted the government . The governor of Fashoda
•‘•.SIR .94, . May' 1902.
2SIR - 96, July 1902.
3sir - 97, Aug. 1902.
4SIR - 94, May 1902; SIR - 93, Apr. 1902.
5SIR - 9 6, July 1902.
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who summed up the results of this expedition wrote:*
...The Government has undoubtedly lost rather then gained 
ground, owing to the unfortunate results obtained by the 
expedition of Denkur in April last when the inhabitants fled... . 
before the government troops and returned to find their, 
village burnt and cattle vanished...^
Thus the pattern of southern administration was set and was in­
tensified during the following years. In the years 1903-5 'the govern­
ment sent three punitive expeditions to subjugate the Azande of the 
Bahr al-Ghazal province. In 1905 the mission was finally accomplished# 
Yambio, the Sultan of the Azande, was killed in battle and the tribe,
which had previously been harassed by the army of the Congo Free State,
2submitted without much resistance ’# The inevitable result was that
the Azande chiefs lost control of their tribe which, in consequence,
3
had to be administered by government officials •
Wot all the senior British officials agreed with this policy. 
Matthews, the governor of the Upper Wile province from 1902-8, advo­
cated peaceful penetration and insisted that 1 ...the act of going 
through the country without molestation of the natives, cannot but 
appeal to the savage mind...*^ Following the first punitive expedi­
tion against the Azande, Matthews insisted that the tactless behaviour
1GGR - 1902, p.346.
2GGR - 1905j P P * 6 - 8 ;  A scientific expedition from the Congo had tried 
to establish itself in that area, and the urgency of establishing 
direct control over the Azande was probably motivated by fear of fo­
reign penetration; see Correspondence regarding the fLemaire Expedi- 
tion1, 9 Jan.- 30 Apr. 1904, FO 403/346, pp.4-105
C.Reining, The Zande Scheme, pp.17-20; see also pp.286-7.
4ggr - 1904, p.133.
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of its British commander was largely responsible for the subsequent
1
hostility of the tribe • In his own province, Matthews consistently
opposed the use of force* He sent Wilson, his senior inspector, to
collect tribute south of the Sobat river accompanied by only six
jihadiya, Wilson, !•••assessed and collected*.• a tax worth about
£400...he is one of the few men we seem to have who throughly under-
2stand the "pacification" policy*..* The following year Matthews
objected to launch a punitive expedition against the Nuer. He claimed 
that the 1.•.hostility of the Nuers to the presence of a British 
official has been deliberately fabricated by the Dinkas...1 , and 
insisted that no armed intervention was necessary in an intertribal 
conflict^*. Mathhews persisted in his views, until he left his pro­
vince in 1908, and stated in his final report:
•*.Government is a necessity, of course, if we are to occupy 
their country, but in some ways it is not an unmixed blessing, 
therefore one is probably not far wrong in saying that those
tribes are best off which have as little of it as possible...
A similar policy was advocated in I9O6 by the new governor of
Bahr al-Ghazal. He insisted that unnecessary emphasis had been
placed on military expeditions: *
^Matthews to Wingate, 12 Apr, 1904» SAD/275/3*
^Matthews to Wingate, 11 Apr* 1904j Ibid,
3ggr - 1905, p . 16.
Ibid, p.150; when in 1906 a punitive patrol was sent to deal with 
the Atwot Dinka, without trying peaceful penetration, Matthews protes­
ted strongly; see Matthews to Wingate, 2 Jan. 1907j SAD/28o/l.
^GGR - 1908, p.655; sea also pp.284-5*
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•..Any further patrolling in the Southern districts, except by 
an inspector and his escort, is undesirable. We want the people 
to realize that we have ideas beyond the provision of supplies 
and carriers. .
Owen, the governor of Mongalla and a former Sudan agent, held
quite different views. He favoured active intervention in tribal
and intertribal feuds which he was convinced would 1...make both
2
peoples happy and contented...* His suggestion to undertake a puni­
tive expedition against the Beir tribe was, however, vetoed by Wingate 
owing to lack of funds’^. When Owen renewed his demand two years later, 
Wingate stated:
...Our policy in the Sudan, which I must insist on being under­
stood by all Governors who, like yourself, have in their provin­
ces a great deal of non-effectively occupied country, must be 
never to advance into such unoccupied districts unless you fully 
intend to stay there, and in the present case...I am not yet in 
a position to effectively occupy the Beir Country...4
In 1911 Wingate was ready to act. During that year the government
had undertaken sixteen military expeditions to enforce its authority^.
Wingate therefore urged Gorst to sanction a punitive expedition
against the Beir tribe who were constantly harassing the tax-paying
Dinka. *...The only alternative would be to abandon all idea of taking
XGGR - 1906, p.552.
^Owen to Wingate, 16 Aug. 1908, SAD/283/8/3.
^Wingate to Owen, 17 Dec. I908, SAD/298/3.
4Wingate to Owen, 14 Jan. 1910, SAD/290/l.
^Wingate to General Dalton, 18 Feb. 1911, SAD/300/l; Wingate wrote:
i..I am glad to think that little is known of our various difficulties 
in this respect at home...* Details of these expeditions were only 
mentioned in the Sudan Intelligence Reports.
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taxes from those tribes we cannot effectively jbrotect *, .The moral 
effect would be disastrous throughout the Sudan...1** Owing to dif­
ficulties of transport and water supply, nearly a year passed before
2the government was ready to strike » Wingate decided that the con­
centration of a large military force f...affords an opportunity which
should not be let slip for undertaking operations against the Anuaks..1
3
who were constantly raiding the tribute-paying Huer tribe • Consequen­
tly the largest military operation since the Wad Habuba revolt was 
4
set in motion • The expedition against the Beir was reported by
Wingate to have been accomplished -
...with a comparatively small loss of life on their side and a 
minimum of casualties on ours. In all...not more than 200 
Beirs have been killed, whilst our casualties, including 
friendlies, were only 41
The results of the Anuak patrol were regarded as less satisfac­
tory. The intelligence report stated that the Anuak were encoun­
tered on 15 March 1912, and that their villages were captured and
burnt. However, in the heavy fighting which took place about fifty
6
officers and W.C.O.s lost their lives * The private correspondence
"1
Wingate to Gorst, 1 Man. 1911, S-AD/300/3; see also Wingate to Grey,
20 Aug. 1911, SAD/301/2.
2SIR - 211, FeD. 1912.
^Wingate to Kitchener, 7 Deo. 1911, SAD/301/6/2.
^Minutes ~ No.13908, 2 Apr. 1912, FO 37l/l362, (signed?! R.P.M.
5Wingate to Stack, 12 Apr. 1912, SAD/l8l/l/3.
SIR - 212, Mar. 1912, p.3; Stack to Wingate, 1 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2,
Stack reported that Kitchener objected to the burning of villages be­
ing mentioned in official reports; see also Kitchener to Grey, 10 May 
1912, F0 371/1362.
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between Wingate, Slatin, and Stack indicated that the expedition was 
a completer failure. The British commander of theiexpedition under-. 
estimated the force of the Anuak, and consequently,did not wait for 
reinforcements but relied on the support of the, Wp:er friendlies who 
were reported to be hostile to the Anuak. However, the Uuer were
1...not sufficiently civilised to appreciate that point of view...*
1 ,
and failed to rally to the patrol's support • A special court,, of-
enquiry established that the British commander had not only disobey­
ed his instructions but had nearly caused a political scandal by
2 • . 
infringing the Abyssinian border On 26 March 1912 the government ;
officially declared peace with the Beir bribe, and decided to
3
establish military control o^er their district ?* Wingate noted 
optimistically that the Beir and Anuak were hereditary enemies 1..and 
now that the Beirs can be said to have definitely accepted Government 
authority, we may make some use of them when we take on the Annuaks..1^
1Wingate to Stack (private), 20 Apr* ,1912, SAI)/l8l/l; Wingate wrote 
that none of these points will be mentioned in the official report; 
see also Slatin to Wingate, 27 Apr. 1912, Ibid. Slatin who was very 
critical of the expedition promised to be *...as discreet as possible 
down in Cairo...1
^Wingate to Stack, 9 May 1912, SAD/l8l/2/2; Stack to Wingate, 20 May 
1912, Ibid.
3
SIR - 213, Apr. 1912; it is interesting to note that Major Leveson 
who was so heavily criticised for the conduct of the Anuak expedition 
was appointed as commander of the new Pibor-Sobat district*
^Wingate to Stack, 12 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3; later in the same year
the Abyssinian government proposed a combined military expedition
against the Anuak. This was turned down by Wingate who feared that 
the Abyssinian would raid in order to capture slaves; see Wingate to
Asser, 10 Sep. 1912, SAD/182/3/2.
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Despite the obvious shortcomings of punitive expeditions* Wingate 
persisted in his view that they were unavoidable. In 1913 he ^.de­
cided to bring the Agar Dinkas to book*..these childish natives must
be taught to respect the Government and to take the punishment for
1
not doing so...1 When he proposed a further expedition against the
2
Garjalc Nuer it was vetoed by Kitchener who feared another fiasco •
Wingate was^hhrefore forced to cancel the expedition and to *...try 
peaceful penetration...*^ Less than six months later the expedition 
was sanctioned as peaceful penetration had apparently proved ineffect­
ive* Wingate was confident *...that captured cattle etc., from them 
I the Garjalc Nuerl will, in all likelihood, coirer the expense of the 
patrol...*^
Judging by the results, as reported by Wingate in 1914> the policy 
of punitive patrols had achieved little, if any results. Intertribal 
fighting continued to flourish throughout the southern Sudan • Even 
Owen, an avowed protagonist of military force, had to admit that the 
fighting between the Nuer and the Bor Dinka was the outcome of the 
recent punitive expedition which *...left the Nuers free to act 
against their nedt door neighbours...*^
“l
Wingate to Eeilden, (Governor of Bahr al-Ghazal),21 Eeb.1913,SAD/185/2/2.
^Clayton to Wingate, 3 Nov. 1913, SAD^469/5«
^Wingate to Clayton, 6 Nov. 1913, Ibid.
^Wingate to Stack (private), 18 Apr. 1914? SAD/190/1/2.
5
^GGR - 1914, pp.3-5; Wingate reported constant tribal fighting between 
the Anuak, the Nuer, and the Dinka, while the shaykhs of the Azande 
had to be deported for fermenting sedition.
Owen to Wingate, 5 July 1914» SAD/l9l/l/2.
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In the northern provinces of the Sudan the system of tribal
administration followed different lines# Order was maintained by the
government posts and military action was only required on the Darfur 
1border • Turbulent tribes were dealt with by ordinary policy measures
2which in most cases proved quite adequate * But the Nuba mountains, 
although part of Kordofan, were dealt with on lines similar to those 
employed in the south. The first major military operation in the Nuba 
mountains took place at Talodi in 1906 . On 25 the Arabs near
Talodi killed the EJgyptian ma*mur and thirty-eight men at a local dan­
ce* According to the official report the main reason for the uprising 
was the Arabs1 dissatisfaction with the governments anti-slavery 
measures^* In the ensuing battle, in which the Nuba makks of Kadugli, 
Jabal Iliri, and Jabal Qadxr fought with the government against the 
Arabs, seven Arab shaykhs and 120 men were killed and 100 prisoners 
were taken to SI Obeid. The■government reinforcements, which arrived
after the- battle was over, killed another 350 Arabs and took 100
, . 5
additional prisoners • Wingate who inspected Kordofan shortly after 
the incident, wrote:
^See pp*85” 6*
^See for instance GGR - 19^7» PP*44“5> SIR - 193> Aug. 1910*
For religious uprisings in the Nuba mountains see pp.208-9•
^GGR - 1906, p.7; for the unofficial versions about the Talodi murder 
and the subsequent court martial of the rebels, see pp.270-1.
5SIE - 143, June 1906.
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• ••I cannot "but feel that with our pin point garrisons at El Obeid 
Bara, and Talodi, we are really ruling the vast Kordofan country 
far more by bluff than by anything else•.."Yeshurn waxed fat 
and kicked” can a&ell apply to the majority of Kordofan tribes  ^
and we ought to be in a position to deal with them if they kick.**
A major operation against the Nyima mountains of the Nuba district
was undertaken in 1908* This group of hills, which had not been under
government control during the Turco-Egyptian period and the Mahdia,
was captured by an overwhelming force and the inhabitants were punish- 
2
ed severely • Justifying the burning of villages and the destroying
of crops, the sub-governor of the Nuba mountains wrote:1*..Until such
a time as we can enforce the Penal Code the punishment must be collec- 
3
tive...1 The Nyima patrol opened a new period in the Nuba mountains
during which the government relied on punitive expeditions to enforce
its authority. Action was taken against the Katla Kidu, Tima, Tira,
and Dagig hills during the years 1909-1910^*
The governments method in one of these expeditions was described
by Savil§,then governor of Kordofan.
...On finding no opposition we only burned the houses and grain 
and killed all animals...after lunch we went on to a few tukls 
we had overlooked in the morning and while finishing off those 
and killing a few more pigs, we saw some of the friendlies 
coming up and doing a little looting...5
^"Wingate to Cromer, 12 Dec. 1906, SAD/279/6.
2 S A R  -  1 9 0 8 ,  p p . 5 7 - 8 .
3GGR - 1908, p.590; see also Wingate to Gorst, 29 Deo. 1908,F0 371/659. 
^Handbook Kordofan. p.95i GGR - 1910| PP* 56-61.
^Savile's diary, 1 Feb. 1910, SAD/427/7.
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At one of the mountains Savile met with opposition. The makk of Tagoi 
refused to accompany him to Tendik, whereupon Savile ordered his vil­
lage to be destroyed* In the resulting battle, the government troops 
were beaten by the Nubas and forced to retreat‘d. This incident was 
a direct result of Savile1 s lack of knox^ledge of intertribal relations,
for it was caused by the long standing enmity between the makk of
2Tagoi and the other makks who were accompanying Sasvile • Nevertheless
Wingate decided that punishment was essential, and entrusted the ex-
3
pedition to Asser, his adjutant-general • A severe battle took place 
in which many prisoners were taken. The makk of Tagoi, who succeeded 
in escaping, was eventually caught and executed in April 1911^ '* Both 
Slatin and Asser condemned the expedition and bitamed the British of­
ficer in charge of the Nuba mountains as being responsible for the 
unnecessary bloodshed. Asser wrote:1...I donnot think that such a
notoriously bloodthirsty medal hunter as Vickery is the type of man
 ^ *5to look after and guide such people as the Nubas. •*. Slatin commented:
1...The whole Tagoi Expedition is regretable it was provoked by Bimb. 
Vickery...and could by careful management have been avoided...1
1 ITdxcL. 18 Apr. 1910.
2S1R - 189, Apr. 1910',
Wingate to Asser, 12 Sep. 1910j SAD/297/3; Wingate to Gorst, 22 Sep. 
1910, Ibid.
4SAR - 1911, p.63: GGR - 1911, p.8.
^Asser to Wingate, 12 Oot. 1910, SAD/298/l.
Slatin1s diary, 6 Nov. 1910, SAD/441*
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Nonetheless, similar expeditions were undertaken in the following
years. In 1911 five punitive patrols were sent against the Nuba
mountains* Villages and crops were burnt, cattle was confiscated,
1
and many prisoners were taken • A major battle extending for oVer 
two months, took place in 19141 when over 5000 Nubas from Tira al-
2Alchdar fought against the government troops before they surrendered •
With the outbreak of the first World War Wingate reluctantly decided
3
to postpone further action until'vthe conclusion of hostilities >• The 
only major military action during the War was an expedition against 
Fiki (Ali, one of the Nuba makks, who rebelled against the government 
in 1915^» By "the end of that year the preparations for the conquest 
of Darfur absorbed all the governments resources, and punitive expe- 
ditions against the tribes had to be postponed *
While punitive expeditions were aimed primarily at demonstrating 
the government’s authority and collecting taxes, one of their most 
disturbing features' was the compulsory drafting of prisoners into the 
army. This was yet another sphere in which the Anglo-Egyptian
GGR - 1911,p.8.
2GGR £ 1914,. pp.5-65 SIR - 240, July 1914.
3Ibid.
^Frank Balfour to Lady Balfour, 27 July 1915» SAD/303/6; see also pp’* 
216-7*
^Wingate to Balfour, 20 Dec. 1915i SAD/197/3/2; for details see Theo­
bald, *Ali Dinar. pp.l54“l6l* An interesting sideline of the conquest 
of Darfur, was Wingate’s plan to employ aeroplanes in the tribal ad­
ministration of the less accessible districts; see Memorandum by 
Major C.H.Stigand, 20 Aug. 1916, SAD/2OO/5.
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authorities followed in the footsteps of their Turco-Egyptian and
1Mahdist predecessors • An article published in 1902, claimed that
'•••it isnft war that they wage in Africa; what is there carried on
2
is nigger hunting*..*
Following the reconquest many of the old Sudanese soldiers had
to he released from the Egyptian army, and were settled in colonies *
Despite the mass recruiting which took place both from the ranks of
the Mahdist jihadiya and from amongst the liberated slaves, there was
a constant demand for more recruits^* The situation was further
aggravated by Wingate's policy of replacing Egyptian units by those
5composed of Sudanese . Hence provincial governors were instructed to
6do their utmost to obtain as many recruits as possible. But as volun­
teers apparently did not supply the required numbers, recruiting 
became an essential adjunct of the punitive expeditions. One of the 
major hunting grounds was in the Nuba mountains where punitive expe­
ditions became very frequent after 1908. Following one of those 
expeditions, Slatin wrote:1...Today arrived over 100 Nuba prisoners;
^R.Hill, Egypt in the Sudan 1820-1881, pp.46-8; for a description of 
the siave-s o1dx er s TbaaTnqirf in the southern provinces see Holt, 
Mahdist State, pp.34—5? R.Slatin, Fire and Sword in the Sudan.*.,p.380; 
see also H.Russell, The ruin of the Soudan, causet effect and remedy, 
(London 1892), pp*17“9* Russell relates how the Baqqara tribes under­
took slave raiding in order to pay their taxes to the Turco^Egyptian 
government•
2H.R.Fox Bourne,* Punitive Expeditions in Africa*,The Aborigines'Friend, 
Vol.6, Apr. 1902, p.3.
^GAO - 711 12 June 1901; see also p.
^S.S.Butler, The Egyptian Army In.d.1,SA0/422/l3; see also The Times.
30 Mar* 1900; Slatin to Wingate, 21 Jan. 1900, Inclosure in Cromer 
to Salisbury, 8 Feb. 1900, FO 78/5086.
^Thms policy was decided, upon following the Omdurman mutiny of 1900; 
for details see pp.165-8.
6. CAP- 66, 28 May 1901.
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men & boys who were taken from the ICattla and Tirra mountains and will
he enlisted as soldiers - all in a pit able isici state..** It seems
that the number of prisoners to be recruited was even taken into
account when planning anlexpedition. Following the patrol against
the Beir and Anualc, Asser complained to Wingate:1.. *1 find that owing
to our expectation of obtaining prisoners from the Annuaks and Beirs
2
not being realised, we are some 3000 Sudanese short...* In 1913 
Asser suggested the imposition of a levy of men on some of the southern 
tribes:
...I see the Nuers and Shilinks have had a scrap. Would it not 
be a good opportunity to help recruiting by making the Nuers 
produce a similar number of men to what they killed and hand 
them over to the Army? I would be a good way of introducing 
them to the idea of a levy of men.*.3
There can be no doubt that these methods of recruiting had a bad 
effect on the standard of the army as well as on the attitude of the 
tribes to the idea of voluntary recruiting. Analysing the massive 
desertion from Sudanese units in 1915» Colonel Brake, the new adjutant- 
general, wrote that the compulsory recruiting of prisoners and unde­
sirables was largely to blame^#
The failure of punitive expeditions was clearly stated by two
1Slatin's diary, 29 Deo. 1910, SAD/441.
2Asser to Wingate, 12 Aug. 1912, SAD/182/2/l.
^Asser to Wingate, 4 Apr. 1913, SAB/l86/l/2; Stack who was then Sudan 
agent came forward with the idea of exchanging cattle for recruits; 
Stack to Wingate, 7 Sep. 1913, SAD/l87/3/l*
^Drake to Wingate, 26 May 1915> SAB/195/5*
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Anglo-Sudanese officials who served as inspectors during Wingate’s
governor-generalship. Willis, who became director of intelligence in
1920, defined the government’s tribal policy in the south, as *
’...administration by raids...1:
...It is not surprising if the natives could detect but little 
difference between the old Turkish, the Dervishes, and the 
Sudan Government. They all raided, but the last was not 
interested in slaves but took cattle only and was possibly 
more efficient in the methods of getting them*..l
It was only after the first World War that * ...a return was made
to the old plan of peaceful penetration but under circumstances far
2
more difficult.. 1 A similar view was taken by Gillan, who had 
served in Kordofan since 1 9 1 0 ^ .The success or otherwise of the 
administration was judged largely in terms of "patrols” and few other 
questions were a s k e d . . . H e  also criticised the use of ’friendlies* 
in punitive expeditions as ’...the looting and cruelty committed by 
undisciplined friendlies usually lead to^ /sub sequent recriminations and 
suspicions which take years to die down...*^ Finally, Gillan warned 
against the burning of villages and the confiscation of cattle, which 
punished the innocent but allowed the ringleaders to prepare for the 
next round^.
1Survey of the policy of the Sudan Government in the Upper Hile.
In.a. 1926?!., SAD/212/10/1. The survey was probably written by Willis.
2Ibid.
3SPS. p.26.
^Gillan, Huba, p.5*
hbid, p.53.
6Ibid, pp.54-5-
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Chapter VIII.
Land-settlement and taxation'.
During the later years of the Khalifa’s rule the Sudan was struck
by continuous famine* Many of the cultivators of the Gezira, the
most fertile part of the country, were partially expropriated to
make room for the Baqqara immigrants. Agriculture was not only
overtaxed, but also ravaged by the ill-disciplined and starving
1Mahdist soldiers # The immediate resumption of cultivation was 
essential both economically and politically, and was regarded by the 
authorities as the best guarantee for peace* To achieve this, 
cultivators had to be assured that the ownership of their lands 
would not be challenged by the new authorities. Furthermore, land 
speculators had to be warned not to purchase land frcm its previous 
owners who had fled from the Sudan during the Mahdia and whose 
claims of ownership could not be acknowledged without evicting the 
present cultivators^1* A IChedivial decree was therefore promulgated 
in April 1897» which provided for the compulsory registration of 
titles^.
1For details see Holt, Mahdist State, pp.235-6; see also ’Owner­
ship of Land1, inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 20 Feb* 1900,
FO 78/5086.
E.F.Knight, Letters from the Sudan. (London 1897)i PP*195-6; Knight,
The Times special correspondent who accompanied the expeditonary 
force during the Dongola campaign, warned against the massive sale 
of lands by refugees from the Sudan to Greek speculators in Cairo.
3S.R.Simpson, ’Land Law and Registration in the Sudan’f Journal of 
African Administration. Vol.FII, No.1.(1955)» p.ll.
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a, Agricultural land.-settlement.
Following the reconquest, Kitchener proclaimed that no land
q
sales would he recognized without a valid title to such lands •
This proclamation, which set out to protect the native landowners
from foreign speculators, remained on& of the guiding principles of
the government’s land policy throughout the Wingate era. The second
principle regarding land-settlement was proclaimed in the ’Title to
Lands Ordinance 18991• It ordered that continuous possession of
lands during the five years preceding the date of claim ’...shall
2create an absolute title as against all persons...’ It further 
stated that' any person who claimed to have been dispossessed of his
land during the Mahdia would have to supply ample proof as to his
title. Finally, in default of the two previous conditions, ’..conti­
nuous possession since the re-establishment of the civil authority
3shall creater;a prima facie title...* Thus the government in its 
desire to resume cultivation and to avoid any further dislocation of 
the inhabitants, recognized the legal validity of titles which were 
acquired durihg the Mahdia.^
1SG - 1, 7 Mar. 1899; SG - 10, 1 Apr. 1900.
2SG - 2, 27 May 1899.
3
Ibid; see also ’Ownership of Land’, inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 
20'Feb. 1900, F0 78/5086.
^A very similar attitude was adopted by the Mahdi. He wrote to Muha­
mmad al-Khayr ?Abdallah Khujali, governor of Berber, that lands which 
were wrongfully taken during the Turkiya should be returned to their 
lbgal owners, unless a period of seven years had passed since their 
dispossession. See Manshurat al-Imam al-Mahdi, Vol.3,pp.41-2; for 
the legislation and settlement of town lands see pp.348-57.
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In the following years further legislation was undertaken,■ The
!Land Acquisition Ordinance 1903*1 enabled the government to take
possession of any land which was ’•••likely to be needed for any
public purpose.••’ Compensation was to be settled by the provincial
governors by ’...a friendly agreement with the person interested*.*’
Failing agreement, a mommission of three members, two of whom were
to be appointed by the governor, was empowered to settle the dispute'*'.
Accordingly, in the following years, the government took possession
of lands required for development in many towns and rural districts
of the Sudan. The land acquisition orders were published in the
Sudan Gazette and contained the names of the landowners and the size
2of their respective plo^s of land •
Until 1905, no mention of government lands was made in any of 
the ordinances dealing with landownership. 1...Tfe seems to have been 
assumed that the Government had an inherent power of disposition over 
any land in which no private claims had been proved...1  ^ In 1905 'fche 
government promulgated an ordinance for the settlement of rights over
1SG - 45, Mar. 1903; GSR - 1903, p.80.
2
The first order was published in SG - 48, June 1903, and referred 
to lands belonging to Jirjis ?Abd al-Shahid and his brothers; in 
July 1903, three saqiyas were acquired in Dongola province belonging 
to al-Hajj Bur al-Da im Ahmad, Husayn Khalifa, and Jamil Babikr.
SG - 49, July 1903; see also SG*~ 58, Jan. 1904; SG - 65, Aug. 1904;
SG - 73, Mar. 19°5; see also GGR - 1906, pp.610, 673-4; where it was 
announced that the government acquired land in Karima and Khartoum 
for the expansion of the railway terminus.
3
Simpson,1 Land law and registration in the SudanJ Journal of African 
Administration. Vol.VII, no.l (1955), p.12.
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waste forest and unoccupied lands. According to this ordinance the
government was deemed the legal owner of all lands and forests which
were 1 ... entirely free from any private rights or that the rights
1
exist ings.. *do not amount to full ownership...,1 Should the govern­
ment decide to develop these hands 1 . • .The Governor-General may
compulsorily expropriate all private rights...existing in or over 
2such lands...*
In 1905 'the government took further action against the unautho­
rized sale of lands. In June 1906 Phipps warned Wingate that Greek
speculators were buying land in the Gezira for as little as P.T*40 
3a • The government therefore forbade the selling of lands
without the written consent of the provincial governors, and declared 
that all sales to which such consent was not given would be regarded 
as null and void^. Prospective buyers were ofdered to apply only to 
the provincial governors or to the director of agriculture and lands * 
These orders were slightly modified in the years 1906-8, when the 
government decided to recognize sales of land in the province of 
Khartoum which had been concluded prior to the publication of the 1905
.1SG - 80, 24 Aug. 1905.
2m a .
Phipps to Wingatei 12 June 1905i SAD/276/6; according to Phipps a 
,jadfa consisted of 5^/3 feddans and was the measurement used for 
taxation. According to R.Hill, Egypt in the Sudan... «p.41 a ,jad*a 
was 5^/3 feddans.
^SG78, July 1905» 1 Disposal of land by natives11.
^SG - 79* Aug. 1905j 1 Sale or lease of lands1•
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1order . It also enabled cultivators to sell or mortgage their rights 
2fru-crr lands without, however, prejudicing the ownership of the-.govern- 
ment over such lands'^.
The underlying motive of all these orders was to expand cultiva­
tion while safeguarding the inhabitants1 rights and encouraging the
formation of a Sudanese proprietory class^* All lands which were
5
regularly cultivated were regarded as mulk and the full rights of
6 ‘
their owners were guaranteed • However, lands which depended for 
their cultivation on high floods or rains, as well as forests and 
waste lands, were deemed to belong to the government who could ex­
propriate the cultivators when such lands were required for develop- 
7ment . In 1911, Kitchener declared that all the lands in the Sudan
were Khara.jiya, thus providing the government with yet another
8
safeguard against the alienation of lands <•
1SG - 96, 23 May 1906; SG - 113, June I907.
2
Buqr or Karu were the lands lying behind the river banks which were 
only cultivable in years of exceptionally high floods. GGR - 1905jP*64i 
J.D.Tothill,(ed)Agriculture in the Sudan.(London 1948),p*943*
3SG - 123, Jan. 1908.
4Wingate to Cromer, 6 Apr. 1905, SAH/276/4.; GGR - 1905, pp.63-7.
5Mulk - land in which full private ownership is recognized*
^Simpson,* Land law, and registration in the Sudan, Journal of African 
Administration. Vol.VII, No.l (1955), p.13.
7'When in 1921 the government wanted to expropriate lands in the Gezira 
which had been recognized as mulk, a special ordinance had to be 
promulgated to that effect; Ibid, p.14*
o
Kitchener to Wingate, 5 Apr. 1912, SAD/l8l/l/3; Wingate to Kitchener,
15 Apr. 1912, Ibid; see also SAR - 19H» P-52. Khara.jiya lands which 
originally did not amount to full ownership, had since 1891 been re­
garded as equaintoufaklk.Thus Kitchener's declaration seems to have had 
no legal significance; see G.Baer,A history of landownership in mo­
dern Egypt 1800-1950*(London 1962),pp.8-12.
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The Sudan government had thhee major advantages in dealing with
iand-settlement• It was not hampered by the capitulations which had
obstructed land legislation in Egypt and other parts of the Ottoman 
1
Empire • Furthermore, most of the cultivable lands were owned by
2small-holders, and the problem of large estates did not exist >.
Lastly, wacrf existed only in a small measure and thus a major 
difficulty was avoided.
The ’Title of Lands Ordinance* of 1899, provided for the appoint— 
meht of special commissions in the various provinces and districts 
in order to determine the ownership of lands within their jurisdic­
tion. These commissions were appointed by the governor-general 
and consisted of three commissioned officers of the Egyptian army 
and of two Sudanese notables^. Landowners could not appeal to 
any higher authority against the commission’s decisions. However, 
the commissions were empowered to reconsider a case if a petition
S
was presented within six months of its original decision •
^Ibid, pp.64-70, 120-131; Cromer, Modern Egypt, Vol.II, pp.426-442.
2
For the problem of disintegration of the large estates in Egypt, 
see G.Baer, A history of landownership in modern Egypt 1800-1950, 
pp.13-39, 112-120.
^P.M.Holt, Holy families and Islam in the Sudan, Princeton Hear 
East Papers, Ho*4 (1967)1 P*6$ see also pp.192,276-7; for the -problems 
connected with awqaf in Egypt, see G.Baer, A history' of landownership 
in modern Egypt 1800-1950, pp.169-185.
4SG - 2, May 1899.
^SG — 45, Mar. 1903, amending the'Title of Lands Ordinance 1899'.
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The presidents of most of these commissions were British officers
and inspectors, and its Sudanese members were generally thev-shaykhs
1of the most powerful tribes within its areas of jurisdiction •
Parallel to the work of these commissions, a cadastral survey and a
registration of title deeds was undertaken in the agricultural dist- 
2riots , while forests and wastelands were treated as a separate
3
category and entrusted to specially appointed ’Settlement Officers* •
The work of all these commissions was under the general supervision
of the legal secretary who was in charge of land-settlement during a
great part of this period^-. Defining tha aims of the governments
land policy in 1908, Bonham Carter wrote:
. .*T* The settlement of all disputes as to land#
2. The establishment of all titles on a basis of certainty, 
and the registration of the saiWi- 
3* The ascertainment and registration of the rights of the 
Government to land*
4* Where land is subject to tax the provision of an equitable 
basis for taxation*...5
1The appointments\of these commissions wdre published in the Sudan 
Gazette!» These commissions functioned for a limited period only* See 
for instance SG - 32, 1 Feb 1902; Sennar Mudiria Lands Commission;
SG - 40, Got* 1902, Bon&ola Mudiria Lands Commission; SG - 71j Feb* 
1905» Berber Mudiriar.Lands Commission}. SG - 86, Jan* 1906, Sennar 
Mudirian Lands Commission*
2The central cadastral survey was started in Dongola by its 'governor 
Colonel Jackson in 1903, but only in 1905 did the government order 
that surveys be started in other provinces* GGR - 1903, Appendix A, 
pp.154-7; see also SG - 80, 24 Aug* 1905,'The Demarcation and Survey 
Ordinance 1905*•
3rbid.
In the years 1904-10 land-settlement was part of the department of
agriculture and lands; see pp.129-130*
^GGR - 1908, The Legal Secretary1s Report, p.197*
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In order to achieve these aims the government had to overcome
numerous problems which were described by several government officials
1
responsible for land-settlement during that period • During the fibst 
few years the settlement officers were conoerned primarily with the
2ownership of saqiya and other lands which were cultivated regularly •
Bwnership was determined according to continuous cultivation for a
period of two to five years, while those who could prove legal owner-
ship by:t had not cultivated the land during the past few years were
3compensated with land elsewhere •
The ownership of lands-that could only be cultivated during years 
of exceptional rains or floods was far more difficult to determine^’1.
The most comprehensive work in this field is by H.fst .G.Peacock, A 
Report on the Land Settlement of the Gezira, Messelemia District, 
(London 1943)* Peacock was a judgd of the Sudan civil court andwas in 
charge of the Gezira land-settlement in the years 1906-10. A second 
report was written by J.G.Matthew, inspector in the Sennar province 
1905-9i and president of the land-settlement commission for Singa 
district. *Land Customs and Tenure in Singa District1,SNR,Vol.4,(l92l), 
pp.1-1 9. The third report was about land-settlement in the province 
of Berber and was written by Ryder, who became land-settlement officer 
in 1906* 'Memoirs of Ryder 1905-16J(typescript),SAD/4OO/8 . (Short 
references: Peacock, Matthew, Ryder)
2Ryder, pp.61-2; Peacock, p.21.
^'Title to Lands Ordinance 18991 » SG_ - 2, 27 May 1899*
^The terms used for the classification of lands were different in many 
of the provinces and were based on local usage. Thus Matthew (pp'.17-9) 
uses four terms for riverain lands, whilst Peacock divides them into 
six classes using different terms (Peacock pp.47-8)• The classification 
used by the government divided the lands into four main groups: 
a) sacriya or shaduf lands (artificially irrigated) , b) saluka lands 
(irrigated by floods), c)matara lands (dependent on rains), d)Karu and 
buqr (cultivated in years of exceptionally high floods) See GGR - 19^4» 
pp.5-7•
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These lands were usually claimed on a tribal basis and there was
1 * 'rarely any documentary evidence to prove ownership • Where valid
titles existed they derived from the Funj sultans, the Turco-Egypt!an
2
authorities, or the Mahdist state <* In the Singa district of the
province of Sennar the majority of landownership claims were based on
titles acquired during the Funj Sultanate. The tribal leaders who held
most of these titles were regarded as the unchallenged owners of these
3.lands, and were duly acknowledged as such by the new authorities U 
Over the years many of these lands had been subdivided amongst the 
individual members of the tribe, or were reassigned to other tribes 
and individual fakis^. In the Messelemia district of the Geaira, 
titles which were acquired during the Turkiya or the Mahdia had great.er 
weight than those of the Funj Sultanate and were regarded as ample
proof when put forward in claiming ownership. In the majority of
5cases, however, claims were based on oral evidence • In Sennar, the 
presence of Makk fAdlan, a direct descendant of the Funj Sultans, 
enabled the government officials to rely on his information > In the
Matthew, pp.2,8; GGR - 1908, p.198.
^Matthew, pp.1-11.
^Matthew, pp.2-5*
^Matthew, pp.5”7i Tor the granting of lands as free gifts (sadaqa) to 
fakis, see P.M.Holt, Holy families and Islam .in the Sudant Princeton 
Hear East Papers, Ho.4,(19^7)» P * 6 .  r _  ~
^Peacock, ppf. 42-4'.
^Matthew, p.l6. ' ’ '
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Blue Kile province landownership was based largely on inheritance!.
In the majority of cases the land inherited was not divided according 
to the Sharova, but was partitioned amongst the heirs by common con­
sent. The registration of titles of inherited land depended on oral
1evidence as there was generally no documentary proof . Other claims 
of landownership were based on purchase, dowries, gifts, and continuous 
cultivation^* In cases of dispute the settlement officer '...regis­
ters the land in the name of the person who appears to be the right
owner...and directs the other party, if not satisfied with the regis-
3
tration, to petition the Settlement Officer...*
A different approach was adopted for uncultivated lands in which 
native rights were recognized. The settlement officer was ordered to 
'...liquidate those native rights on the spot, and give in land... 
such compensation as he considers desirable, leaving the remainder of 
the land to be registered to Government free of r i g h t s . . T h e  in­
evitable result was that-the government commissions were overwhelmed
with, petitions. In 1906 there were 1,323 petitions dealing with land-
V . ' ■ <5
settlement in the Shendi district of Berber alone f while many other
^Ibid; GGR — 1905t P*357* Peacock, pp.31-2, 43-4*
2
Ibid, pp.33-4*
■^ Ibid, p.35*
^Corbyn (Settlement Officer ICamlin) to Legal Secretary, 28 Feb. 1910, 
SAD/290/2/2, inclosure in Wingate to Gorst, 29 Mar. 1910,SAD/290/3/l.
■5ggr - 1906, p.352.
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1petitions were directed to the governor-general • Bonham Garter 
admitted that many of these petitions were the result of mistakes in 
the early years. He further blamed the many irregular and unrecorded 
sales which continued despite government orders* He therefore ordered 
that many of the disputed cases should in future be referred to the 
Sharira Courts and not be left to the sole discretion ot the settlement 
officers^.
The area of privately owned land and the size of individual plots 
varied between the different provinces. Most of the lands in the 
Kassala province belonged to the government , while 1 privat Owner­
ship in the Gezira had been recognized in the past as lihng as living 
man remembered.. Moreover, the average size of individual holdings
in the Gezira was only 25 feddans, and each plot had to be registered 
5
separately . By 1913, the cadastral survey of over 2,300,000 feddans 
in the Gezira was completed. The ownership of these lands was divided 
between the government and about 40,000 individual owners^* In the 
province of Khartoum the average size of landholdings was 15 feddans
1Ibid, p.6; according to Shahln Bey, Wingate's Arabic secretary, the 
majority of the 1,185 petitions presented to Wingate concerned land­
ownership.
2ggr - 1906, p.351; GGR - 1908, pp.197-9.
3GGR - 1904, p.73'.
Peacock, p.36.
^Ibid, p.60.
Pearson Idirector of surveyl to Wingate, 25 Apr. 1913, SAD/108/1 6.
f°r sacri.ya lands and 55 feddans for buqr lands^. In Dongola and
Haifa individual shares in land and date trees were often so small
that the governor of Dongola.proposed '...to compel small shareholders
2to sell to larger...1
In the southern provinces and in the Nuba mountains land-settle- 
ment was not undertaken during this period. Tribal disputes concern­
ing land '...did arise as elsewhere...,but these were adjusted on a
3
tribal basis either by agreement or administrative decision...* In 
Kordofan the only land-settlement undertaken until 1916, was that of 
El Obeid and Dueim. Nearly all other lands were either owned by 
tribes of by the government and the few disputes that arose were 
settled according to local sustom^'. In the district of Bara, where 
many claims to private land were put forward by members of the river-
5ain tribes, they were recognised whenever supported by valid evidence *•
In the years 190-7idlland registration was completed in most of
6
the agricultural districts of the Sudan • Motivated by its desire to 
increase cultivation and to establish a contented class of small
1GGR - 1906. p.519.
2Ibid, p p . 6 1 4 ,  6 3 9 .
Gillan, Nuba, p.37*
^Handbook Kordofan. pp.109-10; see also SIR - 171,Oct. 1908; GGR - 
1908, p.596; SIR - 238, May 1914.
^SIR - 159? Oct. 1907i see also H.A.MacMichael,'Tlie Kheiran1,. SNR - 
Vol.3, (1920), pp. 231-244.
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landowners, the government recognised the cultivators as owners and 
divided tribal lands into individually held plots'*** By 1913, many of 
the uncultivated lands which had been given up by their owners’ owing 
to the introduction of a progressive land-tax were being reclaimed by 
their previous owners; '..*A proof of their increased means of culti­
vation. . •1 ^
The anti-speculative measures which had been introduced/since 1899, 
were not applied to what the government regarded as reliable capital­
ist companies which in turn were urged to undertake the development
3
of uncultivated lands • But private enterprise failed to respond; 
most of the foreign companies who applied lacked the necessary capi­
tal, and thus until the end of the First World War, the majority of 
development projects were undertaken by the government itself^* The
1In 1903 Slatin arranged with the Abu Sinn family of the Shukriya
tribe that they would give up 56,000 acres of their lands to the
smallholders who cultivated them. See Slatin to Wingate, 26 Jan.
1903, SAD/273/1; see also Peacodk, pp.39-40.
^GGR - 1912, p.102. For the introduction and the effects of the 
progressive land-tax, see p.36l.
3
GGR - 1904, PP*45~50; The report was by a special,commission appoint­
ed by Wingate to investigate the role of private enterprise in the 
Sudan’s economic development; see also The Times. 18 July 1904? SG -
64, 1 July 1904; GGR - 1907, pp.17-18.
^Gaitskell, Gezira, pp.46-50; see also Owen fo Wingate, 13 Jan. 1907, 
SAJ)/28o/l; Owen reported that the Khedive and Prince Muhammad *Ali 
had bought a considerable amount of land from Muhammad Sharif Wur al- 
Da’im with the intention of floating a company in Britain to under­
take its development. The scheme failed as a result of Owen's inter­
vention; see also Wingate to Slatin, 12 Apr. 1911, SAD/431/H;
Wingate reported enthusiastically about the progress made at the 
government's development are^near Tokar.
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one notable exception was the Sudan Experimental Plantation Syndicate
which was founded by an American, Leigh Hunt, in 1904* The syndicate
received a concession of 10,000 feddans at Zeidab, near the confluence
1of the Atbara with the Nile . It was this company which, under its
new name ’The Sudan Plantation Syndicate*, undertook the Gezira
2development project after the first World War .
While capitalist companies failed to respond to the government’s 
appeals, land sales to private speculators flourished despite the 
government’s regulations* There were a number of reasons why the 
government failed to enforce its poMcy: firstly, the land in ques­
tion was in the main privately owned and in many cases sold without
3government permission ; secondly, once the registration of titles was
4completed the government had no power to stop sales , and lastly,
while some of the governors adhered to the regulations, others adopted
§a more flexible attitude * It was also difficult to force local
Gaitslcell, Gezira, pp*51“3; the papers and correspondence in connec­
tion with the Zeidab concessuon, and the negotiations regarding the 
Gezira scheme are in SAD/l08/415J ®1°i* other land concessions granted 
during this period see GGR - 1908^ ,pp.5*~8.
^Gaitskell, Gezira, pp.53-73*
3
See for instance Bonham Carter to Wicola Amarandus, 22 Feb. 1902,
FO 14l/371J Bonham Carter informed Amarandus that his purchase of 
lands in Khartoum, was based on forged documents and would not be 
accepted by the government; see also GGR - 1907* pp.l7“l8»
^In 1906 Cromer warned Wingate ’•••that the manufacture of false nat­
ive claims was going on at a great rate, the Greeks being the insti- 
gators•*.We must not allow ourselves to be ’’done” in the presumed 
interests of the natives, but in the real interests probably of the 
Greeks,*.’ Cromer to Wingate, 2 Feb. 1906, SAD/278/2.
5 -The governors of Haifa and Khartoum adopted strict measures whilst 
the director of the department kf dgriculture and the governor of 
Dongola were more lenientj see GGR - 1902, pp.253* 287; GGR - 1906,
pp.662, 769-770; GGR - 1907, pp.17-18.
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cultivators to abstain from selling while the sale of government
lands was advertised in the Sudan Gazette and lands were sold freely
1to willing bidders .
It was not long before some of the Greek merchants commenced
2
buying lands in the Gezira from local landowners r. Angello Capato,
one of the biggest Greek merchants in the Sudan *•.•purchased about
20,000 feddans in Kamlin mostly from the Habuba family and amongst
others from Abd El ICader...* Altogether, the resulting alienation
of lands did not reach considerable proportions as there was' more
land for sale than willing purchasers^. Moreover, the government
5
refused to register the sold lands . Consequently, when in 1908;the 
Sudan was hit by an economic depression, many of the speculators had 
to sell at a loss, while others, who could not prove their ownership,
The first advertisement of the sale of lands in the. Gezira was pub­
lished in the Sudan Gazette No.46, April 1903* It referred to
1...845 feddans of Eirst Class Gezira land, situated in ...Kabushia.•* 
In 1902 over 500 feddans were sold to Mr Costi Loiso, a Greek mer­
chant and hotel-owner in Wadi Haifa. In the same year 15OO feddans 
were sold to Neberowi Bey; see GGR - 1902. pp*242,282; in 1906 Loiso 
bought another 500 feddans, and a concession of al-Hassa lands near 
Berber was sold to Amin Pasha ^Abdallah; see GGR - 1906, pp*570,636; 
see also GGR - 1908, p.4*
2Cromer to Wingate, 2 Feb. 1906, SAD/278/2; Sffl - 1905, p.152;
Cromer reported that Greek merchants in Khartoum bought over 50,000 
acres in the Gezira for P.T.4i!r an acre.
Bonham Carter to Wingate, 25 May 1909» SAI)/287/3; according to certain 
reports, land-settlement problems w;ere one ibf the reasons for the Wad 
Habuba revolt, however, this was denied by Wingate; see p.205.
4GGR - 1902, P.253; Sffi - 1908, p.60.
5SAR - 1905, pp.137-,152; Sffl - 1906, p.136.
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1were declared bankrupt . In the case of Angello Capato, whose liabi-
2
lities amounted to £E 230,000, Lord Grenfell , chairman of the Bank of
Egypt, intervened personally and adlced the government to register
3
Capato1s lands in the Gezira . This request was turned down by Bonham 
Carter, who wrote:’•..that it was impossible to register purchases 
of unsurveyed and unsettled.:lahd*.1 ^  In a private letter to Wingate, 
Bonham Carter added that the lands purchased by Capato were 
'...cultivated by permanent tenants...and it is doubtful whether it 
would be advisable to allow these tenancy lands to get into the hands 
of foreigners,..1
1GGR - 1908, pp.554-6; see also Luzatto to Slatin, 15 Nov.l908,SAD/284/- 
11/2; Luzatto was the director of the Bank of Egypt; in his letter to 
Slatin he appealed to the Sudan authorities to grant title deeds to 
several Greek merchants, who were hit as a result of economic crisis 
in Egypt, Lists of bankruptcies were published in the Sudan Gazettet 
throughout the years 1908-9*
^Grenfell, Francis Wallace, 1st Baron (l841-1925)t sirdar of the 
Egyptian army 1888-1892; commanded the Egyptian army in the Battle of 
Tushlci in I889; in 1902 he was raised to the peerage; was made field- 
marshal in I9O8; DUBS 1922-1930, pp.362-4*
^Bonham Carter to Wingate, 25 May 1909* SAD/287/3• Grenfell had pre­
viously approached Wingate to help the financial undertakings of the 
Bank of Egypt in the Sudan, He promised Wingate that following the 
death of Luzatto, the bank1s director in Egypt, the bank would be kept 
on more English lines* Wingate replied:1...You can rely upon me doing 
what I can to further the interests of the Bank in the Sudan...f,see 
Grenfell to Wingate, 9 Mar. 1909J Wingate to Grenfell, 22 Mar. 1909*
, SAD/286/3.
Bonham Carter to Wingate, 25 May 1909j SAD/287/3. Wingate was at the
time on a special mission in Somaliland and hence was not consulted 
by Bonham Carter about Grenfells request, (E.Wingate, Wingate of the 
Sudan, pp.151-3)*
^Bonham Carter to Wingate (private), 22 June 1909» SAD/287/4 *
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Aided "by the economic depression, the Sudan government succeeded
in checking land speculation in the Gezira, which was destined to
become the country’s major economic asset . In 1914 'khe government
. declared that no sales of land in the Gezira which occurred after i
1
1 July 1905 would be recognized as valid • Furthermore, the right
to purchase or lease lands in the Gezira was henceforth vested in the
government. The government had similar powers to determine prices
without taking into consideration any increasedin the value of 
2
land...* This policy was bitterly criticized by al-Ahram arguing
that it was ’...absurd to deprive the Egyptian of the right to possess
3land which he watered with his blood. . * 1 Similar articles appeared
in other Egyptian papers. However, the government maintained its
policy despite the criticism^.
b. Urban Iand-settlement.
In his annual report for 1899 Cromer wrote that the treatment of
urban property presented relatively few problems as compared with
■5
landownership in rural districts • Many of the towns had been reduced
1SG - 247, Feb. 1914.
2Ibid.
3
Al-Ahram* 5 July 1914; the quotation is from a tetter to the editor 
signed by a former Sudan government official. It was written following 
an article in al-Ahram. 1 July 1914j which criticized the Sudan govern­
ment’s attitude to foreigners and its land policy. The article and 
the letter were translated by the intelligence department,SAD/191/1/2.
^Butler to Wingate, 20 July 1914* Ibid; Butler wrote that several 
Egyptian newspapers criticized the land policy in the Sudan.
5
’Ownership of Land’,inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 20 Feb. 1900.
F0 78/5086.
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to ruins during the Mahdia and the reconquest, while others were
1
sparsely populated • Legislation for the ownership of town landswraas
initiated shortly after the reconquest, in all probability prompted
2by the governments desire to affect rapid urban development The
fTown Lands Ordinance 1899* provided for the *...settling of landowner-
ship in Khartoum, Berber, and Dongola and for laying out and rebuild-
3
ing the above towns...1 It authorized the government to obtain any
land it required, either by purchase or by exchange, thus enabling
the new towns tc> be planned without interference by property owners*
Landowners were ordered to erect buildings conforming to the 'tanzlm'
regulations1 , within two years^i. All lands which were not allotted
to private owners, or whose owners failed to comply with the building
regulcations, were to '...become and be the absolute property of the 
5Government...1 In March 1902, landowners in Khartoum were reminded 
'...that the time within which they were bound to erect buildings on
1Of the major towns only Omdurman and Suakin had a considerable popu­
lation, whilst Khartoum, Berber, Dongola, and El Obeid were ruined 
and largely deserted.
^Stome, p*206.
3SG2, 27 May 4.899.
hbid; the tanzlm regulations set down the standard of buildings which
had to be erected according to the classification of the land.
15
W.H.McLeon, The planning of Khartoum and Omdurman, Paper read at the 
R.I.B.A. Town Planning Conference (London 10-15 Oct. 1910),SAD/235/l* 
According to The Times, 11 Apr. 1900, the two years regulation was 
imposed in order to induce the inhabitants of Omdurman who owned 
land in Khartoum to move to the new town.
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1'their land expires on the 31st December 1902...* A year later
Wingate reported that most of the landowners had complied with the
2-building regulations !*
In I904 the 1 Towns Lands Ordinance1 was extended to ICassala, al-
Qadarxf, Dueim, and El Obeid, where land-settlement commissions had
3
been functioning for some time • The town lands commissions, which 
were composed of a president, two officers, and two notables, function­
ed in a similar way to the rural land commissions^1. The building 
regulations were henceforth applied to all major towns and in 1907
twenty-three landowners in Kassala lost their lands, having failed
5
to comply with the regulations • In Haifa, landowners who wanted to 
build had to present a petition to the governor in order to confirm 
that the land was in fact theirs. The governor, who had initiated 
this 1 paternal arrangement’, argued that it had .proved of the
1SG - 33, Mar. 1902.
GGR - 1903, p.63; see also SG — 42, Deo. 1902. The government announced
that it will take possession of all lands whose'owners had not complied 
with the building regulations.
3
SG - 59» Feb. 1904j the ordinance was extended to these towns 
following the government’s realization that the land-settlement 
commissions were functioning without any legal authority,
^The town land commissions for Khartoum, Dongola, and Berber were 
appointed in July 1899* The presidents.of the Khartoum and Dongola 
commissions were British officers, whilst the Berber commission was 
presided over by an Egyptian; SG - 3, 31 July 1899; A few months 
later the only Egyptian president was replaced by a British officer;
SG - 7? 2 Dec. 1899; see also SG - 10, Apr. 1900. For the functions 
of the rural settlement commissions, see pp. 337“38.
5SG - 120, 15 Nov. 1907.
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1greatest value in precluding or deciding subsequent law suits**.1
In I909 the 1 Town Building Regulations* were announced* They included
detailed instructions as to the type of buildings allowed for each
class of land and laid down sanitary regulations. Land-holders had
to apply to the municipal authorities or to the provincial governor
2
to obtain a building permit •
Special ordinances were promulgated for the settlement of town 
lands in Suakin, Omdurman, and Khartoum Worth* The Suakin land ordi­
nance was promulgated in 1904. It provided for the proof of titles
by five years cons'eoutive possession and its land-settlement commiss-
3.
ion consisted of only three members U The lands of Omdurman, unlike 
those of other towns, were regarded as government property ever 
since the reconquest# In 1906 however, the government decided to 
allocate lands to all genuine claimants !**.who were present at the 
time of the fall of O m d u r m a n * ^  Wingate ordered the sub-governor 
of Omdurman to act as commissioner in hearing the cases and deciding 
which claims were to be recognized^* The fHillet Hamid (Khartoum 
Worth) village lands Ordinace1 was promulgated in 1909* It provided
1CrGR - 1906, p. 624.
2SG - 206, 2 Wov* 1909; the only town where municipal authorities 
existed during that period was Khartoum.
3Sft- 63, June 1904*
4ggr - 1906, p.660*
^SG - 103, Dec. 1906j the commissioneriwa^: ie assisted by the Vmda 
of Omdurman and the shaykhs of the quarters.
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for the appointment of a settlement officeijfahose de*ieion on claims
was to be final, subject only to the approval of the governor-general'*';.
The most notable difference between the land ordinance applied to
Omdurman and Khartoum North, and those of other towns, was that the
inhabitants of the former towns were not represented on the settlement
commissions which consisted of a single British official.
Town surveys of Khartoum, Khartoum North, Omdurman, and Port Su-
2
dan were begun only in 1906 . A year later the fDeeds Registration
Ordinance1 ordered the registration of every sale, gifh, mortgage
or other disposition.* The legality of the transaction could be
proved by a document signed and sealed in the presence of a witness,
. 3
or by a Shari a court '. Finally, in 1912 *The Government Town Lands 
(Native Occupation) Ordinance* was enacted^. It enabled governors 
*...to set apart Government land near towns as sites on which natives 
may squat and erect dwellings** It also provided for compensation 
in the event of the occupiers being turned out of their sites* The 
governor was entitled to order the vaoation of these sites without
"l
Inclosure in Asser to Gorst, 2 Oct* 1909, FO 141/423*
2GGR - 1906, p.522*
^SG - 117, Sep* 1907; the registration of the Khartoum town lands was 
already ord&red in 1901; sec §2 "* ^4» June 1901*
^SG - 225, 23 Nov. 1912; a previous order, published in 1902, required 
*...all natives who are not either householders or living with their 
employers...to live in the large village outside the lines of forti­
fication...* According to Wingate this was done *..*in order to keep 
the City of Khartoum clean...1 ,_GGR — 1902, p.312:.
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stating his reasons, and the oompensation of the inhabitants was
Xleft to the governor's discretion f. In 1913 government lands occupied
by the Sudanese in Khartoum, Khartoum North, El Obeid, and Dueim, were
2
declared 'Native Lodging Areas' • Consequently, the labourers who 
had built Khartoum, and who had lived on the land allotted to them sin­
ce 1899* became government tenants who could be evicted at a month's 
noticed
In its desire to effect the rapid development of Khartoum as the 
country's new capital the government sought the cooperation of priv­
ate enterprise^. Government and private lands were sold freehold 
'...for trifling sums to the Greek traders.•.and much of the most 
valuable land in the new city, passed thus at once into the hands of
5
a few wealthy capitalists...' A similar policy was adopted in other
g
towns, but owing to lack of demand only a few plots of land were sold • 
It was not, however, until 1905 that the government decided to change 
its policy, and stop the sale of government lands in Khartoum.
1GGR - 1912, pp.92-3; SG - 225, 23 Nov. 1912.
2SG - 232, 20 Mar. 1913; SG - 238, 30 June 1913.
A.J.V.Arthur, 'Slum Clearance in Khartoum', Journal of African AcLmi— 
nistration. Vol.6, No.2 (1954)> P*73*
^During the Mahdia Omdurman was the seat of the country's central
administration. The rebuilding of Khartoum was planned and partly
executed during Kitchener's governor-generalship; see pp.17-19*
^The Times. 11 Apr. 1900.
g
Ibid; see also GGR - 1902, p.338, where the governor of Suakin sug­
gested to stop the sale of government owned town lands, until demand
would increase and force up the prices.
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Inevitably the result was that prices soared, and land speculators
1
who had bought a plot for £E 30 could now sell it for £E 1000 *.
Wingate explained away the new policy on the grounds that it raised
2the price of privately owned lands * The governor of Khartoum regard­
ed the increased prices as a good sign for the future development of 
the oity^. It is quite clear that the government, which had by that 
time sold most of its land in Khartoum at very low prices, lost a con­
siderable source of income^". Consequently, when prospects for the 
development of new towns became apparent, the government decided not 
to sell its lands, and adopted the leasehold system • In 1905 all 
the lands at El Damer were bought by the government '...in anticipa­
tion of the development of this town, which is situated close to the 
junction of the Nile-Red Sea Railway., A year HiaigastWingate wrote
optimistically that, '...the leasehold system adopted at El Damer and 
Atbara...has proved an unqualified success and may well be a forerun­
ner of a general introduction of this anti-speculation method of
7
dealing with town lands...'
1GGR - 1905, p.93.
2Itid, p.72.
rbia,. p p «93--4«
h n  X906 the government tried to amend its losses by acquiring }217
feddans near Khartoum, under the 'Land Acquisition Ordinance1*. The 
land was intended for the future expansion of Khartoum and was known 
as the Mogren scheme. In 1908 the government abandoned it^development. 
Land prices in Khartoum had decreased considerably as a result of the 
economic crisis in Egypt, and the scheme had lost its raison d’etre. 
See GGR - 1906, p.l83; Slat in to Wingate, 15 Mar. 1906, SAD/278/3;
GGR - 1908, p.316.
5ggr - 1905, p.7.
£
Ibid, The 527 feddans were acquired by the government under the*Land 
■‘2nd Acquisition Ordinance 1903'; see SG - 75* 19 Apr. 1905’.
7GGR - 1906, p.83.
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Following the government’s decision to establish the Sudan1s major
1port at Shaykh Bargh&t (Port Sudan), an investigation was agreed upon
2
to decide the most suitable land policy for the new town * Wingate, 
and most of the senior British officials, favoured the leasehold sys­
tem, which would guarantee the government’s ownership of the town’s
3.
lands Cromer favoured the outright sale of lands which, he hoped,
would provide the necessary funds for the development of Port Sudan1*
He agreed, however, that the leasehold system be adopted for a trial
period of two years^:. By July 1907 it became clear that the new
system had failed. The prospective lessees of Greek, and Egyptian
origin disliked the leasehold system as it prevented them raising
5money or speculating * British investors were also reluctant to take 
leases as they included a clause enabling the government, in case of 
bankruptcy, to take possession of the lease and all the buildings 
erected on it without paying compensation^. In 1908 Bernard, the
1
The government’s original intention was to develop Suakin as the 
major port. Only in Oct. 1904» a special commission found Suakin to 
be unsuitable and proposed Shaykh Barghut as the site for a new har- 
bour. See Bond to Wingate, 20 July 1904, SAD/275/5; Wingate to Bond, 
28 July 1904, Ibid; 'Report by Commission on Sheikh Barghut' Qctl.
1904, SAD/402/12/7.
2
•’Bonus to Wingate, 17 Nov. 1906, inolosure in Wingate to Cromer,
17 Nov. 1906, FO 141/402.
3Ibid.
^Corbett to Cromer, 26 Nov. 1906, FO 141/402; SG - 100, Sep. 1906.
5Amery to Wingate, 20 July 1907, SAD/28l/l.
The Times. 15 May 1908; SG - 100, Sep. 1906.
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financial secretary, suggested abandoning the leasehold system and
1selling the lands as freehold • Despite the opposition of Wingate
and the majority of the senior officials, Gorst ordered that *...some
plan be devised by which these lands can be bought outright or leased
2as the public prefer*..1 Thus, what came to be known as fthe combined 
leasehold-freehold system* came into being* Government lands were 
offered for sale and the rents procured were lowered considerably*
The director of agriculture and lands reported that, owing to the 
modified terms, eighteen new leases were granted in Port Sudan while
3
not a single plot of land was sold •
•••It is clear therefore that there is*..no public desire to 
acquire freehold land at Port Sudan...except on the part of 
the speculator...The leasehold system is not unpopular with 
the class of person really wanted at Port Sudan viz. the 
person who will live and work there...4
Nonetheless, the new system prevailed and when in 1910 a similar 
problem arose in Omdurman, the governors/general* s council adopted the 
1 mixed leasehold freehold system* despite strong opposition from 
many senior British officials. The principal opposers were Currie 
and Bonham Carter who argued that it was essential that the, govern­
ment should maintain its control over the lands of the major native 
town in the Sudan. Slatin, however, was against leaseholds, which
Bernard to Wingate, 2 Apr. 1908, FO 141/416*
^Bonus to Wingate, 12 Apr. 1908, Ibid; Wingate to Gorst, 28 Mar. 1908, 
Ibid; Harvey to Gorst, 8 Apr. 1908, Ibid; Gorst to Wingate, 11 Apr. 
1908, Ibid.
3GGR - 1908, pp. 12-13'.
Ibid, pp.13-14"
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he regarded as being unpopular amongst the inhabitants. He further
argued that any native landowner ’...is the best and cheapest intel-
1
ligence agent to the Government...1 In March 1910, the governor-
general* s council decided that, ’...Town lands including market lands
should be offered either for sale or lease at the option of the 
2
grantee...* , thereby extending the new system over all the town lands 
of the Sudan.
The govdrnmant1s land policy, despite the mistakes of the early 
years, was on the whole successful. By ;?3geoagnizing the rights of 
private ownership in both rural and urban districts the government 
effected a rapid increase in cultivation and in urban development*
By the end of Wingate’s governor-generalship the bulk of the country’s 
land was owndd by its inhabitants and by the government. Although 
speculation and the alienation of lands caused deep concern in the 
early years, speculators were deterred by the government’s policy 
which was aided by the effects of the economic crisis in Egypt'.
c. Taxation.
The principle of light taxation was laid down by Cromer in l899»
when he assured the people of the Sudan that the system of taxation
3
would be similar to that of other Muslim countries • In his first
Currie to GGC, 10 Feb. 1910; Slatin to GGC, 22 Jan. 1910, FO 867/3;
Wingate to Slatin, 10 Feb. 1910, SAD/290/2/l; Wingate gave his full 
support to Slatin. See also GGC- 28 Feb. 1910, FO 867/1.
2GGC - 14 Mar. 1910, Ibid.
3
Viscount Cromer’s speech to the Sheikhs and Notables of the Soudan, 
Omdurman, 4 Jan. 1899 > FO 633/25; see also pp.42-3*
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annual report on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Cromer elaborated his views:
*..0n going through the list of the taxes which were collected 
under the Khalifa* s rule, it was found that, although 
manner in which the5r ha& been levied was cruel and exton|%®i&te 
to the last degree, they were based on principles w h i c h *'/, 
generally recognised in all Moslem countries#n No radical 
change of system*was, therefore, necessary#..1
Thus a system of taxation evolved which was largely based on that of
the Khalifa, which in turn was not unlike the system of the Turco- 
2
Egyptian Sudan f* The principle taxes which were levied by the new
administration included land-tax, fushr, date tax and herd tax (later
animal tax), all of which were imposed oh the sedentary population'*
Nomads paid an annual tribute based upon an approximate assessment 
3
of their cattle , and a royalty was imposed on gum, ostrich feathers, 
4and ivoryA.
1Sffl- 1899, p.47'.
2
For the system of taxation during the latter years of'the Khalifa’s 
rule, see General Report on the Egyptian Soudan, larch 1895#, compiled 
from Statements made by Slatin Pasha, ^confidentialj, inclosure in - 
Cromer to Kimberley, 20 Apr* 1895, pp‘*8-9 ; Holt, ‘ The* Khalifa, pp'*l65- 
195? taxation in the Turco-Egypt ian Sudan on the eve of the Mahdia 
see Report on the Soudan by Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, 9 Feb** 1883, 
0*3670; Peacock, pp*l6-l8 ; Peacock described the system of taxation 
in the Gezira, based on information he received frok Shaykh Ahmad al~ 
Sunni, camil of the Geaira during the Mahdia* See also al-Ubayyad 
on eve of Mahdist revolt# Arabic MS* in possession of' Mr*d*G*S!*MacPhail; 
English translation in SAL/404/lO*
^For a detailed description of these taxes and the revenue derived 
thereof see Stone, pp*100-ll6, 188-197? see also GGR - 1904, PPt»210-3, 
’List showing the principal taxes in force in the Sudan and the 
rates at which they are levied1'.
^SG - 2, 27 May 1899, fAn Ordinance for regulating the Royalties on 
Gum, Ostrich Feathers, Ivory, and- India Rubber*!* Other taxes were of 
lesser importance including boat tax, house tax, road tax, and forest 
dues; see GGR - 1904, pp*210-3; for details see Stone, pp'.122-6,198-203*
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One of the first problems to be faced by the new administration
was whether a taxpayer belonged to his tribal unit or to the district
and province in which he resided. Following Slatin* s advice it was
decided that 1 *..sedentary natives, although from different tribes,
belong always to the district in which they are living; nomad Arabs,
always to their tribe, although living or grazing in different dis- 
1tricts...* A second problem ifas the definition of a nomad tribe*
The importance of this definition lay in the fact thst nomads paid 
only tribute, while sedentaries were taxed more heavily. The govern­
ment’s decision in each case depended only partly on the nomadic 
character of the tribes. Certain tribes in Kordofan, as well as in 
the southern provinces, paid tribute despite their being partly 
sedentary* This was done owing to the lack of government officials,
2who were required in order to impose the more complex sedentary taxes
The principle of preserving a low rate^.of taxation was adhered
to until 1912. Cromer regarded this as one of the major contributions
3
towards the success of the British administration in the Sudan i. 
Wingate, who was constantly urged to increase taxation, both by the 
Egyptian press as well as by the mounting financial needs of the Sudan,
1GGR - 1902, p.114.
Stone, pp.186-7j see also pp.293-7*
^Cromer to Robinson, 21 Dec. 1914* 0^- 633/23*
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1withstood the pressure largely as a result of Cromer's advice In
1912 Kitchener decided to withdraw the Egyptian annual subvention
which hitherto had enabled Wingate to maintain a low rate of taxational.
Consequently in 1913 taxes had to he ;raised hut, according to Wingate,
onlyhy a small margin and '.••without creating unrest among the 
3
inhabitants..•*
The order promulgating land-tax and date tax was published in May 
1899^* Land tax was imposed on all irrigable lands the cultivation 
of which was not dependant upon rainfall. The annual rrates of tax­
ation varied between P.T.20-50 per feddan, according to the land's 
classification and the method of irrigation^ The governor-general 
determined in which districts and provinces the tax was to be levied ?• 
In 1899 land-tax was imposed on the province of Dongola and in certain
Wihgate to Cromer (private), 9 Jan. 1915» SAD/194/i; In 1905 Wingate 
undertook a comparative study between the rates of taxation in the 
Turco-Egyptian Sudan and those in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudah* According 
to the figures of the revenue from taxation in 1883 and 1905* the 
rate of taxation per capita in 1905 was more than double that of 1883* 
Wingate, however, claimed that in 1883 more than 50$ of thessums
collected did not figure in the revenue as they were '..'.taken by
Government officials and Sheikhs for their own purposes...*, GGR - 
1905, pp.17-81.
^Wingate to Stack, 29 Eebt 1912, SAD/180/2/2; Wingate wrote this letter- 
during Kitchener's visit to the Sudan’.
^Wingate to Kitchener (private), 7 Apr'. 1912, SAD/l8l/l/3; see also 
Stone, p.188, who claims that in 1913 the government increased the
area assessed for cushr, despite the poor rains'.
4SG - 2, 27 May l899i Lor details about date tax, see Stone, p. 1211.
I^bi'd, pp.188-191; see also SG - 2, 27 May 1899? Lhe rates of taxation 
were altered in 1905- Lands were divided into six classes and the 
taxes fixed at P.T.10-60 per feddan. SG - 82, Get. 1905.
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-  _ 1 districts of Wadi Haifa and Berber » Khartoum province was brought
within the taxation system in 1901-2, and in the following years
land-tax was imposed on most of the irrigable lands in the northern 
2
provinces :• . In order to encourage cultivation, landowners erecting
irrigation pumps were exempted from land-taxes for the first two
years^, while those erecting sacriyas were exempted for one year4.
In 1906 a progressive land-tax was imposed on uncultivated lands in
5:order to induce their owners to commence cultivation However, this 
experiment failed in all the provinces except Dongola, and in conse- 
quence was abandoned in 1908 •
*Ushr was imposed on all lands depending on rain for their culti­
vation. It was also levied on irrigable lands which could not be
7
assessed for a land-tax owing to the lack of detailed information
The assessment and collection of fushr caused a great amount of
1
SG - 6, 2 Nov. 1899; Dongola province had paid land-tax since 1897, 
according to a 1Khedivial Decree, dated llth October l897T* SG - 17.
1 Nov. 1900.
2SG - 22, X Apr. 1901; SG - 31, 1 Jan. 1902; SG - 43, Jan. 1903;
SG - 86, 1 Jan. 1906; SG_ - 111, 1 May 1907.
3SG - 22, 1 Apr. 1901.
4§G - 46, Apr. 1903.
GGR - 1905, p.69; according to this scheme a quarter of the lands 
was to be taxed after two years following which the whole plot was 
to come under taxation within 8-10 years.
GGR - 1908, p.21; the only result of the so-called progressive taxa­
tion was that many cultivators abandoned their lands;GGR - 1907, ppr*
194-5, 221, 256.
^Stone, p. 113: GGR - 1906, p.241.
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labour as government officials had to assess the crops before the 
1harvest . Moreover, many of the cultivators prefered to pay their
fushr in kind which compelled the government to arrange the required 
2transport * In some of the outlying districts the expenses and labour 
incurred in transportation exceeded the income derived from *ushr. As
3
a result the government decided not to persevere with the tax Win­
gate maintained that it was a better policy to accept this loss of 
revenue rather than embitter the population by demanding payment in 
money4. The preference of the cultivators to pay in lcind was probably 
caused by lack of cash as well as by their fear of paying more. The 
monetary equivalent of *ushr was. fixed by the government according to 
Lhe dhurra prices at the time of the harvest. However, many cultiva^- 
tors sold their dhurra before the harvest to Omdurman merchants at 
low prices. These merchants were thus in a position to increase the 
price in the various markets, forcing the cultivators to pay the *ushr
1GGR - 1903, p.31
2 f
Despite a government order to pay ushr in money, payment in kind 
continued and the governors were ordered to accept it; see SG - 19,
1 Jan. 1901; GGR - 1905, p.210.
3ggr - 1906, p.502.
4GGR - X907j p.75; However, in the same report the governor of the
WhiteNNile province wrote that all Vshr in his province had to be 
paid in money unless a special permission was granted by him 
allowing payment in kind. Ibid, p.134
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iin prices which were more than double the price paid to them origin­
ally. In 1905 it was therefore decided '...that no dhurra is to be
sold outside a Government market until the assessment of Ushr is 
1completed*..1 Bjr 1908 most of the cultivators were in a position
2to pay cash, so that the problem was solved without coercion • It 
was only after 1910 that some of the outlying districts in Kordofan 
and the Upper Nile provinces were assessed for fushr. while the 
cultivated lands of the Bahr al-Ghazal and Mongalla were not taxed 
throughout this period^.
While ushr and a land-tax were promulgated to tax the sedentary 
population, a herd tax was introduced in 1899 to tax the nomads4. 
Although this tax was supposed to replace the Muslim aakah«(charity 
tax),Cromer had his doubts about its efficiency and recommended its 
early abolition He was soon to be proved right for the nomad 
tribes who depended on their herds for their livelihood could only 
pay the tax by parting with some of their animals. This they refused 
tk do, and instead they withdrew to remote districts, out of reach
1GGR - 1905, p.133; see also Phipps to Wingate, 27 Aug. 1905,SAD/277/2.
2QGR - 1908, p.391-
•3
Stone, pp.I86-7.
4SG - 7,2 Deo. 1899.
SAR - 1899, p.49; see also Hickman to Wingate, 3 June 1900, SAD/270/6,
Hickman, then governor of Dongola, suggested not to. levy the herd tax 
during 1900.
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of government control. Thus the tax, whose principal aim was to tax 
the nomads, could only be levied on sedentaries who already paid *ushr 
or land-tax^* * In August 1901 the herd tax was replaced by two new 
taxes. Nomads were ordered to pay a tribute which was meant to replace 
.iizys'i (poll tax) while sedentaries continued to pay the animal
. 2tax •
These, new taxes, although easier to impose, had their drawbacks'. 
Both the tribute and the animal tax were based on the number of ani­
mals as assessed by government officials. But the assessment of 
nomads was largely based on information supplied by their shaykhs and 
thus tended to be rather low. The government also feared that nomads
would try to evade the tribute and therefore levied it at a lower rate
3
than the animal tax ♦ Inevitably, the result was that the sedentaries 
attempted to evade the tax by sending their animals to graze with the 
nomads^. Moreover, certain tribes were split between two or more 
provinces, and while animal tax was levied on one part of the tribe,
Stone, p.109; quoting from the financial departments report, 1900.
^SG - 26, 1 Aug. 1901, 1 The Tribute Ordinance 1901*, fThe Taxation 
of Animals Ordinance 1901* • The Animal tax was amended in 1903, 19^6,
and 1907. In each case the tax levied on different kinds of animals
was changed and animals employed for agricultural or governmental 
work, were exempted. See SG - 45» Mar. 1903; GGR - 1905, p.134; Slatin 
to Wingate, 19 Mar. 1907, SAD/28o/3. In 1913 the rate of taxation 
was increased as a result of Kitchener*s demand; see GGC, 27 May, 1912,
FO 867/3.
GGR - 1903, p.31j 'tribute was regarded more as a political measure
than a financial one; see SAR - 1901, p.60.
4SG - 48, 1 June 1903.
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the other was paying tribute. Consequently, whenever a government
inspector came to assess the taxes they crossed the border and joined
1their fellow tribesmen • A government order published in 1903 tried
to overcome this problem by threatening prospective tax evaders with
2the confiscation of their animals • invasion, however, continued 
until an increasing number of tribute-paying tribes were put on to 
animal tax3.
In the southern provinces and the Nuba mountains only tribute was
levied on cattle-owning tribes^1. The system of assessing the tribute
in these inaccessible areas was extremely crude and unreliable. In
the Nuba mou.ntains the amount of tribute levied was, 1 ...in inverse
ratio to the amount of resistance likely to by incurred in its col—
5lection...the weak paid and the strong got off free..*1 The same 
applmed to the southern provinces, where tribes like the Nuer or 
Anuak did not pay any tribute owing to their remoteness from govern­
ment control, whereas the Shilluk and Ninka had to pay a small tribute 
from 1902^. In 1909, ^be government decided to impose f...a light
See for instance Wilkinson to Wingate, 27 Nec. 1903, SAD/273/l2.
2CA0 - 51, 21 May 1903; SG - 48, 1 June 1903.,
3GGR - 1906, p.758; GGR - 1908, p.672; GGR - 1909, p.118; for the
comparative increase of revenue from these taxes see Stone, pp!.110-3,
192-7V
^Wingate to Cromer, 2 June 1901, SAD/271/6; Wingate1 s diary, 26 Feb:. 
1902, SAD/272/8; GGR - 1904, p.4.
5Gillan, Nubat p*40; In 1908 the total tribute from the Nuba mountains 
amounted to £E 1000 out of a total of £E 7728 paid by all the nomad 
tribes of Kordofan; see also SIR - 171, Oct. 1908;.
Wingate to Cromer, 2 June 1901, SAh/27l/6; SIR — 143, June 1906;
SIR - 145, Aug. 1906.
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rain tax* amounting to one-tenth of Government requirements, to he
1collected from non-cattle owning tribes.*.* in the Bahr al-Ghaaal . 
Indirect taxation in the southern provinces included an annual requi­
sition of grain for which payment was made "below market prices, and
2
a requisition of carriers for government convoys *
While the system of taxation was primarily geared to the agricul­
tural and nomadic population, numerous taxes of lesser importance 
were imposed on the inhabitants of towns and large villages. A house
tax was levied in 1899 "the rate of one-twelfth of the annual rental 
3
value • However, very few towns had to pay this tax and even Khartoum 
and Omdurman were exempt until 1906^. It was not until 1913, that a 
serious effort was made to tass the non-agricultural population. The 
* Local Taxation Ordinance 1912* imposed rates on all property owners 
in the Sudan. Once again the agricultural community was obliged to 
pay an additional rate amounting t& 10$ of their *ushr or land tax 
Other taxes included a boat tax of P.T.2 per ardeb of the boatfs
XGGR - 1909» p.118; Handbook BAG, p.44*
2Ibid, p.45*
^SG - ihis ^ax was amended in 1905;SG-73t Mar.1905
^3G — 86, Jan. 1906; in 1899 house tax was levied only in Suakin and 
Tawflqiya. SG - 4, 9 Sep. 1899, in 1904 the tax was extended to Kassala 
and to all the major villages in Dongola. SG - 104, Jan. 1904} SG - 
106, Dec. 1904*
^*The Local Taxation Ordinance 1912*, SG ■- 225, 23 Wov. 1912; this 
tax was probahly introduced as a result of Kitchener*s terminating 
the Egyptian siibvention.
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1carrying capacity Road tax was levied by provincial governors who
2exploited the money for road maintenance * Market dues were introduc- 
ed in 1899* They included fees for the sale of animals, weighing fees,
3
slaughtering fees, and royalties • A trader*s tax, introduced By the
government in 1913, came under heavy criticism and had to be modified^-.
This was perhaps the first time that the government had to give way
under the pressure of public opinion and the local press. As most of
the traders concerned were Greeks and Egyptians, the support they
received from the Greek owned Sudan Herald was hardly surprising •.
The assessment and collection of all taxes was performed mainly
by government officials. This was laid down by Kitchener in his
Instructions to Mudirs and was enunciated further in numerous govern- 
6
ment orders • The system of registering the land tax was copied
1§G - 3, 31 July 1899.
2
Stone, p.205; a certain percentage of the road tax was given to the 
shaykhs of the tribes through whose territory the routes passed. For 
a full list of these rates see GGR - 1904, p.212; see also SIR - 8l,
Apr.1901.
^Sub-Mamurs Handbook, pp.337“9*
4SG - 232, 20 Mar. 1913j Wingate to Slatin, 21 Apr. 1914, SAD/104/6'.
Wingate to Bernard, 6 May 1913, SAD/186/2/l. Commenting on the ori- 
tical attitude of the Sudan Herald, Wingate wrote:*...Shall we take 
up the defence of our policy by a series of inspired articles in the 
press I Sudan Times 1 - or shall we take it "lying down"...*
^Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1899, ^0 78/5022; The pro­
cedure of assessing animal tax was laid down in SG[ - 26, 1 Aug* 1901; 
instructions for the assessment of date tax were published in SG - 59,, 
1 Feb. 1904.
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from the Egyptian wird which soon proved too complicated and detailed
1for the small number of clerics available in each district • Even
tribute, which should have been collected without any government
assistance was in fact collected with the active participation of
2Egyptian and British officials f.
By the end of Wingate’s governor-generalship an elaborate system 
of taxation had evolved, largely based on the system of taxation in 
other Muslim countries* The agricultural population contributed the 
larger share of revenue derived from taxation, while nomads and town
3
dwellers continued to be under-taxed ?•
1GGR - 1908, p.560; Dongola was apparently the only province where 
this system proved satisfactory ’...Wirds in possession of Samads 
are daily filled in ...the Sarraf sealing the same. This system *' 
works most satisfactorily; it is simple and popular with the people, 
and it follows native customs.,.1 Ibid, pp.504-5* As Land tax in 
Dongola was levied only on the more sophisticated riverain tribes, 
it is probable that the samads were more reliable than in other pro­
vinces. Samads were village representatives responsible for the 
agricultural management of tenancies. The wird was probably a 
speoially designed form used for registering taxes in Egyptian villages.
^See pp* 312-5r«
3
In 1914 'fcLe revenue from agricultural taxes (not including royalty) 
was £E 247)500; tribute amounted to £E 25,600; and trader’s tax £E7^400 
of the revenue. This did not include the taxes collected from the 
towns and villages under the Local Taxation Ordinance. See GGR - 1914,
p. 20
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Chapter IX.
Labour and slavery.
In the early years of the Condominium there was a permanent 
shortage of labour in the Sudan. This affected development projects 
as well as agriculture and was intimately connected with the problem 
of domestic slavery. It was probably this affinity which led the 
governor-general to entrust both domestio slavery and labour to the 
intelligence department in Khartoum.
Slave raiding and slave trade were regarded as a separate entity 
and came under the auspices of the Egyptian department for the re­
pression of slave trade. However, in many oases the boundaries 
between the repression of slave trade and domestic slavery were 
rather obscure. Hence it is easier to comprehend the policy pursued 
in the Sudan by discussing the various aspects of slavery and labour 
in their entirety.
a. The department for the repression of slave trade.
The principles guiding the Sudan government’s policy towards 
slavery were formulated by Lord Cromer in 1899, when he affirmed 
that the government would fight against slave raids and slave trade, 
but that domestic slavery would be tolerated by the new administration . 
This was based on the assumption that the anti-slavery measures under­
taken in the Turco-Egyptian Sudan were largely responsible for the
1’Lord Cromer’s Speech to the Sheikhs and Notables of the Soudan1, 
Omdurman, 4 Jan. 1899, FO 633/25; see also pp.
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1Mahdi's success . It is in the light of these beliefs that the sub­
sequent relationship between the Sudan government and the slavery- 
repression department may be better understood#
The slavery-repression department was under the direction of the
Egyptian ministry of the interior until the end of 1910# Its task
2was to abolish slave raids and to suppress the slave traders • At
the time of the reconquest there were not less than 15*000 men em-
3ployed in the slave trade • The first aim was to stop the exporta­
tion of slaves outside the Sudan borders and an order to that effect 
was published in 1901^# Despite the regulations, slave trade conti­
nued, especially actoss the Red Sea to the Arabian peninsula and 
through the Abyssinian border# In 1902 a considerable number of 
Sudanese children and adults were abducted in Dongola and in the
Wingate, Ten Years Captivity, pp*8-9; R*C#Slatin, Fire and Sword in 
the Sudant 1879-1895» p*134» Reasons for the Sudanese Revolt jn.d. in 
Ha urn Shuqayr's handwritingl, SAD/llo/2/6; Holt, Mahdist State# pp'* 
34-6; see also Handbook Kordofan# p.84* Symes wtote that *.#!Gordon’s 
campaign against the slave trade#.#laid a mine of unrest and discon­
tent among the natives and officials throughout the country that the 
smallest sparlf was liable to kindle and which the advent of the 
Mahdi fanned..#into open and widespread rebellion.#.1
2
Aocording to the Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention of 1877» slave 
trade from the Sudan was to have stopped by 1880. Owing to the Mahdia, 
the implementation of this convention in the Sudan had to be deferred
until the reconquest# In Jan# 1899 slave trade in the Sudan was de­
clared illegal. Handbook,pp#1X8-180#
^P#F#Martin, The Sudan in Evolution.(London 192l),p.2l6#
^CAO - 133, 5 Dec. 1901; this order was superceded by more detailed
instructions; SO - 63, 1 June 1904«
1
Geaira and smuggled to Arabia • Further oases were reported in
2Suakin and Kassala in 1904 * On the Abyssinian border the slave
trade was even more difficult to control* The border divided the
Anualc tribe between the two countries, and constant raids on the
Sudanese section of the tribe provided Abyssinia with an annual sup- 
3ply of slaves • Another source of slaves was the Nuba mountains*
Slave raiding was practised both by the Arab tribes and by the Nubas 
and continued throughout Wingate's governor-generalship^.
The main supply of slaves did not come from within the Sudan*
R
Slaves were imported from the French Congo by the .jallaba * The 
route into the Sudan passed through the western district of Bahir al- 
Ghazal, where vast uninhabited areas made control virtually impossible
•‘'GGR.- 1903, pp.27, 40.
2GGR - 1904, pp.771 129.
Inclosure 2 in Cromer to Harrington, 2 Jan. 1906, FO 407/165.
See for instance SIR - 92, Mar. 1902; SIR - 96, July 1902; following
a tour of the Nuba mountains in 1903, the governor of Kordofan, Mahon, 
commented*••.personally I am not a great admirer of the black man, 
at his home, and am certain that you see him at his best as a slave, 
or soldier...' SIR - 104, Mar. 1903, Appendix "E"'* In 1905 it was 
claimed that actual slave raiding had ceased in the Nuba mountains, 
yet-slave trade went on as before, SIR - 130, May 1905* SIR - 232, 
Nov.1 1913; SIR - 247, Feb* 1915? SIR - 251* June 1915; all contain 
reports of slave raiding.
5The -iall&ba usually, stated that they had married the women-slaves 
whom they imported, or that the slaves were presents from the sultans. 
GGR - 1906, p.558.
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1
without considerable forces • Slaves were also smuggled into the
Sudan by *Ali Dinar’s emissaries and were sold in Omdurman market,
with Wingate’s approval and despite the protests of McMurdo, the
2
British head of the department for the repression of slavery u
The main route for smuggling slaves was by way of the pilgrimage
3
from Western Africa to Mecca which passed through the Sudan • Many 
of these pilgrims, Takarlr and Fallata, settled in the Sudan in 
special colonies, either before reaching Mecca or on their way back* 
Owing to the length of the Sudanese borders and the scarcity of 
border patrols, this movement, which accounted for 9 0% of all Sudan­
ese pilgrims, could not be controlled. The Fallata either brought 
the slaves with them or obtained them in the Sudan, and then took 
them across to Arabia, Despite all government precautions, the 
pilgrims could cross the border into Eritrea and thus avoid control1*
XStoftey 1 inspector Baijr al-Ghaaal I to Wingate (confidential), 14 
Sep, 1910, SAD/300/l, This report was based on a thorough investiga­
tion undertaken by the Sudan government and the French authorities'*
Even Ravenscroft, the senior inspector of the slavery department 
objected to strong measures being taken, as the slave trade was the 
only profitable enterprise in western Bahr al-Ghaaal, and by stopping 
it the tribes would be induced to leave the Sudan, SIR - l6l, Dec,1907*
^Talbot to Wingate, 20 June 1903, SAD/234/l, Talbot suggested that
*A1T Dinar be a&ked to stop the slave trade? Wingate to. Cromer, 11
Dec, 1903, FO 141/378; Wingate justified this trade on political
grounds; see also Mclurdo to Cromer, 3 Dec. 1903, Ibid*
3
All details are taken from C*A.Willis, Report on Slavery and the 
Pilgrimage, (1926), SAD/212/2; the report was based on the data 
collected by the Sudan intelligence department of which Willis was 
the director sincd 1920* For details about the pilgrimage, see pp.
193-6.
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Others sailed to Jedda from Suakin, and were obliged to pay a deposit
at the government’s quarantine. Even of those over three thousands
failed to return in the years 1909™ 1913 *^.
Thus, in the sphere of slave trade, where the authority of the
department for the repression of slavery was unchallenged, it only
succeeded in reducing the trade but could not stop it. This was partly
the result of inadequate means, and the vast areas it had to control.
However, the main reason for the continuation of slave trade, was the
demand for slaves in the Arabian peninsula and the high remuneration 
2offered • The department’s greater success in suppressing slave
raiding, was largely due to the extension of administrative control
and to the greater risks involved in the raids. Yet the fact that
in 1914 slavery was again on the increase is a clear prodf that it
was not completely uprooted, and that a more fundamental change in 1
3
economic and social outlook was necessary in trder to overcome iti.
1The figures quoted by Willis do not agree with those given in the 
Sudan Intelligence Reports for those years; SIR - 174“233,Jan* 1909- 
Dec. 1913. They also do not correspond to the information sent by 
Wingate to Cromer, at the latter's request, when he wrote:’••.The 
question of the traffic in slaves in connection with the annual 
pilgrimage has received very careful consideration ...and I am in­
clined to believe that the measures taken for the suppression of 
this traffio have proved to be efficient..,’  ^Wingate to Cromer, 9 
Feb. 1914, FO 633/23.
Q
C.A.^illis, Report on Slavery and the Pilgrimage (1926) ,SAD/212/2*
^GGR - 1914, P*36; Ravenscroft, then director of the slavery repres­
sion department, attributed the increase in slavery to the scarcity 
of grain.
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The organization of the department for the repression of slave
trade was unique in that its headquarters remained in Cairo although
1its centre of activities was in the Sudan • Moreover, Captain
MoMurdo, the director of the department until 1910, was not under the
supervision of the governor-general of the Sudan. As an official of
the Egyptian ministry of the interior he reported to the British
2consul-general in Egypt without any reference to Wingate i* The de­
partment appointed its\own inspectors who set up posts throughout the 
country, assisted by their own mounted police and camel corps* They 
could make arrests and issue warrants without reference to the loeal 
authorities^. In 1902 the department launched its own stern wheeler 
’Liberator1, to oontrol slave traffic on the upper reaches of the 
Nile .
In 1905, the department was reorganized and its police force was 
divided into three parts with their headquarters at El Obeid, al- 
Ru§ayri§, and Khartoum • also its legal position vis-4-vis the 
Sudan government was defined so as to link it mire closely to the
1Cromer to Wingate, 13 Feb. 1901, FO 141/364, Hill.Slatin, p.106.
2
Wingate included comments on slavery in his own yearly memorandum, 
but no report from the slavery department was printed among the de­
partmental reports 6f the Sudan government, throughout Wingate’s 
governor-generals&ip. In some cases Wingate did not receive even a 
copy of McMurdo's reports, GGR - 1903, p.51*
3SG - 30',■ 1 Deo. 1901.
4ggr - 1902, p.304.
5ggr - 1905, pp.56-7.
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Sudan administration and to avoid unnecessary clashes. The depart­
ment's police force was hence-forward considered part of the. Sudan 
police and its inspectors became ex-officio magistrates of the seoond 
class. They were also entitled to give orders to ma*murs and police 
officers in connection with slavery cases. On the other hand the 
provincial governors could make recommendations to the inspectors of 
the slavery-repression department and represent their views to the
department's headquarters at Khartoum. Lastly, all the department's
1
reports had to be forwarded through the governor-general •
Despite these organizational reforms clashes between government
officials and the staff of the slavery department were frequent and
covered almost every sphere of the department's activities. McMurdo
explained the strained relations by the fact that his department
functioned as an independent body within the Sudan. He further claimed
that owing to Slatin's unique authority over everything connected with
s l a v e r y . h i s  IMcMurdo'si point of view does not get a fair hear- 
V
ing...'- ' Despite a certain element of truth, this was an over­
simplification of the issue* Basically, the antagonism was over
matters of policy. Wingate regarded the religious and tribal re­
volts in the Gezira and the Nuba mountains as a direct result of 
the slavery department's efforts '...to pander to Exeter Hallism in
^Henry to Wimgate, 18. July 1904» SAD/275/5; see also GAO - 268, 
'Repression of Slavery Department*, Khartoum, 12 Mar. 1905.
^Stack to Wingate, 20 May I9O8, SAD/284/14/lJ quoting a discussion 
he had with McMurdo. For Slatin's views on slavery, see pp.82-4'*
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endeavouring to suppress slave hunting and slave trading...''*' As for
domestic slavery '...any attempt on the part of the slavery depart-
2
ment to interfere.•.will provide hundreds of Abdel Kaders before
long, and I am afraid that our friend IMcMurdoI is about the most
3
injudicious person in Egypt or. the Sudan...* Wingate regarded it 
as his duty to convince the British government to follow his policy 
regarding slavery, rather than McMurdo*s '...which if persisted in 
may lose us the Sudan...1 He further argued that 1...M.iMcMurdoI has 
no case and if he plays up to Exeter Hall and a Radical Government, 
the sooner we come to a full and complete understanding, the better*.'^
It is only in the light of these views that the friction between the 
Sudan government and the slavery-repression department can be under­
stood.
A suggestion to establish a home for freed slaves in Omdurman was 
rejected by Wingate on the grounds '...that the time has not yet come
^Wingate to Gorst, 19 Nov. 1908, SAD/284/15; Exeter Hall in London 
was a centre of anti-slavery activities in Britain, and Wingate 
believed that McMurdo was taking his orders from the Anti-Slavery 
Society, See Wingate to Stack, 31 May 1908, SAD/284/l3j R.Hill,
'The Period of Egyptian Occupation1, 1820-1881',SNR - Vol.39 (1958),pp. 101-2
2
cAbd al-Qadir Wad Habuba was the leader of the Gezira rebellion in 
1908; see pp.202-7*
^Wingate to Stack (private), 12 May 1908, SAD/284/13; see also 
McMurdo to Wingate, 2 Apr. 1908, SAD/282/4, where he apologized for 
one of his official's '.-..over zealousness and ignorance...' in 
dealing with slavery problems.
^"Wingate to Stack, 31 May 1908, SAD/284/1 3*
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when we can establish in the Sudan anything in the shape of Government
1institutions as a refuge for the escaped slaves...* This however,
did not stop the provincial governors from establishing homes for
2
freed slaves in their provinces under their own supervision The 
same attitude prevailed regarding the establishment of stations in 
the provinces manned by the staff of the slavery department'. The Sudan 
government could not object openly to these stations, but tried to keep 
them attached to the government posts to allow control by the provin­
cial inspectors. When the department for the repression of slavery 
suggested to establish an independent station of its own in south-east 
Kordofan* Slatin objected saying *...1 do not like having posts scat­
tered over mountains, Recoment I sic! that inspector and men should 
stay at Elliri with our own Mamur andjlnspector... * ^  When in 1909 the 
slavery department wanted to establish a post on the Darfur border, 
Savile, the governor of Kordofan, objected strongly, despite the fact
that slave trade across the borders was a well known fact^.
The antagonism between Wingate and Slatin on the one hand, and
McMurdo to Wingate, 5 Dec. 1906; Wingate to McMurdo, 16 Dec!, 1906, 
S£D/279/6.
2
In 1902 a home for escaped slaves for the eastern Sudan was established
in Nogara. See McMurdo to Cromer, 24 Feb. 1902, FO 14l/371> See also
GGS - 1902, p»332, where the governor of Sennar reported that all 
runaway slaves were collected at Wad Madani where accomodation had 
been arranged and were employed in the mudiriya.
■^McMurdo to Stack, 18 Mar. 1907, SAD/280/3; Slatin to Wingate, 20 Mar. 
1907, Ibid.
^Willis's diary, 16 May 1909, 6 Nov. 1909, SAD/210/2.
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McMurdo on the other, was of course well known, even to junikr 
inspectors. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that relations at 
the lower levels of administration were no better than at the top, • 
The following extract from Willis1s diary illustrates the situation 
in ICordofan:
...19 February 1910*•.Whithingham'*'...has freed various slaves or 
rather annexed them...is full of nonsense about the Homr and 
slave dealing and is very much down on Ali Gula, He is doing a 
lot of harm and is putting the country back...28 March 1910... 
Siatin immensely pleased over mji complaint re S.R.D. I slavery 
repression department) which I put in to Savile on receipt of 
Ali Gula's complaint about death of a man arrested by Whithingham. 
Slatin has his knife into him in a lot of other things...^
The authorities at Khartoum and ICordofan were well aware that -All
J.ulla, the naair of . the Misirxya, was deeply involved in the slave
trade* Yet they objected to any interference by the slavery depart-
3
ment in what they regarded as an internal, tribal affair •
There seems to have been general confusion as to the exact funct­
ions of the department for the repression of slavery. Domestic slaves
1
Whithingham was one of the senior inspectors of the slavery depart­
ment* Wingate’s and .Slatin’s mistrust for him was a well known fact. 
Wingate to Gorst., (secret), 6 Dec. 1910, SAD/298/2.
^Willis’s diary]. Feb*-Mar. 1910, SAD/210/2.
^See for instance Willis’s diary, 9 Nov. 1910, Ibid. Willis wrote that 
*Ali Julia’s Dinka slaves were bought in I9O8 with the permission of 
Lloyd, then governor of ICordofan. See also IC.D.D.Henderson,1 Some 
notes on the history of the tribes living south of the Wadi el Ghala* 
In.d.l, SAD/478/5. Henderson wrote the following about *Ali Julia: 
’...Ali was allowed to rule his tribe more or less as he liked, and 
slave raiding went on as merrily as ever - the Nazir’s share being 
about 25/0 of the profits...’ When in 1903, Sayyid al-Makki ’ s son was 
imprisoned for slave raiding,-Wingate wrote,*...I think it would be 
good policy to let the man out on account of his father’s servicesJ*.’, 
Wingate to Nason, 4 Aug. 1903, SAd/273/8.
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were outside its sphere of responsibility. But the exchange of 
slaves within the Sudan* s boundaries was regarded by the department 
as part of the slave trade. The department also objected to the fact 
that despite the goommidtoiBaht3 to abolish domestic slavery gradually, 
new slaves were a common phenomenon. Many of those who were regis­
tered, as alaves in 1918, were born to free parents after the Condomi-
1nium Agreement was signed •
The endless clashes between Sudan government officials and the
department*s staff are, therefore, easy to comprehend* Wingate’s aim
was to remove McMurdo, and to bring his department directly under the
governor-general of the Sudan. He wrote to Gorst, that should his
suggestion be accepted ’...there would be no further need for the
servioes of a Director...’ and that in order to induce McMurdo to
2leave, a ’...fairly liberal pension...1 should be offered to him 1*
By November 1910, the ground was prepared. McMurdo had agreed to
retire, and Gorst set about the task of convincing the British
government to agree to the new status of the department:
...As regards the effect which this change may be expected to 
have in the battle...against this detestable traffics I in slaves! 
it is obvious that the exclusively British composition of the 
present Soudan administration affords greater guarantees than 
have hitherto been obtainable that this branch of their duties
will be prosecuted with the utmost vigour...3
^Eor details see pp.382-84.
^Wingate to Gorst, 13 Apr. 1910* SAD/43l/ll. At the time this letter 
was written, McMurdo was shooting white rhino in the Lado Enclave 
despite a government order to the contrary!.Ji it is one of the morals 
of the age that the Head of a Dept, can use Govt, money as he does and 
nothing is said..•*,Phipps to Wingate, 14 Apr. 1910, SAD/296/1/3.
3Gorst to Grey, 5 Hov. 1910, F0 371/895.
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1Following Grey’s approval , the staff of the slavery department was
transferred to the Sudan civil service and Major Ravenscroft was
2appointed as its new director . The department was financed, as be­
fore, by a special grant from the Egyptian government. It was decided 
to decrease its activities by absorbing its special police force with­
in the ordinary provincial police^• When Ravenscroft resigned in 1914» 
Wingate decided to amalgamate the remaining staff of the department 
with the provincial administration and wrote to Ravencnoft that he 
would ’...probably do away with the appointment of a Director...
Though the department for the repression of slave trade continued to 
exist, its functions were so limited, and its control by the govern­
ment so complete, that no further clashes seem to have occurred in 
the following years.
b. Domestic slavery.
Domestic slavery was tolerated by the Sudan government on principle. 
Cromer initiated the policy in 1899 > a*id it was reaffirmed by 
Kitchener in his ’Memorandum to Mudirs’ • Fundamentally it was based
^*Grey to Gorst, 14 Nov. 1910, Ibid.
O
TWingate to Gorst (secret), 6 Dec. 19i0» SAD/298/2. Wingate demanded 
that the appointment of the new head should be left to him. Gorst, 
however, insisted that he should be consulted before the appointment 
was made. Gorst to Wingate, 12 Dec. 1910, Ibid.
3GGC, 20 Mar. 1911, F0 867/2; see also GGR - 1911, p.73*
^Wingate to Ravenscroft, (private), 1 July 1914> SAD/l9l/l/2.
^See pp.21,42*
Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 18991 ^0 78/5022.
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on the belief that the Sudan1 s socio-economic structure coq.ld not
withstand a sudden abolition of slavery, and that it was bouhd to
oause renewed religious upheavals similar to the Mahdist revolt‘d.
Hence the government decided:
••.whilst making every effort to suppress slave raiding and slave 
trafficking.•.deal as gently as possible with questions of domes­
tic slavery..1 hoping to|..gradually transform the status of 
slavery-and substitute for it a system of paid labour.•*2
The outcome of this policy was that domestic slaves were in fact ur­
ged to stay with their masters unless they were maltreated by them^,
and runaway slaves were urged to return to their owners^*. As late
as 1915 inspectors were instructed ’...to induce nunaway servants to
return to their masters,..’ They were also informed that in order to
5free a slave the payment of his ransom had to be completed*
^ee for instance Gromer to Robinson I of The Times 1,21 Dec. 1914, FO 633/ 
241 see also GGR - 1907, P*76, where Wingate commented that as slavery 
is sanctioned by Islam, it is very hard to fight against*t]?or the at­
titude of Islam towards slavery see *Abd, Encyclopaedia of Islam, new 
edition (Leiden 1954)» pp*24-4°*
2ggr - X904, p.36.
In 1913| Bonham Carter complained, that '...escaped slaves are dealt
with on no principle. Decisions are given which are not only contrary 
to the British policy as regards slavery, but which cannot be justi­
fied by Mohammedan Law*..1,see Bonham Carter to Wingate, 28 Dec. 1913,
sAD/188/3/1.
See for instance Slatin's diary 1902,SAD/441i'Notes on the Bahr el 
Ghazal’ * • • .Re*'*FreedomM - run away men and women should be send I sic! 
back to their master if not special reason prevent so...*; see also
H.A.MacMichael,’Reminiscences of Kordofan in 1906’,(typescript),SAD/ 
294/l8. MacMichael wrote of a group of runaway women slaves, claimed 
by Sayyid al-Makki, whom Slatin decided to return to their owner. 
Slatin’s intention was nullified by Percibal, officer commanding the 
oamel corps, who arranged the marrigge of the women to his men, with­
out Slatin’s knowledge.
^J.Matthew (acting governor Red Sea) to all Inspectors, 26 Jan* 1915, 
Anti-Slavery Archive^, G/282.
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Among the measures introduced by th& government to prevent the
increase of domestic slaves by illegal trade or slave running was an
1order obligihg all governors to register ’Sudanese servants* within
their provinces. In the northern provinces registration was started
in 1904 and a year later 19f638 Sudanese servants were registered in 
2Dongola* In parts of ICordofan, Wingate objected to the registration
3as late as 1915? fearing that it might cause disturbances !* The-very
limited effect which registration had in reducing the numbers of
domestic slaves was clearly indicated in a memorandum written by
Bonham Cirter in 191&S
...In some provinces the rules as to the registration of:
Sudanese (Confidential Circular Wo.10 and Confidential 
Circular Wo.22)4 have been ignored. It was ordered that 
a Register of Sudanese should be made and completed as 
soon as possible. The object was to prevent the future 
buying or selling of Sudanese and preventing masters from, 
making claims to domestio slaves who were not in their 
possession at the time the Register was made. In some 
Mudirias the Register has been kept open, thus defeating 
the object of the Register. Cases have come to my notice
^Domestic slaves were always referred to as servants in cfficial 
communications; see p.83.
2ggh - 1905,.p.51.
3Wingate to Savile, 17 May 1915, SAD/195/6.
I have not been able to locate these oiroulars. However, their
content is clear from the above memorandum as well as from 
Confidential Circular Wo.33 which superseded them in 1919? see pp. 
386-87.
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of children who have been born since the reoccupation 
being entered on such register-••.1
It is apparent that there was a vast discrepancy between the
2official policy and its realization • Slatin, the governments
spokesman on slavery, stated that every slave was free to leave
3
his master should he so desire • But in faot slaves were forced 
to remain in slavery and only gained their freedom if they could 
prove maltreatment. In certain cases even free-born men and 
women, who were enslaved after the reconquest, had to pay ransom
; Bonham Garter to Wingate, 28 Dec. 1913, SAD/188/3/l; Bonham Garter 
ended his letter by asking for a general discussion about slavery to 
which Wingate agreed; see Symes to Stack, $ Jan. 1914, SAD/l89/l/l;
In 1915 Wingate wrote to Wilson, governor of the Red Sea province, 
about a Sudanese woman who had been enslaved after the reconquest.
He stated that if her children were awlad haram (illegitimate), they 
belonged to her, and presumably were to become slaves too. Wingate 
to Wilson (private), 15 Nov. 1915, SAD/197/2/2.
2The British governors and inspectors, were on the whole, reluctant 
to apply fully the governments regulations. See for instance SIR ~ 
159, Oct. 1907• Lloyd, governor of Kordofan, complained that the 
new regulations had caused considerable disturbances amongst the 
Hamar tribe and should be applied with care; see also Meinhof, pv37, 
who wrote that it was a blessing that the government’s provincial 
officials did not take the government1s policy literally, as this 
would have turned the slaves into criminals and disrupted the 
country’s economy.
^Slatin to Wingate, 31 July 1909, SAD/288/l; this letter was written 
in reply to a request from Lord Cromer, who was pressed on that 
point by the Anti-Slavery Society in England. Slatim concluded his 
letter by writing’...I think if you explain this to old Cromer... 
he cannot do much harm but I prefer it always if the Sudan is left, 
in peace...*; See also SAR - 1906, p. 13.2 where Cromer quoted the 
following from a report by Slatin:1...To my certain knowledge no 
slave, male or female, is obliged by force to stay with his so-called 
master...1; For Slatin’s views on slavery, see pp.82-4«
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1
before being freed •
It is therefore, surprising that the Sudan authorities were not 
subjected to pressure by the anti-slavery societies in Britain* What­
ever criticism these societies made was against the slave trade and 
2
£lave-raiding • Only in 1919 Aid islie ’Anti-Slavery and Aborigines
Protection Society’ prepare a comprehensive memorandum on domestic
slavery in the Sudan. Its allegations included the following:
...Fugitive slaves are returned by force to their masters...
The Arab owners of the slaves take their earnings from them when 
wages have been paid by the employers...There are persistent 
allegations of cruelty to the slaves...Slaves who are subjected 
to cruelty fear to appeal to the Inspectors...Slaves are new 
being mortgaged under a system the full facts of which are not 
yet available...3
1
See for instance SIR - 130, May 1905; where the governor of Kordofan 
reported that he had cau^ i^ j runaway slaves and returned them to their 
masters. He further wrote that Makk Geili, of the Nuba mountains, had 
captured many free people from the Khaliifta who now claim their freedom, 
’...in previous individual cases I have allowed persons claiming their 
free born relatives to have them on payment of 4-5 rials M.,the assumed 
average price of people after the battle of Omdurman...’ As for legi­
timately acquired slaves nobody ’...should be entitled to claim them 
unless the owner is willing to take compensation offered...1
2The Aborigines’ Friend and the Anti-Slavery Reporter, the respective 
organs of the two anti-slavery societies, hardly referred to the Anglo- 
Egyptian Sudan until after the First World War. .. In the few cases when 
reports on slavery in the Sudan were published, their criticism was 
very mild. See for instance Anti-Slavery Reporter Vol.22(l90l),pp.53-4; 
The Aborigines’ Friend M l . 6(Apr.1902). In I9O9 the Anti-Slavery Rep­
orter - stated that ’...slavery is practically,, and to all intents and 
purposes, to anti end in the Soudan...* as for domestic slaves, the 
report assured its readers that they were treated ’...just as one of 
the family...* The report concluded by saying that in Bongola there 
were some 24000 Sudanese slaves, and about 120,000 Arabs; Ant-i-Slavery 
Reporter Vol.29(Mar.-May 1909)»P*53* In 1908 the Anti-Slavery Society 
and the Aborigines Protection Society were amalgamated'.
3
Memorandum from the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society 
upon-the Existence of Slavery in the Sudan, 24 Nov. 1919• Anti- 
Slavery Archive, G/282; although this memorandum was written after 
Wingate’s governor-generalship, most.details concern the period 
under discussion.
Apart from the last complaint, all these allegations could he easily*
verified. Slaves were not only returned by force to their masters,
but in certain cases were even brought to the dabtiya to be punished.
The practice of keeping wage-earning slaves whose remuneration was
1forwarded to their masters was also widespread •
The criminal tendencies of freed slaves were regarded as a major
problem since the reconquest. In 1908 Jackson, governor of Dongola,
reported on crime in his province:
• •.The majority of offenders are Sudanese, men and wome^ L, who 
leave their masters on the slightest provocation*,.Many are 
reduced to want; after being unable to obtain regular employ-  ^
ment take, the men to thieving and the women to prostitution,..
Similar reports came in from other provinces, whose governors were
concerned with the problem of public women. These were segregated
and regularly examined by medical officers but the problem could not
be solved. One of the governors stated rightly that *,..until public
3opinion in these matters is Influenced,..no real control is possible..* 
However, when the Anti-Slavery Society offered its help by opening a 
home for freed female slaves, Cromer refused on the grounds that
W.E.Law to Director of Department for the Repression of Slave Trade, 
16 Dec. 1918, Anti-Slavery Archive,G/282. Law, who was a private 
contractor, wrote about cases which happened to him and other employ­
ers, confirming the above accusations. See also Storrar's Letterbooks, 
25 June 19051 SAD/549; Storrar, a railway official, wrote that 
‘..♦sometimes a man will come and ask to work...Instead of starting 
to work himself, he produces a big strapping Sudanese, who he says 
is his slave and will work for him, which the Sudanese does with a 
most cheerful spirit...*
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there was no problem of female slaves in the Sudan • Cromer was 
reluctant to admit the society’s representatives into the country, 
and preferred to forego the much-required help in dealing with freed 
female slaves.
In 1919 the Sudan government sent a confidential circular to all 
government officials enunciating its policy regarding ’Sudanese Ser­
vants’* It defined Sudanese servants as ’***persons who were in a -s 
state of slavery or are considered as such by n a t i v e s * f u r t h e r ,  
that *..,every Sudanese servant not under contract had the right to 
lea^ -e his master if he wishes and may not be compelled or persuaded 
to return against his will..*1 Yet governors and inspectors were 
instructed to try to reconcile master and slave as *...Sudanese ser­
vants who have lived many years with their masters are really happier 
and better off..,* Furthermore, as it was feared ’,..that Sudanese 
should through leaving the homes in which they have been brought up**, 
take to thieving or prostitution...*, governors were ordered to apply 
the regulations regarding the slaves’ righ£?of freedom with great care* 
The circular instructed all governors to keep the Registers of Sudan­
ese servants up to date, thereby implying that new slaves could still 
be registered* Finally, as slavery was not officially recognized by 
the government, cases between slaves and masters could not be decided 
according to Islamic laws but were to judged according to the rules
1Travers Buxton to Wilkinson, 13 June 1901; Gromer to Travers Buxton,
26 June 1901; in The Anti-Slavery Reporter Vbl.22,(l9°l)j PP*53-4
1of trusteeship as between master and servant; *
Even in this late circular the ambiguou^ttitude of the government 
is quite clear* On the one hand it declared the right of every slave 
to become free, while on the other hand ensuring that as many slaves 
as possible should remain with their masters. The reasons for this 
position are clearj public opinion in England and elsewhere in Europe 
would not have tolerated the outright legalization of slavery, yet 
the British adinistrators of the Sudan were aware of the hazards of 
the complete abolitinn^of slavery, namely, the disruption of the social 
and economic life of the country together with an increase in crime1* 
o* Labour.^
The most serious objection to the abolition of slavery was voiced
by the governors of provinces whose agricultural cultivation required
a great deal of man-power. Hundreds of saqi.vas were reported idle
in Berber, Dongola, and the Blue Wile provinces, owing to the decrease 
3
of slaves • Even the Baqqara tribes of Kordofan were affected, they 
being too lazy to cultivate by themselves^*. By~and large the British 
governors, fearing the decrease in cultivation, sympathized with 
the landowners.
1Sudan Government - Confidential Bircular Memorandum No.33, Regula­
tions as to Sudanese Servants, (signed) R.M.Feilden Lewa, Civil 
Secretary, 1 May 1919• Anti-Slavery Archive, G/282.
^See also Handbook, pp.478-487*
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•••in the interests, therefore, of the cultivators...and also 
of the Sudanese, it appears to he desirable to prevent the 
emigration of Sudanese without permission.•.The discontent of 
masters at the constant and increasing loss of their Sudanese ^ 
servants is growing, and one cannot hut sympathize with therm* • •
The governors alsft stressed their belief that ’...any feeling which
may exist against the Government...is due to this cause more than to 
2
any other...1
There is no doubt that agrioulture suffered greatly through the 
lack of labour and that extensive areas of arable land remained fal­
low^. In 1908 the revenue derived form agricultural taxation fell 
for the first time. Analysing the reasons for this, Wingated noted:
1...the desertion of slaves and the attraction of high pay on public 
w o r k s . . . W i n g a t e  was aware thsit1 .. .until the labouring classes are 
large enough for the needs of the growing country, it is only natural 
that the non-technical portion of the insufficient population will 
select the most profitable and pleasant method of earning a living...’ 
During these early years the government departments were the 
main employers of labour. The extension of the railway to the Red 
Sea, the building of Port Sudan, and the opening of new roads
1QCrR - 1907, p.236.
2GGR - 1908, p.488.
3See for instance H.St .G.Peacock, A Report on the Land Settlement of 
the Gezira. Messelemia District (LOndon 1913), p •58; see also 
H.A.MacMicheal, ’The Kheiran’, SWR - Vol.3, (1920), p.234.
4GGR - 1908, p.21.
5XRid, p.177
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required thousands of manual workers. Governors complained that the
railway enticed away their agricultural workers by offering higher 
1wages • This situation was exacerbated with the building of Port
Sudan which attracted all the casual labourers from the Khartoum,
2Berber, and Dongola provinces '• By 1907» demand exceeded supply to
such a degree that workers arrived from Jedda and the Arabian coast
3
beguiled by the high wages • The government departments did not
only fail to consider the needs of agriculture, they also competed
against each other for the limited labour market^. Finally, the
modest beginnings of private enterprise also required labour, and
the government, although eager to oblige, could not meet their demands •
This was the situation in all the northern provinces with the
exception of Wadi Haifa, whose male population emigrated to Egypt
during the winter tourist season to work as domestic servants and 
6
dragomans '• In the south conditions were different. There were no
Phipps to Wingate, 1 June 19°5t SAD/27-6/6j see also A.C.Parker,
'Memoirs of the early days', SAD/294/l0«
2GGR - 1906, p.720; from Berber alone about 1500 workers were employed 
on the railway, apart from those working at Port Sudan. Ibid, p.565*
3GGR - 1907, p.l26j Mages for unskilled labourers had risen from 
P.lt 2-J- per day to P.T. 6-13; see also GGR - 19°6, p.5^5*
^In I906 the governor of Khartoum complained that instead of dividing 
their work over the whole of thejyear, all the departments put out 
their contracts at the same time, thereby causing an unnecessary 
increase in wages; Ibid, p.663.
In 1906 Mr Leigh Hunt, an American entrepreneur, required 1,000 daily 
labourers for his concession in Berber, yet only 500 could be supplied, 
Ibid, p-5^5«
6ggr - 1902, p.279.
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development schemes or railway extensions. Yet eiren the very few
requirements of labour could not be met locally, as the southern
tribes could not be induced to work, and all labourers were imported
from the north!:* The southerners who oleared the roads, built the
rest houses or acted as porters for government expeditions, were
2
generally conscripted and forced to work against their will •
The government was quite aware of the situation. As early as
1900 suggestions were made to transport coolies from India to work
3
on the Sudan railways • In 1902 an agreement was reached with the 
government of India to supply .5,000 Muslim coolies to the Sudan^, and
the British government agreed to become a partner to the contract *
Cromer, however, decided not to continue with this plan. Instead,. 
he ordered Wingate to attempt to recruit the nomad tribes of the
1
Handbook BAG, pp.72-3; in 1910, labour requirements at Wau were for 
the first time met by local labour. See also P.F.Martin, The Sudan 
in Evolution« p.223, who wrote that in Sennar too, the inhabitants 
were not attracted, to wage earning.
Q
See for-instance Slatin's diary 1913, 'Notes Gedaref*, SAD/441*
3'Report on the Soudan Railway', by G.B.Macauley, Director of Soudan
Railways, 2 Dec. 1900, FO 403/312.
^Government of India to Lord Hamilton, India Office, 4 Aug. 1902,
FO 403/323.
^Lansdowne to Cromer, 22 Oct. 1902, Ibid; On 12 Oct. Wingate forwarded 
a detailed memorandum on the conditions of employment of these coolies 
in the Sudan; see Wingate to Cromer, 12 Oct. 1902, FO 141/371
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1
northern provinces to undertake the work • It fell to Slatin to
organize the recruiting* At a gathering of the shaykhs of the nomad
tribes at Kokreb the conditions of work were agreed upon* The head
shaykh of the Hadendowa was elected by the shaykhs to organized the
2work and to represent them in their dealings with the government ■*
By the end of 1903 there were- 300 nomads employed on tha railways* 
Wingate reported optimistically that all those experts who had 
prophesied that nomads were lazy and indolent had been proved wrong\ 
However, this optimism was unwarranted. The.nomads did not carry 
out their agreement^-. With '...the first fall of rains on the 
mountains, I they! gave up their work, being thoroughly , tired of it 
1GGR - 1903, pp.22-4; Wingate who reported this, did not give any 
reason for Cromer's sudden change of heart• In 1905 the suggestion 
to import coolies from India was renewed, but again without results; 
Sudan Agentt'to Cromer, 24 Feb* 1905, FO l4l/393« In the following 
years suggestions were made to induce American Negroes to settle in 
the Sudan, and to import Swahilis as porters in the southern provin­
ces. Neither of these plans materialized; The Timest 27 Jan. 1904; 
Cecil to Cromer, 27 Apr. 1904» FO 141/386; a year later a group of 
Bosnians were sent to the Sudan as settlers and in 1913 a plan was 
devised for the immigration of Maltese labourers to work in the 
Gezira development; See Owen to Wingate, 25 June 1905, SAD/276/6; 
General Sir Ian Hamilton to Wingate, 10 Feb. 1913, SAD/185/2/l.
This plan was rejected by the governor-general's council, following 
Bernard1s advice. (Bernard was of Maltese origin), Wingate to 
Hamilton, 28 Feb. 1913, Ibid.
p
GGR - 19C3, pp.6l~2, Appendix B;'Report by Slatin Pasha on the . 
"Kokreb" meeting frith Sheikhs of Nomad tribes to arrange the work 
on the Red Swa railway'.
3Ibid, pp.23424'.
Tlacauley to Wingate, 20 July, 1904, PO 141/386.
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and longing to get back to their homes...’1 Despite this failure,
small groups of nomads continued to be employed on the railway, and
by 1908, the Hadendowa had developed into expert bridge builders and
were transferred by the railway department to the IChartoum-Shandx 
2section •
Egypt was by far the most obvious labour market on which to draw. 
Seasonal immigration of Egyptian fallahin from Aswan began in the 
early years of the Condominium. They undertook agricultural work 
in the Wadi Haifa and Dongola provinces and then returned to Egypt 
to their own farms^. Yet despite repeated efforts to induce Egyptians 
to settle in the Sudan, only small numbers responded. Wingate con­
cluded that 1•..The Egyptian Eellahin have a rooted objection to 
coming to the Sudan...1 and entertained ’...little hope of success 
in the f u t u r e . E f f o r t s  were, however, continued and in 1904 
Egyptians were contracted to work on the Zeidab plantations . The 
result was 1.*.that Zeidab has become a den of thieves...1 as most 
of the Egyptians who came were of bad character and left the Sudan 
1
GGR - 1904, p.14* The above is a quotation from Slatin’s report on 
the failure of nomad labour. In a private letter to Wingate, Slatin 
suggested that the refusal of the nomads to work, was due to their 
opposition to the building of the Hew port at Shaykh Barghut,(later 
Port Sudan), and not at Suakin. Slatin to Wingate, 8 Sep.1904,
sAD/275/7.
2GGR - 1905, p.22; GGR - 1908, p.628. ,
3GGR - 1902, p.280. 
4GGR - 1903, p.23.
5ggr - 1904, p.1 3.
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the mihute they had enough money”**. Though experiments continued,
there seems to have been no serious attempt to attract Egyptians to
2the Sudan "by offering them more tempting conditions . When labour
on a large scale was again required in the early stages of the
Gezira scheme, Kitchener decided to utilize the services of Egyp-
3
tian convicts rather than recruit more expensive labourers •
In order to overcome the problems created by the shortage of 
labour and to check the decrease in domestic slaves, it was decided 
in 1905 to establish a central labour bureau. The labour bureau was 
attached to the intelligence department in Khartoum under the super­
vision of Slatin^. Detailed instructions as to the employment of 
labour were issued and the conditions of labour, including wages, 
were to be determined by the labour bureau. The heads of departments
^GGR - 1905i pp.13-14; see also Balfour- to Lady Balfour, 11 Dec.1906, 
SAD/303/6. Balfour wh& was then in the public works department at 
Port Sudan, wrote very favourably about the Egyptian workers. He 
added however:1...they say that they (like all the rest of us) are 
only here to make money...1
2
In 1905i a plam was devised by Cecil, to settle ^000 Egyptian fami­
lies in the Sudan every year, by offering them a subsidy of £E 20 
per family, to be paid out of the Egyptian war office budget. The 
plan though approved by Wingate, apparently met with little success. 
See Cecil to Wingate, 25 July 1905* SAD/277/1; Wingate to Cecil,
10 Aug. X905, SAD/277/2.
Clayton to Wingate, 17 Deo. 1913, SAD/469/5; Clayton wrote that the 
convicts were to leave Egypt on 27 Dec. and that the operation was 
done in complete secrecy. See also Wingate to Clayton, 20 Dec. 1913) 
Ibid; Wingate who opposed the scheme wrote that:1...the employment 
of convict labhur will be considerably more expensive than local 
labour.,.1 At the outbreak of the World War in 1914» work was dis­
continued and not much had been achieved.
^CAO - 241, 18 Jan. 1905? see also pp.104-, 111*
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were instructed not to recruit labour except through the labour 
bureau to whom they had to submit all their labour requirements at 
least one month in advance • Employers were further restricted by 
a maximum daily wage of P.T. 3J-, which was imposed by the government*
Private contractors at Port Sudan were also instructed to recruit
2 ' - ' 
their labour only through the central bureau '*
These measures were clearly not implemented and wages continued 
3
to rise • In 1909 Wingate commented:.as long as Departments are
willing to pay the present "famine wages" the labourers**.are liable
to refuse all offer of lower wages...f^  Departments also continued
5to compete, one against the other , resulting in the unchecked
£
desertion of agricultural areas • The labour bureau decided to halt 
this migration by ordering all Sudanese labourers in the provinces
Instructions as to the Employment of Labour1, Appendix "A",
GGR - 1905, pp.160-1*
2
Ibid, p.29? Wingate, who by inclination opposed any restriction on 
free enterprise, wrote:*...! am aware that in giving effect to the 
above proposals, some interference with the ordinary principles of 
supply and demand is involved, but it is oontent.ed that the except­
ional circumstances...warrant the adoption of somewhat exceptional 
measures...1, Ibid, p.30.
3See for instance Appendix "B" - General State of Labour Market,
GGR - 1906, p.140.
4ogr - 1909, p.55. 
5GGR - X906, p.20.
6GGR - 1907, pp.190-93
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to register, and by restricting their movements'1*. In 1910 the labour
bureau reported that its statistics proved that the Sudan labour
2
force could meet all the country*s requirements This was confirmed
in the following years when the supply of uhskilled labour was equal
to the demand, and the labour bureau could cope with all the require-
ment^made upon it, from among the 11,443‘registered Sudanese labour- 
3
ers. * The bulk of the Sudan labour force consisted of Sudanese ex­
slaves and Fallata* Of the Arab tribesmen, only a few became 
regular town workers, while the majority returned to the villages 
after a short time^.
During the first years of its existence the Sudan government 
legislated in order to safeguard the interests of employers and 
employees'* In 1901 an order was published obliging all servants to 
be registered. A special shaykh was appointed to deal with all
5
applications for servants and to be responsible for their misdeeds 
All those who employed servants were warned that if servants 
1GGR - 1909, pp.53“4» Wingate was again worried by 1•..the mistaken 
belief that the Labour Bureau ...intended to interfere in the rela­
tions existing between employers and employed. These misconceptions 
have, I am glad to say, been successfully combated...*, Ibid, p*54*
2ggr - 1910, p.75.
3GGR -'1914, p.10.
GGR - 1909, p.55, commenting on the attitude of the Arabs to the 
FallSta, Wingate quoted the following:*..."Allah took away our 
slaves, but sent us the Fallata'',*.*
5
SG - 19, 1 Jan. 1901; this rather curious labour exchange was proba­
bly founded to cope with the problem of domestic slaves* see pp.382-3*
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accompanied them to other provinces they were 1...responsible for
the return of such servants to Khartoum..,1  ^ In 1905 the Vagabonds
Ordinance1 was promulgated in order to induce freed slaves to take
2up permanent employment I* A vagabond was defined as a person who 
can maintain himself partly or fully but refuses to do so; or who 
begs or gathers alms; or who has no settled home or means of sub­
sistence* On committing an offence a vagabond was liable to more 
severe punishment than an ordinary citizen who committed a similar 
offence^* Two ordinances safeguarding the rights of workers were 
published in 1908* The * Workmen Compensation Ordinance* ensured 
the rights of workers injured or invalided while at work and fixed 
the amount of compensation^"* 'The Apprenticeship Ordinance* regu­
lated the contracts for the instruction of children in handicrafts* 
No contracts were allowed Without the approval of the governor of 
the province who had also to give his consent if the apprentice 
was removed from the Sudan • Until 1908 the only approved appren­
ticeships were at the Mather Workshops at Gordon College, the
1S0 - 61, 1 Apr. 1904.
2ggr - 1905, p.90.
3SG - 80, 24 Aug. 1905.
4SG - 129, 29 Mar. 1908'.
Probably a safeguard against slave trade. SG - 138, 21 June 19°S’.
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government's .workshop at Kassala, and- the workshops of the railways, 
steamers, and telegraph departments* Skilled artisans had to he
brought mainly from Greece and Italy, thus increasing the costs of
• . 1 • ' ' - : 
many projects V • It was to overcome this shortage of skilled labour
that the apprentice ordinance was promulgated*
The.intimate connection between labour and domestic slavery, and
the belief that they should both be controlled from within the same
department was stated clearly by Wingate when he wrote to Gorst:
f**.With regards to the; question of Domestic Slavery*. *we are now
' ' 2 
taking the first step by organizing a Labour Bureau**.T The
establishment of the labour bureau enabled the government to regulate
the. supply andvdemand of labour and to control the domestic slaves
whose desertion of their masters could have caused a disruption of
the socio-economic structure of the Sudan*
1GGR - 1905, pp.31-2.
2Wingate >to Gorst, 19 Nov. 1908, SAD/284/15
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Conclusion*
The first seventeen years of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan were of 
great significance, for during this period the foundation of a new 
administration was laid. The British governor-general was the 
central figure in the administration and it is through his 
activities that one can evaluate the new regime* By virtue of the 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement absolute powers were vested in the 
governor-general * His policies and administration were controlled 
by the British consuls-general in Egypt who reported regularly to 
the foreign office* It is difficult to assess accurately the 
extent of this control* However, it is certain that of the four 
oonsuls-general who served during those years it was Cromer's 
influence over Sudan affairs which was most decisive* Further­
more, the extent of control from Cairo declined over the years 
and reached its lowest point under Sir Henry McMahon*
Under the terms of the Condominium agreement, increased super— 
tisibn.over the Sudan necessitated stricter control by the consuls- 
general, as neither the British nor the Egyptian government was in 
a position to intervene directly. It seems that the weakening of 
central control was due to two main'factors: the consolidation of 
the Sudanese administration; and the greater experience of the 
governor-general as compared to his superiors in Cairo* Under 
these circumstances the freedom of action granted to Wingate in 
the latter years of his rule was fully justified, and increased
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intervention would not have improved'the administrative efficiency* 
Wingate's governor-generalship can best be described as 
government through voluntary consultation* He was not an autocrat 
by nature and preferred to act on the advice of close colleagues* 
Moreover, he balked at taking advice from his subordinates merely 
because they held a particular post. Even after a semblance of 
constitutional government was introduced in the form of the governor- 
general's council, he continued to rely on his own confidants rather 
than on the new body. It was to this aspect of Wingate's rule that 
Slatin owed his great influence over the administration-* Slatin's 
experience in the Sudan helped the new administration in its 
early years, but as time progressed, his conservative attitude and 
pre-Mahdist conceptions about tribal and religious affairs probably 
hindered the necessary development of a new approach*
The British administrators of the Sudan, both civil and 
military, were among the best any country under foreign rule could 
desire. Most of them were honest, hard-working men, who in many 
cases risked their lives for seemingly inadequate material benfits. 
The young university graduates soon made their mark on administra­
tive policies and became even more influential after Wingate's 
departure* The Egyptian officials in thb Sudan were never intended 
to play a significant role in the new administration and had little 
chance of promotion to higher posts. Hence, it was not surprising 
that many of those who applied for employment were not of the
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highest quality* In those spheres of administration where Egyptian 
supremacy could not he challenged, for want of alternative employ­
ees, the standard of the Egyptians was rarely a cause for complaint* 
This applied to the Shari *a courts and to education. The govern­
ment was dilatory in training the Sudanese for administrative 
posts, and in consequence the rate of progress suffered. Sudanese 
children who started their education under the Condominium could 
have graduated from secondary schools by 1910 and filled important 
administrative posts* Instead they were relegated to minor positions. 
It was only after 1924 that they achieved some predominance as a 
result of the rapid removal of the Egyptians which followed the 
assassination of Sir Lee Stack.
The principles, of the new administration were enunciated by 
Cromer and Kitchener in 1899? and remained unchanged throughout 
Wingate’s governor-generalship. Kitchener* s'memorandum tq Mudirs 
and Cromer’s speech to the notables of the Sudan included all the 
major aspects of government policy. Although these policies were 
constantly proclaimed by Wingate as the foundation of his adminis­
tration, some of them were never fully implemented*
The de-central!nation of the Sudan’s administration had been 
proclaimed by the Turco-Egyptian rulers on several occasions, but 
was not put into effect®. Luring the Mahdia, centralization became 
the order of the- day* Yet lack of, effective communications and 
of reliable subordinates hindered the Khalifa fAbdallahi from
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establishing effective control of the provincial governors.
Kitchener*s Memorandum to Mudirs sought to decentralize the 
administration. But once again the intention was not fully imple­
mented, Decentralization depended for its success on the relative 
strength of individual heads of departments vis-£-vis provincial 
governors* Certain departments, such as agriculture,, public works, 
police and prisons were partly decentralized; others, notably edu­
cation and finance, remained fully centralized throughout the period* 
Individual governors were also able to assert a greater measure of 
independence* Thus Dongola became Jackson’s *private kingdom*, 
while Matthews reigned supreme in the Upper Mile province* One of 
the great obstacles/impeding decentralization was the growing
1number of reports sent by the governors to the central departments 
Again, the volume of correspondence between Wingate and his pro­
vincial governors is a reflection of the degree of centralization 
attained* But instead of relaxing central control, Wingate ordered
the governors to decrease their correspondence without 'granting them
2
a greater measure of independence , It is hard to determine whether
1 ■ - The list of reports which each governor had to send to the central
departments during the year increased from twenty-five in 1902, to
seventy-five in 1905* This did not include the monthly intelligence
reports and other military aspects of work* See CAP - 102, 19 July
1902; GAO - 354, 30 Oct, 1905.
2CA0 - 173, 11 June 1904}. CAO - 275, 5 Apr. 1905. The Times
correspondent who visited the Sudan in 1907, wrote that. *..,Sudan 
Government officials*are pestered and hampered incessantly by 
piles of petty accounts,The consequence is that their more 
important work suffers*..*, The Times, 10 Jan* 1908*
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increased decentralization would have been of benefit to the adminis­
tration during its early years. Many of the governors were military 
men without any previous administrative experience* Moreover, they 
were frequently relieved of their duties, and hence could not gain 
the experience and knowledge required for greater independence*
One of the corner-stones of the new administration was its 
religious policy. In the Muslim provinces the government's aim was 
to establish orthodox Islam and to ignore, at least officially, the 
far greater impact that Sufism had on the Sudanese Muslims* The 
government largely succeeded in its first aim but was forced to 
revise its policy towards the suf x orders* Orthodox Islam received 
itswmain impetus through the teachers'and qadxs' training colleges*
In consequence, a firm hold was obtained on the Sharx*a courts and 
on the khalwas which the governmeht subsidized. The government 
maintained its rather ambiguous attitude towards sufx orders until 
the first World War. It was then forced to seek the cooperation of 
influential §ufl leaders and of Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdx who 
had gained considerable support*
The prohibition of Christian proselytization in the Muslim 
provinces was both necessary and wise* The population of the Sudan 
regarded the missionaries as an integral part of the reconquest, and 
would have resented any attempt to interfere with their beliefs.
Even the limited missionary activities in education and medicine 
were viewed by certain sections of the population with grave
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misgivings. Under these circumstances there can he no doubt that 
the government's policy was fully justified.
In the southern non-Muslim provinces the government's policy 
crystallized|only after 1910. Until then missionaries were encou­
raged to proselytize, but. the government did not adopt positive 
measures to prohibit the spreading of Islam. With the introduction 
of English as the official language of the south and the adoption 
of Sunday as its weekly holiday, the government launched an active 
anti-Muslim policy thereby widening the existing gulf between the 
two parts of the Sudan* This policy was both unrealistic and un­
justified. Wingate believed that, given an equal opportunity, Islam 
would have gained many more supporters than Christianity. As a 
Christian ruler, he did not want the south to become Muslim, and 
adopted a policy.which jeopardized the prospects of a united Sudan 
in the forseeable future. There is no proof that the separation 
of the southern provinces from the Sudan was contemplated during 
Wingate's era, but there can be little doubt that the religious 
policy adopted in the south gave rise to later separatist notions.
The government's tribal policy has been described in great 
detail. It is abundantly clear that the principle of encouraging 
tribal leadership was never fully implemented. The two major 
reasons for this failure seem very obvious. First, tribal leader­
ship had largely disintegrated under the Turco-Egyptian and the 
Mahdist regimes. And secondly, independent tribal authority, by
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its very nature, could not exist side by side with, a strong central­
ized government* By entrusting tribal chiefs with administrative 
duties, and by replacing them whenever they failed, the government 
changed the status of shaykhs to that of government officials*
Hence, their authority was derived from the government and did, not 
reflect their influence with their tribes* The only way by which 
the authorities might have succeeded in resuscitating tribal society 
was by ceasing to administer the Sudan altogether; and this was 
clearly not intended.
The use.of punitive expeditions was one of the most negative 
aspects of the government's tribal policy, and stemmed, in the main, 
from lack of administrative control5. In undertaking these expedi­
tions the government pursued a similar policy to that of their 
Mahdist and Turco-Egyptian predecessors, inevitably weakening 
tribal cohesion even further. The only justification for such policy 
could have been the establishment of orderly government. However, 
during the Wingate era many expeditions were undertaken in the 
remote regions of the south where it was abundantly clear that the 
government had neither the means nor the power to establish even 
a semblance of permanent administration.
While certain aspects of the Anglo-Egyptian administration of 
the iudan are open to criticism, the general record of the govern­
ment was by no means unsatisfactory. The hazards of foreign 
domination are abundantly clear and they require no further elucidation.
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Bearing this in mind one could justly claim that the Sudanese fared 
better under their conquerors than many other countries under similar 
conditions. The administration of justice, land settlement, low 
taxation, and the toleration of.domestic slavery were all ultimately 
in the best interests of the inhabitants. One of the major hazards 
of many African countries was the alienation of land from the indi­
genous population and the introduction of a foreign settler element*.
In the Sudan this problem was overcome by strict legislation and by 
creating conditions by which the inhabitants could cultivate their 
own lands at a profit. The government took care to preserve the 
rights of cultivators when granting concessions, and this acted as 
an additional safeguard against, the alienation of l&nd*
The predominant theme of government policy was to link the 
traditional leaders of Sudanese society with government interests'.
The loyalty of the religious and tribal leaders to British rule
f
was a clear indication that this aim had been achieved* It owed 
its success only partly to the government's policy. Memories of 
the maladministration endpred under the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist 
rulers played a significant role im confirming the loyalty of the 
old generation to their new masters. However, the young generation, 
which was not obsessed by memories of the past, was already influenced 
by nationalist ideas. Instead of recognizing the validity of their 
claims , the British authorities tried to banish their ideas from
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the Sudan. They did this by dismissing the Egyptian teachers from 
Gordon College and by banning the nationalist press1* . These 
ineffective measures could only result in alienating the future 
leaders of the Sudan on whose cooperation the British authorities 
were bound to rel^ i.
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